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Abstract 
The emergence of the theory of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa as a legal theory, which is a 
purposive approach to the law in which the main purposes of the law are considered as 
deriving elements of the legal rulings, has occurred in a particular socio-political and 
cultural context for the Shīʿa and within a particular epistemological construction. Given 
the lack of a historical reading of Shīʿī jurisprudence and the limitations of the 
methodological approaches which have to date been employed, this research applies a 
holistic approach. “The Bahbahānian paradigm” is identified as the overarching 
epistemological paradigm in modern and contemporary Shīʿī jurisprudence. The 
Bahbahanian paradigm was formed during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and 
is arguably characterised as being a combination of Aristotelian epistemologically, 
formalist methodologically and soft utilitarianism. Within this paradigm in the context of 
the twentieth century, maqāṣid al-sharīʿa emerged in Shīʿī thought, especially in its 
systematic and comprehensive theorisation by Muḥammad Taqī al-Mudarrisī - a 
contemporary Shīʿī scholar. The introduction of the maqāṣid al-sharīʿa approach 
represents a paradigm shift that departs epistemologically, methodologically and 
functionally from the Bahbahānian paradigm. Mudarrisī’s maqāṣid al-sharīʿa paradigm is 
characterized as pragmatic epistemologically, more accessible and dynamic 
methodologically and employing a virtue ethic. 
Mudarrisī’s maqāṣid al-sharīʿa reflects the eclipse of the quietist character of the 
previous paradigm and the ambition of the contemporary Shīʿī religious institution. This 
ambition comprises a more significant role in the public sphere, which is embodied in 
the application or renewal of the sharīʿa in reality on one hand, and confronting the 
systematical secularization of the modern nation-state of the public sphere on the other. 
Mudarrisī’s version of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa is obligated to challenge three intellectual 
enterprises; that is, the classical Shīʿī jurisprudential reasoning by embracing 
hermeneutical tools which are more accessible to religious knowledge; the Sunnī soft 
utilitarian maqāṣidī approaches by providing virtue ethical jurisprudence; and the 
secular nation-state by providing a flexible legal system. 
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Notes 
Transliteration style used in the thesis follows the well-known style in the field wherein 
no distinction is made between the ā from alif and alif maqṣūra, or from tāʾ marbūṭa 
unless there is an iḍāfa. The initial hamza is not transliterated whether it be hamzat al-
waṣl or hamzat al-qaṭʿ. 
The Qurʾān is cited by reference to sūra number followed by āya or āyāt number, for 
example citation of the āyāt 1-3 of sūrat al-fātiḥa appears as: Qurʾān: 1:1-3. 
I have used Haleem’s translation of Qurʾān throughout the thesis. Concerning 
Mudarrisī’s texts or any other primary text, I have translate them by my own.  
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General Introduction 
 
1. General Introduction 
There has been much debate in the last century about how to modernise Islamic law so 
as to make it appropriate for a changing society. Amongst the solutions that have been 
proposed is the theory of maqāṣid al-sharīʾa as a legal theory for Islamic law. In general 
terms, the theory of maqāṣid al-sharīʾa refers to the idea that the sharīʿa as the legal 
element of God’s message encompasses aims and purposes, which should be fulfilled, 
even indirectly, and through which God’s will for humanity in this world and the hereafter 
will be achieved. This idea on the face of it, is not that different from the Muslim jurists’ 
understanding of the sharīʿah. What makes the theory of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa unique, 
compared to other theories, is its emphasis on practical solutions to legal challenges. 
Maqāṣid al-sharīʿa was provided a mature expression in the words of an Andalusian 
Mālikī Sunnī scholar in the fourteenth century- Abū Isḥāq al-Shāṭibī (d. 1388) - though 
its roots can be seen in earlier scholars’ works such as al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) and al-
Juwaynī (d. 1085)1. Al-Shāṭibī argued that the sharīʿa was established for the benefit of 
human beings and therefore all legal norms aimed to preserve three levels of benefits2 
for humans. The first level is that of necessities3 (al-ḍarūriyyāt) which comprises the five 
universals of which the “lack of all or any one of them in a community or society will lead 
to anarchy and great loss of life, as well as to loss of salvation in the hereafter”4. These 
five universal necessities are religion (al-dīn), life (al-nafs), progeny (al-ʿird), property 
(al-māl) and intellect (al-ʿaql). The second level of benefit pertains to ‘what is needed’ 
(al-ḥājiyyat) which “signify those aspects of the law that are needed in order to alleviate 
                                            
1 Masud has studied the roots of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa prior to al-Shāṭibī, see: M.K. Masud, Islamic Legal Philosophy: A 
Study of Abū Isḥāq Al-Shāṭibī's Life and Thought  (Delhi: International Islamic Publishers, 1989). pp 149-169. 
2 al-Shāṭibī, Ibrāhīm ibn Mūsā, al-Muwāfaqāt fī Uṣūl al-Sharīʿa, vol. 2 (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-ʿArābī). 6. 
3 It is matter of debate how to translate these three levels of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa into English. Scholars have translated 
them differently. 
4 Ibrahim, Yasir S., "An Examination of the Modern Discourse on Maqāṣid al-Sharī‘a" in The Journal of the Middle 
East and Africa 5, no. 1 (2014): 44. 
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hardship so that the law can be followed without causing distress or predicament”5, for 
example, “the abridgment of ritual obligations under circumstances of hardship and 
illness”6, such as praying without performing wuḍūʾ in case of lack of water. The third 
level, according to Shāṭibī, pertains to the improvements (taḥsīniyyāt) which “are not 
needed to such an extent that without them the law becomes inoperable or deficient, 
and relinquishing them is not detrimental to the ḍarūriyyāt or the ḥājiyyāt, but they 
certainly improve the general character of the Sharīʿa”7. Examples of this are the legal 
issues of purifications (al-ṭahārāt) outside of performing the prayer, and considerations 
such as the social etiquette of eating.  Al-Shāṭibī, although an Ashʿarī, based his theory 
theologically on a Muʿtazilite view of the religion, in particular their view of the ontology 
of ethics, in which God’s legal will is based on moral rational foundations. As Johnston 
puts it “Whereas the Muʿtazilites claimed an objective existence to ethical values which 
God takes into account in his dealings with people and his created order (objectivism), 
the Ashʿarites taught that these values may be defined only in terms of what God 
decrees (theistic subjectivism, or ethical voluntarism)”8. As a ramification of this attitude, 
Muʿtazilites would believe that these moral values, especially in its basics, can be 
understood independently by individuals through the intellect (ʿaql). Therefore, for al-
Shāṭibī, the purposes and aims of the law (sharīʿa) underlining each legal ruling can be 
understood and should be the basis for any derived legal issue. He begins his second 
volume of his uṣūl al-fiqh work, which is advocated to deal with his maqāṣid theory, by 
providing a theological proof of this notion9. Interestingly, on the other hand, he proved 
the main idea of the theory and based his categories methodologically on an inductive 
method by surveying the sharīʿa legal instructions. He says, “If the induction proves this 
[that the sharīʿa is based on aims and purposes that benefit human beings], and it leads 
                                            
5 W.B. Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni Usul Al-fiqh  (Cambridge University 
Press, 1999): 168. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid., 169. 
8 Johnston, David, "A Turn in the Epistemology and Hermeneutics of Twentieth Century Usụ̄l Al-Fiqh" in Islamic Law 
and Society 11, no. 2 (2004): 236. 
9 al-Shāṭibī, al-Muwāfaqāt fī Uṣūl al-Sharīʿa, 2: p 6-7. 
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to ʿilm within this subject, then we are certain that it continues throughout all sharīʿa’s 
particulars”10. 
Khalid Masud, in his study about al-Shāṭibī entitled: Islamic Legal Philosophy: A Study 
of Abū ʾIshāq al-Shāṭibī’s Life and Thought, argues that the rise of the theory of 
maqāṣid al-sharīʿa by al-Shāṭibī was a result of the socio-political and economic 
changes that happened in his society. These changes required a flexibility and 
adaptability from Islamic law to be compatible with the new reality at the time of al-
Shāṭibī. That is to say, his “concept of maṣlaḥa in relation to his doctrine of maqāṣid al-
sharīʿah was the product of the need of his time to adapt Islamic law to the new social 
conditions”11 These changes were the consolidation of political power to the Sultan, 
which affected the role of jurists, the “new educational system, judicial structure, 
penetration of Ṣūfī ṭarīqas and spread of liberal thought all supported by the political 
system”12, in addition to the economic development13. Hallaq on the other hand argues 
that the rise of al-Shāṭibī’s theory “were by no means embedded in a desire to create a 
theoretical apparatus which would provide for flexibility and adaptability in positive 
law”14. These social conditions are two groups that adulterated the true law of Islam 
according to Hallaq’s reading, namely; “the lax attitudes of the jurisconsults and, far 
more importantly, the excessive legal demands imposed by what seems to have been 
the majority of contemporary Şūfīs”15. 
Whatever the reasons behind the emergence of al-Shāṭibī’s theory of maqāṣid al-
sharīʿa may have been, it did not spread within Sunnī legal theory as a distinct 
jurisprudential discourse until the modern era in the early twentieth century, through the 
efforts of Muḥammad ʿAbduh (d. 1905) and especially his student ʿAbdullāh Dirāz (d. 
1932) who published al-Shāṭibī’s work al-Muwāfaqāt with his own commentary. Since 
then, the maqāṣidī tendency has become a popular legal discourse within, not only 
Sunnī legal thought, but also amongst intellectualists, so-called reformists and even 
                                            
10 Ibid., p8. 
11 M.K. Masud, Islamic Legal Philosophy: A Study of Abū Isḥāq Al-Shāṭibī's Life and Thought.  p. 25. Also, see: p.35. 
12 Ibid., p. 35. 
13 Ibid., p. 36. 
14 Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni Usul Al-fiqh: p163. 
15 Ibid. 
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Islamic movements. Masud argues that while the socio-political and economic factors 
were significant enough to account for the emergence of al-Shāṭibī’s theory of maqāṣid 
al-sharīʿa, it had failed to continue as a practical legal theory in Islamic law as “the basis 
of material and historical reasons will not be sufficient”16. Rather, he attributed its failure 
to Shāṭibī’s legal philosophy and how his followers had understood it.  Al-Shāṭibī was 
willing to develop his legal philosophy toward a positive Islamic law, Masud suggests. 
But his followers understood the concept of maṣlaḥa as the use of it in the case of the 
text’s absence, which was in fact not the intention that al-Shāṭibī wanted, but rather a 
pre-Shāṭibī’s legal theory17. Moreover, the ambiguity of his distinction, according to 
Masud, between two scopes of Islamic law, namely; ʿibādāt and muʿāmalāt, was 
another confusion that caused others to misunderstand al-Shāṭibī’s legal philosophy18. 
Finally, the dependency of the qāḍī (judge) or mufti (jurist) in stating the legal issue for 
the present cases has “influenced the concept of legal obligation” in which it had been 
linked necessarily to religion and morality as an opposite to positive thought. This 
dependency would have been deconstructed if al-Shāṭibī had accepted the logical 
conclusions, as Masud understood, of his doctrine19. 
Ḥubballāh agrees with Masud that the followers of al-Shāṭibī did not understand his 
theory as he had intended. However contrary to Masud, Ḥuballāh attributed it to the way 
in which al-Shāṭibī had presented his thought20. Furthermore, he adds four more 
reasons for the decline of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa in Sunnī legal theory21, but he insists that 
the primary one is the fact that the theory was born in a sterile environment. That is to 
say, the Ashʿarī theology as a foundation of legal theory cannot bear the theory of 
maqāṣid al-sharīʿa for the limitation of the role of reason in deriving legal issues. 
Ḥuballāh believes, similar to Masud’s reading of al-Shāṭibī’s thought of maṣlaḥa, that 
maqāṣid al-sharīʿa are the source of legal issues based on human evaluation of real 
cases and not merely a framework to rationalise legal issues. This understanding of 
                                            
16 Masud, Islamic Legal Philosophy: A Study of Abū Isḥāq Al-Shāṭibī's Life and Thought: p. 322. 
17 Ibid., p. 323. 
18 Ibid., p. 325. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Hubballāh, ʿAlī, Dirāsāt fī Falsafat Uṣūl al-Fiqh wa al-Sharīʿa wa Naẓariyyat al-Maqāṣid, 1st ed. (Beirut: Dār al-
Hādī, 2005).p.87. 
21 Ibid., pp.87-88. 
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maqāṣid al-sharīʿa cannot be held up by Ashʿarī theology, rather it is most likely to be 
compatible with Muʿtazilī and Shīʿī thought, according to Ḥuballāh22. 
Having said that, maqāṣidī discourse’s popularity in the twentieth is now such that the 
individual has a vast array of material to survey from what has been produced over the 
last century23, though this is of course not the topic of the research here. However, its 
revival in the early part of the twentieth century has incited scholars to investigate the 
reasons behind this, especially since it is interesting that the maqāṣidī discourse has not 
been limited to the jurists, but also attracts interest from those deemed to be “liberals” or 
“reformists”24. Moreover, it has become a significant discourse for, not only Muslim 
scholars in the east, but a notable trend of Muslim scholars who live in the West have 
also embraced the maqāṣid tendency25. In the other words, there are two contexts, 
apart from the classical context of the medieval period where the original maqāṣid 
theory was produced, in which maqāṣid al-sharīʿa has become a notable discourse. The 
first is the Eastern Muslim scholars, especially in the Arab world, and the second the 
Western Muslim scholars and intellectuals. 
Many scholars believe that modernity, especially in the late colonial and early post-
colonial period, was the main cause of the emerging maqāṣidī discourse amongst 
                                            
22 Ibid., p. 88. 
23 The centre of maqāṣid al-sharī’a studies has produced a bibliography of maqāṣid al-sharī’a (al-Dalīl al-Irshādī Ilā 
Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿa) which surveys all the topics related to maqāṣid, and it is now available online in digital format. 
See: http://www.al-furqan.com/maqasid accessed: 18.2.2015. 
24 Hallaq has studied some of them such as Rashād Ridā, Khallāf, al-Fāsī and al-Turābī, on one hand. On the other 
hand, he has studied al-ʿAshmāwī, Fazlur Rahmān and Shaḥrūr. See: Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An 
Introduction to Sunni Usul Al-fiqh: 214-53. Johnston has studied Muhammad 'Abduh, Muhammad Rashīd Ridā, ʿAbd 
al-Razzāq Sanhūrī, ʿAbd al-Wahhāb Khallāf, Muhammad Abu Zahra, and Muhammad Hashim Kamali. See: 
Johnston, "A Turn in the Epistemology and Hermeneutics of Twentieth Century Usụ̄l al-Fiqh," 233-82. Also, in 
another article Johnston studied some other maqāṣidī thinkers such as Muhammad al-Ghazālī, Muhammad ʿAmāra, 
Muhammad Talbi, Muhammad al-Mutawakkal, Rāshid al-Ghannūshī, Ebrahim Moosa and Khaled Abou El Fadl. See: 
"Maqāsịd al-Sharī'a: Epistemology and Hermeneutics of Muslim Theologies of Human Rights," Die Welt des Islams 
47, no. 2 (2007): 149-87. In his recent article, he also studied a contemporary Sunnī scholar who embraces the 
maqāṣidī approach such as al-Qaraḍāwī, see: Johnston, David L. "Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī’s Purposive Fiqh: Promoting or 
Demoting the Future Role of the ʿulamāʾ?," in Maqasid Al-Shari’a and Contemporary Reformist Muslim Thought: An 
Examination, ed. Adis Duderija (The U.S: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 
25 See for example, Ṭāriq Ramaḍān, Hashim Kamali and Ebrahim Moosa. For an analysis of Ramaḍān’s work see: 
David Warren’s chapter: Doha—The Center of Reformist Islam? Considering Radical Reform in the Qatar Context: 
Tariq Ramadan and the Research Center for Islamic Legislation and Ethics (CILE), in A. Duderija, Maqasid Al-Shari’a 
and Contemporary Reformist Muslim Thought: An Examination  (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 73-100. For an analysis 
of Hashim Kamali’s work, see: Adis Duderija’s chapter: Islamic Law Reform and Maqāsịd al-Sharīʿa in the Thought of 
Mohammad Hashim Kamali, in ibid., 13-38. 
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Muslim scholars in the early part of the twentieth century. The falling of the Caliphate as 
a socio-political order for Muslims and the rise of the nation-state had led to serious and 
fundamental changes in the Muslim community. One of these changes was the 
codification of the state law, which was mainly not Islamic in a sense, but had been 
adopted from Western countries. This was seen as a challenge for the Muslim nations, 
especially for the religious institutions represented by the scholars, which in turn has 
provoked Muslim thinkers and scholars to propose an “Islamic” solution. March argues 
that “this meant theorizing a form of Islam that would serve the integrating and 
standardizing purposes of the modern nation-state. It also meant reformulating Islamic 
legal concepts in line with current normative conceptions of the “modern””26. In this 
context, an old Islamic debate had been revived amongst whom were seen as 
reformists, that is to say, the Muʿtazilī-Ashʿarī debate regarding the role of intellect in 
understanding God’s law. Muḥammad ʿAbduh is considered the main scholar who 
began to revive the Muʿtazilī-like theological tradition and it is in this context that he 
encouraged his students to study al-Shāṭibī’s jurisprudential thought. Subsequently, his 
student ʿAbdullah Dirāz published a version of al-Shāṭibī’s jurisprudential book al-
Muwāfaqāt with his own commentary. This intellectual line has continued with other 
thinkers and scholars such as Rashīd Ridạ̄ (d. 1935), ʿAllāl al-Fāsī (d. 1974) and al-
Tạ̄hir Ibn ʿĀshūr (d. 1973). Although they all shared a maqāṣidī discourse, maqāṣid al-
sharīʿa theory at that time was a framework which those thinkers and scholars were 
employing for the purposes of their socio-political context. Thus, not all of them have 
followed al-Shāṭibī’s legal theorisation in regards to maqāṣid and its categories and 
schemes, nor have they all agreed with his methodology of establishing the purposes of 
the sharīʿa. An example for this is what Hallaq has stated, arguably, that Ridạ̄’s thought 
of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa is a new development of the classical legal theory that goes 
beyond even al-Shāṭibī’s. This new development, Hallaq insists, by “the religious 
utilitarianists - Riḍā, Khallāf and others - pay no more than lip service to Islamic legal 
                                            
26 March, Andrew F. "Naturalizing Shari'a : Foundationalist Ambiguities in Modern Islamic Apologetics" Islamic Law 
and Society 22, no. 1-2 (2015): 48. 
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values; for their ultimate frame of reference remains confined to the concepts of interest, 
need and necessity”27. 
Johnston, more precisely, adds another context in which maqāṣidī-like discourse had 
emerged, in addition to the Muʿtazilī-Ashʿarī debate which is the theological foundation 
of this debate, namely the absence or erosion of the central political order. Within this 
context, he sees the emergence and growth of siyāsa sharʿiyya literatures in the 
classical period, which were presented by al-Ghazālī through his emphasis on the role 
of public interest (maṣlaha mursala) and by Ibn Taymiyyah through calling for renewing 
ijtihād. 
Johnston says: “Henceforth, reason and revelation renew their mutual cooperation, and 
especially in eighteenth and nineteenth century India and Egypt, when Muslims called 
upon an Umma in decline to shake off the straightjacket of taqlīd, and exercise ijtihād in 
order to face the challenges of western modernity”28. 
Amongst Muslim scholars and intellectualists in the west, the maqāṣidī discourse is 
notable, especially over the last three decades. Arguably, the most famous three are 
Tariq Ramadan29 and Hashim Kamali30. Despite their different approaches towards 
maqāṣid al-sharīʿa, they all share a notion that the maqāṣid project is the most 
compatible approach of Islamic law with their situation in the West, that is to say, in 
being a minority and having a different identity within a secular non-Muslim state and 
community. 
In the contemporary Shīʿī context, the calling for the maqāṣid al-sharīʾa project is 
happening in a particular socio-political and cultural context for the Shīʿa and within a 
particular epistemological construction. Accordingly, it has particular ramifications in 
                                            
27 Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni Usul Al-fiqh: p.254. Yasir Ibrahim argues 
against this understanding of Riḍā, instead he believes that the better understanding is to deal with the concept of 
maṣlaḥa in Riḍā’s thought as a component of the greater framework, that is maqāṣid al-sharīʿa. For the fuller 
discussion see: Yasir S. Ibrahim, "Rashīd Riḍā and Maqāṣid al-Sharī'a," Studia Islamica 102/103(2006): pp. 157-98. 
28 Johnston, "A Turn in the Epistemology and Hermeneutics of Twentieth Century Usụ̄l al-Fiqh," p19. Hallaq also in 
his critical paper mentions the influence of modernity on the growth of maqāṣidī discourse, see: Wael Hallaq, 
"Maqāṣid and the Challenges of Modernity," Al-Jami‘ah 49, no. 1 (2011). 
29 See for example him work: T. Ramadan, Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation  (OUP USA, 2009). 
30 Kamali has written extensively on maqāṣid al-sharīʿa, the important work is: Kamali, M.H.  Maqāṣid Al-Sharīảh, 
Ijtihad and Civilisational Renewal  (International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2012). 
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regards to this context. It is seen as a paradox, as mentioned above31 in that the 
maqāṣid al-sharīʾa project has emerged from an Ashʿarī background, while that which is 
known as having ʿAdlī tendencies, Shiʿaism and Muʿtazilīsm, which are seen as 
epistemologically and theologically well-prepared for such discourse, did not take a risk 
to establish maqāṣid al-sharīʾa as a legal system. This can be said especially for 
Shīʿīsm, which has survived not only as a theological doctrine, but also as a legal 
doctrine. The importance of this research is that it is an attempt to study this particular 
context and construction from which the Shīʿī maqāṣid al-sharīʾa has emerged and to 
examine the nature of this Shīʿī version, especially that which has been provided by 
Muḥammed Taqī al-Mudarrisī (b. 1945) as it is the only comprehensive and systematic 
Shīʿī contribution to the subject. My research questions, therefore, are: what are the 
reasons behind the emergence of the Shīʿī maqāṣid al-sharīʾa particularly in the 
contemporary era? What are the socio-political and intellectual factors that have caused 
the emergence of such a discourse? What does such a discourse mean for Shīʿī 
jurisprudence from a historical perspective? Furthermore, and most interestingly, how 
will the Shīʿī maqāṣid al-sharīʾa deal with the maqāṣid affairs methodologically, despite 
the fact that Shīʿī jurisprudence has firmly rejected most methodological tools which are 
considered maqāṣidī tools in Sunnī legal theory, such as al-qiyās (legal analogy), al-
maṣāliḥ al-mursalah (social wefare not mentioned in the text), and sadd al-tharāʾiʿ 
(closing the gate to evil). In other words, what would be the Shīʿī methodological tools 
for the maqāṣid al-sharīʾa and subsequently what are the outcomes of the Shīʿī version 
on the purposes of the law? 
My hypotheses in examining these questions throughout the research are:  
 Contemporary Shīʿī jurisprudence is an extension of and a development within a 
jurisprudential paradigm, which was constructed in the pre-modern age. 
 Contemporary Shīʿī activism in the Middle East led by the jurists and culminated 
later on by the Islamic revolution in Iran 1979 was a turning point for Shīʿī 
jurisprudence. It was the most significant moment when Shīʿī Islam faced the 
                                            
31 See on page 12. 
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challenge of modernity. It is in this context that the contemporary Shīʿī paradigm 
(which I will call the Bahbahānian paradigm) has witnessed a deep revision 
within the religious institutions. 
 Al-Mudarrisī as a part of this contemporary construction, but associated to a 
different epistemological trend within Shīʿī thought, would represent a paradigm 
shift within the mentioned revision. 
 Taking into account the different context in which al-Mudarrisī has discussed the 
issue of maqāṣid al-sharīʾa, the outcomes of the Shīʿī version provided by him 
would be quite different from the Sunnī one. It would incline more toward a virtual 
trend rather than a positive utilitarian trend. 
2. Research Context 
The research intersects with two broad contexts within the literature in the field. Firstly, 
when dealing with the socio-political and historical factors that contributed to the 
emergence of the maqāṣid al-sharīʾa project, it intersects with the fields of the history of 
Shīʿī jurisprudence and uṣūl al-fiqh, both being fields that provide an understanding of 
the developments of Shīʿī jurisprudence. Secondly, it intersects with the context of the 
literature within Shīʿī jurisprudence itself, which deals with the theories, conceptions and 
methodologies of Shīʿī uṣūl al-fiqh. In the following section, I will provide an overview 
and evaluation of these two contexts in order to allocate the contribution of the research 
to them and the gaps that it aims to fill. 
As regards the first context, it can be said that the intellectual history of Shīʿī uṣūl al-fiqh 
as an area of study is relatively new; and thus it sometimes seems to be an 
exaggeration to call some works in this field intellectual history. Having said that, 
generally speaking, among the historians of Shīʿī uṣūl al-fiqh, there are four types of 
approaches that attempt to provide an understanding of the history of Shīʿī uṣūl al-fiqh. 
2.1. The Comprehensive Approach 
The comprehensive reading of the intellectual history of Shīʿī uṣūl al-fiqh is based on an 
assumption that Shīʿī uṣūl al-fiqh has its own history, features and problems. The 
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historians of this approach have attempted to provide a comprehensive account of Shīʿī 
uṣūl al-fiqh. Thus, they have dealt with different historical and intellectual issues such as 
the emergence of Shīʿī uṣūl al-fiqh, the theoretical developments, the variety of writings 
within uṣūl al-fiqh and their developments, and significant intellectual shifts. However, 
the contributions in this category vary in their number and depth as some scholars have 
dedicated a few pages, whereas others have written approximately a chapter of a book 
or a long article. The scholars who can be classified within this comprehensive 
approach category are al-Ṣadr32, al-Faḍlī33, al-Mudarrisī34, al-Karajī35, al-Subḥānī36, al-
Qaṭīfī37, Farḥān38, al-Ḥakīm39 and al-Zubaydī40. 
2.2. The Selective Approach 
In contrast to the first category, this type of approach focuses on a particular issue of 
Shīʿī uṣūl al-fiqh, whether to provide a historical overview of the issue or to account for 
its history as part of addressing underlying issues. For example, there are some works 
which only address the issue of al-khabar al-wāḥid or al-ʿaql. This sort of approach to 
the intellectual history of uṣūl al-fiqh has witnessed an increase in contributions, in 
particular over the last decade. However, just like with the first category, they vary in 
their number and depth. Examples of this approach are the works of Ḥuballāh on the 
theory of al-sunnah in Shīʿī uṣūl al-fiqh41 and the works of Gleave on the Uṣūlī-Akhbārī 
intellectual debate42. 
                                            
32  al-Ṣadr, Muḥammad Bāqir, al-Maʿālim al-Jadīdah li ʿIlm al-Uṣūl, 1st ed. (Tehran: Maktabat al-Najāḥ, 1975). 
33 al-Faḍlī, ʿAbd al-Hādī, Durūs fi Uṣūl Fiqh al-Imāmiyya, 1st ed. (Qum,Iran: Muʾassasat Umm al-Qurā, 2000). 
34 Muḥammad Taqī al-Mudarrisī, Fiqh al-Istinbāṭ: Dirāsah Fī Mabādiʾ ʿIlm al-Uṣūl (Understaing the Derivation: 
Studying in the Principles of the Derivation)  (2010). 
35 al-Karajī, Abū al-Qāsim, "Naẓra Fi Taṭawwur al-Uṣūl," Majallat al-Thaqāfa al-Islamiyya, (1986). no. 7. 
36 al-Subḥānī, Jaʿfar, Maṣadir al-Fiqh al-Islāmī wa Manābiʿuhu, 1st ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Aḍwāʾ, 1999). 
37 al-Qaṭīfī, Munīr, al-Rāfid fi ʿIlm al-Uṣūl, 1st ed. (Qum: Maktab Āyatullāh al-Sayyid ʽAlī al-Sīstānī, 1994). 
38 Farḥān, ʿAdnān, Adwār al-Ijtihād, 1st ed. (Qum, Iran: al-Markaz al-ʼĀlamī lil ʽUlūm al-Islāmiyya, 1995). 
39 al-Ḥakīm, Mundhir, "Marāḥil Taṭawwur al-Ijtihād ʿind al-Shīʿa al-Imāmiyya", Majallat Fiqh ʽAhl al-Bayt, no. 13-17. 
40 al-Zubaydī, ʿAlī. Tārīkh al-Ijtihād wa Manāhijuhu, (Shabakat al-Imāmayn al-Ḥasanayn li al-Turāth wa al-Fikr al-
Islāmī),website: 
doi:http://www.alhassanain.com/arabic/book/book/letters_and_university_theses/tarekh_al_ejtehad_wa_manahejoho/
2.html. (accessed: 13.9.2012). 
41 Ḥubballah,Ḥaydar, Naẓariyyat al-Sunnah fi al-Fikr al-Imāmī al-Shīʼī, 1st ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Intishār al-ʿArabī, 2006). 
42 Gleave has two important works in this regards, these are; Gleave, Robert, Scripturalist Islam: The History and 
Doctrines of the Akhbārī Shīʿī School (Leiden: Brill, 2007), and: R. Gleave, Inevitable Doubt: Two Theories of Shīʻī 
Jurisprudence (Brill, 2000). 
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2.3. The Intellectual History of Uṣūl al-Fiqh Within the History of Fiqh 
Although the history of Shīʿī fiqh has not received the attention it deserves, the number 
of works that have been produced in this field exceed those that deal with the 
intellectual history of Shīʿī uṣūl al-fiqh. Part of the reason for this sort of approach is the 
fact that there is a correlative relationship between fiqh and uṣūl al-fiqh, which means 
that anyone who has attempted to deal with the intellectual history of fiqh would have 
been obliged to address, to a certain extent, some issues of uṣūl al-fiqh. This might be 
attributed to the nature of fiqh, which relies on the sources and tools that have already 
been established in uṣūl in order to derive the law. Or on the other hand, since fiqh is 
deemed to be the arena within which uṣūlī concepts are applied and practiced, it would 
be inevitable for anyone seeking an understanding of the intellectual history of fiqh to 
have to deal with the intellectual history of uṣūl al-fiqh. The scholars who can be 
classified within this category are al-ʿĀṣifī43, al-Ḥasanī44, al-Faḍlī45 and al-Subḥānī46. 
2.4. The Intellectual History of Uṣūl al-Fiqh Within the Phenomenon of 
Marjiʿiyya 
As the marjiʿiyya of the Shīʿa has its own unique system and nature as a religious 
institution, many works have been written on this subject from different aspects in the 
last two decades. The majority of them have probably not been written by Shīʿī 
scholars, but it is notable that some Shīʿī scholars have been involved in this field as 
well. Whether the marjiʿiyya is considered a socio-religious institution or a religious-
academic one, the aspects of uṣūl al-fiqh that permeate it cannot be ignored. Therefore, 
in this sort of approach, uṣūl al-fiqh is understood to be an element of the institution. 
Many western studies of Shīʿīsm incline to this approach and there is some Arabic 
                                            
43 Al-ʿĀṣifī, Muḥammad Mahdī. al-Rawḍa al-Bahiyya fi Sharḥ al-Lumʿa al-Dimashqiyya, 1st ed. (Qum,Iran: Maktabat 
al-Dawūrī, 1991). 
44 al-Ḥasanī, Hāshim Maʼrūf, Tārīkh al-Fiqh al-Jaʿfarī, 1st ed. (Beirut,Lebanon: Dār al-ʿĀrif, 1987). 
45 It is worth mentioning that al-Faḍlī wrote several works in legal history for both uṣūl al-fiqh and al-fiqh. Thus, for his 
fiqhī legal history I have put him with this category. See: al-Faḍlī, ʿAbd al-Hādī, Tārīkh al-Tashrīʿ al-Islāmī, 1st ed.  
(Beirut: Dār al-Naṣr, 1993). 
46 Same as what has been said for al-Faḍlī can be said for al-Subḥānī in regard to his various cotribution in the legal 
history. al-Subḥānī, Jaʿfar, Tārīkh al-Fiqh al-Islamī wa Adwāruhu, 1st ed. (Qum: Muʾassasat al-Imām Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq, 
1997).  
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literature inclining towards it too. The scholars who can be classified in this category are 
al-Qazwīnī47 and Farḥān48. 
The limitation of these approaches is mainly methodological, which I will deal with in the 
next section. However, it is also true that time period that concerns our research is 
considered to be a constructive period within modern and contemporary uṣūl al-fiqh, 
especially since al-Waḥīd al-Bahbahānī has not been covered deeply by any of these 
works, except for Gleave’s works, and they tend to be restricted primarily to Akhbārism.  
As for the comprehensive approach, the writings are too generalised in that they have 
not given this time period much attention. The pitfall of the selective approach is that the 
literatures have honed in on one particular issue to which they have not been able to 
provide a paradigm with which to understand the underlying issue within the broader 
context. As for the fiqhī approach, needless to say, that period of interest has not been 
given much attention because it is considered as an uṣūlī period more than a fiqhī one. 
With regards to the institutional approach, though its methodology has been developed, 
the literatures have focused more on the political and fiqhī aspects of marjiʿiyya and 
have not given the theoretical discussions much attention, especially the period of al-
Waḥīd al-Bahbahānī. 
As regards the second context, despite the increased interest in studying Shīʿī 
jurisprudence in the last two decades, there has not been any study of the maqāṣid al-
sharīʾa in Shīʿī jurisprudence, except for an article of Ḥasan Jābir’s entitled: al-Maqāṣid 
fī al-Madrasa al-Shīʿīyya: Ishkālīyyat al-madhhab wa al-Tasmiya. Regardless of the fact 
that the article is short in length, it does not address the actual Shīʿī jurisprudential 
literatures regarding the maqāṣid al-sharīʾa, except for mentioning some contributions 
from a few Lebanese scholars. Instead it addresses the obstacles of emerging Shīʿī 
maqāṣid al-sharīʾa. Moreover, surprisingly, it does not even mention Mudarrisī’s 
contribution. Thus, this particular research aims to fill this gap in the literature. Currently, 
                                            
47 Qazwīnī, Jawdat, Tārīkh al-Muʾassasa al-Dīniyya al-Shīʿiyya: min al-ʿAsṛ al-Buwayhī ilā  Nihāyat al-ʿAsṛ al-Ṣafawī 
al-Awwal (300 A.H.-1000 A.H./912 C.E.-1591 C.E.).  (Beirut: Dār al-Rāfidayn, 2005). Also: Qazwīnī, Jawdat, al-
Marjiʿiyya al-Dīniyya al-ʾUlyā ʿInda al-Shīʿa al-Imāmiyya: Dirāsa fī al-Tatạwwur al-Siyāsī wa al-ʿIlmī (Beirut: Dār al-
Rāfidayn, 2005) 
48 Farḥān, Adwār al-Ijtihād. 
22 
 
there is an article by Takim entitled Maqāsịd al-Sharī‘a in Contemporary Shī‘ī 
Jurisprudence49, in which he attempts to review the current trend toward maqāṣid al-
sharīʿa by Shīʿī scholars. Takim focuses on the concept of maṣlaḥa as a mechanism of 
the maqāṣidī approach and how it has been used by some contemporary Shīʿī scholars 
in dealing with new issues. What can be a criticism of this work is that it limits the 
maqāṣidī approach to the concept of maṣlaḥa alone and, therefore, ignores the wider 
moral and jurisprudential discussions amongst Shīʿī scholars. These are discussions 
such as the position of the intellect as a moral resource for legal issues, the theory of 
constants and variables, resorting to the philosophy of fiqh, and the theory of the scope 
of a legislative void (al-farāgh al-tashrīʿī). All of these discussions form part of  
contemporary Shīʿī debates within the maqāṣid discourse, which he has ignored. 
Moreover, he surprisingly did not mention Mudarrisī’s work in this field, though he does 
draw on previous, much larger works of his. Therefore, this study aims to deal with 
these issues extensively in order to fill these gaps.  
3. Sources, structure and outline of the research 
The research aims to study the reasons behind the emergence of the maqāṣid al-
sharīʾa project within the discourse of Shīʿī uṣūl al-fiqh, as well as its characteristics. 
Based on the assumption that this sort of research is associated with intellectual history, 
the research will deal with the primary sources of the period under study, which has 
been witnessing an increase in recent publications after having existed only in the form 
of manuscripts for a while. These primary sources are those that were written in the 
later Safavid period and during the Qajar period. The principal materials are those of al-
Waḥīd al-Bahbhānī and his students. 
Furthermore, as the research has chosen Mudarrisī as the case study, for reasons that 
will be justified throughout the first chapter, it will deal primarily with his works - not only 
those which have direct relevance to the maqāṣid al-sharīʾa project, but also the rest of 
his works, in order to properly analysis his thought. Moreover, the research will deal with 
                                            
49 Takim, Liyakat, “Maqāsịd al-Sharī‘a in Contemporary Shī‘ī Jurisprudence” in Maqasid Al-Shari’a and Contemporary 
Reformist Muslim Thought: An Examination, ed. Adis Duderija, (The United States: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) pp. 
101-126. 
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contemporary Shīʿī jurisprudential works of the generation prior to Mudarrisī’s as well as 
his own in order to construct a broader backdrop of the environment from which he 
came. In addition to that, the research will deal with the secondary sources concerned 
with both modern and contemporary Shīʿī uṣūl al-fiqh. 
Chapter One seeks to provide a historical reading of modern Shīʿī uṣūl al-fiqh in order 
to construct an intellectual analytical paradigm of modern Shīʿī uṣūl al-fiqh. It begins by 
examining the socio-political and intellectual factors surrounding the later Safavid and 
Qajar periods as the time when the new paradigm was formed, as the research argues 
for. After determining the characteristics of that particular paradigm, that is to say, its 
epistemological, methodological and functional frameworks, the research delves into 
what are deemed to be the modern challenges of the paradigm and the Shīʿī 
jurisprudential responses to them. In order to clarify Mudarrisī’s position within these 
responses, the research will survey contemporary tendencies within Shīʿī jurisprudence 
that have been engaged in seeking a solution to those challenges. Thus, Mudarrisī’s 
maqāṣid al-sharīʾa project will be presented as a systematic contribution in Shīʿī uṣūl al-
fiqh to those challenges. 
Chapter Two is devoted to the review of Mudarrisī’s intellectual biography within which 
the stance of his generation within the Shīʿī religious institution will be examined, 
resulting from the gradual engagement of the Shīʿī jurist in the public and especially the 
political, sphere, since the Safavid period. In identifying his intellectual position within 
his generation as well as within his socio-political environment, the research studies 
both the socio-political and intellectual scenes of each stage of his life and links them 
with his works in order to contextualise his position. This will demonstrate how his life 
has shaped his intellectual biography in such a way that his thought has become a 
challenge for the modern Shīʿī jurisprudential paradigm. Furthermore, it will clarify his 
intellectual attitudes toward contemporary Shīʿī thought which has been reflected in his 
jurisprudential work. In addition to that, the chapter studies his home environment, both 
from his father’s and mother’s sides, as an important element of the Shīʿī traditional 
training institution in the making of a Shīʿī scholar. 
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The research commences in Chapter Three with the detailed examination and analysis 
of Mudarrisī jurisprudential theory regarding maqāṣid al-sharīʾa, docusing especially on 
the question of how Mudarrisī will deal with the classical Shīʿī  jurisprudential theories, 
that is to say, what his position is regarding the Qurʾān, Sunnah, consensus and 
intellect as the sources of deriving legal rulings. The chapter traces his discussions 
regarding these matters and analytically demonstrates his new ideas, theories and 
conceptions, which are considered as the purposive (maqāṣidī) jurisprudential tools. 
Firstly, this will help us contextualise his position within Shīʿī jurisprudence and 
consequently how his jurisprudential thought differs. Secondly, as a part of the focus of 
our research as to what the Shīʿī methodological tools for the maqāṣid al-sharīʾa project 
would be, the chapter will illustrate the maqāṣidī tools that have been provided by 
Mudarrisī. 
The research in Chapters Four and Five deals with the core of his maqāṣid al-sharīʾa 
theory by examining his understanding of the function of the sharīʾa. This aims to 
answer the question about the outcomes of the Shīʿī version of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa 
provided by al-Mudarrisī. To this end, Chapter Four studies his theory regarding the 
nature of the sharīʾa and its components, and therefore its relationship with reality. To 
illustrate these, the study focuses on the meaning of the variables in Mudarrisī’s 
thought, and what it requires intellectually and conceptually. The chapter will show his 
interaction with Western legal and moral philosophy on the one hand and Sunnī legal 
thought on the other, and how this has helped him depart from the classical framework 
of Sunnī maqāṣid. Chapter Five studies his practical thesis as an outcome of what he 
considered to be the purposes of the law (maqāṣid al-sharīʾa). First, we will examine 
Mudarrisī’s interpretation of the constants of sharīʿa and his interaction with modern 
Western legal and moral thought. Next, we will demonstrate an outline of his 
understanding of what maqāṣid al-sharīʿa actually are, through which I aim to show to 
what extent his contribution differs from the Sunnī one. 
Using this structure, the research attempts to adhere to the methodological 
commitments in providing an analytical paradigm, which will facilitate the interpretation 
and significance of the emergence of the maqāṣid al-sharīʾa project within modern Shīʿī 
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uṣūl al-fiqh, and especially Mudarrisī’s contributions. Meanwhile, the research also 
takes into account the complexity of the human phenomenon and its agency within 
temporary construction. Thus, it begins with a broader framework and then narrows 
down to a small construction dialectically, that is to say, from the jurisprudential 
paradigm of the historical perspective, through the contemporary Shīʿī religious 
institution and ending up at a systematic contribution, namely Mudarrisī’s as the primary 
case study. 
 
 
1. Chapter One 
The Formation of Modern Shīʿī Jurisprudence 
1.1. Introduction 
In its particular formation in Shīʿī jurisprudence, discussions around maqāṣid al-sharīʿah 
(the “purposes” of Islamic law) have emerged in a specific context that composes 
various socio-political as well as intellectual factors. The present chapter aims to 
examine these paradigm-creating factors. A key question will be how and when was the 
maqāṣidī discourse formed? Also, what are the main issues of the discourse? The 
ultimate goal in this chapter will be to identify characteristics of the maqāṣidī discourse 
which emerged in the twentieth century and which attempted either to reform and 
modify themselves within that paradigm or to shift from that paradigm to another one. 
In this chapter, I will determine in Section 1.2 the socio-political and intellectual factors 
that formed the modern paradigm of Shīʿī jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh). In Section 1.3 I 
will demonstrate the characteristics of the paradigm in three levels, i.e. epistemological, 
methodological, and functional. In Section 1.4 I aim to outline the challenges that faced 
the paradigm in the mid-twentieth century. Section 1.5 will examine three responses to 
the challenges of the paradigm in Shīʿī jurisprudential discourse in which maqāṣid al-
sharīʿa emerged. 
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The main argument presented in this chapter is that the paradigm which has been 
formed and viewed as dominant in contemporary Shīʿī jurisprudence is what I will term 
the ‘Bahbahānian paradigm’. This paradigm derives its name from al-Waḥīd al-
Bahbahānī (d. 1791), the famous Shīʿī scholar who is regarded as the founder of 
modern Uṣūlism. Here I am arguing against the dominant periodization of modern Shīʿī 
jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh) which claims that modern Shīʿī jurisprudence was founded 
by Shaykh Murtaḍā Anṣarī (d. 1281/1864). Instead, what is argued here is that it is the 
Bahbahānian paradigm which has formed the modern framework of Shīʿī jurisprudence. 
This paradigm was formed gradually in the course of the Safavid period and emerged 
as a dominant paradigm in the middle of the eighteenth century. The Safavid period 
provides a backdrop to the three main factors that compose the paradigm under 
discussion. These factors are: (i) the growth of the philosophical tendency, (ii) the 
emergence of the Akhbārī school, and (iii) the juristic avoidance of politics and the 
institutionalising of the marjiʿiyyah. Each of these three factors provides a framework for 
the Bahbahānian paradigm. As I will aim to demonstrate, the philosophical tendency 
represented the epistemological framework, the emergence of Akhbārism represented 
the methodological framework, and political experience represented the functional 
framework. 
Furthermore, I argue that the Bahbahānian paradigm encountered three serious 
challenges at the beginning of the twentieth century: (i) the rise of the nation state, (ii) 
the rejection of Aristotelian epistemology, and (iii) the rise of the modern Shīʿī political 
activities that ended up with the emergence of a republic in Iran in 1979. The crisis 
faced by the Bahbahānian paradigm has created the search for more appropriate 
jurisprudential frameworks. Three alternatives have been proposed, each of which 
feature maqāṣid al-sharīʿah. These can be characterised as: (i) an internal reform of the 
paradigm provided by Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr, Muḥammad Mahdī Shams al-Dīn (d. 
2001), Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī (d. 2002), and ʿAlī Ḥubballāh; (ii) an alternative field 
provided by Mahdī Mahrīzī (b. 1962), Ḥaydar Ḥubballāh (b. 1973), and Muḥammad 
Muṣṭafawī; and (iii) a new paradigm provided by Muḥammad Taqī al-Mudarrisī (b. 
1945). Although these three responses each feature maqāṣidī style juristic reasoning, 
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my argument is that al-Mudarrisī’s systematic and detailed contribution represents a 
radical new approach to Shiʿi jurisprudence and therefore it will constitute the case 
study under discussion in the current research. 
Some scholars, coming from both Western academia and within the Shīʿī intellectual 
milieu, have tended to present that Shaykh Murtaḍā al-Anṣārī (d. 1281/1864) was the 
founder of modern Shīʿī jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh). This view has been taken for 
granted in much of the literature. I will argue against this view, since, as I will 
demonstrate, the principal intellectual elements of Anṣāri’s juristic system are entirely 
dependent upon the Bahbahānian paradigm. The importance of this for the current 
research is twofold. Firstly, if Anṣārī is considered the founder of modern Shīʿī 
jurisprudence (and not al-Bahbahānī as will be argued here), then our understanding of 
the factors which formed the school is impoverished. At best, such an analysis will focus 
on the intellectual and socio-political circumstances of the eighteenth century ignoring, 
more or less, the century before in which Shīʿī jurisprudence witnessed a rapid period of 
development. The elements of this development include the evolution of the Safavid 
empire into a Shiʿi state and, most significantly, the emergence of the Akhbārī school. 
Changing the periodisation enables us to review the accepted account and posit a 
different one. Secondly, and following on from this, viewing al-Anṣārī as the founder of 
modern Shīʿī jurisprudence hinders a full understanding of the challenges that Shīʿī 
jurisprudence has faced in the modern period. Maqāṣid al-sharīʿah, the focus of the 
current research, is one of them. In what follows, I argue that an analysis which is based 
on the usual periodisation (in which al-Anṣārī is seen as the pivotal and founding figure), 
does not provide an adequate basis for understanding the epistemological foundation 
and functional framework of the modern Shīʿī jurisprudential school. 
If we begin with Western scholarship, Hossein Modarressi claims that ‘the last 
fundamental change which occurred in Shīʿī law and which led to the founding of a new 
school, was associated with the reconstruction of the law and its methodology through 
the scholarly approach of al-Shaykh Murtaḍā Muḥammad Amīn al-Anṣārī (d. 
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1281/1864). This resulted in a radical change in the system of Shīʿī law.’50 Moussavi 
concurs, stating that ‘the contribution of the uṣūlī jurists of this period to the 
development of Shīʿī law did not go much beyond the articulation of what had been laid 
down by the schools of Ḥilla and Jabal ʿAmil until the appearance of Shaykh Murtaḍa 
Anṣarī’.51 
In Shīʿī scholarship, however, the views in regard to this are various. On one hand, 
despite recognising the efforts of al-Anṣārī in articulating the new jurisprudential ideas 
and theories, al-Ṣadr,52 al-Qaṭīfī,53 and al-Faḍlī54 believe that al-Bahbahānī is the 
founder of modern Shīʿī jurisprudence, mainly for his rebuttal of Akhbārism and for his 
groundbreaking new theories. On the other hand, al-Ḥakīm,55 al-Karajī,56 and al-ʿĀṣifī57 
believe that al-Anṣārī was the founder of modern Shīʿī jurisprudence, not only for his 
sophisticated intellectual articulation of jurisprudential ideas and theories, but also for 
his new thought. 
Of all of those who dealt with the matter, Āṣifī was the only one who has provided a 
detailed and specific explanation for what are claimed to be al-Anṣārī’s new ideas and 
theories in jurisprudence. Āṣifī studied the nature of legal evidence (al-dalīl) and legal 
justification (al-ḥujjiyya) in which he thinks that within this subject, which is considered to 
be the core body of jurisprudence, al-Anṣārī has provided new perspectives, ideas, and 
theories. He traced in detail al-Anṣārī’s ideas with regard to these two issues. However, 
around nine years after publishing his article on al-Anṣārī, ʾĀṣifī wrote an introduction to 
a new edition of al-Bahbahānī’s book, al-Fawāʿid al-Ḥāʾiriyya,58 where he changed his 
mind and believed that al-Bahbahānī was the real founder of the modern Shīʿī 
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jurisprudential school and al-Anṣārī was but a sophisticated articulator of the school. 
ʾĀṣifī also traced in detail al-Bahbahānī’s ideas and theories and accordingly realised 
the importance of him in founding the new school. 
I argue here that the modern period of Shīʿī jurisprudence is best understood as 
beginning with al-Bahbahānī, as the epistemological foundations of the modern school 
were established by him.  Al-Anṣārī is best seen as articulating the principles laid down 
by al-Bahbahānī rather than departing from them and forming a new school.. The claim 
rests not only upon ʾĀṣifī’s convincing comparison of al-Anṣārī and al-Bahbahānī, but 
also upon a socio-historical analysis of the circumstances of al-Bahbahānī’s age to be 
detailed in the next section. I suggest that the reason why al-Anṣārī has been identified 
as the founder of the modern school is partly due to the fact that much of pre-Anṣārī 
works of uṣūl al-fiqh (including those of al-Bihbahānī and his pupils) were not available 
until relatively recently. Such works were mostly in manuscript form and not familiar to 
most students of the ḥawzah, and neither students within the ḥawzah, nor scholars 
working in Western academia were familiar with these works. This has changed in 
recent years with many of the works of al-Bihbahānī (and those who immediately 
followed him) being published in Iran and elsewhere. Furthermore, al-Anṣārī trained a 
significant number of students who went on to dominate the intellectual scene.59 These 
students used and taught from his written work and thus propagated it to future 
generations of scholars in a way that assumed al-Anṣārī was an inventive force. 
In the next section, I will attempt to provide an analysis of how al-Bahbahānī in fact 
founded a new school of Shīʿī jurisprudence, tracing the factors that contributed to the 
formation of what I will call the ‘Bahbahānian paradigm' - using the term in the manner 
made famous by Thomas Kuhn. 
1.2. The Formation of the Bahbahānian Paradigm 
The Bahbahānian paradigm, in accordance with all epistemological frameworks, was 
not formed in a vacuum. Rather, it represented the outcome of both a long-term 
intellectual travail and an interaction between several socio-intellectual elements. By 
                                            
59 Al-Subḥānī mentioned fourteen influential students of al-Anṣārī. See Muʾassasat al-Nashr al-Islāmī, Al-Shaykh al-
Anṣārī wa Taṭawwur al-Baḥth al-Uṣūlī, p.40. 
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determining these elements and examining the process of their interaction, the 
researcher can accordingly differentiate one paradigm from another and provide an 
account of their emergence, characteristics, and (perhaps) their future. Firstly, I will 
determine what can be deemed to be the main factors that resulted in the emergence of 
the Bahbahānian paradigm and secondly how its characteristics were constructed. 
A brief introduction to the emergence of the Safavid empire will help in understanding 
the environment from which the Bahbahānian paradigm originated. The rise of the 
Safavid empire in the sixteenth century can be understood to be the result of 
widespread Shīʿī ghulāt60 and Sūfī movements. These movements were flourishing 
gradually in Anatolia during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, where Shīʿī doctrine 
penetrated many Sūfī orders which developed a form of ghuluww doctrine under the 
framework of Sunnī legal schools (madhāhib), especially the Shāfiʿī school.61 The most 
dominant of these movements was the Safawiyya, which was established as a Sūfī 
order at the beginning of the fourteenth century by Ṣafī al-Dīn al-Ardabīlī (d. 1334). 
Over the course of about a century, the Safawiyya movement developed in two ways. 
The first type of development was intellectual, that is, the Safawiyya movement inclined 
towards Shīʿī ghuluww ideas, which were coated by the structure of a Sunnī Sūfī order. 
The second development was socio-political in that the Safawiyya movement became a 
military movement, especially after it gained the loyalty of Qizilbāsh tribes when it 
became very close to Ak Koyunlu’s ruling elite in eastern Anatolia. This constituted a 
turning point in the Safawiyya movement under the leadership of Shaykh Junayd (d. 
1460), the fourth leader of the order, who sought to establish his own empire. Shaykh 
Junayd’s ambition was not realised until his grandson came to lead the order and, in 
1502, succeeded in establishing the Safavid empire, taking almost all Iranian lands 
under his rule.62 With such a complex identity within the empire, mingled with the 
complicated surrounding geopolitical situation, the Safavids were forced to seek a new 
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identity that could unite the empire. These factors also gave them a distinct character 
and legitimised their rule and, accordingly, they contacted the ʿĀmilī Shīʿī scholars of 
Lebanon. Here was where an Arabic Shīʿī Twelver juristic element merged with a Sūfī 
extremist (mughālī) element (Safawiyya) and eventually created the new identity of the 
new empire.  
1.2.1. The Growth of a Philosophical Tendency 
Contemporary Shīʿī usūl al-fiqh reflects, to some extent, an engagement with the 
theories and concepts of Shīʿī philosophy.63 This, however, raises the question of the 
roots of this philosophical tendency, especially when compared with the existence of 
these philosophical elements in Shīʿī jurisprudence in the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries. One possible explanation for this tendency, which I would argue for, is that 
the introduction of philosophical elements in Shīʿī jurisprudence can be explained in 
terms of the growth of philosophy in the second half of the Safavid period and also the 
establishment of what is called the philosophical school of Iṣfahān in the seventeenth 
century.64 This point of view, however, stands against the mainstream view in the 
history of Islamic philosophy which assumes that philosophical thought died with al-
Ghazzālī’s (d. 1111) refutation of Averroes (d. 1198).65 In contrast, philosophical thought 
did not die and it found its way into Persia through the work of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 
1274). Rizvi suggests that Corbin’s aim in distinguishing a philosophical school of 
Iṣfahān was ‘to insist that our academic understanding of philosophy in Islam was 
impoverished and that philosophy did not end in Islam with Ghazālī’s famous attack’.66 
Also the Safavid period witnessed a considerable growth in interest in philosophy, 
especially in Iṣfahān. Al-Ṭūsī’s works became central within Shīʿī theological thought. 
                                            
63 al-Rifāʿī, ʿAbd al-Jabbār, ‘Taṭawwur al-Dars al-Falsafī fī al-Ḥawza al-ʿIlmiyya’, in Kitāb Qaḍāyā Islāmiyya Muʿāṣira 
(Beirut: Dār al-Hādī, 2005). 
64 I do not intend here to be limiting the rational tendency of the Safavid period to what is termed the philosophical 
school of Iṣfahan. I simply intend to mention the notable appearance of this particular rational tendency, whether it 
has united specific characteristics or not is not the concern of the present research. For more information about the 
philosophical school of Iṣfahan, see Seyed Hossein Nasr, ‘Spiritual Movements, Philosophy and Theology in the 
Safavid Period’, in Jackson and Lockhart, vol. 6, pp. 656-97. 
65 For a comprehensive discussion about this see al-Jābirī, Muhammad ʿĀbid, Takwīn al-ʿAql al-ʿArabī (Beirut: al-
Markaz al-Thaqāfī al-ʿArabī, 1982) and Bunyat al-ʿAql al-ʿArabī: Dirāsah Taḥlīliyya li-Nuẓum al-Maʿrifa fī al-Thaqāfa  
al-ʿArabiyya, 10th ed. (Beirut: Centre of Arab Unity Studies, 2010). 
66 Rizvi, Sajjad H. “Isfahan School of Philosophy,” Encyclopædia Iranica, online edition, 2012, available 
at http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/isfahan-school-of-philosophy (accessed online at 22 May 2015). 
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This is especially the case for al-Ṭūsī’s al-Tajrīd which can be considered the first Shīʿī 
theological text written in a philosophical way. Al-Tajrīd was circulated in Shīʿī religious 
institutes and many Shīʿī scholars wrote commentaries on it. 
As mentioned above, Iran was a theatre for the activities of various spiritual movements. 
Under Safavid rule these movements were able to express themselves and they were 
encountered by some philosophical and theological movements in Iṣfahān. This saw 
exchanges between the different schools. Under the rule of Shāh ʿAbbās I, at a time 
when Iṣfahān was at its zenith, some scholars who were involved in these mixed 
movements, became dominant figures in the city and influenced its intellectual life. With 
Mīr Dāmād (d. 1631), and then Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī (d. 1640), commonly known as 
Mullā Ṣadrā, a particular philosophical tendency – which was, broadly speaking, Shīʿī – 
dominated intellectual life in this period. Subsequently, Iṣfahān became a stronghold of 
the rational tendency for Shīʿī thought in such a way that even in the golden age of an 
‘anti-rational’ revival, Iṣfahān remained a rationalist stronghold. This characteristic made 
the city an intellectual centre for rational tendencies which provided Shīʿī intellectual 
history in this period with many ideas and figures who promoted and worked within the 
Bahbahānian paradigm.  
Although the philosophical tendency mainly dealt with theological issues, the 
epistemological ideas which had been developed within this tendency were later on 
employed in jurisprudential issues, as we shall see below67. In other words, the 
philosophical characteristics of the Iṣfahān school were later on represented in the 
epistemological framework of the Bahbahānian jurisprudential paradigm. This claim can 
be supported by reflecting on the intellectual life of Shīʿī thought in this period. It is 
noticeable that most rationalist contributions were attributed to scholars of Iṣfahān. Even 
at the peak of the Akhbārī school, which is considered by some as an anti-rational 
school,68 Iṣfahān was the only city where uṣūlī works were produced. For example, the 
most important uṣūlī work in that period was al-Wāfiyya by ʿAbdullāh al-Tūnī (d. 1660), 
                                            
67 See: 46 
68 This is the typical understanding of Akhbārism, however Gleave demonstrates another understanding, see Robert 
Gleave, Scripturalist Islam: The History and Doctrines of the Akhbārī Shīʿī School  (Leiden: Brill, 2007). 
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usually known as al-Fāḍil al-Tūnī, in addition to the work of Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ al-
Māzandarānī (d. 1675), commonly known for his commentary on al-Kāfī. Moreover, the 
other uṣūlī works of the period, according to what is known and available to us to date, 
are from Iṣfahān. According to the research of Poor, such works include the works of 
Khalīl al-Qazwīnī, Ḥusayn al-Khwunsārī, and Jamāl Khwunsārī.69 Furthermore, even the 
Akhbārī works, which were of a philosophical character, had their roots in Iṣfahān (i.e. 
the philosophical school of Iṣfahān) such as the work of al-Fayḍ al-Kāshānī (d. 1680).  
A close reading of the biography of the founder of the Bahbahānian paradigm, al-Waḥīd 
al-Bahbahānī, shows that Iṣfahānī elements are apparent in his education and family 
network. Al-Bahbahānī was originally from Iṣfahān and had gained his primary religious 
education there from his close family, especially his father, and another Iṣfahānī 
teacher. From his mother’s side he was a descendant of Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ al-
Māzandarānī, who was one of the rational movement’s figures in the Akhbārī period and 
who studied under his son Muḥammad Ḥusayn as well. Al-Bahbahānī was well aware of 
the thought of his uncle, al-Māzandarānī, as is evident from references to him in some 
of his uṣūlī works.70 This much is with regard to al-Bahbahānī’s educational and family 
ties to Iṣfahān; the epistemological ties of al-Bahbahānī to the philosophical school of 
Iṣfahān will be discussed in detail later on. 
1.2.2. The Emergence of Akhbārism 
Akhbārism is a Shīʿī jurisprudential school of thought which emerged at the beginning of 
the seventeenth century. Usually, the foundation of the school is attributed to 
Muḥammad Amīn al-Astarābādī (d.1036/1627). The least that can be said is that al-
Astarābādī’s thought constitutes an essential element of Akhbārism. The effects of 
Akhbārism on the thought of al-Bahbahānī cannot be denied. Some scholars might 
even go further and claim that the entirety of al-Bahbahānī’s thought was a response to 
the challenges of Akhbārism. However, the manner in which the influence of Akhbārism 
(and not only the thought of al-Astarābādī) can be traced in al-Bahbahānī's thought 
                                            
69 Poor, Tārīkh ʿIlm al-Uṣūl, pp. 224-40. 
70 See, for example, Risālat al-Ijtihād wa al-Akhbār in al-Bahbahānī, Muḥammad Bāqir Akmal, al-Rasāʾil al-Uṣūliyya  
(Qum: Muʾassasat al-ʿAllāmah al-Mujaddid al-Waḥīd al-Bahbahānī, 1995), p.26. 
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requires a nuanced analysis.. The central goal in this section will be to identify the role 
Akhbārism played in the formation of the Bahbahānian paradigm. 
Many aspects of Akhbārī thought are considered as reactions against the formation of 
Shīʿī jurisprudence, which was formulated by Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf al-Ḥillī, famous as al-
ʿAllāmah and his students. Consequently, it is a matter of debate whether the Akhbārīs 
were successful in providing an alternative jurisprudential theory or not. However, there 
are two points which cannot be denied. First, in terms of uṣūlī methodologies, Akhbārī 
challenges forced the Uṣūlīs to make a serious revision to their theories, concepts, and 
applications. Second, the huge and immense Akhbārī output during the second half of 
the Safavid period affected Shīʿī thought generally, including Shīʿī uṣūl al-fiqh. They 
were successful in producing three influential ḥadīth encyclopaedias: al-Biḥār by al-
Majlisī (d. 1699),71 al-Wasāʾil by al-Ḥurr al-ʿĀmilī (d. 1692),72 and al-Wāfī by al-Fayḍ al-
Kāshānī (d. 1680).73 The value of these ḥadīth encyclopaedias was such that no 
subsequent jurist could ignore them. These works became the primary sources for both 
deriving legal principles and reflecting on theological matters; they were also popular 
among ordinary Shīʿī believers. 
A close reading of Akhbārī works shows that there are some elements which seek to 
espouse a pure Shīʿī identity as a reflection of the Safavid anti-Sunnī rhetoric. For 
example, accusations of the Uṣūlīs being influenced by Sunnī thought appear frequently 
in Akhbārī works. This can be seen in the methodological rejection of ẓuhūr (prima-facie 
meaning) of the Qurʾān unless it is interpreted by the Imām and the condemnation of 
consensus (al-ijmāʿ). Furthermore, Akhbārīs (and al-Astarābādī in particular) argued 
against the philosophical school of Iṣfahān and attempted to transcend the Aristotelian 
epistemological framework. Al-Astarābādī, for example, maintained that religious 
                                            
71 al-Majlisī, Muḥammad Bāqir, Biḥār al-Anwār fī Akhbār al-Aʾimmat al-Aṭhār, vol. 74 (Beirūt). 
72 al-ʿAmilī ,Muḥammad bin al-Ḥasan al-Ḥurr, Tafṣīl Wasāʾil al-Shīʿa ilā Masāʾil al-Sharīʿa  (Iran: Muʾassasat Ahl al-
Bayt li-Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth, 1994). 
73 al-Kāshānī, Muḥammad Muḥsin al-Fayḍ, Al-Wāfī  (Iran: Maktabat Amīr al-Muʾminīn, 1991). 
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knowledge (or at least divine law) is based on ordinary knowledge (al-ʿilm al-ʿādī) and 
not the Aristotelian concept of knowledge which dominated Shīʿī uṣūlī thought.74  
In the light of the above, I would argue that the Akhbārī movement affected the 
Bahbahānian paradigm only in the methodological respect in which the Bahbahānian 
paradigm was formed later on. Its methodology was, to a considerable extent, a 
response to Akhbārī methodological challenges. This is because the main question of 
the Akhbārī movement was the validity of Uṣūlī methodology in deriving legal issues, 
and they were not so concerned about the theological or the philosophical framework of 
Uṣūlīsm except to the extent which it relates to methodological procedure. Gleave, in 
his excellent work on the Akhbārī school, has concluded that ‘the Akhbārī school is best 
seen as founded by Muḥammad Amīn al-Astarābādī (d. 1036/1626-7) and sees its 
fundamental doctrine as being the rejection of ijtihād as a legitimate legal mechanism 
for the production of legal rulings’.75 This was precisely what concerned al-Astarābādī 
according to his work al-Fawāʿid al-Madaniyya.76 Furthermore, Akhbārī figures were 
able to commit to, broadly speaking, one legal doctrine, but subscribed to a variety of 
theological and philosophical schools. It did not matter of whether an Akhbārī scholar 
was a Sūfī or a philosopher (associated to the philosophical school of Iṣfahān) or a 
theologian (mutakallim), as long as his legal doctrine was that of Akhbārīsm. Finally, the 
only ways Akhbārīsm provided an alternative to Uṣūlī thought was with respect to legal 
methodology and thus they were mainly a methodological movement. In effect, this was 
what the Bahbahānian paradigm was concerned with and responded to, as we shall see 
below77 in detail. 
1.2.3. Avoidance of Politics and Institutionalising the Marjiʿiyya 
It is believed amongst some scholars that al-Muḥaqqiq al-Ḥillī (d. 1277) (and the School 
of al Ḥillah generally) was the first jurist to extend the authority of the Shīʿī jurist in the 
                                            
74 al-Astarābādī, Muḥammad Amīn, al-Fawāʾid al-Madaniyya, 2nd ed. (Qum: Muʾassasat al-Nashr al-Islāmī, 2005), 
p.105. 
75 See Gleave ‘Continuity and Originality in Shīʿī Thought: The Relationship between the Akhbāriyya and the Maktab-i 
Tafkīk’, in Denis Hermann and Sabrina Mervin, Shi’i Trends and Dynamics in Modern Times (XVIIIth-XXth Centuries)  
(Beirut: Orient-Institut, 2010), pp.82-3. Also, Gleave, Scripturalist Islam: The History and Doctrines of the Akhbārī 
Shīʿī School, esp. pp.10-31. 
76 See his preface in his famous work, al-Astarābādī, Al-Fawāʾid al-Madaniyya, p.28. 
77 See: 51 
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Shīʿī community by accepting ijtihād as a tool for deriving legal rulings and establishing 
their foundations.78 This extended authority had become notable and significant both 
theoretically and practically in the Safavid period, when the Shīʿī jurist accepted the role 
of nāʾib al-imām and engaged with the Safavid regime. However, the experience did not 
end well, especially for the Arab Shīʿī scholars who came from Lebanon and were, in a 
sense, the leaders of the uṣūlī trend. After roughly a century of engagement with the 
Safavid court, the Arab Shīʿī scholars, namely the ʿĀmilīs, decided to leave the empire. 
The remaining Uṣūlī scholars, who were at that time dominated by Persians, were left to 
face challenges such as Akhbārīm and Ṣūfīsm. This participation in, and resignation 
from, politics in the Safavid empire was, it can be said, later on theoretically represented 
as the functional framework of the Bahbahānian paradigm when it was formed in the 
early age of the Qājār period. Considering the Bahbahānian paradigm in terms of its 
functional extension, it seems that the paradigm tends to establish foundations for an 
independence of the Shīʿī jurist from the state. Furthermore, it would lead, and had led 
in effect, to the centrality of the jurist in the Shīʿī community and to an institutionalisation 
of the religious authority (al-marjiʿiyya). Finally, it would operate to prevent the utilising 
of Shīʿī jurisprudence for political purposes by temporal regimes. Although the 
emergence of the Shīʿī marjiʿiyya as a centralised authority in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries could not simply be attributed to jurisprudential developments, the 
jurisprudential foundations were addressed as reflecting power relations. 
Scholars who have studied the history of the Shīʿī marjiʿiyya or the early Qājār period 
have noticed that Shīʿī scholars generally (and the religious institution specifically) 
gained, to a certain extent, an independence from the state, or at least there was a clear 
distance between them when compared with the Safavid period.79 ‘By the end of the 
nineteenth century the ground was prepared for the direct involvement of the ʿulamaʾ in 
the political currents of Iran and Iraq’.80 In addition, they have noticed the emergence of 
                                            
78 Norman Calder, ‘Doubt and Prerogative: The Emergence of an Imāmī Shīʿī Theory of Ijtihād’, in Studia Islamica, 
vol. 20 (1989). Also, see: Moussavi, Religious Authority in Shi’ite Islam: From the Office of Mufti to the Institution of 
Marja’, pp. 29-30. 
79 Litvak, M, Shīʿī Scholars of Nineteenth-Century Iraq: The ‘Ulama’ of Najaf and Karbala (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002). 
80 Moussavi, Religious Authority in Shi’ite Islam: From the Office of Mufti to the Institution of Marja’: p. 4. 
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a centralised Shīʿī marjiʿiyya in a particular city, usually one of the Shīʿī shrine cities, in 
contrast to the pre-Safavid and Safavid period where there was a dominance of one city 
but not an institutional centrality. By studying the Bahbahānian paradigm, as we will do 
in detail later on81, it seems that the paradigm includes some fundamental ideas that 
interrelate somehow with the socio-political reality, especially the centrality of the Shīʿī 
marjiʿiyya. As Moussavi suggests, ‘the crystallization of the offices of mujtahid and 
marjaʿ in the post-Safavid era can only be fully understood with a full understanding of 
the popularity of taqlīd and the devotional attachment to the symbols of the Imam in the 
persons of his vicegerents’.82 For example, by means of the Bahbahānian paradigm, the 
concept of ijtihād and taqlīd became stricter such that each believer was obliged to 
follow a scholar for fear of invalidating his religious practice. This was later on added to 
by the compulsory following of the supreme and most knowledgeable scholar. 
Considering the mechanism for deriving legal rulings, the way of gaining the stature of 
ijtihād and the justification for following the scholar’s opinion, it is clear how the 
Bahbahānian paradigm was functioning in a socio-political reality, as we shall later see 
in detail83. 
To sum up, the Bahbahānian paradigm, which was formed during the Safavid period 
and which emerged in the early Qājār age, was both a result of and a response to 
specific socio-intellectual circumstances. It consisted of three socio-intellectual factors: 
(i) the growth of philosophy amongst Shīʿī religious institutions by the philosophical 
school of Iṣfahān, (ii) the emergence of Akhbārism, and (iii) the avoidance of politics 
and the institutionalisation of the marjiʿiyya after the ʿĀmilīs political experiences. These 
factors represent epistemological, methodological, and functional frameworks 
respectively. These frameworks will be studied in the following section to illustrate the 
characteristics of the Bahbahānian paradigm.  
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82 Ibid., p.6. 
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Figure 1. The Formation of the Bahbahānian paradigm and its intellectual reflections. The 
diagram shows the three factors that contributed in forming the Bahbahānian paradigm and 
then how each one them later on became a framework. Thus, the growth of a philosophical 
tendency represents the epistemological framework, the emergence of Akhbārism represents 
the methodological framework, and, finally, the avoidance of politics and the 
institutionalisation of the marjiʿiyya represents the functional framework. 
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1.3. Characteristics of the Bahbahānian Paradigm 
Having determined the socio-intellectual and historical factors, which formed the 
Bahbahānian paradigm, I will demonstrate the characteristics of the paradigm on three 
levels: (i) the epistemological, (ii) the methodological, and (iii) the functional. These 
three frameworks all together represent the Bahbahānian paradigm. The main argument 
to be presented in this section is that although al-Bahbahānī and his students are 
considered to be continuing the Uṣūlī tradition for their defeating of the Akhbārī school 
and their revival of Uṣūlī thought, the emergence of the Bahbahānian paradigm in those 
particular socio-intellectual and historical circumstances has distinguished it from the 
Uṣūlī paradigm. The distinctiveness of the Bahabhānian paradigm can be divided into 
the three areas outlined above (epistemology, methodology and function).  In this 
section, I aim to show that the distinctiveness in each of these areas can be 
characterised in terms more familiar to the European intellectual tradition as follows.  In 
epistemology, al-Bahbabānī and his followers embraced an Aristotelianism; in 
methodology, they adopted a type of legal formalism; in function, they employed a soft 
utilitarianism.  How these descriptions are apt will become clear in the analysis below..  
1.3.1. The Epistemological Framework of the Bahbahānian Paradigm  
By ‘the epistemological framework’ I mean the theory of knowledge which determines its 
nature, value, and its sources. The Bahbahānian paradigm comrpises, I would argue, a 
particular theory of knowledge and this was applied to uṣūlī concepts and theories, 
especially those which were a part of central jurisprudential discussions, i.e. the field of 
the theory of justification (bāb al-ḥujaj / al-ḥujjiyya) which discusses the sorts of 
evidences that can be reliable for deriving legal rulings. The epistemological framework 
was not only confined to what is called the theoretical reason (al-ʿaql al-naẓarī), but also 
included practical reason (al-ʿaql al-ʿamalī) as a source to establish uṣūlī theories. It 
was first employed by al-Bahbahānī himself, but reached its mature and detailed form at 
the hand of his student Muḥammad Taqī al-Iṣfahānī (d. 1832) 84 which I will use here to 
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demonstrate the epistemological framework of the paradigm. This is due to the fact that 
Muḥammad Taqī al-Iṣfahānī was, of al-Bahbahānī’s students, the one who wrote with 
the greatest ability, and most extensively, about the epistemic foundation of legal 
evidence. Furthermore, his work, Hidāyat al-Mustarshidīn, is a commentary on a work of 
a scholar before the Bahbahānian paradigm, so it can show the differences between 
these two stages and support the argument that the Bahbahānian paradigm is different 
from the Uṣūlī paradigm it replaced. 
This epistemological framework conceives knowledge as it was inherited from the 
philosophical school of Iṣfahān, which in turn was inherited from the works of Naṣīr al-
Dīn al-Ṭūsī, who employed Avicenna’s philosophy in Shīʿī theology. This conception of 
knowledge is mainly based on Aristotelian epistemology which can be found in his 
Posterior Analytics, specifically in his theory of demonstrations and demonstrative 
science85 in his logical work, Organon.86 This Aristotelian tradition found its way into 
Shīʿī thought through al-Ṭūsī’s commentary of Avicenna’s work al-Ishārāt and al-Shifāʾ. 
According to this tradition, the concept of scientific knowledge (al-ʿilm al-yaqīnī) is 
confined to demonstrative knowledge (al-ʿilm al-burhānī), which can be deducted 
through a demonstration (apodeixis/burhān). For a deduction to be demonstrative, its 
premises have to be self-evident (dhātī) or based on self-evident premises, and these 
premises constitute the demonstrative syllogism. Otherwise, what we acquire in another 
deduction would be less than scientific knowledge, that is, it might be supposition 
(ẓunūn) or delusion (wahm) (see Figure 2). In this case, it would not be classified under 
a demonstrative science. Rather, it would be categorised under what Aristotle called a 
dialectical argument.87 This perception of knowledge was the central understanding of 
the Bahbahānian paradigm of scientific knowledge (al-ʿilm), not only for theoretical 
reasons, but also because it transferred its understanding to practical reason (al-ʿaql al-
ʿamalī). Practical reason is understood in this paradigm as moral reasoning which plays 
                                            
85 For further reading about Aristotle’s theory of demonstrations and demonstrative science, see Robin Smith, 
‘Aristotle’s Logic’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2012 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/aristotle-logic/>. 
86 ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Badawī, Manṭiq Arusṭū (Kuwait: Wikālat al-Kuwayt lil-Maṭbūʿāt, 1980). 
87 Abū Radgīf, ʿAmmār, al-Usus al-ʿAqliyya: Dirāsa lil Munṭalaqāt al-ʿAqliyya lil Baḥth fī ʿIlm al-Uṣūl, (Bierut: Dār al-
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a crucial role in deriving many theological and jurisprudential concepts and theories. 
According to the Shīʿī theological tradition, which was inherited from al-Ṭūsī and 
employed in uṣūl al-fiqh, the nature of practical reason’s judgements is demonstrative 
judgements as it was in theoretical reason, though the scope of each reason is different. 
This is what is meant in uṣūlī works by rational evidence (al-dalīl al-ʿaqlī).88 Thus, strictly 
speaking, the Aristotelian concept of knowledge in both theoretical and practical 
reasoning is that which resulted merely from self-evident (burhānī) premises. 
 
Type of Knowledge Demonstrative Science Ordinary Science       
Premise 1 Self-evident (dhātī) Supposed (maẓnūn) 
Premise 2 Self-evident (dhātī) Supposed (maẓnūn)/self-evident 
Conclusion Certain (burhān) Speculative (ẓannī) 
Figure 2. An illustration of the concept of knowledge in Aristotelian epistemology. Each column 
represents a logical syllogism. The column headed ‘demonstrative science’ contains two self-
evident premises. The column headed ‘ordinary science’ contains two less certain premises, 
which is why it is not a demonstrative science (burhānī), rather it is a dialectical science in logical 
terms and an ordinary science in jurisprudential terms. 
 
Al-Ijtihād wa al-Akhbār is a very important early treatise of al-Bahbahānī to which he 
often refers in his later works. Al-Ijtihād wa al-Akhbār can be understood to contain the 
essence of al-Bahbahānī’s jurisprudential thought.89 In it al-Bahbahānī determines the 
concept of knowledge (al-ʿilm) as it was found in the Aristotelian tradition. The reason 
for choosing this particular conception might be attributed to his concern for the 
challenges of Akhbārism. One main challenge was the claim that it is only through 
akhbār that we would gain certain knowledge, whereas the Uṣūlī approach only 
                                            
88 In modern Shīʿī uṣūl al-fiqh there is a new trend which sees the nature of practical reason’s judgements not as a 
demonstrative judgment, but as a collective agreement. This trend is known as a trend of philosophers (ḥukamāʾ), 
and its leading figure is Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Iṣfahānī, along with his student Muhammad Riḍā al-Muẓaffar. For 
more details, see ibid., pp. 97-149. 
89 Al-Bahbahānī, Al-Rasāʾil al-Uṣūliyya, pp.3-229. 
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provides supposition (ẓunūn). Hence, the best solution, he argues, would be to restrict 
the concept of knowledge (al-ʿilm) to a very limited scope by choosing the Aristotelian 
perspective and, therefore, to portray what is gained by most of the akhbār as a less 
than certain knowledge. In effect, this was what he did in this treatise. Al-Bahbahānī 
spent a large part of his treatise, providing extensive discussion, trying to prove that 
most of what we acquire from textual sources is not certain knowledge; rather it is mere 
supposition (ẓunūn). The reason is that certain knowledge is only rational knowledge 
(al-ʿilm al-ʿaqlī) or what is based on it.90 This kind of knowledge has to be followed 
rationally, because its authority (ḥujjiyya) is an essential proof (dhātī) and cannot be 
legislated from any external source. Accordingly, for any claimed evidence or method to 
be a source of religious knowledge, it has to be based on this kind of knowledge in 
order to gain religious authority (ḥujja sharʿiiyya). This idea was developed and 
extensively discussed by al-Bahbahānī’s students, and then it became the 
epistemological foundation of Shīʿī jurisprudence for more than a century before it was 
explicitly acknowledged in the twentieth century. The best proponent of this dimension 
of the Bahbahānian paradigm was al-Bahbahānī’s student, Muḥammad Taqī al-
Iṣfahānī, who wrote a commentary on a famous jurisprudential work, Maʿālim al-Dīn wa 
Malādh al-Mujtahidīn, called Hidāyat al-Mustarshidīn ilā Maʿālim al-Dīn. When al-
Iṣfahānī reached the topic of consensus (ijmāʿ) as the first topic of non-hermeneutical 
evidence in al-Maʿālim, he devoted a separate treatise to discussing extensively the 
subject of supposition (al-ẓann). This treatise later on received a commentary 
excellently written by his son, Muḥammad Bāqir al-Iṣfahānī (d. 1884), which 
summarised the whole of the Shīʿī jurisprudential debate on the issue of supposition 
and knowledge in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.91 
In Muḥammad Taqī al-Iṣfahānī ‘s treatise, before he discusses its central topic, he 
provides five introductory points which represent the epistemological framework of his 
discussion. A summary of these points is as follows: the first is the meaning of the 
evidence; the second is that the evidence is divided into an essential proof and one 
                                            
90 Ibid., p.223. 
91 Muḥammad Bāqir al-Iṣfahānī, Sharḥ Hidāyat al-Mustarshidīn  (Qum: ʿAṭr al-ʿIṭrah, 2007). 
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which is based on the essential proof; the third is that the authority of any evidence is 
merely that which provides knowledge (al-ʿilm); the fourth is whether the reason for 
following the evidence, which provides the knowledge, is because it discovers the reality 
of religious rulings or because it provides practically apparent religious rulings; the fifth 
is whether the authority of a supposition (al-ẓann) in the period of the occultation is for 
all kinds of supposition or is restricted to particular ones. Then, he discusses the 
objections of following suppositions (al-ẓunūn), the evidences that support following the 
particular supposition (al-ẓunūn al-khāṣṣa), the refuting of the opinion of following any 
supposition, and finally discussing the authority of the fame (al-shuhrah). 
By considering this treatise, and particularly the five points above, it can be argued that 
Bahbahānī’s employment of the Aristotelian concept of knowledge became the central 
epistemological foundation of his paradigm and a critical tool for establishing most of the 
influential uṣūlī theories. The effects of this epistemological framework can be seen, as 
ʿAbū Radgīf argues, in the two central bodies of Shīʿī uṣūl al-fiqh, namely, the field of 
authority (ḥujjiyya) and the practical principles of religious duties (al-uṣūl al-ʿamaliyya). 
Specifically, this epistemological framework has been employed in deriving a number of 
uṣūlī theories in these important disciplines: the authority of certitude or knowledge (al-
qaṭṭʿ/al-ʿilm), the abnormal certitude (qaṭṭʿ al-qaṭṭʿ), collective knowledge (al-ʿilm al-
ijmālī), the inheritance between rational rule and religious rule (al-mulāzama bayna mā 
ḥakama bihi al-ʿaql wa mā ḥakama bihi al-sharʿ), the presumption (al-tajarī), the 
principle of exoteric meaning (ḥujjiyya al-ẓuhūr), and the principle of rational exemption 
(al-barāʾa al-ʿaqliyya). Furthermore, this epistemological framework has formed the 
structure of Shīʿī uṣūl al-fiqh in which after passing the hermeneutical section the 
sections begin with the most certain evidence to the most doubtful one. This 
epistemological characteristic represented and dominated the Bahbahānian paradigm 
until it faced the emergence of a new modern paradigm, as we shall see later92.  
1.3.2. The Methodological Framework of the Bahbahānian Paradigm 
By ‘the methodological framework’ here I mean the legal mechanism of deriving legal 
issues which the jurist is meant to follow. Therefore, it refers to the procedure, method, 
                                            
92 See: 58 
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and structure of legal evidences. The Bahbahānian paradigm is methodologically 
characterised by several features. Firstly, if al-Majlisī’s statement that Uṣūlīs forget their 
uṣūl when they do fiqh (by which he referred to the observation that many Uṣūlī 
concepts and principles had been established theoretically without any practical 
application in deriving legal issues) is accurate with regard to the paradigm of his time,93 
it is not accurate for the Bahbahānian paradigm. Shīʿī uṣūl al-fiqh before al-Bahbahānī 
was very much concerned with Sunnī dialogue in a way that many of its issues 
confirmed Shīʿī theological attitudes but in uṣūlī language. This clearly differentiated 
uṣūl al-fiqh and fiqh where many uṣūlī theories were useless in Shīʿī fiqh, such as the 
theory of consensus (ijmāʿ). With the Bahbahānian paradigm, the uṣūlī theories became 
leading tools in deriving rulings in a way that the differences between one jurist and 
another in fiqh can be attributed to their uṣūlī bases. 
Secondly, the Bahbahānian paradigm firmly differentiates between two kinds of 
evidence: the first is what is called proof (dalīl) and the second is the principle (aṣl). 
Although this distinction existed before, the Bahbahānian paradigm contributed a 
theoretical framework, clarifying its characteristics and providing a clear procedure for 
applying it. Accordingly, this paradigm reflected a distinctive differentiation between two 
categories of evidence: the first is known as al-adilla al-ijtihādiyya and the other is al-
adillah al-faqqahatiyya.94  
Thirdly, as a result of the previous point, the extension of the practical principles 
reflected a particular methodological mentality which dominated the Bahbahānian 
paradigm. This mentality is what is called cautious reason or what others described as 
the jurisprudence of constants.96 It is characterised by seeking certainty in religious 
knowledge; in cases of uncertainty, the jurist is, supposedly, reluctant to use his 
personal reasoning to express a preference of one possible answer over another. 
Rather, he would methodologically seek to exercise caution by applying one of the 
                                            
93 Al-Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār fī Akhbār al-Aʾimmat al-Aṭhār, vol.74, p.222. 
94 Al-Waḥīd al-Bahbahānī is said to have first distinguished these two kinds of legal evidence and the concepts have 
been given a sophisticated elaboration by Murtaḍā al-Anṣārī. See ʿAlīpoor, Tārīkh ʿIlm al-Uṣūl, p.262. 
96 al-Mudarrisī, Muḥammad Taqī, al-Tashrīʿ al-Islāmī: Manāhijuhu wa-Maqāṣiduhu, 10 vols., vol. 2 (Tehran: Dār 
Intishārāt Mudarrisī, 1992), p.105. 
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practical principles in the case under investigation. This mentality was, I would argue, 
the result of two main factors: the first is an academic factor, which is related to the 
Uṣūlī-Akhbārī conflict regarding the question of to what extent we can gain religious 
knowledge in the Imām’s absence and whether knowledge is attainable or not. To 
answer this question, Uṣūlīs discussed in depth what is known in uṣūlī literature as the 
closing of the door of knowledge (insidād bāb al-ʿilm).97 The second is a socio-political 
factor which is related to the religious institution’s wish at the time to avoid being a part 
of any temporal regime and seeking to establish its centrality. This factor resulted in the 
derivation of rulings being restricted, as much as possible, to textual sources or practical 
principles such that the jurist is the only one who can do ijtihād and no one else. In spite 
of the cautious approach, methodologically the jurist in the Bahbahānian paradigm 
gained authority and in practice he would take into account several socio-political 
circumstances when he derived rulings as we shall see below98 in our discussion on the 
functional framework of the paradigm. 
Finally, as a result of the extension of the practical principles, the tendency of 
abstracting uṣūlī and fiqhī principles and rules (al-qawāʿid al-uṣūliyyah wa al-fiqhiyyah) 
featured in the Bahbahānian paradigm methodologically. Despite the existence of some 
works in uṣūlī and fiqhī rules before, in this paradigm it shifted profoundly in terms of 
quality and quantity. This can be seen in the literature written on the established ‘non-
harm’ (lā ḍarar) rule and also it is obvious in Shaikh al-Anṣarī’s (d. 1864) works, 
especially his book al-Makāsib. This reflects the point stated above about cautious 
reason in which the jurist attempts to be very close to the text and to abstract the rule 
that extends the scope of the text as much as possible before he goes to the practical 
principles. On the other hand, the tendency towards al-qawāʿid especially after Shaikh 
al-Anṣarī, indicated the limitation of the Bahbahānian paradigm’s methodology. Hence, 
the jurist was confused between being close to the text as an expression of cautious 
reason and overriding the limitation of this methodology. The qawāʿid tendency was the 
middle way. 
                                            
97 The most extensive discussion of this topic can be found in al-Anṣārī’s work. See al-Anṣārī, Murtaḍā, Farāʾid al-
Uṣūl, vol. 1 (Qum: Majmaʿ al-Fikr al-Islāmī, 1998), pp. 384-620. 
98 See on page 53 
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1.3.3. The Functional Framework of the Bahbahānian Paradigm 
By ‘the functional framework’ I mean the relationship between the legal mechanism of 
deriving rulings and the social reality of the jurist and his society, which here refers to 
the Shīʿī or Islamic community generally. Accordingly, jurisprudence here is seen as an 
epistemological authoritative tool which can be used in society. From this perspective, I 
would argue that the Bahbahānian paradigm was characterised by two functional 
features, which were in effect correlating with the epistemological and methodological 
frameworks of the paradigm.  
Firstly, in addition to the basic and assumed function of any Islamic jurisprudential 
system which is to provide legal rulings for the believer to follow, the character of the 
Bahbahānian paradigm is functionally more than that. That is to say, it was formed in a 
way that would centralise socio-political and religious authority under the Shīʿī religious 
institution represented by the Shīʿī jurist. The paradigm emphasises the provision of 
legal issues solely through the jurist (mujtahid) in which his opinion regarding legal 
issues have to be followed. This is apparent in the field of ijtihād and taqlīd and it might 
reflect the circumstances surrounding the emergence of the Bahbahānian paradigm 
where many parties sought to gain authority in Shīʿī society at that time. There were 
Shīʿī rulers represented by the Shāh, the leaders of Shīʿī Ṣūfī orders, and the 
transmitters of the accounts of the actions and words of the Prophet and Imams (the 
muḥaddithīn).. The reason for this claim is that since the onset of the Bahbahānian 
paradigm the centralisation of Shīʿī religious institution can obviously be seen. 
Furthermore, the system of taqlīd has firmly been established under the shadow of this 
paradigm. Reflecting on some jurisprudential issues in this period, some support for this 
view can be found. For example, the issue of ḥujjiyyat al-ẓann, and the way that the 
Uṣūlīs have justified following it, would eventually assert the authority of the jurist’s 
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opinion. For instance the idea of following interests (al-maṣlaḥah al-sulūkiyya),99 tanjīz 
al-wāqiʿ bi-qawl al-faqīh, and al-ijzāʾ all assert the centrality of the jurist. 
Secondly, although Shīʿī uṣūlī thought rejects the idea of public interest (al-maṣlaḥah) 
as the source of deriving legal issues, with the Bahbahānian paradigm this idea 
received significant attention theoretically and practically. Therefore, the concept of 
interest, especially the interest of Islam in general or the Shīʿī community in particular, 
became a crucial source for deriving legal issues, and in particular those issues which 
relate to socio-political affairs. This happened to the extent that it can be argued that 
interest in effect became the backdrop for the jurist in the Bahbahānian paradigm when 
he deals with public affairs. For example, the experiences of the Shīʿī jurists with the 
temporal state since the Ṣafavid era, demonstrate how the concept of interest was 
sometimes the general public interest, and sometimes specifically the interest of 
Shīʿīsm (as the jurists understood it).. The employment of the concept of interest can 
obviously be seen when we consider, for instance, the Tobacco Revolution of 1890, the 
Constitutional Revolution of 1907, and the Revolution of 1920 in Iraq and many public 
issues which are being dealt with in Iran and amongst Shīʿī political movements. 
Although the Bahbahānian paradigm methodologically established the the dual authority 
of the text (naṣṣ) and the principles (uṣūl), in a way that there is no space for making 
exceptions by invoking harm (al-ḍarar), some jurisprudential concepts were created to 
reinforce the practical application of the notion of interest. These applications are known 
as ‘secondary rulings’ (al-aḥkām al-thānawiyya), and are based on principles such as 
the principle of embracement (al-ḥaraj), necessity (al-ḍarūra), and the ruling of authority 
(al-aḥkām al-wilāʾiyya). Before the Bahbahānian paradigm there were few discussions 
on these concepts. However, from the inception of the Bahbahānian paradigm onward 
these concepts became jurisprudential objects, and afterwards they became fiqhī 
objects. Moreover, they were profoundly developed on the theoretical level in a way that 
enabled the jurist to use them as tools when he dealt with public affairs. In a word, as a 
                                            
99 This term has been created by Murtaḍā al-Anṣārī as a solution to one of the famous jurisprudential problems that 
appeared with the Bahbahānian paradigm, specifically, how to council between the apparent judgment which results 
from legal evidence and the assumed real judgment (al-ḥukm al-wāqiʾī). See al-Ṣadr, Muḥammad Bāqir, Durūs fī al-
Uṣūl, 2nd ed., 3 vols., vol. 2 (Beirut: al-Sharikah al-ʿĀlamiyyah lil-Kitāb, 1986), pp.17-23. 
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result of the political experience of the Shīʿī jurist since the Safavid era, the concept of 
interest was significantly developed not to be justified as a source of deriving legal 
issues. Rather, it was developed in order to be a practical tool in the hand of the jurist to 
fulfil the function of jurisprudence, which is the interest of the community, in a way that 
can be described in the Western tradition as ‘soft-utilitarian’. This type of utilitarianism 
can be distinguished from ‘hard-utilitarianism’ which, according to the approach of 
Bentham, simply bases its moral foundation on pain and pleasure. However, soft-
utilitarianism still allows individual and societal interest to be taken into account when 
legal rulings are issued. 
 
Figure 3. The characteristics of the Bahbahānian paradigm: epistemological, methodological, and 
functional frameworks. In the theoretical establishment, the diagram shows the epistemological 
framework which seeks the most certain knowledge and the methodological framework which 
proceeds from the text to the principle. In the practice of the socio-political jurist, the diagram 
shows the functional framework which underpins the theoretical establishment. Interest (maṣlaḥa) 
is a crucial element of this functional framework. 
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Figure 4. Overview of the formation and characteristics of the Bahbahānian paradigm. It is a 
combination of Figures 1 and 3, in which Figure 1 represents the socio-political, historical, and 
intellectual factors that contributed to the emergence of the Bahbahānian paradigm. Figure 3 
represents its epistemological, methodological, and functional characteristics. 
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1.4. Challenges of the Bahbahānian Paradigm and the Tendencies 
of Reformation  
The Bahbahānian paradigm became the dominant trend in Shīʿī jurisprudence in the 
middle of the eighteenth century and the works of its main figures were circulated in the 
Shīʿī religious schools in Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, and the Gulf. Using Kuhn’s metaphorical 
conception of the paradigm formation process,100 the Bahbahānian paradigm was 
established and progressed to a second stage where it would be circulated, taught, 
explained in detail, and institutionalised as it was the only valid paradigm for the field. 
This is exactly what happened to the Bahbahānian paradigm. The Uṣūlī schools 
dominated the Shīʿī learning cities, their works were the main textbooks for studying 
Shīʿī jurisprudence and they have been extensively commented on since then. 
However, this paradigm has encountered several challenges since the beginning of the 
twentieth century in the form of critique and attempted modification. Three main 
challenges have affected the Bahbahānian paradigm: (i) the fall of the Islamic caliphate 
and the rise of the nation state, (ii) the undermining of the Aristotelian epistemological 
paradigm and (iii) the rise of a modern Shīʿī state in Iran. Having mentioned these 
challenges, I would argue that the common point between them is that Shīʿī religious, 
as well as socio-political, experience has shifted from focusing on individuals and small 
communities to focusing on societal matters and the larger society. In the other words, 
the discourse of Shīʿī jurisprudence has shifted to the public sphere and societal 
concerns. Accordingly, this shifting required a modification of, or transfer from, the 
Bahbahānian paradigm to an alternative. At this stage, I will review the attempts 
suggested as alternatives to the Bahbahānian paradigm which can be summarised into 
three principal tendencies. These will be discussed below. I will then study one of them 
in detail as the case study of the research. 
 
1.4.1. The Fall of the Islamic Caliphate and the Rise of the Nation State 
                                            
100 T. S. Kuhn and I. Hacking, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: 50th Anniversary Edition  (University of 
Chicago Press, 2012), pp.66-77. 
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The rise of the nation state after the fall of the Islamic Caliphate in the early decades of 
the twentieth century is seen as the beginning of secularisation of Islamic communities 
especially in the Middle East region. Although some might argue that the secularisation 
of Islamic communities began in the late period of the Ottoman Empire, or in the era of 
Muḥammad ʿAlī Bāshā for the Arab world, the falling of the Islamic caliphate made the 
process of secularisation systematic.101 In particular, for the Arab world and maybe 
partly for Iran, which are of interest here, the rise of the nation state and the systematic 
secularisation of the public sectors, especially education, represented a serious 
challenge for religious institutions. It was the moment when the question of the validity 
and consistency of religious discourse for the modern age insistently arose. Also, it was 
a moment of the manifesting of a new educated social class which had been 
challenging religious authority. In other words, the rise of the nation state is seen as a 
practical application of modernity in Islamic communities, especially in the public 
sectors. For Shīʿī communities, especially in Iraq and Iran where the central learning 
cities were, the challenge of modernity was slightly delayed in comparison to the Sunnī 
experience. For Iran, it can be dated by the rise of the Pahlavi regime and for Iraq it was 
after the revolution of 1920. In any case, the secular state and the secularisation of the 
public sectors posed many questions in front of the religious discourse, of which the 
Bahbahānian paradigm at that time (in terms of Shīʿī jurisprudence) was dominant. 
Accordingly, at this time, Sunnī as well as Shīʿī religious debate witnessed considerable 
calls for the renewal of theology and law, so that they might be consistent with the 
modern age. These can be seen in the tendency to re-open the door of ijtihād in Sunni 
thought, for instance, and in calling for renewing the religious learning curricula, the 
need for new theology and the tendency to renew jurisprudence in Shīʿī thought. 
 
1.4.2. The Undermining of the Aristotelian Epistemological Paradigm 
                                            
101 Bishārah believes that the relationship between religion and secularism can only be understood with a historical 
reading of the secularisation of the Islamic community. For that he proposed an intellectual project to study the 
matter. He suggests that the starting point of this historical reading should begin with the late period of the Ottoman 
Empire. See Bishārah, ʿAzmī, al-Dīn wa al-ʿAlmāniyyah fī Siyāq Tārīkhī  (Qatar: Arab Centre for Research and 
Political Studies). 
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For a long time, Aristotle was seen as a symbol of a school of thought rather than as 
merely a great philosopher. Aristotelianism was not only seen to be a philosophical 
school which was confined to the topic of metaphysics, but it was also seen as a 
framework for many academic disciplines, including science as we know it today. For a 
long time Aristotelianism could be found at the centre of the curriculum of religious 
schools in Europe, whether Catholic or Protestant.102 The same can roughly be said of 
the curricula of Islamic schools. Subsequently, criticising the Aristotelian framework was 
seen as a sign of the beginning of the modern age in general and of science in 
particular. However, if criticism of Aristotelianism in science was felt to be paving the 
way to development, it was not seen to be doing so in religious matters. Criticising the 
Aristotelian framework raised many questions for religious thinking which, in some 
cases, led to profound theological change. Although the Christian world (and possibly 
the Jewish world as well) experienced this challenge early, the Islamic world possibly 
encountered this shift in the middle of the nineteenth century. However, it had become a 
serious intellectual challenge by the first quarter of the twentieth century, when Islamic 
scholars began to seek alternatives to, as well as solutions for, this challenge. Scholars 
started to call for a new Islamic theology which took into account scientific and 
intellectual changes when dealing with theological issues.103 In the light of theological 
discussions, the concerns moved to other Islamic fields, of which jurisprudence was 
one. This was not surprising considering the correlation between the two fields. 
Although Jamāl al-Din al-Afghānī’s Shīʿīsm is a matter of debate, some prefer to date 
the beginning of Shīʿī disputes over modernity to the inception of his new theology. But 
the serious discussions (possibly accompanied by practice), as others would argue,104 
regarding the new theology amongst Shīʿī scholars started with the generation of al-
Ṭabāṭabāʾī (d. 1981) and his students, followed by other scholars in Iraq and Lebanon. 
                                            
102 R. Porter, K. Park, and L. Daston, The Cambridge History of Science: Volume 3, Early Modern Science  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p.26. 
103 For a comprehensive reading of the emergence of the so-called new theology in the Islamic context and how 
Muslim scholars conceived it, see al-Rifāʿī, ʿAbd aljabār. al-Ijtihād al-Kalāmī: Manāhij wa Ruʾā Mutanāwiʿah fī al-
Kalām al-Jadīd (Beirut: Dār al-Hādī). 
104 Ḥaydar Ḥubballāh argues that for the Shīʿī discourse, al-Tabtabā’ī was the first to begin the trend of the new 
theology. See his ʿIlm al-Kalām al-Jadīd Qirāʾah Awwaliyyah. http://aafaqcenter.com/index.php/post/669. Accessed: 
02/07/2014. 
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Many topics have been discussed within the new field of theology. A heated topic of 
debate was the validity of legal methodology, which in effect relates directly to the 
essence of jurisprudence. Needless to say, also present was the question of the validity 
of the Aristotelian framework, especially in its Shīʿī version for jurisprudence.105 The 
debate sometimes ensued by questioning whether Islamic texts were able to be read 
and interpreted by using the new methodologies.106 Ultimately, I would argue that these 
debates, taking into account their intellectual premises, gradually represented a 
considerable pressure over legal and jurisprudential discussions during the second half 
of the twentieth century. This pressure could, to a certain extent, be deemed as a 
significant challenge to the Bahbahānian paradigm as it was the legal paradigm of Shīʿī 
jurisprudence which was in place at the time.  
1.4.3. The Rise of the Modern Shīʿī State in Iran 
Not only was the rise of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979 a significant event for the 
Shīʿah, it was also an important event for all Middle-Eastern Islamic nations. Islamist 
movements in the Middle East were especially influenced by the revolution. The Islamic 
Republic of Iran was seen as the first modern Islamic state since the fall of the Islamic 
caliphate in the early decades of the twentieth century. However, for the Shīʿī 
experience, the revolution was more significant. The Shīʿa had historical experiences of 
political participation with some regimes, both Shīʿī and Sunnī. Also, they experienced, 
to a significant extent, a clerical involvement in politics, especially with issues closely 
related to governmental affairs. The first political experience was with the Safavid 
empire during the seventeenth century. The second political experience was with the 
Constitutional Revolution of 1905 in the Qājār period. The rise of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran in 1979 was the first Shīʿī political experiment to be led by a Shīʿī jurist, seeking 
Islamic rule in a modern age. Interestingly, although the revolution was regionally in 
Iran, the most important Shīʿī regions and nations were involved with the revolution. 
Cohesion could be seen throughout Iraq, the Gulf, and Lebanon. Interaction took place 
not only in the nations and among ordinary people, but also in the elite classes of these 
                                            
105 Al-Ijtihād al-Kalāmī: Manāhij wa Ruʾā Mutanāwiʿah fī al-Kalām al-Jadīd, p.294. 
106 Ibid., p.267. 
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nations. The participation of jurists in Shīʿī religious learning cities would affect not only 
the socio-political dimensions of these societies, but also the intellectual dimension of 
Shīʿī thought generally. In effect, what had happened, I would argue, was that the rise 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979 represented a real examination of a common 
slogan of the Islamist movement saying ‘Islam is a solution’, and in particular for Shīʿī 
jurisprudence. After the success of the revolution, many constitutional and legal issues 
appeared before Shīʿī jurists such that they were forced to revise every single traditional 
issue and attempted to provide an Islamic approach for the basic matters of the state. 
Rafsanjānī (b. 1934) said that they thought that by simply applying Islamic law, they 
would build a strong modern state, but the reality was shocking and more 
complicated.107 Moreover, many scholars under these circumstances revised the validity 
of current Shīʿī jurisprudence in dealing with these types of modern problems and this 
led them to find a reforming or an alternative approach. For example, Sayyid al-
Khomaynī (d. 1989) delivered an important speech on the effect of time and space on 
deriving legal issues.108 Also, before this, Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr (d. 1980) wrote a 
paper on the Islamic constitution.109 From this time onward, Shīʿī scholars began to take 
the matter of renewing the legal system in general, and jurisprudence in particular, 
seriously. This is reflected in the literature I will survey later, as well as in the 
conferences organised by, and the important speeches delivered by, influential 
scholars.  
1.5. The Alternatives to the Bahbahānian Paradigm 
Having discussed the challenges which were encountered by the Bahbahānian 
paradigm, there were several attempts to provide alternatives to the paradigm. Although 
all the alternatives somehow recognised the challenges, their approaches were 
different. In the sections below I will demonstrate three main tendencies which attempt 
to modify, or move on from, the Bahbahānian paradigm. 
                                            
107 al-Sayf, Tawfīq Ḥudūd al-Dīmuqrātiyya al-Dīniyya (Beirut: Dār al-Sāqī, 2008), pp.81-2. 
108 al-Khomaynī, Rūḥallah, Ṣaḥīfat al-Imām, 21 vols. (Tehran: Muʾassasat Tanẓīm wa Nashr Āthār Imām Khumaynī), 
p.242. 
109 al-Ṣadr, Muḥammad Bāqir, al-Islām Yaqūd al-Ḥayāt, 2nd ed. (Tehran: The Ministry of Islamic Guidance, 1982), 
pp.3-19. 
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1.5.1. Reform within the Bahbahānian Paradigm 
This tendency argues that the Bahbahānian paradigm, especially in terms of its 
epistemological and methodological frameworks, is capable of functioning as a 
mechanism of deriving legal rulings. The only requirement is to improve some of its 
concepts and tools in addition to expanding its scope to accommodate modern issues. 
This means, according to this view, that the progress of Shīʿī jurisprudence happens 
quite normally as it responds to the challenges in each historical stage by improving its 
own concepts and tools. However, what is required now, given these modern 
challenges, is to expand the scope of the paradigm’s effectiveness. This should take 
place through interaction with modern fields, especially those which relate to societal 
issues, such as the political institution, the economic system, and the judicial system. 
Here there are four principal scholars who can be associated with this tendency. They 
are Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr, Muḥammad Mahdī Shams al-Dīn (d. 2001), Muḥammad 
al-Shīrāzī (d. 2002), and ʿAlī Ḥubballāh. The reason for choosing these scholars is that, 
despite differences, they each share a similar approach. 
Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr carefully read the history of Shīʿī uṣūl al-fiqh and, therefore, 
was aware of its developments throughout Shīʿī history.110 Nevertheless, he believed in 
the capacity of the Bahbahānian paradigm, especially with Shaykh al-Anṣārī’s 
contribution, though al-Ṣadr did not identify al-Bahbahāni with a general framework for 
Shīʿī jurisprudence as I am arguing here. Consequently, in terms of his uṣūlī research, 
there were a few attempts to improve the current Shīʿī uṣūlī thought. For example, he 
tried to reconstruct the structure of uṣūl al-fiqh, revise the nature of practical reason and 
its applications in the uṣūlī field, and to produce a few simple and new ideas in several 
uṣūlī issues. However, his real contribution lay not only in these ideas, but also in the 
way he invested uṣūlī tools in societal issues in which he examined the capacity of the 
Bahbahānian paradigm. This can be seen in his approach to ways of dealing with 
contradictory evidence where he argued that the purposes of the law (the maqāṣid al-
sharīʿah) have to be a basis of weighing some evidence over others.111 Moreover, it can 
                                            
110 Al-Ṣadr, al-Maʿālim al-Jadīdah li-ʿIlm al-Uṣūl. 
111 al-Ṣadr, Muḥammad Bāqir, Buḥūth fī ʿIlm al-Uṣūl, 7 vols., vol. 7 (Tehran: Muʾassasat Dār al-Maʿārif, 1997), pp. 
333-4. 
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be seen in his calling for a social reading of the holy texts.112 Essentially, al-Ṣadr 
attempted to invest the uṣūlī concepts and tools in societal issues in a way which 
enables uṣūl al-fiqh to deal more with public concerns as well as with individual ones, 
with a confidence in the capacity of the Bahbahānian paradigm.  
The approach of Muḥammad Mahdī Shams al-Dīn was similar to that of al-Ṣadr but he, 
in addition, addressed sensitive societal issues. He did not generally have a problem 
with the Bahbahānian paradigm. Rather, he appreciated the depth of Shīʿī uṣūlī 
scholars but questioned the extent to which philosophical ideas have been used in a 
field deemed to have a social scope.113 Shams al-Dīn wrote only a few short articles on 
uṣūlī issues and left no systematic work on uṣūl al-fiqh.114 However, he diligently used 
uṣūlī tools when he addressed societal issues, such as the Islamic social institution, the 
political theory of Islamic government, and what he described as sensitive women’s and 
some economic issues. Although he had a sense of maqāṣid al-sharīʿah in his 
approaches to fiqhī matters, which he both dealt with and called for, he did not provide a 
theoretical jurisprudential framework. 
In contrast to Shams al-Dīn, Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī has written extensively on uṣūl al-
fiqh. Al-Shīrāzī’s publications have followed a traditional course, both in terms of the 
way they have been structured and in terms of the way he has commented on the 
traditional textbooks of Shīʿī uṣūl.115 Although al-Shīrāzī did not attempt to provide new 
jurisprudential ideas he did expand the scope of the application of the Bahbahānian 
paradigm so that rulings pertaining to modern affairs could be derived. For example, he 
wrote Islamic laws (fiqh) pertaining to media, politics, globalisation, social institutions, 
traffic, liberty, Islamic government, the economy, the environment, and other matters. 
Thus, al-Shīrāzī, within this tendency, represents a model of a practical application, 
which has attempted to invest the capacity of the Bahbahānian paradigm as much as 
possible as a response to the challenges stated above. 
                                            
112 al-Ṣadr, Muḥammad Bāqir. Ikhtarnā lakum, (Beirut: Dār al-Zahrāʾ, 1975), pp.90-9. 
113 Qanṣū, Mahmūd, al-Muqaddimāt wa al-Tanbīhāt fī Sharḥ Uṣūl al-Fiqh, 8 vols., vol. 1 (Beirut: Dār al-Muʾarikh al-
ʿArābī, 2009), pp.5-34. 
114 For an overview of Shams al-Dīn’s jurisprudential opinions, see al-Mīlād, Zakī, ‘Al-Shaykh Muḥammad Mahdī 
Shams al-Dīn wa al-Naqd al-Manhajī li-Uṣūl al-Fiqh’, al-Kalimah, no. 74 (2012). 
115 al-Shīrāzī, Muḥammad, al-Uṣūl, 8 vols. 
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The last example of this tendency is ʿAlī Ḥubballāh (b. 1961), who is a contemporary 
Shīʿī Lebanese scholar. Although he is more recent than the other scholars mentioned, 
it is reasonable to associate his uṣūlī works with this tendency. In his extensive volume 
on uṣūl al-fiqh, Dirāsāt fī Falsafat Uṣūl al-Fiqh wa al-Sharīʿa wa Naẓariyyat al-
Maqāṣid,116 he discussed the issue of renewing Shīʿī jurisprudence and attempted to 
provide recommendations for improvement. His main criticism was not levied against 
any of the foundations of the Bahbahānian paradigm’s frameworks (the epistemological, 
methodological, and functional frameworks already described). On the contrary, 
Ḥubballāh believes that the Bahbahānian paradigm has the capacity to generate new 
tools and concepts which are able to deal with modern issues. However, this generating 
capacity, according to him, has not correctly been activated. Ḥubballāh, sees his main 
task to be the reactivation of the generating capacity of the Bahbahānian paradigm and 
the establishment of new tools based on the paradigm’s foundation.117 In his view, the 
two principal requirements needed to activate a real sense of ijtihād are: (i) reintegrating 
intellectually with other Islamic legal schools by having comparative studies in 
jurisprudence, and (ii) embracing the theory of maqāṣid al-sharīʿah with a Shīʿī 
foundation.118 
In summary, this tendency was a response to the modern challenges faced by the 
Bahbahānian paradigm. Although each of the four scholars discussed take a different 
approach to the challenge, they all, I would argue, believe in the generating capacity of 
the Bahbahānian paradigm. While some of the four scholars chose to work on uṣūl al-
fiqh more than fiqh (and vice versa) the result has been the witnessing of partial 
changes in the Bahbahānian paradigm. 
1.5.2. Calling for an Alternative Field to Reform 
This tendency argues that the Bahbahānian paradigm has been firmly established and 
has provided many sophisticated tools, concepts, and theories, especially in linguistic 
analysis, the epistemological foundation of justifying the value of legal evidence (what is 
                                            
116 Hubballāh, ʿAlī, Dirāsāt fī Falsafat Uṣūl al-Fiqh wa al-Sharīʿa aa Naẓariyyat al-Maqāṣid. 
117 Ibid., p.10. 
118 Ibid., pp.11-12. 
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known as al-ḥujjiyya), and the practical principle of dealing with unknown cases. 
According to this tendency, the process of self-improvement within current Shīʿī 
jurisprudence is sufficient to meet challenges. However, according to this trend, dealing 
with modern challenges is not the business of uṣūl al-fiqh for both conceptual and 
practical reasons. With regard to conceptual reasons it is argued that the function of 
uṣūl al-fiqh is to determine the reliability of the legal evidence which may be used to 
derive legal rulings. The way to make legal rulings more consistent with the modern age 
and to be able to achieve the purposes of the law is not the prerogative of uṣūl al-fiqh. 
With regard to the practical reasons, it is argued that the field of uṣūl al-fiqh – with its 
extensive subject matter – is already at its capacity and unable to accommodate further 
demands. That is to say, the scholars and students of the field of uṣūl al-fiqh would 
normally take a quite long period of time to make adjustments to jurisprudential theories 
and concepts, let alone to applying them to theories in fiqh. It follows that there must be 
another field to deal with these issues. The process of creating another theoretical field, 
as the argument goes, is the natural process for all fields which have grown and 
expanded. Subsequently, this tendency calls for creating a new field and the most 
popular one which has received much attention and intellectual work is what is called 
‘the philosophy of fiqh’. The famous scholars who represent this advocacy are Mahdī 
Mahrīzī (b. 1962),119 Ḥaydar Ḥubballāh (b. 1973),120 and Muḥammad Muṣṭafawī.121  
Several points have been addressed amongst the scholars who are interested in the 
philosophy of fiqh, the most important of which was the very question of the function of 
the field and its scope. With regard to the nature of the field, there is somehow a 
common agreement amongst the scholars that the purpose of the philosophy of fiqh is 
not the derivation of legal rulings. However, this is not to say that the philosophy of fiqh 
does not indirectly effect the derivation of legal rulings. This would happen, according to 
their argument, by making the jurist aware of what the epistemological, ethical, and 
                                            
119 Mahrīzī, Mahdī, Madkhal ilā Falsafat al-Fiqh, trans. Ḥaydar Najaf (Beirut: Dār al-Hādī, 2002). 
120 Ḥaydar Ḥubballāh presented his ideas regarding the philosophy of fiqh in thirteen lectures. See Ḥaydar Ḥubballāh, 
‘Falsafat al-Fiqh’, http://hobbollah.com/mohazerat_category/%D9%81%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%81%D8%A9-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D9%82%D9%87/ . (accessed online at 22 May 2015). 
121 Muṣṭafawī, Muḥammad, Falsafat al-Fiqh: Dirāsah fī al-Uṣūl al-Manhājiyya lil-Fiqh al-Islāmī (Beirut: Markaz al-
Ḥaḍārah li-Tanmiyyat al-Fikr al-Islāmī, 2000). 
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methodological assumptions of jurisprudence are. With regard to the scope of the field, 
the scholars advocating the philosophy of fiqh, who were mentioned above, have made 
different suggestions. Some have suggested the field should include more than ten 
subjects, whereas others have just suggested just a few subjects. The subjects of 
interest here are only three in number. Firstly, maqāṣid al-sharīʿa: scholars have 
debated whether the purposes of the law are part of the field or whether they are a 
separate field as it is in recent Sunnī literature. Despite differing views, all are agreed 
that awareness of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa is important when dealing with modern issues. 
Secondly, the relationship between fiqh and time: there is a common agreement that 
this subject should be including in the philosophy of fiqh. The basic question of this topic 
is how the changes that take place throughout the ages would affect the mechanism of 
deriving legal issues. Thirdly, hermeneutics: here, also, there is a common agreement 
on including this subject in the field. However, the question of hermeneutics in this 
context is different from the one which is usually dealt with in traditional jurisprudence. 
The question here concerns the relationship between the reader, who is here the jurist, 
as a person attached with a tradition and the text, which is here the holy text. There are 
other topics, which have been debated and discussed in the field, but these three are 
the most relevant to our interest as they reflect an alternative way of dealing with 
modern challenges.  
1.5.3. Calling for a New Paradigm 
In this tendency, the Bahbahānian paradigm is viewed as having reached a dead end in 
which it is epistemologically, methodologically, and functionally incapable of responding 
to modern challenges. It might be used to be consistent with a particular historical 
stage, but given all these new changes, the paradigm is not sufficient any more. 
According to this tendency, which is represented by (and possibly only by) Muḥammad 
Taqī al-Mudarrisī (b. 1945), the Bahbahānian paradigm is characterised by three 
general features that make it both historically confined to a particular situation and 
functionally ineffective. Firstly, the Bahbahānian paradigm was formulated in particular 
historical circumstances, where the Shīʿa were under the pressure of dictatorial and 
sectarian regimes. According to al-Mudarrisī, in these circumstances any group of 
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human beings would be expected to take a defensive position. In terms of 
jurisprudence, this means the derivation of a mechanism that would save the necessary 
elements of the group identity. Al-Mudarrisī calls this ‘the fiqh of the necessity’.122 This 
character manifests itself in jurisprudence in many ways; one way, for instance, is the 
expansion of practical principles (al-uṣūl al-ʿamaliyya), something which has been very 
noticeable in Shīʿī jurisprudence over the last two centuries. The basic idea of practical 
principles is that if there is an absence of textual evidence determining the ruling for a 
specific matter the jurist should apply a practical principle to at least eliminate confusion 
and to at least provide practical instruction. This, in a sense, shows that the Shīʿī jurist 
is uncomfortable with moving away from textual evidence, by providing moral principles 
taken from the purposes of the law rather than a solely practical instruction. 
Furthermore, the dominance of a cautious mentality in the Bahbahānian paradigm is 
another manifestation of the influence of those historical circumstances which, 
according to al-Mudarrisī, reflect a desire to conserve the minimum elements of the 
group’s identity. Secondly, the Bahbahānian paradigm was conceptually and 
functionally established to deal with the legal issues of individuals. As a result, its 
conceptual tools and theories were not able to address collective and societal issues 
whereas in modern societies any legal system would not be valid if it lacks societal as 
well as conceptual tools and theories in deriving legal rulings.123 Thirdly, the 
Bahbahānian paradigm was in many parts based on, as al-Mudarrisī argues, a 
particular philosophical school which infiltrated Shīʿī thought theologically at the 
beginning, and then found its way to jurisprudence. This philosophical school, as al-
Mudarrisī perceives it, is a Hellenistic Greek philosophy generally based on a polemic 
characteristic which is unproductive epistemologically especially in the legal system, in 
his view.124 
Given these criticisms, this tendency calls for a new jurisprudential paradigm which 
represents a break from the Bahbahānian paradigm and will be able to deal with 
modern issues. As for al-Mudarrisī, he proposes the maqāṣidī paradigm and suggests it 
                                            
122 Al-Mudarrisī, Al-Tashrīʿ al-Islāmī: Manāhijuhu wa Maqāṣiduhu, vol.2, p.34. 
123 Ibid., pp.28-32. 
124 Ibid., vol.1, p.77. 
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should be based on a new epistemological foundation. This proposed paradigm should 
have a social sense in deriving legal issues and should be characterised by a spirit of 
initiative. 
1.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has argued for four main points. Firstly, the Bahbahānian paradigm 
became the dominant paradigm in contemporary Shīʿī jurisprudential discourse. 
Secondly, this paradigm is composed of three essential socio-intellectual factors which, 
in turn, have formed its characteristics on three levels: the epistemological, the 
methodological, and the functional. Thirdly, these characteristics consist of the 
Aristotelian framework epistemologically, the formalist framework methodologically, and 
the soft-utilitarian framework functionally. Fourthly, the Shīʿī jurisprudential maqāṣidī 
discourse can be seen throughout alternatives to the Bahbahānian paradigm. However, 
al-Mudarrisī’s project is the only systematic contribution that represents the paradigm 
shift. 
The following chapter will study the intellectual biography of al-Mudarrisī taking into 
account the socio-political and intellectual circumstances surrounding his insights. The 
ultimate goal is to examine how his thoughts have been constructed. This will pave the 
way for the following chapters in which I will study in detail his jurisprudential theories to 
see how he has shifted from the Bahbahānian paradigm on each level.  
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2. Chapter Two 
Mudarrisī’s Intellectual Biography 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The current chapter aims to examine the intellectual biography of Mudarrisī. The central 
argument postulated is that Mudarrisī is a product of the socio-political position of Shīʿa 
scholars. This position has witnessed a remarkable transformation since the Safavid 
period, moving from isolation and passivity to participation in the socio-political arena 
and public life. This shift encountered specific socio-political conditions in the Arab and 
Islamic world in the 1960s, in a distinctive set of circumstances for the Shīʿī community, 
especially in Iraq. Accordingly, this context created a unique phenomenon within the 
Shīʿī religious institution that might be termed the “political jurist”. Mudarrisī is a 
manifestation of this phenomenon, albeit in a distinctive manner and with unique 
characteristics. This argument as a whole gives rise to several questions, which 
collectively constitute the research questions of the present chapter, and which are as 
follows: 
(1) What were the transformations in the socio-political position of Shīʿa scholars 
and how did these transformations create the phenomenon of the political jurist? 
(2)  What is the unique contribution of Mudarrisī to the phenomenon of the political 
jurist and how has it been formed? 
To find answers to these questions, the current chapter is divided into three sections, 
commencing with a brief account of the four most significant events in the socio-political 
position of Shīʿa scholars. These are: (i) the emergence of the Safavid state, (ii) the 
Tobacco Revolution of 1891, (iii) the Constitutional Movement of 1907, and (iv) the 
Revolution of 1920. The second section explores Mudarrisī’s extended family in order to 
highlight the primary environment of his intellectual development, bearing in mind that 
he is a descendant of the Mudarrisī family on his paternal side, the Shīrāzī family on his 
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maternal side and the Sabzawārī family on his aunt’s side. The third section sheds light 
on his intellectual biography in parallel with the socio-political circumstances that 
surrounded each stage of his life. Aiming to examine his intellectual biography and its 
development in depth, this section - which mainly deals with his life - is further divided 
into three phases, each representing a distinctive stage of his life. This approach not 
only charts the intellectual development of Mudarrisī’s thought throughout the course his 
life, but also demonstrates how he adapted the notion of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa within Shīʿī 
thought. It also highlights the general characteristics of his approach to maqāṣid al-
sharīʿa, which in turn serves as an introduction to the following chapters, in which these 
characteristics will be analyzed in depth. 
To begin with, Muḥammad Taqī al-Mudarrisī was born in 1945 in Karbala, Iraq into a 
scholarly family. At the age of eight, he started his religious learning under his father, 
Muḥammad Kāẓim (d. 1994), his uncle, Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī, and some other 
scholars in Karbala. It is claimed that he had attained the level of ijtihād125 by his 
twenties. Since his first book in 1965, his output, both in books and in lecture notes 
transcribed by his students, has been voluminous. Since 1965, he has been credited 
with around two hundred books, both written by him as well as others’ collections of 
transcriptions from his lectures. From the early period of his life, he was involved in 
socio-political activities in Iraq with his uncle Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī, and therefore much 
of his output has had a political element alongside his purely religious writings. In 1971 
he emigrated to Kuwait with his uncle after a death sentence was issued against the 
latter by Saddam Hussain's regime. He stayed in Kuwait until 1979, when the Islamic 
Revolution led to the establishment of a new regime in Iran. He emigrated to Iran until 
the fall of Saddam’s regime in 2003, after which he went back to Karbala and has been 
based there ever since, teaching and practicing his religious and political activities. 
 
 
                                            
125  L. Louėr, Transnational Shia Politics: Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf  (Columbia University Press, 
2008), p. 93. 
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2.2. The Socio-political Position of the Jurist in Shīʿī Society 
2.2.1. The Emergence of the Safavid State 
The north-western Iranian city of Ardabīl, located in the mountains of Azerbaijan, was 
dominated by a Sufi order in thirteenth century126 The Safavid Sufi order had been 
established by Ṣafīy al-Dīn al-Ardabīlī (1252-1334), and its leadership was based on an 
inheritance system, claiming descent from the Prophet’s Household. When Shaykh 
Junayd (d. 1460), the fourth leader of the order, became the leader of the Safavid Sufi 
order, this was a shifting point in its history. He transferred the Safavid movement from 
a spiritual ghulāt127 movement to a military one. Through the course of about fifty years 
the Safavid movement had managed to unite Iranian lands together with other 
surrounding lands under its rule. After 1501, and under the rule of Shāh Īsmāʿīl I, almost 
all Iranian lands gradually came under the official rule of the Safavid Empire, the first 
large empire in history to adopt Twelver Shīʿī Islām as the official religion of the state.128 
In spite of the debate about whether the Shīʿī scholars were part of the ruling regime of 
the Safavid Empire from the beginning of its establishment or whether they came later 
on129, Shaykh ʿAlī al-Karakī (d. 1533/34) was one such scholar who played a significant 
role therein once he accepted the position of Shaykh al-Islām130 of the Safavid state. 
                                            
126 For further reading on the Safavid dynasty and empire, see Peter Jackson and Laurence Lockhart, ed. The 
Timurid and Safavid Periods, 7 vols., vol. 6, The Cambridge History of Iran (The United Kingdom: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006). Also see Newman, Andrew, Safavid Iran: Rebirth of a Persian Empire, 1st ed. (London: I.B. 
Tauris & Co Ltd, 2009). Also see Darwīsh, ʿAlī Ibrāhīm, al-Siyāsa wad-Dīn fī Marḥalat Taʾsīs al-Dawla al-Ṣafawīyya 
1501-1576, 1st ed. (Qatar: Arab Centre for Research and Political Studies, 2013). 
127 For further details on the ghulūw movement, see Heinz Halm, al-Ghannūṣiyya fi al-Islām, trans. Rāʽid al-Bāshsh, 
1st ed. (Beirut: Manshūrāt al-Jamāl, 2003). 
128 Qazwīnī, Tārīkh al-Muʼassasa al-Dīnīyya al-Shīʿīyya : Min al-ʿAsṛ al-Buwayhī ilā Nihāyat al-ʿAsṛ al-Ṣafawī al-Awwal 
(300-1000 A.H./912-1591 C.E.), pp. 260-71. 
129 Qazwīnī argues that the Shīʿī scholars were not part of the Safavid regime from the beginning; he holds that they 
came later on after the Safavid regime had already established their authority. See ibid. p. 283.. 
130 It is debatable whether the position, which ʽAlī al-Karakī was given, was an official position of Shaykh al-Islām or 
whether he was only given a powerful religious and political authority within the system. Stewart believes that the first 
Shaykh al-Islām of the Safavid Empire “dates back to ca. 963/1555- 56, when Shāh Ṭahmasb appointed Shaykh 
Ḥusayn b. ʿAbd al-Ṣamad al-Ḥārithī al-ʿAmilī (d. 984/ 1576) as Shaykh al-Islām of Qazvin”. See Devin J. Stewart, 
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Shīʿī scholars had experienced close relationships with the ruling regime before the 
Safavid state, during the Buyid period in Baghdad131 as well as ‘Īlkhanate dynasty in 
Iran.132 What was significant at this time was that, for the first time, the state officially 
claimed to adopt Twelver Shīʿī Islam as the religion of the state. In addition, the Shīʿī 
scholars were, not only consultants to the king, but they also held real authority within 
the state133, at least in the first half of the history of the Safavid Empire.  
As the Safavid state successfully accommodated the most significant sacred places for 
the Shīʿas on various occasions, namely Najaf and Karbala, the Shīʿī scholars were 
compelled to engage in a debate on the legitimacy of the Safavid state. This led to two 
important effects on Shīʿī society generally, and on the scholarly class in particular. 
Firstly the practical effect was that Shīʿī scholars had to engage in day-to-day political 
life whereby they could no longer retreat from it, although they attempted to do so many 
times.134 Hence, the Shīʿī community came to a situation in which it could not have 
changed without the participation of the scholars. Secondly, on a theoretical level, the 
consequence of the participation of the scholars in the running of the state opened 
many unanswered questions in Shīʿī political thought.135 This led the scholars to 
                                                                                                                                            
"The First Shaykh al-Islām of the Safavid Capital Qazvin," Journal of the American Oriental Society 116, no. 3 (1996). 
Al-Qazwīnī in contrast believes that al-Karākī was appointed as a Shaykh al-Islām, although his privilege of a notable 
religious and political authority was with Shāh Tahmasb I. See Jawdat Qazwīnī, "Al-Marjiʿiyya al-Dīnīyya al-ʾUlyā 
ʿInda al-Shīʿa al-Imāmīyya: Dirāsa fī al-Tatạwwur al-Siyāsī wal-ʿIlmī"  (Beirut: Dār al-Rāfidayn, 2005), pp. 140-46. 
Abisaab mentioned that al-Karakī was the first Shaykh al-Islām of the Safavid Empire, at least the first ʿĀmilī scholar 
to be given this position. See Abisaab, Converting Persia: Religion and Power in the Safavid Empire. p. 27-28 and 
153. 
131 In this period Shaykh al-Mufīd and al-Sayyid al-Murtaḍā played an important role in building the relationship 
between the Shīʿī community and the state. 
132 In this period Shaykh Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī and al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī played an important role in building the 
relationship between Shīʿī community and the state. 
133 Abisaab has tracked the religious positions held by Shīʿī scholars and who was appointed for each position; see 
Abisaab, R.J,  Converting Persia: Religion and Power in the Safavid Empire  (I. B. Tauris, 2004), Appendix II, Posts 
and Activities of the Emigré ‘Amili ‘Ulama. 
134 For example, Kāẓim al-Yazdī attempted to remove the religious institution’s involvement in political life by refusing 
the Constitutional Revolution in 1907, but he was not successful.  
135 The famous example of this is the debate between al-Karakī and al-Qaṭīfī during the Safavid period about the 
obligation of the Friday prayer. Al-Qaṭīfī’s argument was that the Friday prayer should not be prayed unless the state 
is legitimate, and this in turn raised the issue of what then were the criteria for a legitimate state. For more details see 
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develop many aspects of Shīʿī political thought, which in the long term formed the role 
of the scholars in Shīʿī community, as we shall see when we discuss the biography of 
Mudarrisī136. 
One last point is worth mentioning here. The relationship between Shīʿī scholars and 
the Shah of the Safavid state did not continue as it had begun. This is particularly 
noticeable in the reign of Shah ʿAbbās I [1587-1629] through the conflict that existed 
between the religious authority, in the hands of the scholars, and the temporal authority 
held by the Shāh. Taking into account the fact that the central sacred places of Shīʿīsm 
had not experienced long-term stable rule as a result of the Ottoman-Safavid conflict, 
many Shīʿī scholars changed their attitude toward the Safavid state and decided to 
reside in Najaf or Karbala instead of Iran, making Iraq, especially Najaf and Karbala, a 
place where Shīʿī political decisions were made. Furthermore, it encouraged a huge 
emigration to these sacred places after the decline of the Safavid state. 
2.2.2. The Tobacco Revolution of 1891 
As a consequence of the developments during the Safavid period, Shīʿī scholars gained 
a significant political position in the community. Although the Qajar state attempted to 
limit the authority of Shīʿī scholars in comparison with the Safavid state, the importance 
and influence of Shīʿī scholars was still notable especially in the later Qajar period.137 
This probably increased when the Shīʿī scholars established a kind of central religious 
authority (marjiʿiyya), which was autonomous both in its political decision as well as in 
its economic support from the state. 
As Litvak noted in his study138, the nineteenth century witnessed a kind of centralisation 
of the Shīʿī learning place and leadership. This started with Shaykh Muḥammad Hasan 
Najafī (d.1850) followed by Murtaḍā al-Anṣārī. After that period, the Shīʿī scholarly 
                                                                                                                                            
'Ibrāhīm Fū'ād, al-Faqīh wa al-Dawla: al-Fikr al-Siyāsi al-Shīʿī, 1st ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Kunūz al-Adabīyya, 1998), pp. 
153-59.  
136 See on page 86 (2.4.1.2.). 
137 See the introduction of Robert Gleave in Religion and Society in Qajar Iran, edited by Robert Gleave,  (London 
;New York : Routledge Curzon, 2005), p. 4. 
138 Litvak, Shi'i Scholars of Nineteenth-Century Iraq: The 'Ulama' of Najaf and Karbala'. 
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community became a distinct religious and social institution, having independent 
political and economic power. What helped it gain such a position, perhaps, was the 
geographical location of Najaf and Karbala, being in a neutral zone between the Qajar 
and Ottoman states in terms of the political power of either side. In addition, the 
conversion of the tribes that dominated the south of Iraq139 to Shīʿīsm, in which Shaykh 
Kāshif al-Ghiṭāʾ (d. 1813) had played a significant role, enabled a local power base. 
After al-Anṣārī’s death in 1864, Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Shirāzī (d. 1895) emerged as his 
successor. The Tobacco Revolution in 1891-1892, led by Shirāzī was the first example 
of the power of the marjiʿiyya against any state. The starting point was a concession 
granted to the British company of Major G. F. Talbot for a full monopoly over the 
production, sale, and export of the Iranian tobacco for fifty years by Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh 
(d. 1896) on March 20, 1890. The Shāh considered this deal to be a support of his 
authority by making an alliance with Western countries, whereas the people in Iran, 
especially those who were badly affected by this deal, along with the scholarly 
community, considered it to be a material attack on the Iranian economy and a part of 
Western colonialism. People started protesting against the pact, led by some scholars, 
and they contacted Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Shīrāzī for his opinion on the issue. Shīrāzī 
on his part, sent a letter to the Shāh advising him to cancel the deal, but the Shāh did 
not heed his advice. Shīrāzī himself was aware of his power and influence, and already 
had a negative view of Shāh Nāṣir al-Dīn. He was the only mujtahid of Najaf who 
refused to welcome the Shāh in public when he visited the shrine in 1870.140 Bearing 
this in mind, together with the heavy support from the merchant community in Iran and 
some Shīʿī scholars (in particular Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī141 [d. 1897]), Shīrāzī issued a 
fatwā declaring the use of tobacco to be tantamount to war against the Hidden Imām. 
When the fatwā was circulated, people stopped the purchase and sale of tobacco and 
continued protesting for two months until the Shāh had to cancel the concession to the 
                                            
139 Ibid. p. 186. 
140 Ibid. p. 83. 
141 To read more about the role of al-Afghanī in the Tobacco Revolution, see Ibrāhīm, Fūʾād, al-Faqīh wa al-Dawla: 
al-Fikr al-Siyāsī al-Shīʿī, 1st ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Kunūz al-Adabiyya, 1998), pp. 209-10. 
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British company. What is interesting to note is that the Shāh’s own wife stopped 
smoking when she heard about Shīrāzī’s fatwa.142 
What this event might suggest is that the authority held by the scholars at that time had 
reached the same level as the state and perhaps even greater. This might be attributed 
to the development of the Shīʿī religious institution as having a role in political life, in 
addition to the strong ties between the institution and the society, especially the 
merchant community. This is particularly noticeable with Shīrāzī who is considered as 
the first marjaʿ to have legally enforced his agents to bring the 20% khums dues to 
himself or to get permission from him to distribute it.143 On the other hand, this event 
encouraged the scholars who came after al-Shīrāzī to engage in political matters to a 
greater extent as we shall see below144. 
2.2.3. The Constitutional Revolution of 1907 
Shīrāzī died in 1895, just a few years after the Tobacco Revolution, but the effects of its 
victory remained amongst Shīʿī religious institutions and in the collective consciousness 
of Shīʿī society in Iran and Iraq. Only a few months later, Shāh Nāṣir al-Dīn died had 
brought one of the most important periods of Iranian political history to a close. 
However, within about ten years, the jurist and the Shāh were at loggerheads again in a 
new battle with the events of 1905. 
Muẓaffar al-Dīn Shah (d. 1907) succeeded his father in ruling the Qajar state. He was 
not decisive like his father and did not have his qualities of leadership. He was in actual 
fact weak and inclined to luxury by all accounts.145 In order to reinforce his position, he 
chose to ally Iran with Western countries by giving them economic concessions, in 
return for which he received loans from them, as with Russia and Belgium. This 
shocked the people of Iran, and the situation worsened as in that year Iran witnessed a 
severe cold spell, ruining the agricultural crops of that season. The government was 
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143 Litvak, Shi'i Scholars of Nineteenth-Century Iraq: The 'Ulama' of Najaf and Karbala', p. 85. 
144 See 76 
145 Tawfīq al-Sayf, Ḍidd al-Istibdād: al-Fiqh al-Siyāsī al-Shīʿī fī ʿAṣr al-Ghayba, 1st ed. (Beirut: al-Markaz al-Thaqāfī 
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unable to respond and made various poor decisions, i.e. selling franchises to Western 
companies and borrowing more money from the West.146 Therefore, the people chose, 
with the aid of the scholars, to start protesting, especially after the government had 
publicly punished ten important merchants. One of these merchants was killed as a 
result of the punishment.147 This enraged the people, and was the starting point of a 
protest that gradually spread through all the main towns of Iran, demanding reformation 
of the political system. 
While the situation was developing thus in Tehran, Najaf148 was following the 
developments of the event. The three main scholars in Najaf were aware of what was 
happening with interest and supported the demands of the movement. These were: 
Mirzā Ḥusayn Khalīlī (d. 1908), Muḥammad Kāẓim al-Khurāsānī (d. 1911) and 
Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Nāʿīnī (d. 1936). At the same time, there was another group of 
scholars in Najaf led by Muḥammad Kāẓim al-Yazdī al-Ṭabāṭabāʾī (d. 1919) who were 
critical of the movement as it demanded constitutional reform. Regardless of the 
reasons for each group to support or oppose the constitutional movement, the point 
here is that the Shīʿī religious institutions in Iran and Iraq, whether of traditional or 
rationalist tendency, were all engaged in the event. This engagement was represented 
by social public debate, and even sometimes by public conflict and violence between 
the two groups. There was also much academic debate between the scholars in their 
respective learning circles and their written works, in addition to numerous poems 
penned at that time. Probably the most famous work regarding the event was the work 
of al-Nāʿīnī: “Tanbīh al-Umma wa-Tanzīh al-Milla”, being a jurisprudential plea for a 
legitimate and constitutional government. 
Although eventually Shāh Muẓaffar al-Dīn accepted the demand of the constitutional 
movement towards the end of his life, his son Muḥammad Alī Shāh (d. 1925) came to 
                                            
146 Ibid. p. 56. 
147 Ibid. p. 58. 
148 The role of Najaf in the Constitutional Revolution has not received enough attention as al-Sayf mentioned, so he 
gave the role of Najaf particular attention in his work regarding the Constitutional Revolution. See ibid., pp. 65-102. 
He might not have been aware of the work of Hairi which is dedicated to Naʾīnī’s political thought. See Hairi, Abdul-
Hadi, Shīʿīsm and Constitutionalism in Iran: A Study of the Role Played by the Persian Residents of Iraq in Iranian 
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power and succeeded in dividing the movement once again and sparking an open 
dispute between them. The dispute reached to the extent that Iranian society was 
divided into two groups, one called “mashrūṭa” (constitutional) and the other 
“mustabidda” (authoritarian). Furthermore, each of them constructed a military force and 
fought to achieve their demands in Ṭehran.149 Eventually, the event ended with the 
execution of one of the leaders of the mustabidda - Faḍlullah al-Nūrī (d. 1909). This had 
a huge impact on the reputation of the movement in Iran and Iraq. An agreement had 
been made between Russia and Britain to divide Iran into a Russian zone in the North 
and a British zone in the South, and this was reflected in Najaf within the Shīʿī religious 
institution. On the one hand, there was a feeling that the scholars were still retaining 
their power against the state and were successful at achieving their demands for a 
constitutional state. On the other hand, however, there was a feeling that the scholars 
had lost their power in the new context, particularly with the chaos that was ensuing in 
Iran after the division between Russia and Britain. Nonetheless, this experience, despite 
its consequences, was not the end of the relationship between the jurist and the state. 
There was another confrontation which was to influence the position of the jurist in the 
contemporary era, and which relates directly to our case study. 
2.2.4. The Revolution of 1920 in Iraq 
It can be claimed that the revolution of 1920 in Iraq had an influential role in forming 
general Iraqi society in the last century and Iraqi Shīʿī society in particular. The uprising 
showcased both the position that Shīʿī scholars had gained as well as the extent to 
which those scholars had an effect on Iraqi society. For this research, 1920 can be seen 
as the most significant event with regard to Mudarrisī in terms of time, place and family 
relationships. 
Although the revolution started in May 1920, its causes had been developing since the 
British occupied Iraq in 1917. Regardless of whether the real causes of the revolution 
were nationalist feelings that had begun to spread across Iraq at that time, or some 
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other causes150, the 1920 revolution started as a peaceful protest against British policies 
in Iraq. It soon developed into a military confrontation, as almost all Iraqis participated in 
the movement, regardless of their religion, sect, race, tribe or town. For these reasons, 
it is referred to as the Great Iraqi Revolution of 1920. By October of 1920, the revolution 
had achieved its demand for an Arab government calling for the Amīr Fayṣal b. Ḥusayn 
(d. 1933) to be the King of Iraq. 
What is of interest to our research is the role that Shīʿī scholars played in the revolution. 
It is well-known that the fatwā issued by Mīrzā Muḥammad Taqī al-Shīrāzī (d. 1920) had 
a decisive influence on the development of the revolution, especially amongst southern 
Shīʿī tribes. But what is hidden behind the protests and military resistance is, probably, 
more important. It could be said that al-Shīrāzī politicised almost all religious elements, 
beginning with sacred places, and in particular Karbala (as it had become the capital of 
the revolution), through to religious rituals, such as ʿĀshūraʾ protest, and finally ending 
with the religious seminaries (Ḥawzas). This picture is well described and illustrated by 
the Iraqi historian ʿAlī al-Wardī (d. 1995) in his social history of modern Iraq, where he 
devotes a whole volume of his historical encyclopaedia to the revolution of 1920.151 
In addition to Shīrāzī’s letters to the British and to the tribes as well, al-Wardī uses 
manuscript memoirs of some of the religious leaders of the time to show the extent to 
which the scholars were involved in the details of the revolution and in leading the most 
important negotiations with the British rule. Many names have emerged during these 
events, and some of them played an important role after the revolution in developing the 
                                            
150 There is a debate whether the Revolution of 1920 was caused by the nationalist feelings that had begun to spread 
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151 Ibid. 
72 
 
religious seminaries as participants in political life.152 Furthermore, some scholars led 
military confrontations whilst cooperating with the tribes.153 
The engagement of the scholars with the details of the revolution, and with leading 
many elements of the movement had two significant impacts on their position. Firstly, 
scholars in general and the Shīʿī religious institution in particular, became responsible 
for political change in future Iraqi society, to an extent. Secondly, internally, the Shīʿī 
religious institution started to think seriously about its involvement in political life in 
modern Iraq, and this was independent of the pressure from Iran. In particular, during 
the events of the 1920 revolution, and for the first time in the Arab world, Shīʿī scholars 
had begun to think about what an “Islamic Government” might look like, as letters from 
Shīrāzī himself indicated.154 In addition, there was a collective feeling that the scholars 
who had participated in the revolution had achieved the inauguration of Amīr Fayṣal b. 
Ḥusayn as a king of Iraq. Some scholars considered it a failure as their demands had 
not been achieved, but at least the event made them think about the possibility of the 
scholars ruling the temporal state by themselves. This effect can be seen later, when 
the scholars started participating in an organised political action a short time after the 
revolution of 1920 by establishing the Muslim Youth Organisation in 1941155 as well as 
other organisations. Finally, the effects of the political role for the Shīʿī scholar of the 
events of 1920 can clearly be seen when studying the life of Mudarrisī and his political 
thought, as we shall see below156. 
2.3. Mudarrisī’s Family 
                                            
152 For example, Hibat al-Dīn al-Shahristānī, Jaʿfar al-Khalīlī, Faḍlullāh al-Īṣfahānī, Muḥammad al-Ṣadr etc. 
153 For example, Muḥammad al-Ḥabūbī, Hadī al-Maqūṭar, etc. 
154 al-Wardī, Lamahạ̄t Ijtimāʿīyya min Tārīkh al-ʿIrāq al-Ḥadīth, p. 5. 
155 The Muslim Youth Organisation was established in 1941 by ʿIzz al-Dīn al-Jazāʾīrī as a sector organization against 
the Nationalist and Marxist movement. The slogan of the movement was ‘Islamic society, Islamic state - the 
happiness of the world and the blessings of the Hereafter. For further details, see: Qazwīnī, "al-Marjiʿiyya al-Dīniyya 
al-ʾUlyā ʿInda al-Shīʿa al-Imāmiyya: Dirāsa fī al-Tatạwwur al-Siyāsī wa al-ʿIlmī," pp. 266-68. 
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Having drawn an overall picture of the socio-political circumstances of the Iraqi and 
Iranian societies by focusing on their most significant transformations, this section 
focuses on Mudarrisī’s family. 
The names of the families in societies found in Iraq and Iran is not based only on 
biological relations or a place where a person spent his or her childhood. It also 
represents a place where the person’s social status is created. This is especially true for 
the Shīʿī scholarly community, in which - for many historical and cultural reasons - a 
religious student’s family plays two major roles in his life. First, in a scholarly family, a 
student is trained and qualified in order to carry forth the reputation of his scholarly 
family. The case of the al-Jawāhirī family is an obvious example in the Shīʿī context, in 
which the very name of the family was formed based on the work of Muḥammad Ḥasan 
al-Najafī, Jawāhir al-Kalām. Second, the social status that the student achieves can be 
created based on his family’s status. Some families are famous for managing holy 
shrines, while others are famous for playing political roles within the Shīʿī scholarly 
community. Therefore, being a member of a famous scholarly family is an important 
component in developing the character of a Shīʿī scholar. 
Accordingly, studying the complexity of Mudarrisī’s family can shed light on several 
aspects of his character. His extended family includes the Mudarrisīs, the Shīrāzīs, and 
the Sabzawārīs, all of whom have migrated between Iraq and Iran and have played, to 
some extent, an important role in the most significant events that both societies have 
witnessed. Clarifying their relationships and some of their roles in Iraqi and Iranian 
societies helps in understanding how Mudarrisī’s character was formed. 
2.3.1. The Mudarrisī Family 
In Arabic, mudarris means “teacher” (سّردُم); when ī is added ( ي  in Arabic), it transforms 
the word from an adjective into a surname. This is one of the many ways in which 
names of families are made in Middle Eastern cultures. However, such surname 
designations make tracing family roots difficult because, when any number of people 
are doing same job at the same time (e.g., teaching), all of them are given the same 
surname. This is actually what happened in the case at hand. Today, the Mudarrisī 
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family is quite extensive and it includes many smaller families, who are unrelated by 
ancestry. The fame of the Mudarrisī family, which led people to start writing about them, 
might be attributed to the fame that Mudarrisī gained and the inter-marriage between 
the Mudarrisī family and the Sabzawārī family. 
According to some sources157, Muḥammad Jawād al-Mudarrisī is one of Muḥammad 
Taqī al-Mudarrisī’s ancestors. It is not known when he was born or when he died, but it 
is clear from the sources that he had emigrated from Mashhad to live in Karbala and 
eventually died in Najaf. It can be estimated that he may have emigrated to Iraq at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, when the sacred places in Iraq had witnessed a 
massive wave of immigration from Iran, especially by Shīʿī scholars, as Litvak 
demonstrated.158 
Mudarrisī’s grandfather, Muḥammad Bāqir al-Mudarrisī – again whose dates of birth 
and death are unknown - was, according to some sources, a famous teacher in Najaf 
who later went on to become a Grand Ayatollah (marjiʿ) in Mashhad. He was a student 
of Grand Ayatollah Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Husaynī al-Shīrāzī (d. 1895) and a close 
colleague of Shaykh Faḍlullāh al-Nūrī. After the constitutional revolution, he moved to 
Ṭehran with him to support the revolution. When al-Nūrī was executed, Muḥammad 
Bāqir al-Mudarrisī emigrated to Mashhad, where he eventually died. However, his role 
in the constitutional movement is unclear, and the sources that discuss this period do 
not mention him. In addition, it is unknown what exactly his role was when he moved to 
Mashhad and whether he visited Iraq during this time or not. Based on the date of birth 
of his son Muḥammad Kāẓim (the father of Mudarrisī) in 1911, it can be estimated that 
Muḥammad Bāqir al-Mudarrisī was a young student when he participated in the 1906 
revolution in Iran with Faḍlullāh al-Nūrī. After al-Nūrī’s execution, Muḥammad Bāqir al-
Mudarrisī continued his career as a clergyman in Mashhad. At this time he developed 
his relationship with the Shīrāzī and Sabzawārī families, into which both his son 
Muḥammad Kāẓim as well as his daughter, married in Iraq. Although the extent of his 
participation is ambiguous, the picture of Muḥammad Bāqir al-Mudarrisī’s participation 
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in the constitutional movement and the subsequent retelling of his story amongst his 
family are important aspects that implicitly formed Mudarrisī’s character. The marriages 
into the Shīrāzī family would also have had a considerable impact on Mudarrisī’s life. 
The most important person from the Mudarrisī family to have had an influential impact 
on Muḥammad Taqī al-Mudarrisī was his father, Muḥammad Kāẓim al-Mudarrisī, who 
was born in 1911 in Mashhad. In 1949, he emigrated to Karbala to continue his studies 
at the religious institution there.159 It is obscure exactly why he chose to migrate to 
Karbala but the possible reasons for this are firstly, the family’s relationships in Karbala 
that his father had previously established, and secondly, the  fact that the Shīrāzī family 
also lived in Karbala at that time. After the death of Mīrzā Muḥammad Taqī al-Shīrāzī, 
Karbala had become the place where the Shīrāzī family had inherited marjiʿiyya. At the 
end of the sixties, Muḥammad Kāẓim al-Mudarrisī moved to Kuwait with Muḥammad al-
Shīrāzī before returning to his hometown Mashhad after the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 
1979, where he died in 1994. 
When Kāẓim al-Mudarrisī was in Mashhad prior to coming to Karbala, he met Mīrzā 
Mahdī al-Iṣfahānī160 (d. 1946), who is well-known as the founder of the Tafkīkī School 
(“School of Separation”).161 He studied under al-Iṣfahanī for about twenty years and was 
deemed to be one of his closest students. Although it is debatable whether or not Tafkīk 
is a suitable title for the school, its main claim is that all religious knowledge must be 
understood using solely religious methods, in that one should rely only on religious texts 
resulting from revelation (waḥy). According to Mudarrisī, he studied al-Iṣfahānī’s 
thought, especially the theology therein, under his father, and asserted that al-Iṣfahanī’s 
                                            
159 Personal interview with Hādī al-Mudarrisī, Muḥammad Taqī al-Mudarrisī's brother, in 2012. 
160 Zakariyyā Dawūd, "Al-Madrasa al-Tafkīkiyya wa al-Taʾṣīl li al-ʿAql al-Shīʿī", al-Baṣāʾir, no. 35 (2005), pp. 52-94. 
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school was the one that influenced his own thoughts.162 This will become clear when we 
study his intellectual development and actually examine to what extent al-Iṣfahanī’s 
school impacted his thoughts, specifically in terms of jurisprudence with which this study 
is concerned. 
2.3.2. The Shīrāzī Family 
The Shīrāzīs are a well-known religious scholastic family from the city of Shīrāz in the 
south of Iran. The family originally settled in the Iraqi cities of Najaf, Karbala and 
Samarra at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The Shīrāzī family became well 
known after the events of the Tobacco Revolution in 1890, when Muḥammad Ḥasan al-
Shīrāzī issued the famous fatwā against a British tobacco company. In contemporary 
Iraq, the Shīrāzī family reinforced its position in Iraqi society during the events of the 
revolution in 1920, when Muḥammad Taqī al-Shīrāzī declared a jihād against the British 
colonisation and called for Iraq’s independence under an Arab government. Since that 
time onwards, the Shīrāzī family has been a crucial part of the Shīʿī religious 
community. 
For the purpose of our study, the most important person from the Shīrāzī family is 
Muḥammad Mahdī al-Shīrāzī (d. 2002), who was the maternal uncle of Muḥammad 
Taqī al-Mudarrisī. Muḥammad Mahdī al-Shīrāzī was born in Najaf in 1928 as the oldest 
son of Mīrzā Mahdī al-Shīrāzī, who was at the time considered a marjiʿ in Karbala. After 
the death of his father, Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī claimed his marjiʿiyya at the age of thirty-
three, which is deemed by the institution of marjiʿiyya institution as a fairly young age for 
such position. He chose a unique pattern of marjiʿiyya, focusing on how he thought the 
marjiʿiyya should conduct itself in modern life. According to him, the marjiʿ was one who 
engaged in political and social matters and sought to establish an Islamic state163 by 
leading society both culturally and politically. This understanding of marjiʿiyya affected 
Shīrāzī’s life in many ways, which can clearly be seen in his written memoirs164 as well 
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as his intellectual works, although his thought falls out of the scope of this study. He 
witnessed the constitutional and republican period of Iraq and was an active religious 
scholar165 in both, but the most significant period for him was when he stood against the 
republican state in Iraq, especially during the period of the Bathist regime. As a rebel 
against the Iraqi regime, Shīrāzī was sentenced to death, but he fled to Kuwait with his 
family in 1970166, which he found to be a good base for his marjiʿiyya. He spent nine 
years in Kuwait before moving to Iran after the Islamic Revolution in 1979.  
Throughout his religious and political journey, Mudarrisī remained with his uncle, initially 
as his student, until Shīrāzī’s death in 2001. At the beginning of his religious learning, 
Mudarrisī studied the traditional curriculum of fiqh and uṣūl under him until the higher 
level (al-dars al-khārij). He was also influenced by his uncle’s political and intellectual 
thought. According to Mudarrisī167, the study sessions with his uncle were divided into 
two parts: the traditional religious curriculum and current political affairs. Furthermore, 
another uncle of his, also called al-Mudarrisī, was the leader of the social political 
movement that had been established by Shīrāzī in Karbala and remained under his 
supervision.168 The movement was part of Shīrāzī’s activities as the modern social and 
political side of his marjiʿiyya; and its role was to accommodate young people and 
spread his marjiʿiyya among them. The movement was newly entitled the ‘Islamic Action 
Organisation’ (IAO) at the end of seventies, although it had previously been known 
amongst Shīrāzī’s followers as the Movement of the Vanguard’s Missionary, the MVM 
(Ḥarakat al-Ṭalāʽīʿ al-Risāliyyīn), the Marjiʿiyya Movement (Ḥarakat al-Marjiʿiyya), or the 
Missionary Movement (al-Ḥarakat al-Risāliyya).169 When Shīrāzī left Iraq to go to 
Kuwait, Mudarrisī both accompanied and worked with him until the beginning of the 
Islamic Revolution in Iran, when they fell into disagreement. Nonetheless, they still 
enjoyed a good relationship as kinsmen until Shīrāzī’s death in 2002. Although 
Mudarrisī had disagreed with him towards the end, his uncle’s great influence on his 
                                            
165 His activities can be seen in his memoirs.  
166  Louėr, Transnational Shia Politics: Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf, p. 120. 
167 Muḥammad Taqī al-Mudarrisī, al-Maʿhad al-Islāmī Bayna al-Aṣāla wa al-Infitāḥ,  (1993). 
168 Louėr, Transnational Shia Politics: Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf, p. 97. 
169 Ibid., p 98. 
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thought and socio-political ideas is undeniable, especially during the early stage of his 
life. This influence is clearly evident when looking at his intellectual biography. 
2.3.3. The Sabzawārī Family 
The third family related to Mudarrisī is the Sabzawārī family, who are originally from 
Sabzawār in north-eastern Iran. The most famous scholar of the Sabzīwārī family in the 
contemporary era is ʿAbd al-Aʿlā al-Sabzawārī (d. 1993), who came to Najaf at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. He studied under some of the most famous scholars 
of the time, such as al-Nāʿīnī, al-ʿIrāqī, al-Iṣfaḥānī, al-Kunbānī, and al-Balāghī. 
Sabzawārī was well-known as a skillful teacher in the religious institutions in Najaf and 
later became a Grand Ayatollah (marjiʿ) after the death of Abū al-Qāsim al-Khūʾī (d. 
1992), but he died shortly after being marjiʿ in 1993. He married Mudarrisī’s aunt when 
he was in Najaf. Although he did not have a considerable impact on Mudarrisī in terms 
of either his religious training or his political thought, when Mudarrisī claimed marjiʿiyya 
in 2002, his family relation to Sabzawārī, and consequently to Najaf, afforded him credit 
within the Ḥawza as part of the prestige of marjiʿiyya. 
To sum up, there were three major elements that Mudarrisī gained from his complex 
family structure. First, in terms of his intellectual background, he inherited the tradition of 
Tafkīkī thought from his paternal side – a school of thought deemed to be a critical 
movement within the Ḥawza. Second, his family’s involvement in politics, both his 
paternal and maternal sides, created a model for the jurist to pursue, unconfined to the 
teaching and religious scopes, but expanded to include the socio-political scope as well. 
Third, his family’s composition from three scholastic religious families gave him a social 
legitimacy and protection within the Shīʿī scholarly community whilst further influencing 
his choices in terms of the social and intellectual role he could play. 
This broad picture of Mudarrisī’s family represents the environment in which he was 
brought up. I have tried to illustrate how his family is related to other scholastic religious 
families on the one hand whilst also mentioning the roles that members of his extended 
family played in the most important events in Iraqi and Iranian society on the other 
hand, in order to clarify how it affected Mudarrisī’s character, both explicitly and 
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implicitly. The following sections explore the dialogue between these internal elements 
that contributed to Mudarrisī’s character and the extensive external factors that have 
together shaped Mudarrisī’s thought. 
2.4. Mudarrisī’s Intellectual Biography 
As previously mentioned, Mudarrisī is examined here not merely as an isolated agent, 
rather as part of a greater socio-political and intellectual construct. Thus, I will study his 
intellectual biography synthetically with the socio-political events surrounding him and 
his own religious, social and political activities. In order to examine his intellectual 
development, I suggest dividing his life into three phases, namely; in Karbala and 
Kuwait between 1960 to 1979, in Iran between 1979 to the late 1990s, and in Iran and 
Iraq from the late 1990s to 2011. Each phase is characterized by the major events 
within it, which we will explore in the next sections.   
2.4.1. In Karbala and Kuwait (1960-1979): The Search for a Project 
This is the first phase of Mudarrisī’s intellectual biography. It begins geographically in 
Karbala and ends in Kuwait. However, it begins intellectually with the search for a 
project within a dynamic area in the Middle East where several “projects” of renaissance 
were competing with each other, and ends with a distinctive Shīʿī “project”. The 
common characteristic of his thought during this phase was the quest for a socio-
intellectual project where each place that he went to influenced his options to a certain 
extent. Similarly, each work that he produced contributed to his intellectual options. 
2.4.1.1. Activities 
Around 1960, in spite of his youth, Mudarrisī engaged in religious studies in Karbala. As 
mentioned above, Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī, his uncle, was the most influential person in 
his intellectual and social life, and he had a special relationship with him. Mudarrisī at 
this stage of his life was solely occupied with studying in the Ḥawza. At the age of 
around twenty, he began to become more socially and politically active alongside 
Shīrāzī. Although Shīrāzī was based in Karbala, his view of his marjiʿiyya extended 
regionally, if not internationally. He was, therefore, concerned with keeping up with the 
socio-political and intellectual trends and events that were happening across the region. 
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Mudarrisī was aware and interested in these events under the influence of his uncle 
who was teaching him at the time, and spending half of the sessions with him on politics 
and the other half on formal religious study. Furthermore, Shīrāzī was assigning him to 
some preaching tasks and mobilizing missions, and eventually appointed him as a 
leader of the MVM.170 
In the late fifties and during the sixties, the Middle-eastern region, especially the Arab 
world and Iran, were largely characterised by a preoccupation with the matter of 
“renaissance” and the role of religion. This issue was a subject of debate in the 
presence and effectiveness of three movements, namely, the Marxist, Liberalist and 
Nationalist movements. Both Sunnī and Shīʿī thinkers participated in and contributed to 
the debate, with Ḥasan al-Bannāʾ (d. 1949), Sayyid Quṭb (d. 1966), Malek Bennabi (d. 
1973) and Abu Al-Aʿlā al-Mawdūdī (d. 1979) representing the Sunnī side; ʿAlī Sharīʿatī 
(d. 1977), Murtaḍā Muṭahharī (d. 1979) and al-ʿAllama al-Ṭabāṭabāʾī (d. 1981) 
representing the Shīʿī Iranian side, which was very close to the Iraqi regard; and 
Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr and Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī representing the Shīʿī Arab side. 
The non-religious counterparts for the Islamist project were classified as internal or 
external rivals. Whereas this battle focused primarily on internal rivals, the Nationalist 
movement took place on the ground for the most part while the intellectual and external 
developments took place in the Marxist and Liberalist movements, respectively. 
However, the external rivals varied as Marxism was a strict philosophy whereas 
Liberalism was open to general principles. It is in this environment that Mudarrisī was 
engaged. 
On the political side, however, the sixties marked the peak of Arab-Israeli conflict as it 
was the third decade of war between Arab and Israel after the wars of 1948 and 1973. 
The Arab-Israeli wars were not just a military confrontation, but rather a conflict of 
existence from one angle, and a representation of the relationship with the West or ‘the 
other’ from another angle. Furthermore, they were the subject of an ideological debate 
between the Islamist movement and the Nationalist one, particularly during this stage, 
                                            
170 The work of Laurence Louër is the most important work that studies the MVM. I refer to this work 
frequently for most of the events in Mudarrisī political life. See L. Louėr, Transnational Shia Politics: 
Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf  (Columbia University Press, 2008). 
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as the Arabs lost the battle with Israel in 1967, referring to it as “an-Naksah” (The 
Setback). Indeed, 1967 had profound implications for the Arab world not only on the 
political level, but also on the ideological one, especially since such events happened in 
light of the rise of the nationalist republican states of Egypt, Syria, Tunis, Libya, Algeria 
and Iraq.171 In Iraq, this phase marked the fall of monarchy and the beginning of 
republican rule through a nationalist movement before Iraq was taken over by the 
Bathist regime in 1958. The Bathist regime was well known for its deteriorating 
relationship with the Shīʿa, especially when Saddam Hussain took over the regime later 
on.  
In response to these challenges and events, this phase witnessed the establishment of 
Islamist political activity in both sects in Iraq via the Daʿwa party172 (1957) and the Iraqi 
Islamic party (IIP 1960).173 Mudarrisī, with support from Shīrāzī, had established 
Ḥarakat al-Ṭalāʽīʿ al-Risāliyyīn (MVM) in 1967174 immediately after the Arab-Israeli war. 
This, in many ways, would explain why Mudarrisī became so intellectually involved with 
regional intellectual matters as the founder of al-Haraka al-Risāliyya. It is worth 
mentioning too that during this stage, Iran witnessed considerable political activity 
among Shīʿī scholars against the Shāh’s regime. In 1964 Khomeini was exiled from Iran 
to Turkey; and the following year he went to Iraq, where he lived for approximately 
fourteen years. Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī had a special relationship with Khomeini during 
that time, and it was then that Mudarrisī came into contact with Shīʿī Iranian activism.   
At the beginning of the seventies, Baʿthisits having already taken over the country’s 
regime, chosen a policy of persecution toward the Shīʿa and a restriction of the religious 
institution. Thus, many scholars were imprisoned and some were displaced under the 
name of nationalism, especially from the Iranian community in Iraq. This period naturally 
                                            
171 For a comprehensive study regarding the Arab–Israel conflict between 1948 and 1973, see 
Muhạmmad Ḥasanayn Haykal, Sanawāt al-Ghalayān, 1st ed. (Egypt: Markaz al-Ahrām li al-Tarjama wa 
al-Nashr Muʾassasat al-Ahrām, 1988).  
172 Ṣalāḥ al-Kharsān, Ḥizb al-Daʿwa al-Islāmiyya: Ḥaqāʾiq wa Wathāʾiq, 1st ed. (Beirut: al-Muʾassasa al-
ʿArabiyya li al-Dirāsāt wa al-Buḥūth al-Istirātījiyya, 1999). 
173 See the official website: http://www.iraqiparty.com/main/ [accessed 17.06.2012]. 
174 Louėr, Transnational Shia Politics: Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf, p. 97-98. 
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sparked Shīʿī opposition to the regime. In 1970, the Bathist regime issued an arrest 
warrant for Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī and Mudarrisī, who remained in hiding for about four 
months before escaping to Kuwait.175 As a result, Mudarrisī’s family decided to emigrate 
from Iraq. Being of Persian descent, in addition to their political activities, made them 
easy targets despite having been based in Iraq for more than a century. Kuwait at that 
time was experiencing its brightest stages, where the state was aspiring to establish a 
modern country with urban and economic growth. This ambition enabled Kuwait to 
become a centre of attraction for an Arab labour force as well as intellectual academic 
elites, especially from Palestine, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. This situation led 
the political movements and activists to deem Kuwait as one of the best places for 
personal security and organisational growth. Thus, almost all political movements in the 
Arab world at that time, namely, nationalist, Palestinians, Brotherhood, Salafist, Party of 
Liberation, al-Daʿwa party, some Iranian revolutionaries and MVM movements - had a 
considerable presence there, establishing their public bases and growing their cadres. 
In these circumstances, Mudarrisī arrived in Kuwait with his uncle, Shīrāzī, and his 
socio-political activities expanded and extended within the Gulf region. Mudarrisī’s 
activities in Kuwait included setting up a Ḥawza, accommodating young people, 
publishing books and preaching in mosques and ḥusayniyyas. By late seventies, 
Mudarrisī had already expanded the MVM and established branches across the Gulf, 
especially in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, but did not succeed as much in the UAE and 
Oman as in the rest of the GCC countries.176 Being in Kuwait also gave him an 
opportunity and the MVM in general to make a contact with Sunnī activists such as the 
Muslim Brotherhood and the Palestinian movements, who also had political and 
organizational activities in Kuwait. Therefore, Mudarrisī had plenty of opportunity in 
Kuwait to familiarize himself with the Islamist intellectual discussions with regard to the 
“Islamic renaissance”.  
The renaissance movement, in terms of how Islamist thinkers attempted to form it, was 
preoccupied with several major issues. The first issue that occupies a significant 
                                            
175 Ibid. p. 120. 
176 Louėr has studied how the MVM expanded in the Gulf during seventies, see ibid. pp. 120-49. 
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amount of space in Islamist thinkers’ works was the “Other.” Here, the "Other" refers to 
the civilisational other, namely, Western civilisation. Islamist discourse at the time was 
preoccupied with western civilisation, which was a natural result given that almost all 
Middle Eastern countries were under Western colonisation. Thus, works from this period 
commonly examine the nature of colonisation, its effects and residues, and how to 
confront it intellectually, especially in countries that had endured long periods of 
colonisation, such as Algeria.177 The second issue focused on the “possibility” and/or 
the “validity” of the Islamic solution for the renaissance movement. Related approaches 
had two tendencies. The first tendency was defensiveness, concerned with defending 
Islamic thought against Marxism and Capitalism. This tendency can be seen in the 
works of Murtaḍā Muṭahharī, al-ʿAllama al-Ṭabāṭabāʾī and Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr on 
the philosophical level and Sayyid Quṭb and Malek Bennabi in criticising the socio-
political institution of Marxism and Capitalism. The second tendency was concerned 
with constructing Islamic thought by examining the features of Islamic doctrine and the 
socio-political institution, although it is sometimes claimed in this discourse that Islam is 
the only solution for the modern world. Sometimes this tendency appears in the 
discourse on “originality” (al-aṣāla/al-taʾṣīl), which argues for the necessity of 
institutionalising the renaissance movement. This issue was also given significant 
attention in Islamist thinkers’ works.178 The third issue of the renaissance movement 
focused on “contemporaneity” (al-muʿāṣara), which claimed to open a path to the 
achievements of current Western civilisation in attempting to transcend the traditional 
movement amongst religious circles. According to this discourse, openness constituted 
a part of the renaissance project, although there was much debate with regard to the 
concept of contemporaneity and its mechanisms.179 
                                            
177 Malek Bennabi is the best representative of this point. 
178 The work of Muḥammad ʿĀbid al-Jābirī is the best one to consult, especially his series on Criticism of 
the Arab Intellect: al-Jābirī, Takwīn al-ʿAql al-ʿArabī. 
179 For further information see Naḥnu wa al-Turāth: Qirāʽa Muʿāṣira li Turāthinā al-Falsafī (Beirut: al-
Markaz al-Thaqāfī al-ʿArabī, 1980). Also, for literature in English, see C. Mallat, The Renewal of Islamic 
Law: Muhammad Baqer as-Sadr, Najaf and the Shi'i International  (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
pp. 1-22. 
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2.4.1.2. Mudarrisī’s Works 
At the beginning of this phase, Mudarrisī was primarily concerned with establishing the 
correct defense for Islamic thought against the threat of non-Islamic ideologies, 
particularly Marxism. Yet, he was also occupied with revolutionising Shīʿī thought in 
order to establish his socio-political organisation and providing an intellectual 
methodology of reading Islamic religious texts to address contemporary issues. It was 
the first period of Mudarrisī’s intellectual contribution, during which he published more 
than fourteen works. Some of these were motivational and mobilizing books, aimed at 
promoting and preaching his own and MVM’s thought, while the others were 
foundational works, aiming to lay down the intellectual groundwork for his and MVM’s 
thought as a distinct school of thought particularly within Shīʿī movements and Islamic 
movements in general. These works were separate from his private writings for the 
MVM, which cannot be studied here, as these writings are unavailable to the public.180 
The first of these foundational works was al-Thaqāfa al-Risāliyya181, which comprises of 
twelve chapters. Although this work is shorter than the others, it is Mudarrisī’s most 
significant work in terms of giving us insight into his particular school of thought and the 
MVM’s ideology in general. The first chapter is devoted to answering the question: “Why 
are Muslims today a backward community?” Mudarrisī claimed that Shīʿīsm as a reform 
movement in Islam could change this situation, but he argued that a divorce had taken 
place between Shīʿīsm and the Shīʿa culture, as a result of which the Shīʿa with its 
current distorted culture had become part of the crisis. He then defines ten concepts 
representing the essence of Shīʿīsm that had become distorted: divine guardianship (al-
wilāya), leadership (al-imāma), infallibility (al-ʿiṣma), occultation (al-ghayba), 
intercession (al-shafāʿa), the period of occultation (ʿaṣr al-ghayba), the jurist (al-faqīh), 
innovation (bidʿa), imitation (taqlīd) and waiting (al-intiẓār). In the remaining part of the 
second chapter, he analyses the causes of this deviation, concluding that it had 
                                            
180 Fuʾād al-Ibrāhīm, in his book al-Faqīh wa al-Dawla, mentioned some of them, although he did not 
mention the date of each one. See Ibrāhīm, al-Faqīh wa al-Dawla: al-Fikr al-Siyāsī al-Shīʼī. 
181 Muḥammad Taqī al-Mudarrisī, Bayyināt min Fiqh al-Qurʾān: Dirāsa Taʿtamid Istinbāṭ al-Sunan al-
Ilāhiyya min al-Dhikr al-Ḥakīm: al-Ḥajj  (Beirut: Dār al-Maḥajja al-Bayḍāʾ, 2012). 
85 
 
happened when Shīʿīsm had became the religion of the state. In the third chapter, 
Mudarrisī explains the manifestations of this deviation in practical culture, which can be 
boiled down to three phenomena: rumination on tragedies, repetition of theological 
arguments, and introversion into the self. In the fourth chapter, he explains how the 
Qurʾān was playing a crucial role in forming the Shīʿī culture, followed by a discussion 
of fiqh and its crisis in the fifth chapter. According to Mudarrisī, fiqh was devoid of its 
purpose and had come to be practiced superficially in reality. In order to reform this 
deviation, in the sixth through the ninth chapters, he concentrates on free will and 
personal responsibility, or what he termed “the responsible culture” (al-thaqāfa al-
masʾūlah). Meanwhile, he blamed a certain culture that had infused into Islamic thought 
destiny, mysticism and pantheism, all of which had come from Greek and Indian 
philosophy. Accordingly, he read all of these theological and philosophical debates from 
a cultural perspective and blamed them for withdrawing the Islamic socio-political 
reality. Therefore, the tenth and eleventh chapters are devoted to examining the manner 
in which Islamic thought and culture are purified from these deviations. He ends the 
book by exploring the importance of historical awareness, particularly of Shīʿī history, 
because this would give the Muslim or Shīʿī, according to Mudarrisī, the motivation to 
create his own reality and play a role in his current reality. Mudarrisī ultimately called for 
a re-reading of Shīʿī history in order to awaken the contemporary Shīʿa. 
The book al-Thaqāfa al-Risāliyya is arguably Mudarrisī’s most important work, 
particularly in this period. This book was released in a period when almost all Islamist 
movements and trends had already established their activist theory. In Sunnī circles of 
the time, the Brotherhood movement had established its activist theory, which was 
probably the first of its kind. In the Shīʿī circles, Najaf also provided its own theory and 
established its movement through the efforts of al-Ṣadr in the Daʿwah party. The Iranian 
Shīʿa had also started their socio-political activities and provided their ideas regarding 
the renaissance. In this context, Karbala was the only part of the Islamic socio-political 
circles, especially Shīʿī circles, that had not yet established its activist theory. Therefore, 
providing such work was necessary for Karbala to be a part of the so-called Islamic 
Revival, especially if we keep in mind Shīrāzī’s discourse at that time, calling for 
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Muslims to awaken. This work of Mudarrisī’s served to fill a gap in Karbala and created 
a cultural social identity amongst Shīʿī movements, especially considering that this book 
used to be private literature for the MVM before it became public. 
From another angle, the significance of this work lies on the fact that it seems to be a 
summary of Mudarrisī's ideas. In other words, this work can be deemed to be a thesis 
plan or outline of Mudarrisī’s intellectual and practical project. Throughout Mudarrisī’s 
intellectual biography, every single chapter of this book was subsequently expanded 
upon, with some modification, being transformed into a significant intellectual work. This 
is not to say that Mudarrisī had a clear idea from the beginning about what he was 
going to produce in the future, but rather that this book left an indelible mark on his 
school of thought, giving it a particular characteristic. 
Beside its functional and practical role, the contents of the book is an amalgamation of a 
critical Shīʿī school, the Tafkīkī school182 (school of separation), Shīrāzī’s ideas of the 
Shīʿī renaissance and and his own ideas consistent with the cross-regional trend of 
activism. The Tafkīkī school was founded by Mīrzā Mahdī al-Iṣfahānī around the 1940s 
as a critical move away from the dominant philosophical school within the Shīʿī learning 
institutions, Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical school. As mentioned before, the school called 
for the separation of human knowledge (al-ʿulūm al-bashariyya) from divine knowledge 
(al-maʿārif al-ilāhiyya), and in so doing, repealed Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical school 
which, according to the Tafkīkī school, had been heavily influenced by Greek 
philosophy which had penetrated into the Islamic civilizations during the era of 
translation. The main claim of the Tafkīkī school was that divine knowledge (al-maʿārif 
al-ilāhiyya) has its own methods to interpret and understand its contents, and therefore 
does not need any support from human knowledge (al-ʿulūm al-bashariyya). Although 
human knowledge is useful for other fields of knowledge, it is not valid for religious 
knowledge, according to the Tafkīkī school. That is why it is called the Tafkīkī school of 
separation, in which they separate between the nature of divine and human knowledge. 
Mudarrisī was heavily influenced by this school through his father, as mentioned in the 
                                            
182 See footnote 151.  
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previous section. This influence and the elements of the Tafkīkī school will appear 
frequently in his works. 
The second work of his is al-Fikr al-Islāmī: Muwājaha Ḥaḍāriyya183 This work can be 
divided into three main parts. The first section discusses the issue of the theory of 
knowledge. It is obvious that the central concern of this part is to refute Marxist thought 
and philosophy in this field, although Mudarrisī also addresses other schools, such as 
ancient Greek philosophers and modern Western thinkers like Immanuel Kant and 
Descartes. Attacking Marxist philosophy in the 1950s and 1960s seemed to be a 
common phenomenon amongst Shīʿī scholars, and Murtaḍā Muṭahharī,184 al-ʿAllāma al-
Ṭabāṭabāʾī185 and Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr186 all addressed it. This might raise a 
question about Mudarrisī’s motivation to discuss the subject, given that such extensive 
work had already been done in this field. Although many Shīʿī scholars had already 
addressed the issue, Mudarrisī approached it in a different way. Muṭahharī, Ṭabāṭabāʾī 
and Ṣadr took recourse to the Shīʿī theological and philosophical inventory, which had 
been established by Mullā Ṣadrā’s School, in their discussion of Marxist theology, 
whereas Mudarrisī approached the issue by relying on the Shīʿī Tafkīkī school.  
Although a huge difference does not exist between these approaches in this particular 
field as they all have the common goal of refuting Marxism, the difference is clearly 
seen in the doctrine part of this work and later on when Mudarrisī wrote al-ʿIrfān al-
Islāmī. The second section - according to my own estimation of the book’s sections - 
comparatively discusses the concept of the worldview between Marxist and Islamic 
perspectives. This part is very similar to Ṣadr’s work Falsafatunā and intersects with 
many of the critical Islamist contributions on Marxism during that period. The third 
section concentrates on Islamic doctrine from the Shīʿī viewpoint and its social 
dimensions, in which Mudarrisī attempts to defend the Islamic doctrine in the traditional 
                                            
183 al-Fikr al-Islāmī: Muwājaha Ḥaḍāriyya (1969). 
184 Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Ṭabāṭabāʽī, Uṣūl al-Falsafa wa al-Madhhab al-Wāqiʿī, ed. Murtaḍā Muṭahharī, 
trans. Muḥammad ʽAbd al-Munʽim al-Khāqānī, 1st ed., 3 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Taʿāruf li al-Maṭbūʿāt, 1981). 
185 Ibid.  
186 Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr, Falsafatunā, 3rd ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Taʿāruf li al-Maṭbūʿāt, 2009). 
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way of arguing. In the last three chapters of this section, he argues that Islam includes a 
social institution that can be applied in the modern age and has some features that 
other contemporary institutions do not have. These features, according to Mudarrisī, are 
its comprehensiveness, its integration, its applicability for any time and place and, 
finally, its instinctiveness. 
This work is a clear reflection of its phase, as previously mentioned. The book’s title and 
its sections indicate to the general features of Islamist discourse: al-Fikr al-Islāmī 
(Islamic Thought) suggests the Islamic character of the thought. This indicates to the 
idea of “originality” where the thought should be rooted in Islamic sources. At the same 
time, it implies the concept of the Islamic “possibility” and/or “validity”, where the Islamic 
solution is possible and valid, or sometimes even the best one for the modern age. 
Furthermore, the subtitle of the book, Muwājaha Ḥadāriyya (Civilizational Confrontation) 
indicates the intellectual concern of that period with “the civilizational other”— either the 
Western or the Eastern one (the Marxist movement at that time) - which is dealt with 
more within the contents of the first two sections. These two parts are generally 
characterised by the binary opposition of demolition and construction: demolition of the 
other’s thought, especially for Marxist thought at that time, and construction of Islamic 
thought in an attempt to substantiate its competence in civilizational confrontation. In 
addition, the third section of the book clearly reflects the concept of an “Islamic 
solution”, especially on the level of essential intellectual options in the doctrinal and 
ideological points of reference. This was one of the pillars of Islamic discourse at that 
time, which shifted theological arguments from a dialectical form into a social form by 
presenting Islamic doctrine as a social civilized institution. Indeed, Malek Bennabi 
expressed this when he said that “it is not important for Muslims today to have it proved 
to them that Allah exists, but rather to make them feel Him”.187 However, such a shift 
had practical demand too, requiring Islamist movements to formulate practical programs 
for their audience and preach their discourse. Moreover, this part of Mudarrisī’s work 
displays the idea of “contemporaneity” in which he calls for the Islamic institution, and 
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which pushed him to the frontline of the fight against traditional insights into religion held 
by general Islamic circles and Shīʿī circles in particular. Here he discusses the need to 
improve Islamic thought, differentiating between the constants and the variables in 
Islam, and the nature of Islamic laws. Although he briefly discusses these issues in the 
book, these matters took up a considerable amount of space in his subsequent works at 
both the intellectual and cultural levels, as well as the jurisprudential and legislative 
ones. 
The final point worth noting with regard to this work is the question raised previously 
about the similarity between this book and Ṣadr’s book Falsafātunā. Mudarrisī’s book is 
quite similar to Falsafātunā, especially in the discussion of the theory of knowledge and 
the issue of the worldview in the its section, as well as a subsection in the final part 
where Mudarrisī explores the social problem of the modern human being. Furthermore, 
the structure of the two books is similar in terms of how the contents of the first section 
are arranged as well as similarities in the terminology used in both. Nevertheless, as 
previously emphasized, the approach of each work is different from the other. Yet the 
question remains: Why did Mudarrisī write the book given the existence of Ṣadr’s book? 
There were probably three motivations to this. First, the book used to be private 
literature for MVM members to study and read within the organisational framework. As 
the MVM saw itself as a distinct movement among Iraqi movements, especially distinct 
from the Daʿwāh party, the book played a motivational role in reinforcing the MVM’s 
social identity amongst its own members as they were reading their own ideology and 
developing their organisational symbols. Second, Mudarrisī’s approach differed from 
Ṣadr’s, as previously indicated. His approach was associated with the Tafkīkī School, 
which Mudarrisī seemed to be willing to establish in Arab literature, as will be clearly 
seen in his subsequent contributions to the field of theology and philosophy that had a 
distinct effect on his school of thought. Finally, from a missionary perspective, he 
perhaps thought that the strength of the Marxist movement in Iraq at that time required 
redoubled efforts to stand against it; and providing numerous works against the problem 
would have been a kind of intellectual resistance. 
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Mudarrisī’s third substantial work during this phase was entitled, ‘al-Qiyāda al-
Islāmiyya’188. Where the first work was important in criticising Shīʿī culture in order to 
release it from its past into the present, and the second work aimed to provide 
ideological insights into Islamic thought, the third work aimed to provide a political 
theory for Shīʿī activism. The book can be divided into four main parts, where the first 
part deals with the problematic absence of addressing the subject of leadership in Shīʿī 
thought. Mudarrisī attributed this absence to the deviation that infused Islamic culture, 
which he termed the “apologetic culture” (al-thaqāfa al-tabrīriyya), where Muslims 
justified their backward situation; and the subject of leadership - an essential matter for 
any society - falls under the influence of this culture. He then drew upon four 
methodological principles on which to base his work. The first principle is to establish all 
ideas of political leadership on Islamic sources: the Qurʾān, the Sunnah, consensus and 
intellect. The second principle is to ignore the false political applications in Islamic 
history as they do not necessarily reflect the true application of Islam. The third principle 
is to focus on the essence of the subject while overcoming the linguistic barriers 
between the religious text and modern concepts. The fourth principle is to ignore the 
form in which Islamic leadership should be applied in modern life as it is a variable 
matter and is only related to certain circumstances. The remainder of the first part of this 
work focuses on arguing whether a political institution exists in Islam or not. This debate 
represents the first foundation for establishing Mudarrisī’s theory.  
The second part of the book deals with the nature of the Islamic rule, beginning with the 
idea of divine sovereignty (al-ḥākimiyya al-ilāhiyya) as a result of the principle of 
Oneness (tawḥīd) in the political scope. Given that political life is a scope where  
Oneness can be applied by divine sovereignty, legislation has to be in accordance with 
God’s will, which in turn, is expressed through the Prophet or Imām and, in his 
occultation, rests in the hands of the jurist (faqīh). Here, Mudarrisī provided the idea of 
the Guardianship of the Jurist (wilāyat al-faqīh), especially during his discussion of the 
qualifications of the leader of Islamic rule, emphasizing the conditions of justice and 
knowledge in the ruler.  
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In the third part, Mudarrisī addresses several problematic issues that arose in the claim 
of Islamic rule, especially in Shīʿī thought. Central to these problematic issues is the 
balance between divine sovereignty and the popular one, which is embodied in many 
different forms of arguments, such as the balance between the leader (Imām) and the 
community (al-umma) as well as between freedom and obligation. Mudarrisī uses the 
whole of the third part to deal with these issues.  
The final part of the book is devoted to a discussion of practical matters, e.g. can  
Islamic leadership be applied in the modern age and, if so, how? Here, Mudarrisī sought 
to provide a practical plan to apply the theory of Islamic leadership in the contemporary 
age by arguing that if the Islamic state or government is not possible now, we have to 
actively seek it out by involving the jurist in political activity in practice. This means that 
the jurist has to take responsibility to lead political activity for the Muslim or Shīʿī 
community, which is what Mudarrisī himself did when he founded the MVM. 
This work highlights a few interesting points worth discussing as well. It was apparently 
the first work in contemporary Shīʿī thought, if any previous work existed, calling for the 
theory of the Guardianship of the Jurist (wilāyat al-faqīh). Although it is commonly 
believed in the scholarship of the field of Islamic studies that Khomeini was the founder 
of the theory in the contemporary age, this work of Mudarrisī’s provides a different 
reading of the developments of this idea.189  Mudarrisī’s book was first published in 
1969. It had been a private work for the MVM for about three years before it was 
published190, meaning that Mudarrisī was twenty-three years old when he wrote it. In 
this book, Mudarrisī explicitly defines the concept of wilāya as a sovereignty (siyāda) 
and legislation (al-tashrīʿ) and refers them both to be in the hands of the jurist (faqīh).191 
He claims that this wilāya is a continuity of God, the Prophet and the Imām’s wilāya, 
which should now be for the jurist. However, he believed that because of the historical 
and cultural deviation that affected Shīʿī thought, this political understanding of wilāya 
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was not clear for them.192 Moreover, and this may well be the most important part of his 
discussion, he discusses the contemporary situation regarding who should be the 
leader of the Muslims today, and he believed that this wilāya had to necessarily be 
established, and that it was up to the Muslim community to make it happen.193 At that 
time, no one had claimed such a theory; even Khomeini’s opinion on this issue was not 
yet known, and perhaps was not even fully thought through until he started his lectures 
in fiqh in Najaf after 1970. The Islamic Action Organisation (IAO)194 mentioned this point 
explicitly when it republished the book in its second edition a year after the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran in 1980, concluding that the principle of Islamic Revolution in Iran - 
especially its theory of leadership - completely corresponded with the IAO’s theory.195 
Yet, it can also be claimed that the emergence of such a theory in Shīʿī political thought 
at this particular time was the natural result of the dominant discourse in Shīʿī politics. 
With the presence of Marxist thought as a coherent ideology, surrounded by the 
circumstances of overthrowing the governments in Iraq, seeking an Islamic theory of 
government was an urgent matter. Furthermore, at that time, the Sunnī Islamist 
movement had already provided its theory regarding authority by claiming the idea of 
divine sovereignty, the need for an Islamic government and the implementation of 
sharīʿa law. Therefore, it provoked Shīʿī thought, especially progressive trends, to 
produce its own theory and, in effect, almost all Shīʿī trends had to provide their attitude 
towards this issue. 
From another angle, the formulation of the Guardianship of the Jurist (wilāyat al-faqīh) 
at that time was appropriate within the Shīʿī Iraqi context. As Mudarrisī was in Karbala 
and had already founded his movement - the MVM - he faced the challenge of 
constitutinga legitimacy for political action, especially as he wanted to differentiate it 
from the Daʿwah party. For the Daʿwah party, at least initially, it was not necessary for 
political action to be under a jurist’s supervision,196 whereas for the MVM, which had 
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been established by the jurists and under the supervision of the marjiʿiyya, it was quite 
reasonable and expected for it to be inclined to be under the umbrella of the 
guardianship of jurists. Moreover, this is what Mudarrisī himself emphasized in the final 
chapter in the section entitled “Who is the Islamic leader today?” Since he did not 
believe in what he called ‘passive waiting’ for the hidden Imām and did not accept 
compromising solutions, which entailed cooperation with religious politicians to make an 
Islamic government as great as possible, the best solution was to extend the authority 
of the Prophet and the Imām to the jurist. Accordingly, in practical terms, this is how he 
formulated the organisational structure of the MVM, where the political action derived its 
legitimacy from the jurist, who was at the top of the pyramid, represented by Mudarrisī 
himself as the mujtahid, and secured socially by the marjiʿiyya represented by Shīrāzī. 
Thus, the theory with its structural support was to Mudarrisī’s advantage for political and 
practical agendas. 
Although the Guardianship of the Jurist (wilāyat al-faqīh) is considered to be one of the 
main characteristics of Mudarrisī’s thought, especially his political and activist thought, 
after the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the opportunity to put theory into 
practice, he sought to improve some parts of it and change others. 
The fourth work was a short but important book dealing with the Qurʾān, that is, in 
effect, a summary of a series of lectures that Mudarrisī had given to some students at 
Baghdad University. He subsequently wrote the lectures in a book form. This book, 
Buḥūth fi al-Qurʾān al-Ḥakīm197, is one of the most important works reflecting 
Mudarrisī's thought, and two notable characteristics thereof. First, his intellectual 
association with the Tafkīkī school, where he discusses the matter of intellect (al-ʿaql), 
ontology (al-wujūd) and how to know Allāh in a way that clearly reflects his adoption of 
the Tafkīkī principles. In discussing these issues, he implicitly criticised the dominant 
theological and philosophical trends in religious learning institutions. Second, his 
conviction in the concept of originality, which for him, meant the verification of whether 
an idea or theory had its roots in religious texts - the Qurʾān and the Sunnah - or not. 
Here, he created the concept of “al-tadabbur” to which he devotes half of the book. This 
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concept takes up considerable space in the majority of his works. It basically means 
pondering deeply and systematically on the Qurʾān in order to discover Qurʾānic 
theories and ideas for every aspect of life. Obviously, this technique cannot be done 
without conditions, including methodological and psychological conditions. He 
attempted to provide a concept for the Qurʾānic text, which gave it the capacity to 
contribute to the modern age. At the same time, he provided tools and techniques to 
bridge the gap between the Qurʾān and contemporary reality. By establishing this 
concept, Mudarrisī and his followers, the MVM, started to call their trend ‘the Qurʾānic 
trend’ or ‘the Qurʾānic school’, which subsequently became a part of the organisational 
growth of the MVM and a part of Mudarrisī’s Ḥawza as well. Moreover, this book 
represents the methodology that Mudarrisī used in his exegesis of the Qurʾān and 
includes some concepts that would later be improved upon, in order to be employed in 
his insights into reforming fiqh and uṣūl, as we shall see below.198 
It is worth noting that henceforth Mudarrisī’s effort focused on establishing intellectual 
contributions in several fields - namely, the Qurʾān, logic, jurisprudence (fiqh) and 
culture. This, in fact, represented continuity in expanding some ideas that he had initially 
outlined in his previous works al-Thaqāfa al-Risāliyya and al-Fikr al-Islāmī. It is also 
worth noting that the Qurʾānic project was crystallised as a strategic choice marking 
Mudarrisī’s thought. The previous works were marked by an insistence in Mudarrisī’s 
thought on the necessity of originality, purification of tradition and the search for ideas 
through reliance on religious texts, but methodological choices had not been determined 
once and for all. However, by writing his short and concentrated book Buḥūth fī al-
Qurʾān al-Ḥakīm and then starting with his Qurʾānic exegesis, his methodological 
choices seem to have been determined. Although it is difficult to determine with 
certainty the factors that pushed him towards these choices, two factors most likely 
motivated Mudarrisī to choose this approach. First, it was probably at this time that he 
read the works of Malek bin Nabī and Sayyid Quṭb, who clearly advocated a “back to 
the Qurʾān” approach, especially in bin Nabī’s al-Ẓāhira al-Qurʾāniyya199, in which he 
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attempts to combine adherence to religious texts with a rational approach. Second, 
Mudarrisī’s background with the Tafkīkī school might have influenced his choices in 
terms of the Qurʾānic approach, as the Tafkīkī school calls for basing religious 
knowledge primarily on textual sources, especially the texts of the Prophet’s household. 
Yet, some differences remain between Mudarrisī’s approach and the Tafkīkī school as 
the former focused mainly on the Qurʾān and chose it as the starting point whilst the 
latter focused mainly on the Imāms’ narrations. 
From another perspective, Mudarrisī’s Tafkīkī school background in theology and 
philosophy equipped him with a critical perspective, which is what enabled him to 
criticise the traditional trend that was dominant in Shīʿī religious learning circles at that 
time. This is to say that the Tafkīkī school itself was deemed to be a critical trend, 
especially for theological and philosophical traditions in Shīʿī thought, and Mudarrisī had 
grown up in such an environment, particularly in terms of theological demotion, which 
gave him - at least on the psychological level - a critical mentality overlapping with an 
ambition to develop and reform religious thought. As a result, his works during this 
period are marked by this critical feature, as evident in his book Buḥūth fi al-Qurʾān al-
Ḥakīm, and his jurisprudential work as well as his work on logic,, which will be 
discussed below, where he overtly and explicitly criticizes Shīʿī religious thought. 
Therefore, it can be claimed that had it not been for his association with the Tafkīkī 
school, he perhaps would not have obtained this particularly critical and reformist 
thought toward Shīʿī religious thought or developed an ambition to modernise religious 
thought. He would also not have contributed to the further development of the Tafkīkī 
school. 
The fifth work in this phase chronologically is a jurisprudential book called “al-Fiqh al-
Islāmī: Qism al-Muʿāmalāt al-Uṣūl al-ʿĀmma”, which is basically a commentary on the 
classical jurisprudential textbook “Sharāʾiʿ al-Islām”200 written by al-Muḥaqqiq al-Ḥillī (d. 
1277) used in Shīʿī religious learning institutions. In this work, Mudarrisī attempted to 
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provide a different approach to the commentary on Sharāʾiʿ al-Islām, a well-known book 
with a long history of commentary. His commentary was based on attempting to survey 
the main principles in the field of transactions and to study each one separately by 
discussing its nature, limitation, extension and function. For example, instead of 
repeatedly studying the terms of the contract in every field (e.g., lease, sale, mortgage), 
he chose to study the principles of the contract and then generalise it to each field, 
unless there was an exception in certain fields. This is the way in which modern legal 
studies work, at least by Mudarrisī’s estimation, where jurists may study, for example, 
the rule of coercion and its theoretical determinants and then generalise it to all the 
places where it can be applied. The roots of this approach can be found in Shaykh 
Murtaḍā al-Anṣārī’s school, where it was applied in his famous book al-Makāsib.201 
Mudarrisī admired this work and considered it to be the first step toward principled 
jurisprudence (al-fiqh al-qawāʿidī), which bases the derivation of legal rulings on a base 
principle (qāʿida) that has been derived from the text rather than each individual ruling 
being derived from individual texts in turn. He also believed that this approach to 
jurisprudence was better than the traditional approach to studying it, as it would enable 
students to grasp it deeply and systematically whilst avoiding repetition. However, when 
he returned to his discussion of jurisprudential issues in 1980, he had improved his 
thesis in the framework of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa. Therefore, the issue was, not only a re-
organisation of learning, but it was also a theory of understanding religion and improving 
jurisprudence, as we shall see202. 
Chronologically, the seventh work to be penned in this period was “al-Manṭiq al-Islāmī: 
Uṣūluhu wa Manāhijuhu”203, which consists of an introduction and seven sections, 
wherein he discusses procedural and conceptual issues in the introduction (e.g., the 
definition and object of logic and its relation to philosophy). Before that, however, he 
spends some time discussing his motivations for writing this book, which he 
summarises into three main reasons. The first was the quest for Islamic culture for the 
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identity of the Islamic community (umma), a culture commensurate with the Islamic 
community to reinforce its self-confidence and which would initiate a civilizational 
dialogue. However, this could not be achieved, according to Mudarrisī, without trusting 
tradition whilst at the same time believing in methodological reformation. As the field of 
logic is a core subject, establishing it according to Islamic thought and improving it by 
benefiting from modern advances were things that he considered to be critical steps 
along this path.204 The second reason was to reform the methodology of religious 
learning. Mudarrisī believed that religious learning institutes had stagnated and become 
stuck in methodologies that no longer necessarily represented the religion and did not 
benefit the modern age. Therefore, they needed to be reformed.205 The third reason 
was the quest for integrity in modern education. As Muslim communities were open to 
modernity, especially at that time, when schools and universities were emerging as 
independent learning institutions, these new institutions represented challenges to the 
integrity of the Islamic notion of culture.206 
By considering the book in its entirety, we can see the influence of the triad: the Other, 
original Islamic integrity and contemporaneity. The first part of the book represents the 
concern of the Other, as Mudarrisī explored the history of logical thought, beginning with 
the Greek school, through the Islamic civilisation, and then turning to medieval times, 
before ending up at modern logical thought. In each stage, he not only read it 
descriptively, but also normatively by evaluating the strong and weak points of each 
school or philosopher. The second part represents integrity and, in effect, can be 
deemed as the essence of his work as he argued in support of Islamic logic - what he 
termed “The Principles of Islamic Logic” (Uṣūl al-Manṭiq al-Islāmī). He built his argument 
on the claim that there has to be a special Islamic logic as Allah through his Prophet 
and his Imāms has given human beings everything that they need. Therefore, He would 
not have ignored this important field. Therefore, all we have to do is to discover these 
principles through the religious texts provided by the Prophet and his Imāms. Mudarrisī 
employed every available text related to the subject of logic in order to “discover” the 
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original Islamic principles of logic. The third part is devoted to a discussion of the 
psychological factors that cause human beings to fail in their thinking. Here, the extent 
to which Mudarrisī benefitted from modern advances in the social sciences, especially 
psychology, education, sociology and sociology of knowledge, is clear. From the third 
part onwards, the book highlights his interaction with these modern advances in social 
sciences. The fourth part discusses methodology and the issue of the relationship 
between the subject and its appropriate method, while the fifth part discusses the 
methods of induction and the experimental method. In the sixth part, he examines the 
methodology of social sciences, their feasibility and their scientific indicators, but 
devotes a significant part of the discussion to historical methodology. The final part of 
the book deals with the issue of analogy, including definition, deduction and 
mathematical logic. 
As far as practicality goes, this book also contributed to Mudarrisī’s reformation of the 
Ḥawza curriculum, in which the book was an alternative for existing books on logic. He 
replaced the common Ḥawza logic textbook with this one when he founded his own 
Ḥawza. The essence of the book’s thesis will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 
Three when addressing Mudarrisī’s theory of knowledge and his concept of reason 
(ʿaql). 
The final works to be written by him in this period were a series of short books criticizing 
contemporary civilisation207. Each of these titles primarily discusses two issues: the 
deficiency of contemporary civilizations (either Western or Eastern) and the possibility of 
reviving Islamic civilization in our age based on the  essential role of religion. In effect, 
the principal ideas of these books and much of their terminology are very similar to 
Malek Bennabi’s thought, who significantly contributed to this field in what he called 
“The Problems of Civilisation”.212 Furthermore, they are similar to the works of Sayyid 
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Quṭb, who wrote al-Islām wa Mushkilat al-Ḥaḍāra.213 These two thinkers had a profound 
influence on the Islamic discourse of the period, especially on this subject. This 
influence might be attributed to the fact that their writings were easy to read and grasp 
and both lived in the West for a while, which gives their ideas and critiques some credit. 
2.4.2. In Iran (1979 – late 1990s): The Practical Experience 
This is the second phase of Mudarrisī’s intellectual biography, of which he spent the 
most part in Iran, immediately after the Islamic revolution until roughly the late nineties. 
The main characteristic of this phase is that Mudarrisī’s thought had been put into 
practice in reality, be it his political activist thought or his reformation of religious 
education. As a pragmatic characteristic of his thought resulting from this practical 
experience, his legal and political philosophy began to change and develop further, 
whereby he sought to establish his theory of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa whilst simultaneously 
revising his theory of the Guardianship of the Jurist (wilāyat al-faqīh). Furthermore, 
thanks to the new situation, his thought is characterized by his primary concern with the 
Shīʿī internal community and its issues. Towards the latter part of this phase and 
corresponding to some socio-political events, his thought and strategic choices inclined 
to a different stance, which will be discussed in the next section. It is difficult to 
determine an exact date for the new phase, because there was so single political or 
religious event that took place in order for such a date to be determined. Rather, it was 
a gradual process in the late 1990s that eventually led Mudarrisī to make a decision to 
declare his marjiʿiyya during the lifetime of his uncle. 
2.4.2.1. Activities 
The most significant event at the beginning of this period was the Islamic Revolution in 
Iran since the success of the revolution in overthrowing the regime of Shah changed the 
map of one of the most vital areas, the Middle East. Simultaneously, at the Shīʿī level, 
the event meant that Iran became the first modern state based on Shīʿī doctrine and run 
by Shīʿī scholars, which gave Shīʿī communities a euphoria of victory and activated 
Shīʿī political action in Lebanon, the Gulf and Iraq. However, within two years of the 
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success of the revolution, the Iraq–Iran war had started, which had political and 
intellectual implications for the Shīʿī community. Almost all Iraqi Shīʿī political 
movements were engaged in the ranks of the war, either in a military form on the 
ground or in a political form in the media and diplomatic activities. This raised many 
questions regarding the legitimacy of jihād and who the leader of the Shīʿa was. 
Mudarrisī, after the success of the revolution, left Kuwait in late 1979 with his uncle 
Shīrāzī. As the representative of the MVM, he participated in the state apparatus, 
particularly in the dialogue of drafting of the constitution. In the meantime, the MVM 
received some responsibities within the state apparatus, the Arabic Radio, and was 
given a somewhat diplomatic position along with some sectors in the ministry of 
services. Moreover, at the beginning of the eighties, the MVM announced that the 
Islamic Action Organization (IAO) was now the official Iraqi wing of the movement.214 
Furthermore, this period witnessed the birth of the first religious learning institution, to 
be under the direct supervision of Mudarrisī - Ḥawzat al-Qāʾim - which created an 
opportunity for him to apply his insights to how the Ḥawza should be. Ḥawzat al-Qāʾim 
was not only a place of religious learning, but also a socio-political place for the MVM, 
which housed the different sectors of the movement. 
At the Shīʿī level, there were dynamic political activities on the ground in Iraq, Lebanon, 
the Gulf and Iran, which in turn required intellectual theorisation, especially in political 
philosophy. This situation marked this period with a need to address political thought by 
raising questions about the state and its issues, as well as about political actions and 
related issues. Thus, at this time, perhaps almost all Shīʿī political movements had 
determined, generally speaking, their intellectual choices towards a certain political 
trend - the Daʿwa party was based on the work of al-Ṣadr, Iranian trends were based on 
Khomeini’s thought and al-Shirāziyya was based on the works of Shīrāzī and Mudarrisī. 
At the Arab level, this period witnessed firm contradictions. On the one hand, for the 
Arab nationalist, the residual of the seventies had led to the beginning of severe 
criticism of Arabic culture and thought. This criticism was intellectually opened through 
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the works of the famous Arabic thinker Muhammad ʿĀbid al-Jābirī215, who published a 
series of books entitled Naqd al-ʿAql al-ʿArabī216 (Critique of Arabic Reason). This 
development stemmed directly from what is called in Arabic literature as “Arab 
Impotence” toward the first and main problem for them: the Palestinian issue. At the 
same time, it stemmed from the conversion of revolutionary states into dictatorial states, 
which affected almost all political movements, activists, intellectualists and academics. 
On the other hand, this period witnessed the revival of the Islamists, which in turn 
resulted from a peace agreement with Israel, the Afghan war with the Soviet Union, and 
the Islamic Revolution in Iran. 
For Mudarrisī, the late eighties and early nineties, was the time when the MVM had a 
profound disputes and disagreements.217 The disagreement began with political 
attitudes of the MVM towards certain places, such as Saudi Arabia and Iraq, but then 
accelerated into an ideological and intellectual disagreement. As a result, the Saudi, 
Kuwaiti and some parts of the Iraqi sectors split from the MVM. They thought that the 
radical political discourse of the MVM was not suitable for the Gulf where the Shīʿa were 
a minority. They preferred a more moderate discourse, compatible with the democratic 
and reformist discourse (i.e. human rights, citizenship and non-violent change). In fact, it 
seemed to be a common situation across Shīʿī activism. This period witnessed a retreat 
of activist trends, especially after the non-solution of the situation in Iraq, as most Shīʿī 
socio-political movements were concerned with it. At the same time, it was an 
opportunity for traditional trends to increase again as the result of the retreat of the other 
trends. This situation encountered the so-called period of revisions (murājaʿāt), and 
Shīʿī discourse was engaged in these revisions, albeit in an adequate form for its own 
issues. Consequently, many intellectual issues were raised, such as the relationship 
between Shīʿī communities in secular states and the Shīʿī marjiʿiyya, the validity of Shīʿī 
fiqh for the modern age, the position of the jurist in the Shīʿī community and the 
legitimacy of Shīʿī political actions in their own communities.  
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Around the beginning of the 1990s, politics dominated the overall scene and had huge 
effects on the intellectual scene. This decade witnessed some political events that 
changed, broadly speaking, the socio-political map of the Middle East. The first of these 
events was the fall of the Soviet Union after its defeat in Afghanistan, which was not 
only a dramatic disintegration of a superpower, but also the collapse of an ideology and 
a global axis that had dominated approximately half the world throughout the last 
century. Immediately thereafter, the second event emerged: Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 
1990, marking the complete collapse of the nationalist project at a pan-Arab level. In 
addition, the invasion required international intervention by NATO, led by the U.S. This 
marked the beginning of the so-called New World Order, which resulted in intellectual 
and political indications of the existence of international forces in the Arabian Peninsula. 
With regards to Iraq, the Second Gulf War meant that the Iraqi matter had entered a 
tunnel of non-solution as the state was besieged internationally, isolated regionally and 
controlled internally by a totalitarian regime. This situation affected the Shīʿī situation as 
well, especially in terms of the political and religious movements led by the rebels of the 
regime. 
Subsequently, this phase witnessed a considerable shift in the intellectual scene, 
especially in Islamist discourse. Many works that were perceived to be a self-criticism of 
the discourse of the Islamic movement appeared, particularly after the Gulf War, when 
the New World Order was announced. It started with a work by the Kuwaiti Islamic 
thinker ʿAbdallāh al-Nifisī (b. 1945) al-Ḥaraka al-Islāmiyya: Ruʾyā Mustaqbaliyya: Awrāq 
fī al-Naqd al-dhātī218 and was followed by many other works concerned with the same 
issue. Some intellectuals preferred to call this period the period of “revisions” as almost 
all Islamic movements, whether Shīʿī or Sunnī, started a self-criticism of their own 
discourse. Therefore, at that time, many issues dominated the intellectual scene, such 
as the relationship between religion and state, the possibility of applying sharīʿa, multi-
culturalism within Islamic sects and the issue of takfīr, the relationship between Islam 
and the West and the legitimacy of political actions within the secular state. Both Shīʿī 
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and Sunnī intellectual revisions happened in conjunction with the increasing number of 
liberal movements in the Arab world generally and in the Gulf in particular, which in turn 
made the debate and revision occur in both theological and philosophical terms. 
2.4.2.2. Mudarrisī’s Works 
During this phase, Mudarrisī was primarily concerned with the new reality challenging 
Shīʿī thought after the Islamic Revolution in Iran, namely, the relationship between 
religion and state. Yet, he was also focusing on building up and mobilising his 
movement (MVM). 
This period lacks any significant intellectual works written by Mudarrisī himself, but it is 
full of a thematic series of his lectures that were collected for publication as a book or 
short series in small books. Yet, from an intellectual perspective, these thematic 
lectures are no less constitutive than those penned by Mudarrisī himself during the 
previous period. There are approximately thirty such works in total, including books and 
short series, and can be studied to determine why his works shifted in form during this 
period. 
The first of these was a series of lectures delivered to various groups in Ḥawza al-Qāʾim 
during the first year of its establishment 1979-1980. These were published as a book 
entitled al-Tamaddun al-Islāmī: Ususuhu wa Mabādiʾuhu219. In this series, Mudarrisī 
dealt with issues of Islamic law and its relation to modern life, including his insights into 
reform of Islamic jurisprudence, the relationship between the law and reality, how to 
provide law for a modern state and the position of the jurist in making a legal decision 
for the state. These lectures were the beginning of his journey in writing his 
jurisprudential work, al-Tashrīʿ al-Islāmī: Manāhijuhu wa Maqāṣiduhu220 which consists 
of ten volumes, initially made public in the 1990s and not finished until the late nineties. 
It is in this book that Mudarrisī presents his theory of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa These lectures 
perhaps marked a new stage in Mudarrisī’s thought, characterised by the development 
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of his jurisprudential insights by shifting from educational reform to methodological 
reform, and the development of his political thought regarding Islamic leadership. 
Mudarrisī’s witnessing of the Iranian experience in addition to his participation in the 
state apparatus kept him in touch with reality in examining the ability of religious 
institutions to run a modern successful state, like other thinkers calling for an Islamic 
solution. This “shock”, if it can be so called, was expressed by many leaders of the 
Iranian experience221, as they found a wide gap between what was written in 
jurisprudential books and the complicated reality of modern life. From this perspective, 
Mudarrisī started his lecture on “Islamic modernization”, but found it was not enough 
given the depth of the challenge. Therefore, he went on to spend more than fifteen 
years on al-Tashrīʿ al-Islāmī project. The first volume of this project was published at the 
beginning of the 1990s. Yet, the project of reforming jurisprudence did not stop with the 
legal discussion; it reached out to the jurist and his position. This ultimately opened the 
political file again, as Mudarrisī started to revise his theory of “wilāyat al-faqīh”. This 
revision developed in conjunction with the reformation of jurisprudence in al-Tashrīʿ al-
Islāmī in the next decade. He began with uṣūl works, publishing the first volume of al-
Tashrīʿ al-Islāmī in 1992. In the same year he published the second volume. Both 
volumes dealt with classical Shīʿī jurisprudential theories in an attempt to adopt them 
towards a maqāṣidī discourse. In 1995, he published the third volume, representing his 
new contribution to Shīʿī jurisprudence - at least that was the claim - his theory of 
maqāṣid al-sharīʿa in the Shīʿī version. By this time, he had finished the uṣūlī part of his 
jurisprudential contribution, and from 1996 until 2004 he published the remaining six 
volumes of the project, presenting the fiqh applications of his uṣūlī theory. The content 
of this work will be examined in detail in the third, fourth and fifth chapters of this thesis. 
The second of these sets of transcripts was a series of various lectures related to 
Islamic action and activist thought, in which he dealt with some activist and 
organizational topics from a religious perspective, in opposion to what were spread at 
that time, which were mostly Marxist. They were released to the public as part of the 
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activist supply of the MVM, which had been accumulating for fifteen years (since the 
late sixties). These lectures clearly show the effort that Mudarrisī made to revolutionise 
Shīʿī religious concepts, using concepts like patience, integrity, prayer, action and 
intercession in the activist framework and concepts like community, loyalty, cooperation, 
defence, and jihād in the political framework. Several collections of lectures were 
published in this context, including the book al-ʿAmal al-Islāmī: al-Munṭalaqāt wa al-
Ahdāf222, published in 1981 and consisting of three volumes, all published within this 
decade. In addition, the book al-Baʿth al-Islāmī223, published in 1984, was devoted to 
dealing with the concepts of revolution and how to create a revolutionary believer. 
Furthermore, ʿAn al-Iʿlām wa al-Thaqāfa al-Risāliyya224 was published in 1985, Āfāq al-
Ḥaraka al-Islāmiyya225 in 1985, Mustaqbal al-Thawra al-Islāmiyya226 in 1985, Hākadhā 
Yataḥaddā al-Fikr al-Islāmī227 in 1986, Baṣāʾir fī al-Ṭaḥarruk al-Islāmī228 in 1987, al-
Waʿy al-Islāmī229 in 1989, and al-Nahj al-Islāmī: Taʾammulāt fī Masīra al-Ḥaraka al-
Islāmiyya230 was published in 1990. The rest were his cultural mobilising public lectures 
that he collected and published in written form. All these attempted to revolutionize 
religious concepts and mobilise activism.  
Mudarrisī’s works at this phase were characterized by an abundance of activist and 
political works compared to the previous two decades, which were practically devoid of 
such concepts. This seems to indicate the need for such works, as the Shīʿī political 
movement had been witnessing significant political dynamic activities in their areas. 
Particularly, with regard to the MVM, which was in its golden age at beginning and 
middle of the eighties in terms of its broad spread and organizational strength, this 
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situation required an organizational mobilization and a feeding proportionate to its large 
scale, which may account for the abundance of activist and political works. 
The third of these lectures was a series discussing societal issues entitled al-Mujtamaʿ 
al-Islāmī: al-Munṭalaqāt wa al-Ahdāf231 which were delivered to groups of students in 
Ḥawza al-Qāʾim and then published in 1983. In this series, Mudarrisī discussed what an 
Islamic society should look like, including its main values and main purposes. He 
explored issues related to sociology and education in terms of the nature of society and 
the relationship between the individual and society. In addition, he examined the 
hierarchy within an Islamic society, the position of the scholars in it and the value of 
action and cooperation. Based on the content, he was clearly concerned with the new 
Islamic society created in Iran and attempted to provide insights into this “new” field. 
The fourth of these lectures was a series related to Islamic history232, entitled al-Tārīkh 
al-Islāmī: Durūs wa ʿIbar, dealing particularly with the period between 63 A.H. to 255 
A.H. These lectures were in fact delivered when he was in Kuwait in the late seventies, 
but were published in the eighties. The principal idea of the book is to reread the history 
of the Shīʿa Imāms based on the conviction that, although they lived in different 
circumstances and dealt with each period in a different way, they had one purpose that 
was embodied in several forms. From this perspective, Mudarrisī also re-reads the 
relationship between Shīʿī groups, mainly among the Ismailis, the Zaydis and the 
Twelver Shīʿa (ithnā ʿashari), in which he claims that all these groups were in reality one 
group and were coordinating with each other, especially during the early stages of their 
establishment. The Ismailis and Zaydis engaged in military tasks under the order and 
supervision of the contemporary Imām of the time while the Twelver Shi’a adopted 
cultural tasks. However, these groups later separated for some reason, distancing 
themselves from one another. The point here for Mudarrisī, aside from what is deemed 
to be academically accurate today, was to address the Shīʿī individual and to change 
his outlook of his own history, which he has hitherto seen as a river of blood and 
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persecution. In addition, he wanted to reform the collective historical memory of the 
Shīʿī individual - the memory that had made him a passive actor in the modern age. 
Mudarrisī attempted to reform this memory by providing a reading that claimed that the 
actions of the Imāms were coherent and consistent, although varying and embodying 
several forms. It is an ideological reading of the history aiming to address the present 
Shīʿī community into being an active agent.  
The fifth work, which is the only work written by Mudarrisī himself in this period, was the 
book al-ʿIrfān al-Islāmī: Bayna Taṣawurāt al-Bashar wa Baṣāʾir al-Waḥy233. Although 
the content of the book was provided to groups of students at Ḥawza al-Qāʾim in a 
lecture format, the book was actually published in al-Baṣāʾir, a quarterly intellectual 
journal issued by Ḥawza al-Qāʾim.234 The content of the book basically deals with 
theological and philosophical matters, in which Mudarrisī mainly criticizes, sometimes 
firmly, the philosophical tendency of studying Islamic doctrine. In particular, his criticism 
is directed at the Mullā Ṣadrā School, as he deemed – in keeping with the Tafkīkī 
school – that it had been influenced by Greek philosophy and attempted to adapt 
religious texts and concepts to be consistent with it. He asserted that religious 
knowledge provided by the Imāms had its own method for the acquisition of religious 
knowledge and was completely different from human concepts and methods towards 
that end. Therefore, in this book, he addressed the history of theology in Islamic 
civilization and demonstrated how it was influenced by some philosophical trends. He 
then critically discussed some philosophical theories, including mystical ones, namely 
the philosophical informed mystical contemplation (ʿirfān). At the beginning of the book, 
he discussed his motivations for writing this book, explaining that the current political 
events, namely the Islamic Revolution in Iran, should not obviously distract scholars 
from cultural matters. By this, he questioned the cultural trend of the leaders of the 
Islamic Revolution to believe in philosophical and mystical tendencies in reading 
religious knowledge. He also seemed to say that, although he supported the revolution 
politically, his attitude regarding theological issues was distinct. 
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Publishing such a book at this time was practically political suicide, as it was the 
complete reverse of the revolutionary situation. However, this book would have 
occupied considerable space among the MVM as it became a part of the Ḥawza al-
Qāʾim curriculum and spread the Tafkīkī thought amongst the MVM. In any case, the 
book showcases Mudarrisī’s Tafkīkī background while simultaneously representing his 
idea of purifying the Islamic tradition, which he called for in his book al-Thaqāfa al-
Risāliyya, in which he deems Greek philosophy to be a part of the deviations that had 
infused Islamic culture. However, the book has political agendas as well. By publishing 
al-ʿIrfān al-Islāmī and, before that, by presenting lectures in same field, he came to 
occupy a position distinct from both the traditional as well as the renaissance discourse 
at the same time. On the one hand, the traditional tendency did not agree with the new 
theological theses with their political dimensions, and the book preserved the traditional 
framework of theology; but on the other hand, the renaissance trend, especially the one 
leading the revolution, posed new theological theses in defining religion and its role, 
albeit related to the philosophical Shīʿī school, namely that of Mullā Ṣadra represented 
by Muṭahharī at the time. Therefore, Mudarrisī’s thesis in al-ʿIrfān al-Islāmī was a double 
confrontation of these two frameworks, whereby he criticized the former for its closed-
mindedness and the latter for its adherence to the philosophical framework of Mullā 
Ṣadrā. This double confrontation liberated Mudarrisī from the weight of these two 
schools, traditional theology and Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophy, and made him both a 
spokesperson of the Tafkīkī School as well as its developer, and this was to be reflected 
in his contribution in the jurisprudential field also, as we shall see in the next 
chapters235. 
One of the works of this period is a short written document regarding how the Ḥawza 
curriculum should be formulated. Mudarrisī wrote it as a statute for Ḥawza al-Qāʾim’s 
curriculum and it was, in fact, applied in the Ḥawza in Tehran. Although the document 
was published in the nineties as part of the book al-Maʿhad al-Islāmī Bayna al-Aṣāla wa 
al-Infitāḥ236 which also includes Mudarrisī’s weekly ethical lectures for the students of 
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Ḥawzat al-Qāʾim, it was actually written in the eighties. In this book, he attempted to 
formulate a Ḥawza curriculum that balanced original Islamic integrity, missionary work, 
and openness. Therefore, he divided the curriculum into these three categories, with the 
first category including traditional classes (i.e., fiqh, uṣūl, logic and Arabic) in addition to 
the Qurʾān, ḥadīth and history. The second category consisted of missionary classes, 
which were, in fact, Mudarrisī’s books, namely, al-Fikr al-Islāmī and al-ʿIrfān al-Islāmī as 
a theological class, al-Manṭiq al-Islāmī as a complementary class, and al-Thaqāfa al-
Risāliyya as the Islamic culture class. The third category represented openness and 
consisted of modern subjects (i.e., politics, sociology and psychology) in addition to 
classes that discussed current affairs, such as Islamic movements and other political 
movements in the Middle East. The document also included some advice on the style of 
teaching, emphasizing the importance of developing students’ critical thinking skills, and 
advice on the practical program in the Ḥawza, such as spiritual and cultural programs. 
This document was not merely a collection of theoretical ideas, but rather reflected the 
practical practices of Mudarrisī’s Ḥawza at the time and his philosophy of religious 
education.  
The sixth work of this phase was his set of political works. As Mudarrisī was a 
representative of the IAO, as publicly announced after the revolution, and the period 
became heated by the time of the Iraq–Iran war, he was targeted by the international 
media and did many interviews regarding current political issues. Accordingly, some of 
the works of this period were collections of these interviews, which reflect his political 
stances, including al-Ṣaḥāfa Tuḥāwir al-ʿAllāmah Mudarrisī237 published 1985, ʿAn al-
ʿIrāq wa al-Ḥaraka al-Islāmiyyā238 published in 1988, al-Intifāḍa Al-Shaʿbāniyya fī al-
ʿIrāq: al-Asbāb wa al-Natāʾij239 in 1991, Aḍwāʾ ʿAlā Azamāt al-Khalīj240 in 1991 and 
Hākadhā Nabnī ʿIrāq al-Ghadd241 in 1993. These works focused on the Second Gulf 
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War and expressed the opinion of Mudarrisī and the IAO regarding Iraq’s current 
situation. This collection was, in effect, his interviews with international media as a 
representative of the IAO. He also published some lectures regarding Lebanese political 
issues.  
It is also worth noting that during this period a shift occurred in Mudarrisī’s intellectual 
works. In previous periods, they had been the product of an individual effort by 
Mudarrisī himself, whilst in this period, after he moved to Iran, his works were a 
collective effort. Accordingly, there were very few intellectual works written by him 
personally, although every single lecture of his was reproduced in a book or a short 
book thanks to the human and organisational growth of the MVM, which had moved to 
Iran at that time and coalesced in the form of political, educational, cultural and media 
foundations. For example, some important active foundations at that time included 
Mudarrisī’s office, al-Shāhīd newspapers, Ḥazwa al-Qāʾim and the IAO, which in turn 
made publishing more organised. Therefore, during this period, the number of 
Mudarrisī’s works doubled. Moreover, Mudarrisī seemed to abandon the axis of “the 
Other”, which had concerned him during the previous two decades, except for some 
political announcement, but he was still concerned with the other two axes, namely 
originality and contemporaneity. They appeared in his works in this phase, as we have 
seen. It might be attributed to the fact that his concern with the Other needed to 
convince the audience of the Islamist option. Once people chose the Islamist option, as 
evidenced by the success of Islamic Revolution in Iran, the Islamist project faced the 
challenge of originality and contemporaneity, which engaged Mudarrisī’s focus on them 
further, and they continued to mark his work in the next phase. After the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran, Mudarrisī’s intellectual works inclined towards an internal discourse 
aimed at the Shīʿī community. One final observation is that Mudarrisī’s activist work in 
the latter part of this phase shifted from establishing insights on activist actions to 
providing the rationale and justification for Shīʿī activism. This, in effect, was a reflection 
of the soul of the nineties amongst the Islamist movements, and was clearly evident in 
Mudarrisī’s work. The content of the work tells us a lot about this as he discusses the 
differences between political and religious actions, the balance between the elite class 
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and the laiety, the balance between self-moral education and reforming society and so 
on. His titles clearly reflected his rationalising tendency in his activist work. 
2.4.3. In Iran and Iraq (late 1990s – 2011): Towards Marjiʿiyya 
This phase begins in Iran in the late 1990s and ends in Iraq in 2011 following the fall of 
the Bathist regime in 2003. Despite various events that took place in this period, the 
internal Shīʿī changes are the best vantage point from which to explain Mudarrisī’s 
intellectual biography. In response to these changes, the common characteristic of his 
thought is the quest to establish his marjiʿiyya principally in Iraq. At the end of this 
phase, a crucial event occurred in the Middle East: the Arab Spring of 2011. As this 
would require a separate research paper in itself, the focus of the current research will 
end with this date. 
2.4.3.1. Activities 
At the beginning of this phase, Mudarrisī was in Tehran, teaching and following up the 
situation in Iraq. The most important event for him was the death of his uncle, 
Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī in 2002, which meant that it was an opportunity for him to declare 
his marjiʿiyya amongst the Shīrāziyya in particular, but also in general. On the other 
hand, this decade began with al-Qāʿidah’s attacks on the World Trade Centre complex 
in New York City on September the 11th, which led the U.S. to declare war on 
Afghanistan, followed by Iraq, under the title of: the War on Terror. These two wars 
were not just any war, if there is such a thing; they significantly changed the Middle East 
socially and politically, especially in the Gulf region. They also directly affected the Shīʿī 
situation, as Iraq, where most holy shrines and major Shīʿī marjiʿs are located, became 
a free land for the Shīʿa. As a result of these wars, hidden sectarian wars emerged 
between the Shīʿa and the Sunnīs in Iraq and Lebanon. Mudarrisī went to Iraq 
immediately after the invasion of the U.S and set up his office, Ḥawza and some 
political activities.  
2.4.3.2. Mudarrisī’s Works 
During this period, Mudarrisī seemed to throw all his weight behind his jurisprudential 
project in the field of fiqh. He had almost completed his entire uṣūl al-fiqh project, al-
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Tashrīʿ al-Islāmī in the previous phase and made remarkable headway in the field of 
jurisprudence. His success can be attributed to the real circumstances of the MVM in 
the nineties. At the end of the eighties, Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī, representing the 
marjiʿiyya umbrella for the MVM, and Khomeini, representing the revolutionary umbrella 
for the MVM, fell into dispute. This put the MVM in a dilemma: by choosing Shīrāzī, they 
would lose their revolutionary legitimacy; by choosing Khomeini, they would lose their 
religious legitimacy. Thus, the only escape from the crisis was for Mudarrisī to take a 
bold and strategic step forward by declaring his own marjiʿiyya, whereby he would both 
gain religious legitimacy and preserve internal unity, as well as finally open up new 
prospects for the MVM on the ground. However, this step required legitimate and 
academic proof in Mudarrisī’s favour in the fiqhī field, which he already had by 
reputation, but not on paper yet. Consequently, he put considerable effort into the fiqhī 
field, which might account for the amount of fiqhī works published during this period. His 
fiqhī effort doubled, especially after 2002. This might be due to practical necessity, as it 
is customary within the Shīʿī intellectual tradition for the one declaring himself a marjiʿ to 
produce a risālah ʿamaliyyah as it is the essential channel between the jurist and his 
followers. Unless the succeeding marjiʿ was appointed by a will or by recommendation 
of the previous marjaʿ, the situation would be difficult. Mudarrisī was at least a 
candidate to receive a recommendation, if not by testament, of his uncle to be his 
successor, but this did not happen. Therefore, he was obliged to complete his risāla 
ʿamaliyya as soon as he could. Although he had completed the mission within a few 
years within this phase, he was still faithful to his approach toward the fiqh. He 
structured his practical manual (risāla ʿamaliyya) to be consistent with his maqāṣidī 
approach, whereby he starts his book with some Qurʾānic verses that are related to the 
field, followed by some ḥadīth as well. Before he moved on to examine legal rulings, he 
discussed the philosophy of the field and its legal rulings in several paragraphs. This 
order is an outcome of his theory, which was expounded in al-Tashrīʿ al-Islāmī. He 
began publishing his risāla ʿamaliyya in a short series of booklets called al-Wajīz fī al-
Fiqh al-Islāmī, each of which dealt with one of the fiqhī fields (e.g., purity, prayer, 
fasting). By the end of 2001, Mudarrisī had successfully completed the fields of acts of 
worship in Shīʿī fiqh in addition to some new topics that he created, such as Fiqh al-
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Ḥayāt al-Ṭayyiba. He subsequently wrote another of his new innovated fiqhī fields. The 
death of his uncle al-Shīrāzī in 2002  allowed him to declare his marjiʿiyya publicly as 
his uncle’s successor. He completed his fiqhī works dealing with both acts of worship as 
well as his new fields, and published them all in three volumes. 
In response to the new situation in Iraq as well as in the Shīrāziyya movement born with 
the death of Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī, this phase witnessed three new shifts in Mudarrisī’s 
work: political thought, a new Qurʾān exegesis and the classical uṣūl work. His first 
renewed interest led to the publication of two books related to political thought, the first 
being Fiqh al-Dustūr: Aḥkām al-Dawla al-Islāmiyya242, which was in effect his 
jurisprudential lessons given in Karbala after the fall of Saddam’s regime in 2003. In this 
book, he dealt with issues related to the state and the constitution, such as the 
purposes of an Islamic constitution, the source of legislation, the source of sovereignty 
and the goals of an Islamic state. He also discussed issues related to the state, such as 
property, wealth, rights, identity of the state and political participation. The second book, 
al-Ḥukm al-Islāmī fī ʿAhd al-Imām ʿAlī243 was published in 2008 and included his lessons 
taught to groups of students in Karbala whilst writing the Iraqi constitution. Such efforts 
stemmed from the new situation in Iraq after 2003, as Iraq became an open area again 
after a long era as a non-solution state. However, what is notable in Mudarrisī’s 
approach towards political thought is that it is distinct from his approach in previous 
phases, especially from the discourse of the seventies. While the political discourse of 
the seventies focused on the absolute guardianship of the jurist and the religious state, 
his discourse in this phase was more inclined to the nation state and its sovereignty. 
This might be a reflection of the current circumstances surrounding him. He showed a 
high degree of flexibility and amendment to his previous political stance and a quick 
response to new challenges. Therefore, it is highly possible that his political thought will 
change in the near future in conjunction with the Arab Spring and its new challenges. 
Mudarrisī’s second shift in thought led him to embark upon a new Qurʾanic exegesis 
after he returned to Iraq in 2003, different from the old exegesis that had been written in 
                                            
242 Fiqh al-Dustūr wa Aḥkām al-Dawlah al-Islāmiyya, (2003). 
243 Al-Hukm al-Islāmī fī ʿAhd al-Imām ʿAlī, (2008). 
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the eighties. Mudarrisī called it Bayyināt Min Fiqh al-Qurʾān, then added the subtitle: 
“Qurʾanic study derives divine cosmological laws based on the decisive verses of the 
Reminder”. Although the methodology of this exegesis is ambiguous, it seems to 
include a shadow of some of the theories established by him in al-Tashrīʿ al-Islāmī, such 
as how to discover divine cosmological laws and how to interpret reality through the 
Qurʾan, which he called taʾwīl. Thus far, four sūras from the new exegesis have been 
published: al-Nūr,244 Luqmān,245 al-Furqān246 and al-Ḥajj.247 Although Mudarrisī started 
this new Qurʾānic exegesis, it is not exactly clear in what way it is new. Compared to the 
old Qurʾānic exegesis Min Hudā al-Qurʾān, whose methodology had been developed 
before he started to write it, the methodology of the new one is thus far too ambiguous 
to ascertain. It seems too early to understand it properly at the beginning of this project. 
It also raises a question as to whether the motivations for pursuing such a project are 
genuinely a new methodology that deserves to be called new or is it just that Mudarrisī 
is is inclined to engage in Qurʾānic studies, given his high religious position in the 
Hawza? It is currently too early for academic answers to these questions. 
Mudarrisī’s third and final shift in thought saw the publication of a jurisprudential work 
dealing with the issues of uṣūl according to the traditional order in Shīʿī religious 
learning institutions. The traditional order normally begins by defining uṣūl al-fiqh and its 
objective, then moves on to linguistic discussions, starting with how language had been 
created and ending with the issue of al-mushtaqq. In his book, Mudarrisī discussed 
these issues in detail whilst including some additional subjects, such as the history of 
uṣūl al-fiqh, some issues of modern linguistics and a particular chapter on the linguistics 
studied for the reading of hadīth. Although this book is, in effect, a compilation of 
lessons that he gave in Karbala for graduate students (al-dars al-kharij), he penned 
                                            
244 Bayyināt min Fiqh al-Qurʾān: Dirāsa taʿtamid istinbāṭ al-sunan al-ilāhiyya min al-dhikr al-ḥakīm: Al-Nūr 
(Beirut: Dār al-Maḥajja al-Bayḍāʾ, 2011). 
245 Bayyināt min Fiqh al-Qurʾān: Dirāsa taʿtamid istinbāṭ al-sunan al-ilāhiyya min al-dhikr al-ḥakīm: 
Luqmān (Beirut: Dār al-Maḥajja al-Bayḍāʾ, 2010). 
246 Bayyināt min Fiqh al-Qurʾān: Dirāsa taʿtamid istinbāṭ al-sunan al-ilāhiyya min al-dhikr al-ḥakīm: Al-Nūr. 
247 Bayyināt min Fiqh al-Qurʾān: Dirāsa taʿtamid istinbāṭ al-sunan al-ilāhiyya min al-dhikr al-ḥakīm: Al-Ḥajj 
(Beirut: Dār al-Maḥajja al-Bayḍāʾ, 2010). 
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down himself and called: Fiqh al-Istinbāṭ: Dirāsa fi Mabādiʾ ʿIlm al-Uṣūl248 which he 
published in 2010. It is quite obvious that authoring this book was in line with the 
objective of marjiyya and its prestige, which Mudarrisī is now seeking to strength. Any 
scholar claiming to be a marjaʿ must necessarily produce respectable scholarly works in 
fiqh and uṣūl to prove and maintain his scholarly status. Usually, these fiqhī and uṣūlī 
works are taught in the marjiʿ’s own Ḥawza as part of the legitimization of his marjiʿiyya. 
Mudarrisī seems to be inclining towards these requirements. 
2.5. Conclusion 
The gradual development of the Shīʿī jurist’s position in relation to the temporal regime, 
from the Safavid period until the early part of the twentieth century, has formed the 
general structure of the emergence of the political jurist within the Shīʿī community. As 
mentioned in the chapter, four events have played a significant role in forming the so-
called ‘political jurist’, namely the Safavid Empire, the Tobacco Revolution of 1891, the 
Constitutional Movement of 1907 and finally the Revolution of 1920. The product of this 
process was a jurist who was motivated to seek out his own state instead of remaining 
passive under the temporal regime. Mudarrisī was one such example of this 
phenomenon among Shīʿī scholars, whilst simultaneously contributing to it too. One 
significant contribution of his was his advocation of the theory of the Guardianship of the 
Jurist (wilāyat al-faqīh) for the first time in contemporary Shīʿī thought - a theory that 
accounts for a considerable part of contemporary Shīʿī activism and political 
endeavours. Furthermore, his adaption of the theory of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa in a Shīʿī 
version, which will be examined in the next chapters, is another contribution to the 
phenomenon of the political jurist. The theory is not merely legal, but also political, in 
some of the ways in which it defines the position of the jurist in the society. 
As demonstrated in this chapter, Mudarrisī’s thought was crystallised within this context 
and though his interaction with the socio-political context of the Arab world since the 
sixties over the course of forty years of intellectual and political activities. This was not 
merely a historio-political construction, but also an intellectual context, that provoked the 
                                            
248 Fiqh al-istinbāṭ: dirāsah fī mabādiʾ ʿilm al-uṣūl. 
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Shīʿī jurist to form a legal political theory that enabled him to politicize his tradition in 
order to best interact with reality. During the early phase of his intellectual activities he 
was preoccupied with rational-philosophical concerns, in which he sought to establish a 
different epistemic philosophical project from the general trend within the Shīʿī religious 
institution. However, in the second phase of his intellectual activities, he was 
preoccupied with making political and legal philosophy interact with reality. This is 
where he underwent a thorough practical examination of his own thought in the context 
of the eighties and nineties of Iran and the Arab world, and adapted the theory of 
maqāṣid al-sharīʿa. The third phase saw him focusing primarily on the internal Shīʿī 
context, occupied with establishing his religious status of marjiʿiyya, and subsequently 
to find his position within the new situation in Iraq post-2003. 
In order to fully understand his intellectual journey, from his epistemological concerns 
through to his political and legal thought, to his jurisprudential concerns finally, it is 
necessary to study his legal philosophy, especially the theory of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa. 
Mudarrisī has employed many of his previous theories of epistemology and political 
thought in his legal theories, in addition to reflecting his actual social and political 
experience. In the next chapters, I will proceed to study his legal theories in detail. 
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3. Chapter Three 
The Adaptation of Classical Shīʿī Uṣūl al-Fiqh towards 
Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿa 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Before embarking on an examination of Mudarrisī’s legal system, and the position of 
maqāṣid al-sharīʿa within it, a methodological observation is in order.  I am aware of the 
methodological issues which arise when studying religion in general249 and Islamic legal 
studies in particular250. The most pressing problem for this study concerns how one 
describes a religious system in a language, and more broadly, in an intellectual context 
quite different from the one in which the system itself developed. As has been 
recognized by many commentators251 language is not a neutral communication tool, but 
is itself a crucial part of the cultural context in which it is used.  With regards to Islamic 
legal theory, this is perhaps most obvious in the extensive lexicon of Arabic technical 
terms for which there are rarely simple English equivalents. The legal theorists 
themselves usually employ these terms with an assumption their audience is fully 
cognizant of the term itself and the technical context in which it is used. The challenge 
in a study such as this is to convey the contents of the religious system of a particular 
thinker, in this case Mudarrisī, in an intellectual and linguistic context quite different from 
that in which it was composed and on which it was intended to have an impact. This 
issue is linked to the famous “insider/outsider problem”252, which has been occupied 
several academic discipline including anthropology, philosophy and sociology to name 
only a few. 
                                            
249 McCutcheon, Russell T., The Insider/Outsider Problem in the Study of Religion: A Reader. 2ed ed. (London, 
Casell, 1999) 
250 Weiss, Bernard G., The Search for God’s Law: Islamic Jurisprudence in the Writings of Sayf aI-Dīn aI-Āmidī. 
(USA: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2010). 
251 Weiss, The Search for God’s Law. pp. 1-29. Also, see: Kim Knott, “Insider/outsider perspectives” and Douglas 
Allen, “Phenomenology of religion” in The Routledge Companion to the Study of Religion ed. John Hinnells. (London, 
Routledge, 2005), pp. 243-258, 181-209.  
252 McCutcheon, The Insider/Outsider Problem in the Study of Religion: A Reader. pp. 1-11. 
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What I am intending to do in the coming chapters – 3, 4 and 5 - is to provide an 
“explanation” or “ interpretation” of Mudarrisī’s legal theory of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa. 
Obviously there must be a clear distance between my critical judgement of his ideas 
(i.e. whether it is convincing theory for a believer attempting to understand the world 
from within a religious tradition), and my best attempt to account and analyse his 
thought.  Nonetheless, it is a perfectly acceptable, methodologically speaking, to try and 
understand Mudarrisī’s system of thought by focusing on how it operates as a 
(supposedly) coherent system, and how its development might appeal to the religious 
sensibilities of those he is attempting to convince. 
My principal and primary job, then, is to explain and interpret how Mudarrisī’s thought 
has been constituted and formed in regard to his theory of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa with a 
view to understanding his overall project in presenting a work of Islamic legal theory. 
This makes my methodological approach here slightly different to the previous chapters. 
Chapter One, previously, has provided even a broader context in which Mudarrisī has 
come about. Chapter Two attempted to provide an analytical reading of Mudarrisī’s 
thought in relation to the socio-political circumstances surrounding him in each stage of 
his intellectual life. This can be deemed as an external (or say “outsider”) study of his 
thought. The following chapters, however, are an attempt to examine and explain his 
legal theory of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa in details. They are an attempt to understand 
Mudarrisī’s thought recognizing his theological commitments, the audience to which he 
wishes to appeal, and attempting to understand how his system might form a coherent 
whole, as this is clearly his intention.  
Based on this methodological commitment, I will not confine myself to his legal works 
alone. Rather I will use a set number of his texts, i.e. philosophical, theological, 
exegetical and fiqhī. The reason for this approach is that these texts demonstrate and 
clarify his legal ideas, bringing out the organic correlation between them. Furthermore, 
Mudarrisī has discussed several schools of thought, whether Islamic, Western or 
Eastern, in several of disciplines, i.e. legal and moral philosophy. For the sake of 
explanation and analysis, not critical judgement, it is not my task here to examine the 
extent to which he was accurate in understanding these schools of thought. Rather, it is 
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even not useful for the purposes of this research to engage in such discussion. What 
concerns my investigation, then, is the question, “what do these ideas, figures and 
schools mean for him and how has he benefited from them and to what purposes?” In 
this context, I will refer as much as it is possible to the sources he has used in his 
arguments, whether in his discussion internally with Islamic thinkers and scholars, or 
externally with particularly Western schools of thought, philosophers and scholars. It 
seems that he was entirely dependent on the translated works of Western thought into 
Arabic, and to a lesser extent, in Persian. Therefore, whenever I refer to the original text 
in English or provide a further reference to the schools of thought or philosophers or 
thinker – it is merely to enable the English reader be familiar with them, though the 
reference here is not essential to understanding Mudarrisī’s main point in referring to 
them. 
This approach is quite similar to some works have been done in Arabic and in English, 
for example, the important work of Badawī on Aristotle253 in which he attempted to show 
how the Arab understood these philosophers. In Western scholarship of Islamic legal 
studies, the work of Bernard Weiss on al-Āmidī has been highly influential in 
establishing the appropriateness of this expository method. Weiss explains his 
approach in a way that encapsulates my own approach to explaining and interpreting 
Mudarrisī’s legal thought, when he writes: 
Just as this study is not fundamentally diachronic, so it is not fundamentally 
critical. I have attempted to make clear the foundations—premises, pre- 
suppositions, methods—underlying the system of jurisprudential thought that 
unfolds in Āmidī’s writings, but I have not undertaken to examine those 
foundations from a critical perspective concerned with issues confronting 
contemporary theory and methodology. Āmidī himself was very reflective about 
the methodological and epistemological underpinnings of his thought, and I have 
tried simply to present his thinking about those underpinnings, leaving it to my 
readers to respond critically in whatever way they choose. In elaborating here 
and there on the ramifications of certain ideas or principles found in Āmidī’s 
                                            
253 Badawī, ʿAbdalraḥmān, Arusṭū ʿind al-ʿArab, 2ed ed. (Kuwait: Wikālat al-Kuwait li al-Maṭbūʿāt, 1978). 
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writings, I am not, I think, adopting an essentially critical stance. I am simply 
exploring the consequences these ideas or principles have for the process of 
formulating the law.254 
The present chapter and the following two are divided in a way that, hopefully, allows 
the reader to get inside the system and understand Mudarrisī’s position in the issues he 
has discussed. His legal thought can be viewed, as previously argued255, as a response 
to the challenges that faced what is referred to here as the Bahbahānian paradigm. It is 
not a partial response, but rather a systematic one that justifies its consideration as a 
paradigm shift from the Bahbahānian paradigm. As was mentioned in the first chapter, 
the distinctive elements of the Bahbahānian paradigm were its employment of particular 
epistemological, methodological and functional frameworks. Mudarrisī’s legal 
philosophy as a paradigm shift, therefore, is presumed to represent a departure from 
these three levels. The second chapter attempted to provide an analytical reading of the 
socio-political and internal intellectual factors that constructed and formed the overview 
of Mudarrisī's thought. This analytical reading was designed to pave the way for this 
chapter where I will elaborate on the ways in which al-Mudarrisī has departed from the 
Bahbahānian paradigm on each level, and his adoption of classical Shīʿī uṣūl al-fiqh in a 
way accommodates his alternative, namely, the maqāṣidī project. Therefore, I will first 
describe in detail Mudarrisī’s insights in connection with jurisprudential theory, 
beginning with his epistemological framework and its applications in jurisprudence. 
Then, I will move on to examine his methodological ideas. For each element of his 
thought, I will shed light on the way in which he departs from the Bahbahānian paradigm 
by constructing a context that allows for comparison. The third level, i.e. the functional 
framework, will be discussed in the subsequent chapters. 
3.2. The Epistemological Framework of al-Mudarrisī 
In Chapter One, it was argued that the Bahbahānian paradigm had a specific 
epistemological framework thatcrucially affected its methodological procedures257. I will 
                                            
254 Weiss, The Search for God’s Law. p. xxv. 
255 See: p 59-60. 
257 See: p 43-5. 
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here begin with Mudarrisī's epistemological framework as an expression of a paradigm 
shift from the Bahbahānian one. I will address the issue beginning with an overview of 
the position and the significance of epistemological discussions in Shīʿī jurisprudence. 
The ultimate aim here is to establish the context in which Mudarrisī's position can be 
placed. Following this, I will examine the way in which Mudarrisī addressed the question 
of epistemology, generally, as a foundation of his thought. This demands an analytical 
examination of the general characteristics of his epistemological attitude. Finally, I will 
investigate the way in which Mudarrisī employed this epistemological attitude in 
jurisprudential issues and the vision that it can be deemed as a paradigm shift from the 
Bahbahānian paradigm. Throughout this discussion, I aim to argue that Mudarrisī 
departed from Aristotelian epistemology under the influence of the Tafkīkī school. He 
adopted a new epistemology that allowed him to address jurisprudential issues in an 
innovative way that was congruous with his maqāṣidī approach to jurisprudence. 
3.2.1. An Overview of the Epistemological Discussions in Shīʿī Jurisprudence 
It is important here to closely identify what is meant by epistemological discussions in 
Shīʿī jurisprudence and also to make a clear distinction between reason (al-dalīl al-ʿaqlī) 
as one of the four sources of deriving sharīʿa law and the epistemological foundation of 
justifying the validity of several sources of the sharīʿa. Since the establishment of Shīʿī 
jurisprudence, considerable parts of Shīʿī jurisprudential discussions are considered to 
be ‘a system developed through a form of philosophical analysis applied to socio-
linguistic principles (al-uṣūl al-lafẓiyyah) and rational norms (bināʾ al-ʿuqalāʾ) in order to 
determine general rules for the interpretation of what may largely be reduced to the 
exoteric meaning of utterances (ẓāhir al-alfāẓ) and rational correlations (al-mulāzamāt 
al-ʿaqliyyah)’258. These kinds of discussions, though they might include some textual 
bases, are what is meant by epistemological discussions or foundations of Shīʿī 
jurisprudence, i.e. the theory of knowledge that determines the nature of knowledge, its 
value, and sources. In this sense, what is known as reason (al-dalīl al-ʿaqlī) in 
jurisprudential literature would be an application of these epistemological foundations in 
                                            
258 Ali-Reza Bhojani, Moral Rationalism and Shariʿa: Independent Rationality in Modern Shīʿī Usul Al-Fiqh. (New 
York: Taylor & Francis, 2015).p. 49 
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specific areas of uṣūl al-fiqh. Although in modern and contemporary textbooks of Shīʿī 
jurisprudence most of these epistemological foundations are often discussed within the 
field of reason, specifically in the issue of rational correlations (al-mulāzamāt al-
ʿaqliyyah), they are not confined to this field. In the pre-Anṣārī era, these the rational 
foundations of jurisprudence used to be debated within the issue of certainty (qaṭʿ) and 
speculative knowledge (ẓann), though their scope is vaster than these areas and goes 
throughout all the uṣūl al-fiqh as its theoretical foundations. In actual fact, in this era of 
the history of Shīʿī jurisprudence, the subject has witnessed considerable attention in 
that the issue of al-qaṭʿ and al-ẓann became a philosophical discussion and an analysis 
of the theory of knowledge rather than a legal discussion. However, before the 
emergence of the Akhbārī School, the discussions of the theory of knowledge were 
regarded as theological debate topics and had not noticeably been applied in 
jurisprudential discussions. 
According to this understanding of the nature of epistemological discussions in Shīʿī 
jurisprudence, it would be misleading to simply confine the subject to the issue of 
reason. Such too would be the case if the Uṣūlī-Akhbārī conflict was merely considered 
a debate on whether reason can be counted as a source alongside the Qur’an and 
Sunnah, rather than as a fundamentally epistemological debate. This understanding is 
what motivated some contemporary scholars to question, not only the position of reason 
in Shīʿī jurisprudential thought, but also the epistemological foundations of the majority 
of the uṣūlī fields as a rational mechanism of justifying jurisprudential theories259. 
Interestingly, some have argued that in effect the critiques of Akhbārism are deemed to 
be the first Islamic Shīʿī criticism of theoretical reason, comparable to the first Western 
critique of theoretical reason by Kant in the modern age260, which supports the idea that 
the debate goes beyond mere reason.  
Identifying the subject as such, at the beginning of this research, I attempted to define 
the epistemological characteristics of current Shīʿī jurisprudence (which I called the 
                                            
259 ʿAmmār Abū Radghīf wrote two books specifically on this issue, namely Radghīf, al-Usus al-ʿAqliyya: Dirāsa lil 
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260 Radghīf, al-Usus al-ʿAqliyya: Dirāsa lil Munṭalaqāt al-ʿAqliyyah lil Baḥth fī ʿIlm al-Uṣūl, p.106 
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Bahbahānian paradigm). I argued that it’s epistemological features were as follows. The 
paradigm mainly formed a theory of knowledge as it was inherited from the 
philosophical Iṣfahānī school within the Aristotelian framework of theoretical and 
practical reason. This led the paradigm to be occupied with the duality of certainty (al-
qaṭʿ) and speculative knowledge (al-ẓann), making this duality dominate almost all 
jurisprudential discussions, be they in the application of the theoretical or practical 
reason. These epistemological characteristics were clearly manifested in the pre-Anṣārī 
era in analyzing the nature of al-qaṭʿ and al-ẓann, as they were in Anṣārī's era, within 
the discussion on rational correlations (al-mulāzamāt al-ʿaqliyyah). However, the duality 
was manifested in the discussion on reason in the contemporary era were discussion 
included both independent rational and non-rational indicators (al-mustaqillāt wa ghayr 
al-mustaqillāt al- ʿaqliyya). 
Examining this understanding of the nature of epistemological discussions in Shīʿī 
jurisprudence will pave the way for us to understand the reason why Mudarrisī has paid 
considerable attention to the field of epistemology, and the way in which he has infused 
this topic within his jurisprudential theories and discussions. 
3.2.2. Mudarrisī's Epistemological Works 
Among all of Mudarrisī's works (excluding Qur’anic and fiqhī works as they would 
naturally require a considerably quantitative approach), the epistemological works have 
the lion’s share in both quantity and quality. He wrote three important books, which 
discuss epistemology (or the theory of knowledge as it is known in contemporary Arabic 
and Islamic literature). They are, respectively: al-Fikr al-Islāmī: Muwājaha Ḥaḍāriyya, 
Buḥūth fi al-Qur’an al-Ḥakīm, and al-Manṭiq al-Islāmī: Uṣūluhu wa Manāhijuhu. 
Although Al-Fikr al-Islāmī was published before Buḥūth fi al-Qur’an al-Ḥakīm, it might be 
that the latter was written first, as it was in fact a transcription of a series of lectures 
delivered at Baghdad University. Moreover, in terms of the contents too, Buḥūth fi al-
Qur’an al-Ḥakīm appears to have been penned earlier, as Al-Fikr al-Islāmī seems to be 
an extended application of the ideas of the former. In any case, these three works 
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represent three stages in Mudarrisī's epistemological thought, beginning with Buḥūth fi 
al-Qur’an al-Ḥakīm and ending with al-Manṭiq al-Islāmī. 
In Buḥūth fi al-Qur’an al-Ḥakīm, Mudarrisī addressed the question of epistemology in 
the section entitled 'reason' – (al-ʿaql)261, in which he discussed an ontological view of 
reason, the nature of rational judgments and the difference between reason and human 
will. Reflecting on the way in which he addressed these issues, one can conclude that 
his discussions were noticeably preoccupied with internal Shīʿī theological and 
philosophical debates on epistemology, which was directly relevant to theological 
attitudes. In a sense, he was preoccupied with Shīʿī-Shīʿī dialogues more than with 
establishing a theory in epistemology for general human knowledge262. Moreover, it 
clearly reflects his Tafkīkī association, which is characterized by an anti-Aristotelian 
framework as an alternative to the mainstream in Shīʿī theology and philosophy. 
In Al-Fikr al-Islāmī, Mudarrisī expanded his epistemological discussions both 
quantitatively and qualitatively. In terms of quantity, the epistemological discussion was 
introduced in the third one of this book, in which he set out to elaborate his ideas in 
detail. In terms of quality, he began a comparative analysis, measuring his own system 
against various schools of philosophical thought. Special attention was paid to Marxist 
thought as it was the dominant socio-intellectual trend in Iraq at that time, promoted by 
the nationalist and communist movements. Although he was comparing his thought with 
different Western and Eastern schools of thought, it is noticeable that his approach to 
the subject was defensive, and concerned with the socio-political circumstances of Iraq 
and generally of the Arab context. 
His most qualitatively mature as well as his largest contribution as far as epistemology 
was concerned was al-Manṭiq al-Islāmī. The book consists of an introduction and seven 
chapters, which can be grouped into three main sections sections in addition to the 
introduction: history of logical thoughts, principles of Islamic logic, and the scientific 
                                            
261 Buḥūth fī al-Qur’an al-Ḥakīm, pp. 88-119 
262 An excellenct review of this debate see: Radghīf, al-Usus al-ʿAqliyya: Dirāsa lil Munṭalaqāt al-ʿAqliyya lil Baḥth fī 
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Āthārahā al-Taṭbīqiyya, 1st ed. (Iran: Dār al-faqīh, 2003). 
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methodologies of conducting research in the social sciences and humanities.263. 
Focusing on the field of epistemology, it seems that Mudarrisī was concerned with 
establishing an Islamic epistemological theory. He was confident that there should be 
an Islamic theory of the most important subject. He recognised a need for an Islamic 
epistemology, given that seeking knowledge was the most important task of the scholar. 
264. However, this theory could not be the Aristotelian framework as the latter had 
proved its limitations. At the same time, it could not be confined to religious fields either; 
rather, it had to be a theory that could be applied to all branches of knowledge. Thus, it 
required a constructive and critical integration of all logical ideas. He was aiming to 
develop a theory which was less a defence of Islam in the face of non-Islamic 
philosophies, but rather an Islamic theory of knowledge which integrated, when 
appropriate, the ideas current within certain non-Islamic philosophical trends. These 
were exactly what he provided in his book and what made it the most mature work out 
of all his epistemological contributions. 
Considering these three experiences with their characteristics, Mudarrisī's 
epistemological attitude was characterized by several features, which he would employ 
in his jurisprudential analysis. In the next section, I will demonstrate the general 
characteristics of Mudarrisī's epistemology, followed by an examination of how he used 
them in the field of jurisprudence. 
3.2.2. The General Characteristics of Mudarrisī’s Epistemology 
In terms of epistemology, Mudarrisī's attitude begins by providing an ontological view of 
reason (al-ʿaql), its relationship with the self (al-nafs), and its components. Finally, he 
ends with his view of the method as a scope of the activities of reason. I will therefore 
address each issue separately with the ultimate goal of demonstrating different 
dimensions of his view. 
3.2.2.1. The Ontological View of Reason (al-ʿaql) 
                                            
263 I discuss this work of his elsewhere in the research in terms of the intellectual biography of Mudarrisī, in painting a 
picture of and taking into consideration the socio-political context of his life. (See: p 96-8). 
264 al-Mudarrisī, al-Manṭiq al-Islāmī: Uṣūluhu wa-Manāhijuhu, p. 25 
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The concept of reason and its applications across a variety of disciplines in Islamic 
thought has been a controversial and crucial issue. The issue used to divide the Muslim 
community, generally speaking, into two trends with the Shīʿī attitude standing in 
support of the authority of reason, to a considerable extent alongside the Muʿtazila. 
However, the situation has changed since the growth of philosophical theology and the 
role of reason in the discovery of religious knowledge.  This had, for some time been the 
source of intra-Shīʿī debate. The situation went a step further with the emergence of the 
Akhbārī School, in that the dispute became a jurisprudential discussion as well. In this 
context, identifying the ontological concept of reason became a starting point in 
determining each position in the debate. Mudarrisī, following this pattern, begins with 
identifying an ontological position towards the concept of reason. His position has two 
claims on the nature of reason. 
The first claim is that reason is a specific creation, distinct from the human soul. It 
consists of light, and is considered a spiritual (rūḥānī) entity, being the first of Allāh’s 
creations265. Though these statements about the nature of reason are mainly founded 
on textual bases, Mudarrisī, following the Tafkīkī school, considers the religious texts 
involved in examining this issue to be texts of the “reminding” and “provoking” sort. 
Therefore, he, as well as the Tafkīkīs, attempts to provide a rational justification for this 
view  based on a psychological analysis and what is claimed to be a ‘primitive’ or 
intuitional (fiṭrī) argument266. Viewing reason as a distinct creation stands against a wide 
range of philosophical views that see reason as a faculty inside the human being, and 
consequently, it results in a different analysis of the relationship between the agent and 
the known object. It would, of course, considerably affect any theory of knowledge. The 
psychological and ‘primitive’ argument regarding reason as a distinct creation argues 
that the absence of reason in childhood as well as in old age suggests that reason is not 
an intrinsic part of the human being, otherwise it would be present throughout the 
human lifespan. In addition, the absence of reason when consumed by anger or lust or 
any other similar situation is another indication of this. In a sense, reason is a gift from 
                                            
265 Buḥūth fī al-Qqur’an al-Ḥakīm, pp. 88-90 
266 Ibid. pp. 99-100 
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Allāh, bestowed upon the human being in a particular situation at a specific time, 
especially when he/she is pious and seeking good267. Mudarrisī says: 
“One of the facts that will be discovered when we reflect on reason through 
its effects, is the fact that reason is granted. After this bestowal, we come to 
the realization that the light of reason was absent in us, but then suddenly 
and without any kind of self-acquisition of it, it was given to us. Then, when 
we are unable to find it again at will, when attempting to remember 
something, for example, but  forgetting it instead […] here, we know that 
controlling reason is in someone else’s hand, that is, Allāh”268. 
This leads to the second argument: 
The second claim is that reason has particular moral characteristics that are considered 
intrinsic to it. If one relies on textual sources, as Mudarrisī does, these characteristics 
amount to about seventy-five moral characteristics, which stand opposite to which stand 
opposed to seventy-five "immoral" or "morally repugnant" characteristics linked to 
ignorance of human beings. Examples of these moral and immoral characteristics are 
good versus evil, faith versus disbelief, honesty versus lying, self-control versus anger 
and so on. As it was said above, the mention of these characteristics in the text is 
merely as a kind of reminder. This means that one can primitively discover these moral 
characteristics by referring to his/her intuition. Mudarrisī says: 
“Since reason is a grant, it is absent in childhood, but is suddenly planted in 
the human being when s/he becomes mature […]. At this stage, he/she feels 
a dazzling light immersing her/his heart and guiding her/him to (1) wisdom 
and (2) knowledge. The wisdom shows him/her good and evil, and virtue and 
vice, and guides him/her to goodness and happiness”269. 
This viewpoint of reason leads to the second general theme of Mudarrisī's 
epistemology, in which he addresses the causes of human faults in knowledge. 
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3.2.2.2. Between Reason and Desire (al-hawā) 
Based on the previous ontological overview of reason as the source of truth and moral 
attributions, the question that Mudarrisī raises here is that, having realized the 
ontological status of reason, what is the source of error for human beings in terms of 
knowing physical objects and moral judgments? Here Mudarrisī turns away from his 
purely epistemological perspective and provides a more detailed psycho-ontological 
view. 
Mudarrisī believes that the human self (al-nafs) is an entity which consists of three 
elements: human will, reason and desire (al-hawā)270 (see figure 5). Human will is 
neutral and can be supportive either to reason or to desire depending on which of them 
takes over. However, the other two, namely reason and desire, have their own 
characteristics that affect human behavior, not only in everyday life, but also in 
epistemology. Accordingly, one has to firmly differentiate between conceptual ideas that 
emanate from reason and others that stem from desire, in order to avoid error in terms 
of epistemology. Based on this simple psycho-ontological view of the self, Mudarrisī 
makes two claims concerning human desire, followed by the assertion that most human 
errors over statements of knowledge can be attributed to psychological factors rather 
than mistakes in reasoning. 
The first claim regarding the nature of desire is that desire is an intrinsic part of the 
human self271. Its origins are the biological instincts of the human being, such as the 
desire to survive, eat and reproduce. When these desires are related to physical things, 
such as eating and reproduction, they are called shahwa in Islamic terminology. 
However, when related to non-physical things, such as the desire for power, to below to 
a social group, money, learning and luxury, they are called hawā. 
The second claim is that desire can affect the conceptual understanding of the 
individual when he/she is employing epistemological justifications. The nature of its 
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representations is negative when seeking an objective truth, and it inclines to leading 
the human toward deviation272.  
Based on these claims, Mudarrisī argues that human knowledge is neither purely 
objective and nor can it detach rational activities from its psycho-social existence. 
Rather, it is affected to a large extent by its psycho-social activities, and therefore, these 
affect the conceptual understanding of the individual. 273. In order for human knowledge 
to avoid errors, we have to distinguish between conceptual ideas that stem from reason 
and those that come from desire. To this end, Mudarrisī benefits considerably from 
psychological and sociological studies and theories that have researched the effects of 
society and self-awareness on the human being, especially in terms of epistemology. 
Thus, Mudarrisī argues that the mistake of Aristotelian logic is that it focuses on the 
form of knowledge, that is the form of deduction, and it ignores, or at least neglects, 
psychological factors274 in his view, major errors emanate from these psychological 
factors. In other words, reason has to be fully active to guide the human being through 
all stages of the deductive process. This requires the individual, and the analyst, to 
understand the psychosocial factors that are involved in the process of knowledge 
acquisition, and to control them such that reason or rationality determines the outcome. 
This would guarantee, as far as is possible, the avoidance of errors and would build a 
relatively coherent view in the subject of study. This approach might be very similar to 
some trends in the theory of knowledge in Western philosophy, such as coherentism275 
or the reflective equilibrium276. However, in Mudarrisī's view, to make this epistemology 
work a reality, he calls for a specific method which brings us to the third element of his 
epistemology. 
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275 Olsson, Erik, "Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 
2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/justep-
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Figure 5 – This diagram shows the construction of the self and its components in Mudarrisī’s 
view. The self in Mudarrisī’s view consists from Will, Reason and Desire.  
 
3.2.2.3. The Method and the Object 
Based on Mudarrisī's previous arguments, particularly that reason is intrinsically 
different from desire and that the majority of human errors in terms of knowledge are 
attributable to psychological factors, Mudarrisī argues that calling for the application of 
this method would be a rational and practical way in which this theory can be 
represented and work properly. Calling for the application of this method simply means 
three things for him: 
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Firstly, the recognition that the Aristotelian endeavour of establishing a general and 
formal rule of deduction is applied to all disciplines is erroneous. Rather, the object of 
each research itself should specify which method of research and what sort of 
deduction would be most appropriate277. Here, he seems to resemble the pragmatic 
theory of knowledge and logic, especially John Dewey’s; since he has cited him several 
times, that the object would itself specify the method. According to Mudarrisī, it would 
not be as problematic to get something wrong within the method as it would be if we got 
the actual method wrong278. 
Secondly, that reason would be active and dominant at all stages of research, from 
going back and forth critically, to choosing an appropriate method, to forming  a 
deduction, to considering the object of the research and to finally reaching a coherent 
conclusion. This would place the epistemological value of all elements of the research 
under the supervision of reason, depending on the case study279. 
Thirdly, that as the subject matter dynamically follows the method, the inquiry has to be 
open to all available and appropriate methods in favour of finding the most correct 
answer to the research. Actually, this is exactly what Mudarrisī did in his work on logic. 
He examined various methods found in different disciplines, and sought to learn from all 
of them in composing a work on logic. 
To sum up, the general characteristics of Mudarrisī's epistemology lie in the belief that 
reason is the source of truth, because  reason is differentiated from desire as the source 
of error. He established this epistemology to be valid for all disciplines of knowledge, 
and therefore applied it himself in his theological as well as his jurisprudential work. In 
the following sections, I will examine how he has gone about applying his epistemology 
in jurisprudence and how it affects his opinions regarding rational evidence and its 
relevant issues.  
3.2.3. Mudarrisī's Epistemology in Jurisprudence 
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278 Ibid. p. 340 
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Mudarrisī's attitude regarding epistemology has naturally been reflected in his 
jurisprudential works. Although the central concern of his jurisprudence is not 
epistemology as it was for the Bahbahānian paradigm, where the importance of gaining 
knowledge and especially religious knowledge was central, there are many issues in 
jurisprudence which need a clear epistemological position. Moreover, I argued above 
that challenging the epistemological framework represents a paradigm shift from the 
Bahbahānian one, and therefore any attempt to move away from the Bahbahānian 
paradigm requires a clear epistemological alternative. Therefore, Mudarrisī addressed 
several central jurisprudential issues in the field of Shīʿī jurisprudence, namely al-
ḥujjiyya. These issues are the correlation between reason and sharīʿa (al-mulāzamāt 
bayna al-ʿaql wa al-sharʿ), certainty (al-qaṭʿ) and speculative knowledge (al-ẓann), 
sometimes called the ḥujjiyya of legal indicators (ḥujjiyyat al-amārāt al-sharʿiyya). In the 
following sections, I will examine these three issues aiming to demonstrate Mudarrisī’s 
opinions and to show how they fit in with his maqāṣidī endeavour. 
3.2.3.1. The Correlation between Reason and Sharīʿa (al-
mulāzamāt bayna al-ʿaql wa al-sharʿ) 
The jurisprudential question here is simply whether or not the judgment of reason 
necessitates that the sharīʿa judge in accordance with it? Though the question is as 
simple as that, an answer entails many prior philosophical stances regarding the nature 
of the judgments of reason, the nature of divine judgments, and the actual rational tools 
that have been employed in deriving the judgments of reason. Likewise, Mudarrisī 
structured his treatment of the issue, and paid special attention to the issue of certainty. 
In the following sections, I will demonstrate the first three issues, and then I will go on to 
deal with the topic of certainty in subsequent sections. 
3.2.3.1.1. The Nature of the Judgments of Reason 
There is a wide debate amongst Muslim scholars regarding the nature of the judgments 
of reason, namely whether it is only a discovery of existing divine moral judgments, or 
whether reason itself is a source of moral judgments independent of the divine? In other 
words, is reason merely an empty instrument like a torch or is it rather a source? 
Though whether reason is an instrument or a source it is not a significant issue 
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jurisprudentially for the camp of the ʿAdliyya: ultimately they all agree that reason and 
sharīʿa are correlative. It is, though, a crucial point for the other camp as it is specifically 
based on this ground that they reject the correlation of reason and sharīʿa. Besides the 
historical and intellectual factors that rendered this issue so sensitive, the importance of 
the issue for Mudarrisī is represented by the fact that he, following the Tafkīkī school to 
a degree, embraces a particular conception regarding the nature of reason, as 
demonstrated above, that changes the whole discussion here. For him, reason is a 
source of moral judgments as well as an instrument of discovering reality in general, 
whether this reality be physical or social in general terms. Thus, in his view, the whole 
discussion that divides the scholars into two camps becomes meaningless, because for 
the Ashʿarī camp’s rejection of the authority of reason as the source, entails the whole 
grounds for believing in religion to be demolished. This is because reason is the very 
basis for proving the need for religion in the first place, not to mention the credibility of 
miracles and even the existence of God. For the ʿAdliyya camp, it also becomes 
meaningless to confine the capacity of reason to being only a source or an instrument, 
because this is a sort of reduction of the various capacities of reason280. Having said 
that, there is another issue pertaining to the judgments of reason judgments, which will 
be dealt with later on – namely whether these kinds of moral judgments entail action in 
accordance with them, consequently making the agent deserving of reward or 
punishment.  
Mudarrisī says, “Reason might pass a judgment about something, and when it does so, 
it judges assertively for the necessity of its implementation. However, this is different 
from legal obligation, which is what makes it deserving of reward for performing it or 
punishment for refraining from it.”281. 
This position will directly affect the following dimension of the issue. 
3.2.3.1.2. The Nature of the Judgment of Sharīʿa 
Identifying the nature of the judgment of the sharīʿa is Mudarrisī's paraphrasing of the 
main question of the debate, which is usually posed as whether or not the judgment of 
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reason necessitates that the sharīʿa judge in accordance with it and vice versa? 
However, he has chosen a different strategy to deal with the issue, by de-structuring the 
whole issue into separate elements, and then clarifying each one of them before re-
structuring them again to make a judgment. This strategy avoids many 
misunderstandings surrounding the debate, and roots the discussion into an actuality 
and makes it practically relevant to the conceptions used. Rather than being too 
abstract and generalizing the concepts of the debate across all elements, Mudarrisī 
prefers to discuss what is really practised. Based on that approach towards the debate, 
Mudarrisī has two main arguments. 
The first argument is that reason, in its characterization as a luminous moral spiritual 
creation, cannot conflict with sharīʿa. Instead, what does conflict with sharīʿa is the other 
faculty in the human being, i.e. desire (al-hawā), for the general contrast between good 
and evil282. To link this idea to the Shīʿī jurisprudential debate, there is a extended 
discussion among Shīʿī scholars as to the nature of divine commandments (or 
instructions). Generally, they are divided into two broad categories. The first are guiding 
commandments (al-awāmir al-irshādiyya), and the second. establishing commandments 
(al-awāmir al-mawlawiyya). The guiding commandment - “whether its purport be rational 
judgments or positive legal judgments - its role will be one of reminding and guiding to 
rational judgment or positive legal judgment”283. For example, when the commandment 
instructs the human being to obey God, it is here a guiding commandment, because 
obedience to God is something that can be discovered by reason; and if it were to stem 
from the commandment itself, then it would lead to either circularity or to infinite regress. 
On the contrary, the establishing commandment is that which has been issued to 
motivate the human being to an action that, without this commandment, would not be 
known by any means, such as the ritual prayer, for example284.  
Mudarrisī argues that the relationship between divine instructions (commandments) and 
reason is complex, and not a simple matter of God's command being subject to, or 
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indeed outside of, the demands of reason. For him, the Sharʿ and reason are the same 
essence but with different manifestations, in which the Sharʿ is reason in textual form 
and reason is the Sharʿ in rational form within the human being. Thus, divine 
instructions awaken and remind about rational judgments that already exist inside the 
human being, and the judgments of reason judgment reveal about divine judgments, in 
addition to their conceptual role of understanding divine texts285. In this sense, he 
disagrees with the famous division mentioned above, because he argues that all 
religious texts, aside from their complexity and diversity, are simply another aspect of 
reason. Subsequently, the whole duality of divine instruction versus reason, in his view, 
is meaningless and would fundamentally be solved by his approach. 
Based on this argument, Mudarrisī divides the role of reason into three dimensions. 
First, reason generally confirms revelation, i.e. based on the nature of the judgments of 
reason, religion can be confirmed or rejected as revelation from God. Second, reason is 
responsible for understanding divine law (Sharʿ), i.e. through the dialectical relationship 
between Sharʿ and reason, in which the religious text invokes reason and reason 
reflects the contents of divine law, it would eventually be possible to understand the 
principles of the Sharʿ. Third, through understanding the principles of the Sharʿ, the 
other role of reason would be to apply these principles in reality, i.e. it is the role of 
reason to allocate a particular principle to be applied in a specific context in reality. This 
view, breaking down the roles of reason, will be the basis of Mudarrisī's argument for 
the second point of the section, namely certainty (al-qaṭʿ)286. 
Mudarrisī’s second argument revolves around his assessment that the protagonists of 
the different views are based on a faulty presumption. This presumption is that there are 
areas where the Sharʿ does not have a specific legislation, and therefore reason would 
have to take the responsibility of making a judgment therein. Mudarrisī rejects this 
presumption from the ground and claims that there is no area that the Sharʿ does not 
cover287. He bases this argument on theological and textual foundations. As for 
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theological foundations, he argues for the perfection of religion, which means that Islam 
is the final and timeless message for humankind from God. Hence, there should 
necessarily be no area left that the Sharʿ does not cover288. Concerning textual 
foundations, he relies on extensive texts transmitted by the Imāms that state that the 
book (the Qur’an) and the Sunnah have covered all that humankind need. Having said 
that, he does not reject the Shīʿī jurisprudential position first initiated by al-Ṣadr and 
further developed by Shams al-Dīn, who claimed that there are empty areas that God 
has intentionally left as such289. Rather, he holds that through the moral principles of the 
divine law, the jurist would be able to eventually discover all the needs of humankind, in 
a way that results in there being no empty areas. Insisting on this claim, Mudarrisī wants 
to change the debate around reason and revelation by eliminating the duality between 
the two. This alternative, according to him, would be included in the maqāṣidī project. 
To sum up, Mudarrisī embraces a particular conception of reason, following the Tafkīkī 
school, that characterizes the nature of the specific features of the judgments of reason 
in a way that establishes a correlative relationship between reason and the Sharʿ. The 
nature of this relationship is that they share the same essence with a different 
manifestation. Adopting this approach, Mudarrisī determines three roles for reason 
toward the Sharʿ, i.e. confirming, understanding, and applying. Moreover, he argues 
that there is no area that the Sharʿ does not cover and through moral principles: the 
Sharʿ - with the help of reason – would, therefore, be timeless. However, this approach 
leads to the question that if reason does not conflict with the Sharʿ, what might the 
Sharʿ then conflict with? This leads us to the second point of the section. 
3.2.3.1.3. The Judgment of Sharīʿa and Actual Rational 
Methods 
In answer to the question of what the Sharʿ might conflict with, Mudarrisī provides an 
alternative reading for the history of Shīʿī jurisprudence pertaining to its attitude toward 
reason. Based on this reading, he builds his view regarding the relationship between 
reason and Sharʿ. He sees the negative Shīʿī jurisprudential attitude toward reason in 
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both early and modern stances to be mainly held by the Akhbārīs and some Uṣūlīs. This 
is attributed to the notion that they were not rejecting reason itself as a reliable faculty in 
the human, but rather that they were rejecting specific rational methods that were 
employed in reading the holy texts. These rational methods were the Greek rational 
traditions that were embraced by mainstream Uṣūlīs in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. In his view, it is this trend that Akhbārism was critiquing and, similarly, some 
Uṣūlīs, such as Muḥammad Ḥusain al-Iṣfahānī, the author of the al-Fuṣūl al-
Gharawiyya290. 
In addition to that reading, Mudarrisī also provides two arguments to support his claim 
that the Sharʿ would conflict only with the actual applied rational methods rather than 
with reason itself. The first argument is that these rational methods, especially the 
Greek rational tradition and particularly the Aristotelian epistemological framework, have 
not proved their reliability in any scientific, intellectual or philosophical field. Instead, 
they have proved their failure in all these fields. Here, he cites the Western experience 
of the Renaissance, which according to his understanding, built its civilization and its 
social and scientific advances by liberalizing itself from the Aristotelian framework. 
Mudarrisī argues that contemporary Muslim scholars, similarly, have found the 
Aristotelian perspective unhelpful and, therefore, rejecting its application to religious 
disciplines291. 
The second argument is that Islamic thought has a distinctive theory of knowledge, with 
its own methods for general human knowledge.  In particular, Mudarrisī argues that it is 
this theory which is used to understand Islamic sources of knowledge (namely, the 
Qur’an and the Sunnah).. Therefore, any employment of foreign methods in dealing with 
Islamic sources would naturally lead to a conflict between the Sharʿ and these 
methods292. This is how he understands established jurisprudential topics such as the 
necessity of ‘hearing from the infallible’ (al-samāʿ min al-maʿṣūm) or ‘not receiving a 
prohibition from the Sharʿ’ (ʿadam wurūd al-nahy min al-Sharʿ) in choosing a particular 
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method. For Mudarrisī, these ideas are a jurisprudential expression of the theological 
principle of guardianship (wilāya)293. The best example of this idea is the issue of 
certainty (al-qaṭʿ), in which the jurisprudential debates obviously show the tension 
between two tendencies amongst Shīʿī scholars. Mudarrisī uses this debate to 
demonstrate how the foreign methods have affected jurisprudential debates within 
which the scholars have been divided.  
3.2.3.1.4. Certainty (al-qaṭʿ)  
Although the issue of certainty (al-qaṭʿ) had been a central concern since the Akhbārī-
Uṣūlī debate in the seventeenth century and became more obvious with the 
Bahbahānian paradigm, it has become a notable discourse with particular terminology 
since Shaykh al-Anṣārī published his famous work, entitled Farāʾiḍ al-Uṣūl294. 
‘Certainty’ in this discourse means by definition that one is a hundred percent certain 
and assured about the content of a particular statement295. The main question of the 
issue of certainty (al-qaṭʿ) in the field of jurisprudence is: does certainty have an 
authority (ḥujjiyya)? If so, what kind of authority does it have? From where has it gained 
authority? What is the legal status of someone who breaks from following the content of 
certainty? The importance of this issue is that it represents a foundation for the central 
issue of jurisprudence, that is to say, the issue of the authority of the legal evidence that 
is deemed valid evidence for deriving legal rulings. In addition, the jurisprudential 
debate regarding the relationship between reason and Sharʿ is usually discussed here. 
The mainstream body of Uṣūlīs, in contrast to the Akhbārīs, believe that the authority of 
certainty is self-evident. It is an essential proof (dhātī) that cannot be separated from it, 
though they disagree upon the nature of its authority and whether it is used to discover 
reality or merely to excuse the believer. 
In this context, Mudarrisī tends toward the Akhbārī position and develops it further by 
enriching it with his epistemological background. The combination of his argument 
between these two elements represents that he relies on the Akhbārī position of calling 
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for applying the principle of guardianship (wilāya) and on the other hand on his 
epistemological understanding of human knowledge. Though he provides eight 
arguments to refute the authority of certainty, they can be summarized into three main 
arguments. 
In his first argument, Mudarrisī challenges the notion of "certainty" employed by most 
protagonists in the debate. Mudarrisī believes that certainty (qaṭʿ) as a term comes from 
the Greek philosophical tradition, which Muslim scholars have adapted in their religious 
scholarship and through this adaptation the term has been blended with the concept of 
knowledge (ʿilm)296, especially when Shīʿī uṣūl al-fiqh was mingled with philosophical 
tendency, these terms and conceptions blended together to the extent that they could 
easily be interchanged in jurisprudential discussions. However, according to Mudarrisī's 
viewpoint, certainty (al-qaṭʿ) is merely a psychological status regarding a statement and 
in this sense it is not different from complex ignorance (al-jahl al-murakkab)297. But 
knowledge (ʿilm) is epistemologically a different level. It is discovering reality, i.e. 
religious reality. Therefore, once we have doubted the dominant status of certainty, 
viewing it as merely a psychological state, according to Mudarrisī, we can then embark 
on examining what kinds of knowledge are appropriate for religious topics. 
Simultaneously, following certainty (al-qaṭʿ) regardless of its foundations become 
illegitimate. This argument paves the way for some other arguments. 
The second argument is a theological argument based on the Shīʿī theological principle 
of guardianship (wilāyah). The argument claims that once the overriding power of 
certainty has been undermined,, we should ask the legislator (al-shāriʿ) which kind of 
knowledge we should go through to obtain religious knowledge. Here, based on the 
textual evidences and the theological principle of guardianship (wilāyah), Mudarrisī 
argues that the method of knowledge has to be from the teachings of the Infallibles (the 
Prophet and Imāms)298. Providing this sort of method of understanding religion, 
Mudarrisī argues, is one of the most important roles of the Infallibles, which in Qur’anic 
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terminology is called the role of teaching (al-taʿlīm). Otherwise, it would have been 
enough for God to send a prophet who only recites the revelation (waḥy) for the 
people299. Having said that, it is worthwhile mentioning that even though Mudarrisī 
argues that it is an obligation to heed the Infallible in choosing the method of religious 
knowledge, this does not mean that the provided method is not rational. Rather, it is 
rational in the sense that it both reminds humankind of their error in choosing some 
invalid methods such as analogy (qiyās) and also provides special methods that are 
compatible with religious knowledge specifically, such as the mechanisms of al-muḥkam 
and al-mutashābih, as mentioned earlier. 
The third argument is a combination of theological and practical principles based on the 
actual practices of Shīʿī jurisprudence. The argument claims that, on the theological 
level, Muslims believe that there is no area that religion has not covered in terms of 
legislation, because if there was such an untouched area, it would entail the 
imperfection of the religion of Islam300. Furthermore, the juristic practice has shown, 
according to Mudarrisī, that the number of texts and the theoretical hermeneutical tools 
derived from them are sufficient to obtain reasonable and valid religious knowledge. 
From this discussion about certainty (al-qaṭʿ), one can see how Mudarrisī conceives the 
relationship between reason and the Sharʿ, in which he rejects the assumption that the 
Sharʿ has to follow reason regardless of what is claimed to be the root of these rational 
judgments. Rather, he believes that a specific concept of reason, which is neither the 
Aristotelian one nor any human conception, has to be followed not as a different source 
of knowledge, but because it is another manifestation of the Sharʿ itself. 
3.2.3.2. The Authority of Legal Evidences (al-amārāt al-sharʿiyyah) 
The field of the authority of legal evidences (ḥujjiyyat al-amārāt al-sharʿiyya) is deemed 
historically as the main core of Shīʿī jurisprudence, in particular within the Bahbahānian 
paradigm, and some contemporary Shīʿī scholars even consider it to be the real 
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objective of jurisprudence as an academic discipline301. In this field, the scholars' 
discussion concerns whether certain theoretical tools or conceptions can be considered 
valid evidence for deriving legal rulings. However, this discussion always raises the 
question of the criteria that justify whether this or that can be valid legal evidence, and 
naturally it leads to the epistemological foundation of these justifications. In effect, with 
the Bahbahānian paradigm, the field became, to a considerable extent, a field of 
discussing the general theory of knowledge rather than merely being about the 
epistemic requirements for legal rulings. The significance of the field is that it would form 
the majority of the legal evidences that the jurist will use in deriving legal rulings and will 
define not only the actual claimed legal evidence, but also the potential evidence that 
can be used in fiqh. Mudarrisī has engaged in the debate a great deal and in the context 
of the argument of this section, this shows that Mudarrisī represents a departure from 
the Bahbahānian paradigm for the maqāṣidī project, I will allocate his position in the 
context of Shīʿī jurisprudential discussion in order to show how he departs 
epistemologically. 
The main idea that the Bahbahānian paradigm produced and which became the 
foundation for the whole field of the authority of legal evidences, was that almost all 
justifications of legal evidence have to be grounded under the conception of the norms 
proposed by "rational beings" (hereon "rational norms" - bināʾ al-ʿuqalāʾ).. Thus, several 
claimed legal evidences, such as the validity of the isolated report of the Sunnah (al-
khabar al-wāḥid), common linguistic usage (al-ẓuhūr al-ʿurfī), consensus (al-ijmāʿ) and 
even many of the evidentiary principles (al-uṣūl al-ithbātiyya), such as the possession is 
a proof of ownership (qāʿidat al-yad), permissibility (al-ḥilliyya), innocence (al-barāʾa), 
which are all eventually based on the idea of trust, are based on what are called rational 
norms. Relying on the notion of "rational norms", scholars measured each particular 
case against these rational norms. However, the root of the idea of rational norms (bināʾ 
al-ʿuqalāʾ) itself rests on the principles of Aristotelian practical logic, as the 
Bahbahānian paradigm had inherited from that philosophical trend, as explained 
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above302. The strictness of the concept of knowledge in the Aristotelian epistemological 
framework, with the desire of the Shīʿī scholar to support all claimed legal evidences 
with reports from the Infallibles, led to limitations of the legal evidences that can be used 
in deriving legal issues. Furthermore, it led to expanding the scope of the practical 
principles, which are used in case of a lack of textual evidence. 
In this context, Mudarrisī generally accepts the main idea of rational norms as a 
foundation of claimed legal evidences. However, he disagrees with the Aristotelian 
epistemology on which it is founded. Therefore, instead of considering the Aristotelian 
framework as the grounds for rational norms, he believes that reason, as he has 
defined, has to be the foundation. What differentiates this concept of reason from the 
Aristotelian one is that it tends more toward being particularistic and contextualized in 
examining the case study and generalizing the validity of the principle or rule303. In other 
words, it is the reason of experience more than the reason of forms. For example, he 
accepts that the isolated report of the Sunnah (al-khabar al-wāḥid) is valid as legal 
evidence, but not generally for all cases. In some cases the isolated report is not 
sufficient to base a legal ruling on and this is attributed to the fact that the foundation of 
its validity, which is rational norms, would limit its validity in such cases. For instance, no 
rational person would declare a war based on an isolated report, because the evidence 
has to be consistent with the action304. A similar case can be said for legal evidences - 
that they are limited by reason in accordance with the case. 
Based on this, Mudarrisī requires three conditions for legal evidence to be valid. First, 
the evidence has to be consistent with the whole context of Islamic thought305. The 
matter for him is not for the evidence to reach a merely high level of pure rational 
certainty as opposed to a lower degree of speculation. Rather, the point he wishes to 
argue for is that the evidence for a specific Islamic legal ruling is a complex 
construction. The evidence functions, he argues, in a theological and moral system, and 
is linked with other legal rules in other jurisprudential fields. He is, then, arguing against 
                                            
302 Radgīf, al-Usus al-ʿAqliyya: Dirāsa lil Munṭalaqāt al-ʿAqliyya lil Baḥth fī ʿIlm al-Uṣūl, pp. 107-49. 
303 al-Mudarrisī, al-Tashrīʿ al-Islāmī: Manāhijuhu wa Maqāṣiduhu, v.2, pp. 109-10. 
304 Ibid., 113. 
305 Ibid., 109. 
143 
 
an atomised notion of a single piece of evidence being the basis for a single legal rule, 
but rather than the evidence for each legal rules must cohere with both the theological 
and moral demands of the system as a whole, and the evidence for other legal rules. 
The evidence has to be considered through these elements. 
Second, the evidence has to be consistent with, and assessed by similar evidences that 
are close and contiguous to it306. The point here is that each evidence has some similar 
evidence that shares its scope to a certain degree, and therefore the authority of each 
one is limited by another in a way whereby each one cannot have absolute authority. 
For example, the principles of proof, such as the hand, witnessing of two people and 
fame (al-shuhrah), cannot each gain absolute authority. Rather the weight of each one 
is identified in accordance with the other. Similarly this can be said for any claimed 
evidence. 
Third, the evidence has to be consistent with its object and circumstance both in 
examining it historically and in applying it in reality307. The point here is that the nature 
of the object and its circumstances identify the limits of the authority of the evidence. 
For example, for the warfare issue, an isolated report cannot be valid in isolation, and 
similarly this can be said for things that are sensitive in religious terms, e.g. those that 
are related to marriage, death, crime and so forth. It is similarly said that it will be limited 
to the context of the object and the surrounding circumstances, not only in 
understanding the evidence within its historical context, but also in applying it in reality, 
For instance, the principle that possession proves ownership cannot be considered as 
evidence in the case of civil war, but rather, in these circumstances, for claiming the 
right of property, one has to provide several pieces of evidence. 
3.2.4. Conclusions 
Throughout the beginning of this section, there was an attempt to demonstrate how 
Mudarrisī’s epistemological framework was constructed and formed. His relative 
association to the Tafkīkī school helped him to liberate himself from the dominant 
epistemological framework in Shīʿī theological and jurisprudential discourse, namely the 
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Aristotelian framework. Moreover, his communication with modern and Western 
epistemological scholarship and debates with an ambition of a pure Islamic theory of 
knowledge has also enriched his critique of the Aristotelian framework and allowed him 
to construct his own epistemological view. Subsequently, it was characterized by his 
insistence on the psychosocial elements of human error, which he called desire (al-
hawā) using Islamic terminology, and centralizing reason as being a critical tool for 
seeking knowledge. This centralization has been achieved through a combination of 
seeking out the best scientific method for its object of enquiry and calling for a holistic 
and coherent epistemic justification and judgment. Applying this approach to 
jurisprudential issues, Mudarrisī has provided a different foundation for some of the 
most important issues of Shīʿī jurisprudence, namely the relationship between reason 
and the Sharʿ, the validity of certainty and the epistemic foundation of legal evidences. 
Mudarrisī's approach, then, represents a departure from the epistemological framework 
of the Bahbahānian paradigm, in that he aims to dissolve the duality of certainty and 
speculation inherent in that paradigm.  By doing this, he hopes to opens up the 
possibility of establishing legal rulings based on a less stringent form of certainty than 
that inherited by the BAhabhānian paradigm from the Aristotelian tradition. Moreover, it 
opens the door for seeking a different method that can lead to a reasonable level of 
acceptable knowledge from which to derive legal issues. These epistemological 
ramifications stand against some essential characteristics of the Bahbahānian 
paradigm, that is to say, quietism and the limitations of reaching the divine purposes. In 
the next section of the methodological issues, these applications will clearly be shown 
when Mudarrisī’s methodological opinions are discussed in detail308. 
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3.3. The Holy Qur’an 
Mudarrisī’s emphasis on the Qur’an as a crucial source of legal reasoning goes beyond 
the classical discourse of considering the Qur’an as the first source of deriving legal 
issues. As will be demonstrated below, the attachment to the Qur’an in Mudarrisī’s 
thought has an influential effect, not only on his jurisprudential methodology, but also on 
his overview of the maqāṣid al-sharīʿa project.  
3.3.1. A Historical Overview of the Qur’an in Shīʿī Jurisprudence 
The Qur’an is deemed to be the most essential source in the lives of all Muslims, be it in 
their intellectual life, i.e. theological, legal, moral, etc. or in their daily life situations. The 
question in jurisprudential discussion is that given the diversity of Qur’anic contents, 
how can the Qur’an be evidence for a legal ruling? This question has led Muslim 
scholars to question many other aspects related to the Qur’an and has also led to 
discussions about other subjects related to hermeneutics. 
Since Shīʿī jurisprudence was established, the Qur’an as a source for legal rulings has 
not really been discussed in its own right in the literature of the field309. Instead, Shīʿī 
scholars have looked to the Qur’an as an Arabic linguistic phenomenon that has been 
constituted in a textual form. Therefore, they have studied, in the main linguistic 
understandings of meaning (specifically, those found in an Arabic linguistic context).. 
Nevertheless, they dealt with the Qur’an not only as a pure Arabic linguistic 
phenomenon, but also as a holy text for a legal purpose. Thus, a considerable part of 
jurisprudential content has been dedicated to examining linguistic issues, taking into 
account its legal nature. For example, the issues of command, prohibition, generality, 
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particularity, implication of a condition and others have been discussed. Discussions 
were restricted largely to these matters throughout the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries 
within Shīʿī uṣūl al-fiqh. In the seventh century, some developments took place, 
especially with the work of al-Ḥillah school starting with al-Muḥaqqiq310 (d. 1277) and al-
ʿAllāmah311. After this century, a separate section was devoted to the Qur’an within the 
literature. However, it did not amount to a significant change, since the only issue 
discussed in the section was the verification of the soundness of the Qur’anic text, 
known as the issue of recurrence (tawātur) of the Qur’an. This state of affairs lasted 
until the sixteenth century when new writings emerged as a new legal field, namely, the 
verses pertaining to legal rulings (āyāt al-aḥkām). The first Shīʿī scholar who started this 
sort of writing was Aḥmad al-Ardabīlī (d. 1585), as famous as al-Muqaddas al-Ardabīlī, 
for his book Zubdat al-Bayān fī Aḥkām al-Qur’an 312. Although this work might be 
considered a legal (fiqhī) work, it somehow reflected the uṣūlī perspective toward the 
scope to which the Qur’an can be legal evidence. In effect, it could be a practical 
expression of an idea that had been discussed in uṣūlī writings about the extent of the 
essential knowledge needed by a jurist to become a mujtahid 313. In this debate, the 
scholars of the time, generally speaking, agreed that the jurist need only know around 
five hundred verses of the Qur’an, and this was sufficient for the jurist to be justified in 
his derivation of legal rules. 
With the emergence of the Akhbārī school and its intellectual challenges in the eleventh 
century, the discussions on the Qur’an shifted in Shīʿī jurisprudence. One of the 
common ideas of Akhbārism was that the Qur’an itself, without help from the Imām’s 
interpretation of it, could not be valid as legal evidence314,, because either the Qur’an 
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lacks supplementary clues and therefore its meanings cannot be fully constituted, or 
because the Imāms are the only people who can understand it. This led to a huge 
debate in uṣūlī works, which became the principal site for the discussion on the Qur’an 
over the last two centuries in Shīʿī literature. The debate was referred to as “the 
meaning of the Qur’anic text (al-ẓuhūr)”. Other than the two issues of recurrence 
(tawātur) and the meaning of the Quranic text, Shīʿī uṣūl al-fiqh has not discussed 
issues in relation to the Qur'an as a source of law. 
3.3.2. Mudarrisī’s Ontological View of the Qur’an 
By describing Mudarrisī's view of the Qur'an as "ontological", I aim to indicate how he 
conceives of the nature, characteristics and the function of the Quranic text. The 
importance of addressing Mudarrisī’s ontological view is that it reflects the foundations 
of how he employs the Qur’anic text in jurisprudence.  
Mudarrisī sees the Qur’an as the revelation from Allah to human beings, which 
represents the exclusive way of salvation for humanity315. The Qur’anic text itself 
esteems itself as a source of guidance, knowledge and increase in faith. In his view, the 
Qur’an ontologically is the other side of intellect (al-ʿaql), and they both emerge from 
one root, namely, the light of Allah. 316 Thus, its interactions with certain historical events 
were carefully singled out from other events in order to be examples of the applications 
of revelation in reality. This idea leads to another idea that he emphasizes: that the 
Qur’an constitutes the legislative317 Book of God, and the universe represents His 
natural Books318. In a sense, this idea means that the content of revelation is consistent 
with natural law, which is not solely restricted to the physical world but also includes the 
general social institution of human beings. 
This ontological view of the Qur’an differentiates him from other tendencies in the field, 
and leads him to a particular approach for jurisprudential issues. Firstly, since he 
believes in the self-value of the Qur’anic text, he emphasizes the centrality of the 
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Qur’anic text as legal evidence. Other scholars may believe in this centrality, but they 
also emphasize the position of the ḥadīth alongside it, which, in some cases, means 
that the ḥadīth takes on equal value and significance as a source of legislation319. 
Secondly, his belief in the self-value of the Qur’anic text as being inclusive of the value 
of historical events mentioned in the Qur’an also differentiates him from other readings 
of the Qur’anic text, which limit it either partially or totally to a historical text320. Some 
scholars321, not necessarily uṣūlīs, believe in the intrinsic value of the Qur’anic text but 
not literally. They see it as an excellent religious experience, but not entirely valid as 
legal evidence for every time and place. Thirdly, his belief that the Qur’anic text is the 
flipside of the intellect affects the way in which he addresses the famous issue of the 
relationship between revelation and intellect. Finally, it also leads to the belief that the 
sources of legal evidence are only two and not four as usually described in Shīʿī uṣūl al-
fiqh. These sources are the Qur’an and the intellect, the ḥadīth then is deemed as an 
extension of the Qur’an and the consensus (ijmāʿ) as an extension of the intellect. 
3.3.3. Tadabbur: The Way to the Qur’an 
Here I will demonstrate the concept of tadabbur, its meaning, method, what it means for 
Mudarrisī in theory and practice, and the way in which it developed throughout his 
intellectual life. I argue here that tadabbur has developed from being an expression of 
an intellectual and practical interaction with the Qur’an to becoming an essential part of 
Mudarrisī’s jurisprudential theory. 
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In 1972, Mudarrisī published a small but critical book entitled Buḥūth fī al-Qur’an al-
Ḥakīm. In this book, he develops the concept of tadabbur (deep reflection), making it 
one of the hallmarks of his thought. Tadabbur in a common sense means a reflection on 
the Qur’an, and with this sense it might not differ considerably from tafsīr (exegesis) 
generally. However, Mudarrisī transferred the concept from pure reflection on the 
Qur’an to a particular theory about how to read the Qur’an, whereby it is neither a 
professional exegetic process nor a simple thinking about the Qur’anic content. In this 
book he defines al-tadabbur as a deep, concentrating and systematic reflection on the 
Qur’an through which the reader is not only able to understand the apparent Qur’anic 
content, but also to understand its deeper meaning and be able to apply it in practice322. 
In order to justify and provide a practical guideline, he addressed a few issues. First, he 
attempted to differentiate sharply between tadabbur as a legitimate way of dealing with 
the Qur’an and personal interpretation (tafsīr bil-raʾy) of the Qur’an, which is forbidden in 
Islam generally and especially in Shīʿī thought323. Second, he provided an overview of 
the nature of the Qur’an to help anyone wanting to reflect on it, such as the meaning of 
the exoteric (ẓāhir), the esoteric (bāṭin), the clear (muḥkam), the ambiguous 
(mutashābih) and seven letters (al-ḥurūf al-sabʿa)324. Finally, he ended with the required 
psychological and rational characteristics of the person endeavouring to reflect on the 
Qur’an, with guidelines of how to apply the content of the Qur’an practically325. 
Publishing this book was only the beginning of Mudarrisī’s discussions on the Qur’an. 
On the theoretical level, through his engagement in this sort of reflection on the Qur’an, 
and also by his group (i.e. his students and learning institution, Ḥawzā) on a general 
level, tadabbur has in itself become a theory of reading the Qur’an. Many such theories 
and conceptual tools have been established with regard to the Qur’an, such as the unity 
of the Qur’anic sūra, topical reflection (al-tadabbur al-mawḍūʿī), the Qur’anic context 
and its semantic web, and later on, thematic reflection. The gradual establishment of 
these theories and concepts has become a distinct intellectual framework in the Shīʿī 
                                            
322 al-Mudarrisī, Min Hudā al-Qur’an (From the Guidance of the Qur’an), p. 96 
323 Buḥūth fī al-Qur’an al-Ḥakīm, pp.14-17 
324 Ibid. pp. 23-29 
325 Ibid. pp. 36-40 
150 
 
tradition with regard to Qur’anic studies over time 326. On the practical level, Mudarrisī’s 
turning toward this method of al-tadabbur was an expression of his ‘rebellion’  from the 
Shīʿī traditional curriculum in the Ḥawza327. It took around ten years until he returned to 
jurisprudence (both fiqh and uṣūl), but this time with his Qur’anic encyclopedia known 
as Min Hudā al-Qur’an (From the Guidance of the Qur’an). 
I present here a summary of the tadabbur method in its mature version, developed over 
time since 1972 by Mudarrisī and his students, especially Muḥammad Riḍā al-Shirāzī328 
(d. 2008), and published in the latest edition of his Qur’anic encyclopedia in 2008329. 
The key concepts of the tadabbur method are as follows: first, each sūra of the Qur’an 
has one central theme, where the contents of all its verses correlate semantically in 
various ways to support the central theme. This idea is called the thematic unity330 of 
the sūra331. Accordingly, the person reflecting on the Qur’an has to identify the central 
theme of the sūra in order to understand the relationships of its contents (i.e. the stories, 
examples, theological discussions and legal discussions). For example, Mudarrisī 
argues that the central theme of Sūrat al-Kahf (the Cave) is the relationship between 
faith and dealing with the adornment of this world332. This central theme runs through all 
the contents of the sūra, namely the four stories: the account of the Seven Sleepers 
who rejected the persecution of an unjust ruler and abstained from society to preserve 
their faith; the dialogue between the two gardeners, whereby one thanks God whilst the 
                                            
326 The mature expression of these ideas can be found in the new edition of Mudarrisī Qur’anic interpretation, opened 
up in an introduction that demonstrates them. See Min Hudā al-Qur’an, v 1, pp. 39-137 
327 Mudarrisī mentioned this moment of turning toward the Qur’an twice, once in his jurisprudence work and the 
second time in an interview with him. See them respectively, al-Tashrīʿ al-Islāmī: Manāhijuhu wa Maqāṣiduhu, 9: 3. 
See also: "al-Tashrīʿ al-Islāmī wa Qaḍāyā al-ʾUmma," al-Baṣāʾir, no. 26 (2002): pp. 24-59. 
328 Muḥammad Riḍā al-Shirāzī has summerised a series of lessons provided by Mudarrisī when he was in Kuwait 
during the seventies, then he published it first under the title: Kayfa Nafham al-Qur’an, but later on with some 
additions it was published under the title: al-Tadabbur Fi al-Qur’an al-Karīm. The book has been published several 
times. I will use here: al-Shirāzī, Muḥammad Riḍā, al-Tadabbur fī al-Qur’an al-Karīm, 3ed ed. (Beirut: Dār al-ʿUlūm, 
2010). 
329 Mudarrisī, Min Hudā al-Qur’an, v 1, pp. 39-137 
330 Rippin has studied this issue as a notable tendency in twentieth century. However, he focused on some Sunnī 
works and ignored the Shīʿī contributions in which Mudarrisī is deemed as the first Shīʿī scholars who interested in 
and applied it in his tafsīr. There are other Shīʿī scholars as well, famously Maḥmūd al-Bustānī in his book: al-
Bustānī, Maḥmūd, al-Manhaj al-Bināʾī fī al-Tafsīr. (Beirut: Dār al-Hādī, 2001). For Rippin’s paper see: Rippin, Andrew, 
“Contemporary scholarly understandings of Qur’anic coherence” Al-Bayan: Journal of Qur'an and Hadith Studies, 
11:2 (2013), 1-14. 
331 Mudarrisī published a specific book that aimed to provide the theme of each sūra of the Qur’an. See: Mudarrisī, 
Muḥammed Taqī, Maqāṣid al-Suwar fī al-Qur’an al-Karīm, (Beirut: Dar al-Maḥajat al-Bayḍāʾa, 2013).  
332 Mudarrisī, Min Hudā al-Qur’an, v 5, pp. 9-14.  
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other does not; the story of Moses and al-Khiḍr which represents the dialectic of the 
exterior and interior of the world; and finally the story of Ḍhul al-Qarnayn, which 
presents an example of a just ruler. In addition, the sūra includes verses about the 
Hereafter, which is related to the central theme. Second, the theory of thematic unity of 
the sūra leads to the significance of context. Obviously, the importance of context is not 
a new idea, whether it be in Arabic linguistics or in tafsīrs, though ‘context’ here with the 
tadabbur method is more than just linguistic context. It focuses on the intellectual 
correlation within the sūra’s context in order to discover the various relationships 
between the verses that support the central theme. Third, based on this positional 
correlation, the reading has to move back and forth deeply and systematically between 
the verses to discover the contents of the sūra, such that not only the apparent 
meanings are uncovered, but also the deeper meanings underneath, which may be 
principal values, or universal societal or human rules. By following these steps, the 
reader will reach the fourth key idea of the tadabbur method, which is ‘interpretation’ 
(taʾwīl)333. Interpretation here means that after the reader has gained the deeper 
meaning of the sūra (or part of the sūra) that reflects the principal values, or the 
universal societal or human rules, he is now able to apply them in the external reality 
which includes people or socio-political cases and so on. The aim of this application is 
to connect the Qur’an to actual, practical Muslim concerns and to give guidance in 
dealing with these concerns. Needless to say that within this process and steps there 
are other ideas and techniques, but these are the key ones. 
The above description of the concept of al-tadabbur, its meaning, method and how it 
has developed leads to two observations. First, that the beginning of the concept was 
mostly a practical guideline of how to interact with the Qur’an, whereas in its latest 
version, it became a theory about the nature of the Qur’an, and therefore how to read it 
in a particular way through certain protocols and steps. Second, the concept of 
interpretation (taʾwīl) began as an interpretative tool to bridge the gap between the 
Qur’an and practicality. However, through time it became an epistemological 
mechanism for religious knowledge, to understand the religious contents generally and 
                                            
333 Mudarrisī, Min Hudā al-Qur’an, v 1. pp. 98-99. 
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to interface them with reality. This epistemological mechanism has certain 
characteristics and methods which Mudarrisī has employed as a jurisprudential tool for 
his maqāṣidī approach, as we shall see in the next section. 
3.3.4. Interpretation (taʾwīl) as An Epistemological Mechanism 
Here I will demonstrate Mudarrisī’s theory regarding interpretation (taʾwīl). To show its 
characteristics, I will analyze it comparatively with the principal tendencies of 
interpretation in Islamic thought, broadly speaking. After defining his concept of 
interpretation, I will analyze it comparatively with Shīʿī scholars. Here I am arguing that 
the root of his conception goes back to some scholars in the sixties who applied it in 
ḥadīth. Yet, Mudarrisī developed and applied it in the Qur’an before he used it as a 
jurisprudential tool for his maqāṣidī approach. Following this, I will provide some 
examples of his method of interpretation in legal issues in order to illustrate how it works 
in practice.  
3.3.4.1. Mystical Interpretation 
In mystical thought (Ṣūfīsm) there are realms (or levels) of existence; every human who 
wants to reach happiness or truth must journey through these realms through a 
personal existential experience of the divine presence. The journey includes two parallel 
lines: the first starts off with practising a series of self-disciplinary techniques, which 
prepare the wayfarer to read the Qur’anic text, and the second line starts from the 
Qur’anic teachings of practising self-discipline techniques in order to reach a higher 
level of existence. From this perspective, the Qur’anic text becomes a symbolic path for 
individuals to discover and traverse from one status (maqām) to another. The number of 
these statuses varies depending on the type of order. However, they all agree that the 
goal is to reach the highest status. This is where interpretation (taʾwīl) becomes the 
means that the mystic uses in order to reach the secret of existence via special 
hermeneutical techniques. Here too, these hermeneutical techniques vary from one 
order to another, though they all agree that beneath the external reality of the Qur’anic 
verses there are esoteric meanings that summarise the status334. In the Sunnī tradition, 
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Ibn al- ʿArabī is considered to be the ideal representative of this kind of Ṣūfi school, with 
its own style of hermeneutics. Amongst Shīʿī scholars, there are Qur’anic tafsīrs which 
feature mystical interpretation, but the most famous, and possibly the most developed 
one is Tafsīr al-Mīzān by Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Ṭabāṭabāʾī 335. He argues that there 
are exoteric (ẓāhir) and esoteric (bāṭin) levels in the Qur’an. The exoteric is the Qur’an 
itself; its teachings, stories, legal rulings and so on, whereas the esoteric is a special 
existence which is the source of all Qur’anic knowledge, and which cannot be obtained 
through semantic processes. Rather, it is gained through self-discipline and self-
disclosure (kāshif). In brief, the essential view of mysticism regarding interpretation336 is 
one whereby interpretation is merely a means to reach an existential level through the 
application of a special hermeneutical technique.  
3.3.4.2. Linguistic Interpretation 
Interpretation, here, can be defined as the use of the principles of Arabic linguistics, 
grammars and its ways of communicating in order to understand the Qur’anic text. This 
is based on a theological principle that God speaks to people in a way similar to how 
they communicate with each other. Since He chose the Arabic language for the 
message of Islam, He used Arabic as a mode of communication in the manner which is 
common amongst the speakers of Arabic (al-taḥāwur al-ʿurfī  or customary 
communication). As a result, any attempt to understand the Qur’an entails the 
application of Arabic rules of communication; otherwise it becomes unfruitful. The 
interpretation is, accordingly, a means of communication in Arabic, and implies the 
harmonization of two initially contradictory texts of one person, and reliance on 
“acceptable” reason. In other words, one should interpret a text by relying on its 
apparent meaning (ḥujjiyyat al-ẓuhūr). This attitude towards taʾwīl is generally found 
amongst Sunni uṣūlīs, established by al-Shāfiʿī 337 (d. 820), and also amongst Shīʿī 
                                            
335 Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Ṭabāṭabāʾī, al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’an, v. 3, pp.. 41-48, (Qum). Steigerwald attempted to 
study the Shīʿī taʿwīl and has mentioned al-Ṭabāṭabāʾī in her work, though only briefly. See: Steigerwald, Diana, 
Twelver Shīʿī Taʾwīl, in In Rippin, Andrew (ed.) The Blackwell companion to the Qur’an. (United Kingdom: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2006), pp. 373-385. 
336 A good description of mystical interpretation can be found in: Nasṛ Ḥāmid Abū Zayd, Falsafat al-Taʾwīl: Dirāsah fī 
Taʾwīl al-Qur’an ʿInda Muhỵī Al-Dīn Ibn ʿArabī, (Beirut: al-Markaz al-Thaqāfī al-ʿArabī, 2007) 
337 al-Shāfiʿī, Muhammad Ibn Idrīs. al-Risāla, (Beirut: al-Maktabah al-ʿIlmiyya), pp. 21-85 
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scholars in their theological discussions338. However, it is worth noting here that 
metaphor (al-majāz) is considered part of linguistic appearance in accordance with this 
trend, and is different from symbolic interpretation, which is common to mystical 
interpretation339. 
3.3.4.3. Mudarrisī and the Epistemological Interpretation 
For Mudarrisī, interpretation is an epistemological mechanism, which either discovers 
the principle of an object then deems it as its farʿ (corollary), or discovers the farʿ and 
returns back to its principle. To elucidate this idea further, there are some elements that 
require analysis here: the exoteric (al-ẓāhir), the esoteric (al-bāṭin), the clear (muḥkam), 
the ambiguous (mutashābih), and Mudarrisī's theory of the five vertical circles, and how 
he applies it in the context of uṣūl al-fiqh; and subsequently, how he adapted it in his 
maqāṣid context. 
3.3.4.3.1. The Exoteric (al-ẓāhir), The Esoteric (al-bāṭin) and the 
Theory of the Five Circles 
It is a common belief amongst Muslim scholars that the Qur’an has exoteric and 
esoteric meanings. However, they disagree about their precise definitions. Relying on 
some reports (akhbār) from Shīʿī sources, Mudarrisī defines340 the esoteric as the 
scientific dimension of the Qur’an. There are four categories of reports; and by 
combining them we get a definition of the esoteric that consists of four characteristics. 
The first category indicates that each verse in the Qur’an has an esoteric and exoteric 
meaning; the second indicates that the exoteric is the revealed (tanzīl) and the esoteric 
is the interpretation (taʾwīl); the third says that the exoteric is the ḥukm (ruling) applying 
to those unto whom the verse had been revealed, and the esoteric applies to those who 
come after them, following this original ruling.; the fourth says that the exoteric is the 
ḥukm (ruling), and the esoteric is the knowledge (ʿilm). 
These reports (akhbār) are as follows: 
                                            
338 See: http://imamsadeq.com/ar.php/page,531BookAr80P1.html#15 . Accessed: 21.4.2011. 
339al-Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-Fiqh, v.3 
340 Mudarrisī, Min Hudā al-Qur’an, v 1, pp. 75-76. 
155 
 
"All Qur’anic verses have both an exoteric (ẓāhir) and esoteric (bāṭin) 
meaning341. The former is the revelation (tanzīl), whilst the latter is the 
interpretation (taʾwīl) 342. The exoteric addresses those unto whom the verse 
was revealed, while the esoteric addresses those who did like them343. Its 
surface is Allah's Judgement and its depth is Allah's knowledge344".  
Mudarrisī deems345 the fourth category as the correct meaning of the esoteric, and that 
it, in turn, clarifies the other reports. However, to elucidate the basis from which he drew 
this conclusion, we must first refer to his theory of the five vertical circles.  
He claims that, when revising the Qur’an, we find five vertical circles, starting from the 
top to the bottom as follows: one of the beautiful Names of God (ism min al-asmāʾ al-
ḥusnā), the cosmological, societal or human laws (sunnah kawniyyah), the wisdom or 
the reason behind that law (ḥikma), the advice (waṣiyya) and the legal ruling346. These 
vertical circles are interrelated, where each one generates the other starting from the 
top. Mudarrisī argues that adopting this approach would provide the reader of the 
Qur’an a guide-line to understand it as coherent content. He provides an example of this 
theory from Sūrat al-Isrāʾ. 
The verses (27-31) are as follows:  
“Give relatives their due, and the needy, and travellers– do not squander 
your wealth wastefully: those who squander are the brothers of Satan, and 
Satan is most ungrateful to his Lord– but if, while seeking some bounty that 
you expect from your Lord, you turn them down, then at least speak some 
word of comfort to them. Do not be tight-fisted, nor so open-handed that you 
end up blamed and overwhelmed with regret. Your Lord gives abundantly to 
who- ever He will, and sparingly to whoever He will: He knows and observes 
                                            
341 al-Ṣaffār, Muḥammad Ibn al-Ḥasan. Baṣā'ir al-Darajāt, (Ṭehran: Manshūrāt al-'Aʿlamī,1404 A.H), p. 216 
342 Ibid, p. 223 
343 Ibid, p.223 
344 al-Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār fī Akhbār al-A’imma al-Aṭhār,v.74, p. 137 
345 Mudarrisī, Min Hudā al-Qur’an, v 1, pp. 98-99. 
346 al-Mudarrisī, al-Tashrīʿ al-Islāmī: Manāhijuhu wa Maqāṣiduhu, v. 2, p. 53 
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His servants thoroughly. Do not kill your children for fear of poverty a –– We 
shall provide for them and for you––killing them is a great sin”347. 
In light of these verses, he extracts the five vertical circles: the two beautiful Names 
mentioned here represent the first circle, namely, Acquainted and Seeing. As God 
attributes these specific two Names to Himself, they will be reflected in His creation 
such that He extends provision for whom He wills and restricts accordingly. This 
represents the second circle, i.e. the cosmological, societal or human laws (sunna 
kawniyya). Subsequently, the cosmological law generates a wisdom that people should 
embrace in their life, and here it is represented by the phrase: “do not make your hand 
[as] chained to your neck nor extend it completely”, which represents the third circle. 
The fourth circle is the general testament or advisory (waṣiyya), which is represented 
here by the command: “do not spend wastefully”, since the person is aware that God is 
Acquainted and Seeing. he is the one who extends provision and thus wisdom lies in 
being moderate in spending money; and the subsequent advice is to not waste your 
wealth. However, this has to be exemplified legislatively by the fifth circle where God 
details the legal rulings by saying: “give the relative his due, and [also] the poor and the 
traveler” and “speak to them a gentle word” in case you could not provide financial 
dues. Given that, he says348 that these five vertical circles do not always come together, 
rather that there are often three or four of them, or sometimes even less. Moreover, they 
do not have be ordered consecutively. Rather, as with this example, they can be 
reversed or mixed up. 
The second circle (that is, the cosmological, societal or human laws (sunnah 
kawniyyah)), involves the idea of Quranic knowledge - that is the Qur'an's esoteric 
aspect. The meaning of the Sunnah here is extracted from the Qur’anic term mentioned 
in different sūras in the Qur’an, which means the cosmological law of human beings 
which history repeatedly shows, e.g. the negative consequence of oppressors and the 
victory of vulnerable people. It might be that the most similar meaning of the sunan in 
Western scholarship is found within discussions in the field of the philosophy of history, 
                                            
347 The Qur'an, trans. A.S.A. Haleem (Oxford University Press, UK, 2005). p. 177. 
348 al-Mudarrisī, al-Tashrīʿ al-Islāmī: Manāhijuhu wa Maqāṣiduhu, v. 2, pp. 54. 
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especially in the Marxist version. Through this, Mudarrisī, in light of this definition of the 
esoteric, is attempting to establish the validity of the Qur’an for every time and place, 
because then the verses would not die with the death of whom the verses were 
revealed about349. Instead, it becomes possible to reapply them again for new similar 
cases. However, this does not only hold true for moral issues; it is also applicable in the 
legal system. In other words, considering the Qur’an as a valid system of theological 
and ethical knowledge for every time and place as some scholars claim, it is also a valid 
legal system. In order to connect this concept with the legal system, Mudarrisī redefines 
the concept of the clear (muḥkam) and the ambiguous (mutashābih), and then relates 
them to al-maqāṣid. In the following, I will demonstrate his insights on these concepts, 
aiming to demonstrate how he utilizes them in his theory of interpretation, and 
subsequently in the maqāṣidī approach. 
3.3.4.3.2. The Clear (muḥkam) and the Ambiguous (mutashābih) 
While most Muslim scholars concentrate on the seventh verse of Sūrat Āl-ʿImrān to 
define and discuss the concept of the clear and the ambiguous verses, Mudarrisī 
utilizes the first verse of Sūrat Hūd to first define the verse of Āl-ʿImrān. The Qur’an 
says in the first verse of Sūra Hūd:  
“Alif Lam Ra [This is] a Scripture whose verses are perfected, then set out 
clearly, from One who is all wise, all aware”350.  
Mudarrisī locates the clear (or the definitive) in the opposite category to the 
elaborated351. By that, he claims that all knowledge (maʿārif) in the Qur’an, including 
theological, moral and legal issues, have a root (aṣl) and elaboration (furūʿ/tafṣīl). The 
root represents the rule or the concept and the elaboration embodies the applications or 
examples. This may be a theological issue, such as an attribute of God’s for example, 
with its application being a particular story in the Qur’an; or a moral issue, such as the 
value of truth and its application in contracts and transactions; or finally a legal issue, 
such as the value of writing down the agreement in transactions as the embodiment of 
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350 The Qur'an: p. 136. 
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the fulfilment of the agreement. The clear verses are a reference to the elaborated 
verses and, as Mudarrisī argues, this is attributed to the fact that they are the basis 
(known as the Mother of the Book – umm al-kitāb in the Qur’anic term). The original 
meaning of mother (umm) in Arabic (umm) means the origin of something, and has 
been used to signify the human mother of any person because she represents his 
origin, i.e. where he physically came from. Therefore, using this word specifically in this 
context essentially implies the foundational role of the clear verses with respect to the 
elaborated, just as the former is the origin of the latter. Based on this viewpoint, the 
clear and ambiguous verses are not to be dealt with in a semantic dimension, but rather 
in their intellectual or epistemological dimension. Moreover, it means that in reality there 
are two categories of verses: the clear (that are a reference point for deducing the 
meaning of the elaborated verses), and the ambiguous (that operate as an elaboration 
of the clear verses). Sometimes the elaborated verses are called ambiguous 
(mutashābih), when they are being considered without reference to the clear ones. 
However, when considered with reference to the clear ones, they are called the 
“elaborated”. Therefore, the terms elaborated (mufaṣṣal) and ambiguous (mutashābih) 
refer to one and the same thing; it is just the vantage point that varies. 
Having taken this into account, interpretation (taʾwīl) in this context then is neither a 
hidden meaning of the word or the sentence, nor an existential status. Rather, it is an 
epistemological mechanism of going back and forth between the principle and its 
application, whereby the reader of the Qur’an goes back and forth between practicality 
and the universal rule (sunnah). Similarly, the jurist does so by going back and forth 
between the principle (aṣl) and the application (al-farʿ), and then between the farʿ and a 
new legal case in order to derive the individual legal ruling. Mudarrisī extends the usage 
of this epistemological mechanism to almost the whole of religious knowledge in a way 
that makes it a hermeneutical tool for the reading of holy texts, especially the Qur’an. 
Subsequently, wrong interpretation (al-taʾwīl al-bāṭil) and invalid analogical reasoning 
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(qiyās) are processes that go against this mechanism by referring the elaborated verses 
back to other elaborated rather than the clear verses and vice versa.352 
In the Shīʿī context, usage of this epistemological mechanism as a way of 
understanding religious knowledge goes back to a contemporary scholar considered to 
be the founder of the Tafkīkī School, Mīrzā Mahdī al-Iṣfahānī (d 1945). Al-Iṣfahānī, in 
his treatise entitled ‘Risāla fī al-Maʿarīḍ 353, addressed the question of how to 
understand the Imāms’ reports especially when they contradicted each other. When 
addressing this issue, he came up with the idea of the principles (uṣūl) and their 
applications (furūʿ) in a way that makes it a central idea in the whole of his thesis. 
Although the notion of the principles (uṣūl) and their applications (furūʿ) already existed 
in Shīʿī literature and had been mentioned in the reports, the way in which Iṣfahānī 
defined and dealt with them was different, as we shall see in detail in the Sunnah 
section354. Iṣfahānī believed that each legal issue has its principle rooted in the Imāms’ 
reports, and that the jurist has to find these principles first to be able to understand the 
furūʿ. Moreover, contradictions usually occur between the furūʿ, whereas the principles 
are clearer, more consistent and coherent. Thus, the real jurist is the one who can 
understand the method of reading the Imāms’ reports in a way that refers the furūʿ back 
to their principle and vice versa; this method is called ‘al-maʿārīḍ’. 
ʿAli al-Sistānī (b. 1930), the contemporary Shīʿī grand marjaʿ, also addressed the same 
idea in an associated treatise concerning contradictory reports. Through his treatment of 
the issues of contradictory reports, such as the reason for the existence of contradictory 
reports, the ways in which they contradict each other, and suggested solutions to 
harmonize them, he addressed an opinion which he attributed to an early Shīʿī scholar 
called Ibn al-Junayd (d. 991 or 995), who had been accused by some Shīʿī scholars of 
having utilized the Sunni application of analogical reasoning (qiyās). Sistānī defended 
Ibn al-Junayd’s attitude by interpreting his qiyās in a valid way. He claimed that Ibn al-
Junayd had been utilising a particular way of analogy, by referring the applications 
(furūʿ) back to their principles (uṣūl). Furthermore, he claimed that that methodology 
                                            
352 Ibid. pp. 171-73 
353 al-Iṣfahānī, Mīrzā Mahdī, Risāla fī al-Maʿarīḍ. Mashhad: the Central Library of Astan Quds Razavi, no. 13411. 
354 See on page 186. 
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was precisely the import of the term ‘qiyās’ during that early period, especially amongst 
the Shīʿa, and was even encouraged by the Imāms as a valid way of dealing with 
contradictory reports355. 
Whilst those Shīʿī scholars applied this theory to the field of ḥadīth, Mudarrisī developed 
it to be applied to the Qur’an, and then further adapted it in favour of al- maqāṣid by 
claiming that the derivation process (istinbāṭ) of each legal ruling should be based on 
this methodology of dealing with the clear and elaborate or ambiguous verses, or the 
principles (uṣūl) and their applications (furuʿ). As a result, he called this method al-fiqh 
al-shajarī356. In the following section, I will illustrate this method with examples to show 
how interpretation is an epistemological mechanism that generates religious meanings 
as well as legal rulings, and in the following chapters I will discuss his theory of maqāṣid 
al-sharīʿa. 
                                            
355 For a comprehensive understanding of Sīstānī’s argument, see: al-Sistānī, Ali, Taʿāruẓ al-‘Adilla. This is a well-
circulated treatise attributed to al-Sistānī written by his student Hāshim al-Hāshimī. It can be found here: 
http://www.tahkekat.com (accessed: 26.5.2015). 
356 Mudarrisī, Fiqh al-Istinbāṭ: Dirāsa fī Mabādiʾ ʿIlm al-Uṣūl, n.p., 2013), p 215. 
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Figure 6 – Mudarrisī’s epistemological interpretation (taʾwīl), which reflects his combination of the 
theory of five circles, the clear (muḥkam) and the ambiguous (mutashābih) verses, the esoteric 
(bāṭin) and exoteric (ẓāhir) verses and their interpretive operations. 
3.3.4.3.3. Applications of Mudarrisī’s Interpretation 
Here, I will provide a practical application of the method of referring the furūʿ to the uṣūl 
and vice versa in order to illustrate its steps and to demonstrate how it works. To do so, 
I will study some examples provided by Mudarrisī and elucidate some conceptions 
where it is required. 
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The method of referring the furūʿ to the uṣūl is an interpretive process that goes back 
and forth through mainly seven steps. Though it is said that there are seven steps, the 
process is more complicated than simply going through these steps. Thus, it is slightly 
complex and and it is useful to follow the diagram illustrating it. 
1- The first step is to reflect (tadabbur as mentioned above) on the principles 
outlined in the clear verses (muḥkamāt) of the Qur’an, and here the focus is on 
legal principles, even though they are related to moral and theological principles, 
which are above them. The assumption is that most of these legal principles are 
somehow obvious and understood by all people as they reflect common moral 
sense and intuition. Examples of these principles are justice, fairness, truth and 
so on. 
2- The second step is to understand the meanings of these principles by reference 
to what is commonly understood by the community practice (ʿurf) and to support 
this understanding by studying the Qur’anic context where they were allocated. 
Mudarrisī here is reflecting his attitude regarding the ruling that is arrived at 
through legal truth (al-ḥaqīqa al-sharʿiyya) in Shīʿī jurisprudence . In addition, it is 
to seek an understanding of the Qur’anic meanings devoid of employing a 
reader’s cultural bias. 
3- The third step is to study the Qur’anic legal examples of those principles, which 
are usually mentioned straight after mentioni of the underlying principles. These 
examples play the role of clarifying the meaning and the dimensions of the 
principle, which provide the jurist with a template to transfer it to new cases. In 
addition, they show some detailed and important aspects that are relevant to the 
case study. 
4- The fourth step is to study the same principles (muḥkamāt) in the ḥadīth that are 
relevant to the case study. These principles integrate with those of the Qur’an, 
and enrich the jurist’s understanding of the dimensions of the principles. 
5- The fifth step is to refer to common understanding (ʿurf) in studying whether the 
practical examples are actually associated with this principle or that. Here, again, 
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it is arbitrating with the public customary understanding to corroborate the 
meaning of the principle. 
6- The sixth step is to trace the principle back to the principle which precedes it. As 
the principles are connected with each other hierarchically in the form of a tree, 
some principles come before others, until it goes back to the highest principle. 
This step helps the jurist to associate the principle at hand (the branch or farʿ) 
with a most basic principle (aṣl) on which it is based (this affects the idea of 
practical principles (al-uṣūl al-ʿamaliyya). 
7- The seventh step is associating the religious text (the akhbār and some verses) 
to their principle in the case study. In reality, for each legal ruling, there are many 
reports from the Imāms and verses in the Qur’an; in addition, these reports tend 
to be transmitted piecemeal and stripped from a much longer report. Thus, by re-
allocating them to their textual context and then their intellectual context, i.e. the 
principles (al-muḥkamāt) to which they refer, helps the jurist to understand the 
ruling comprehensively. This, in turn, makes the derivation of legal rulings for 
new cases more effective. 
Looking at these steps, one can argue that the second, fifth and seventh steps are not 
essential in the process. The second and fifth are more concerned with dealing with and 
enriching hermeneutical techniques, whilst the seventh is more about organizing the 
sources according to this paradigm rather than being an essential step in the process. 
Bearing this in mind, here is a practical legal example based on this process to 
demonstrate how it works. 
The example is about legal rulings pertaining to dealing with parents. Mudarrisī provides 
this example partially in his book Fiqh al-Istinbāṭ357. The foundation of the relationship 
between a person and his parents is based on kindness (al-iḥsān), according to 
Mudarrisī, which is mentioned five times in the Qur’an (4:36, 6:151, 17:23, 29:8 and 
46:15). In all these places, it says clearly that a person has to treat his parents with 
kindness, and then the verse starts to elaborate the detailed rulings. Thus, the first step 
                                            
357 Ibid, p 40. 
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would be to study this concept in the Qur’an, which is, itself an application of the general 
principle of charitableness. The second step would be to study the relevant legal rulings 
mentioned in the Qur’an itself, and we find several rulings, some of which are relatively 
clear, whilst others are somehow less obvious. For example, the Qur’an requires from a 
person to be humble and merciful towards his parents and to pray for them. These 
rulings are somewhat obvious to common sense, but the Qur’an goes as far as to say: 
‘do not say to them a word of disrespect nor shout at them, but speak kind words to 
them’. The disrespectful word here is ‘uff’, which means any small expression of dislike. 
This example from the Qur’an, according to Mudarrisī, helps the jurist to draw an 
analogy from which to derive a legal ruling. The third step is to study the principles (al-
muḥkamāt) in ḥadīth literature pertaining to the subject. 
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Figure 7 – The application of al-Mudarrisī’s epistemological interpretation on the verse of 
hardship. 
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3.3.5. Conclusions 
Whilst the subject of the Qur’an in Shīʿī jurisprudence was on the whole limited to a few 
matters, Mudarrisī treats it as a central theme upon which he attempted to base the 
entire process of deriving legal rulings. Drawing on his ontological view about the 
Qur’an, he established a practical method to communicate with the Qur’an called 
‘tadabbur’ through which he then developed conceptual and hermeneutical tools to read 
the Qur’an. Interpretation (taʾwīl) gradually became the central tool for reading the 
Qur’an and applying it in reality. However, interpretation according to Mudarrisī is an 
epistemological mechanism rather than a linguistic or existential tool. His understanding 
of interpretation was inherited from his association to the Tafkīkī School, but, whilst the 
Tafkīkī conception dealt more with ḥadīth, Mudarrisī developed it to deal with the 
Qur’an. Through these developments, he attempted to make this mechanism favour his 
maqāṣidī project by redefining the concept of the exoteric (al-ẓāhir), the esoteric (al-
bāṭin), the clear (muḥkam), the ambiguous (mutashābih), and Mudarrisī’s theory of the 
five vertical circles. This establishment of the centrality of the Qur’an among the sources 
of legal evidence as well as the revived role given to it affects the system of derivation 
of legal rulings, especially with the maqāṣidī enrichment. 
3.4. Theory of the Sunnah 
Here, I will address the theory of the Sunnah in Mudarrisī’s jurisprudential thought. As 
with the Qur’an, I will begin with a historical overview of Shīʿī jurisprudential discussion 
regarding the Sunnah in order to provide an essential background against which to 
place Mudarrisī’s position within the tradition. I will, then, analyse his theory through 
addressing four aspects: his conception of the Sunnah, the divisions of the Sunnah, the 
relationship between the Sunnah and the Qur’an and Mudarrisī's own method of 
understanding the Sunnah in itself. Through this analysis, I am arguing that Mudarrisī 
has re-defined the conception of the Sunnah through reviving some old Shīʿī uṣūlī 
discussions regarding the nature of the Prophet’s actions, through which he strengthens 
his argument by dividing it into several categories, and then providing a method of 
understanding the Sunnah which supports his maqāṣidī approach. 
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3.4.1. A Historical Overview of the Sunnah in Shīʿī Jurisprudence 
It is unknown exactly when the slogan of the ‘Qur’an and Sunnah’ arose and dominated 
Islamic discourse, but what is clear is that this slogan has been used on many political 
and doctrinal occasions in the early period after the death of the Prophet. Likewise, this 
slogan seems to have existed in early Shīʿī traditions such as al-Kāfī in the section 
entitled: ‘Everything can be found in the Qur’an and Sunnah’358. This means that 
Sunnah as a term was used and considered as an epistemological reference. In the 
uṣūlī usage, although the term ‘Sunnah’ had been used in the early work, the term 
khabar (pl. akhbār) and ḥadīth (aḥādīth) were more popular. No explicit definition of 
Sunnah as a term can be found in Shīʿī jurisprudential works359 from al-Mufīd (d. 1022) 
until the period of Shaykh al-Bahā’ī (d. 1621).  The latter, in his work ‘Zubdat al-Uṣūl’360, 
was the first scholar to provide a definition of it. Then the definition was used by al-Faḍl 
al-Tūnī (d. 1661) in his work ‘al-Wāfiyya fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh’361, and then it later appeared in 
al-Qummī’s (d. 1816) work ‘al-Qawānīn’362. Finally, it appeared again with al-Muẓaffar 
(d. 1964)363. The definition provided by all these scholars was that the Sunnah refers to 
the sayings, actions and tacit approvals of the infallibles (the Prophet and the Imāms). 
During the period when there was no definition for the Sunnah, the dominating issue 
that had preoccupied the scholars regarding the Sunnah was its probative force 
(ḥujjiyya). Therefore, there were a lot of discussions on the issue regarding the way in 
which a khabar can be a proof - whether as a solitary transmission (khabar al-wāḥid) or 
whether transmitted through many chains of transmission (shuhrah/tawātur). However, 
this is not to say that scholars were not concerned about the Sunnah itself and how it 
should be interpreted. They actually devoted quite a considerable space to textual 
                                            
358 Muḥammad ibn Yaʿqūb al-Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, 4th ed., (Tehran: Dār al-Kutub al-Islāmiyya, 1987), v. 1, p. 59 
359 Here I am focusing on jurisprudential perspective of ḥadīth, for other perspective there are much literature have 
been produced last three decades in Western scholarship. To name a few, Kohlberg’s works are significant, such as 
Kohlberg, Etan, “On the origins of Shīʿī hadīth”, The Muslim World 88(2), 1998: 1665-84 and Newman, Andrew, The 
Formative Period of Twelver Shīʿīsm: Ḥadīth as Discourse Between Qum and Baghdad, (United Kingdom, Routledge, 
2010). 
360 Muḥammad ibn Ḥusayn al-Bahāʾī, Zubdat al-Uṣūl, 1st ed. (Qum: al-Sharīʿa, 2005), p. 179 
361 ʾAbdallah ibn Muḥammad al-Tūnī, al-Wāfiyya fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh, 2nd ed. (Qum: Majmaʿ al-Fikr al-Islāmī, 1995), p. 157 
362 Abu al-Qāsim Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Qummī, al-Qawānīn al-Muḥkama fī al-Uṣūl, 1st ed.(Qum: Iḥyaʾ al-Kutub 
al-Islamiyya, 2000), v. 2, p. 338 
363 al-Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-Fiqh, v. 3, p. 64 
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interpretation within the section of hermeneutics (mabḥath al-alfāẓ), though this space 
was a common one shared by both the Qur’an and the Sunnah. 
Having said that, there was a significant section in the Shīʿī uṣūl al-fiqh tradition that 
dealt with the actions of the Infallibles (the Prophet and the Imāms); in older works it 
was called the section of the actions (bāb al-afʿāl). What is significant about this section, 
however, is that it was an extended area in early Shīʿī uṣūl al-fiqh works, in particular 
with al-Murtaḍā (d. 1044). Then it continued as an essential area in uṣūl until the period 
of Ḥasan Ibn Zayn al-Dīn (d. 1602) where it disappeared until today with some 
exceptions in Bahbahānī’s (d. 1791) works in the Uṣūlī-Akhbārī period, and al-Muẓaffar 
(d. 1964)364, al-Ṣadr (d. 1979)365 and al-Ḥakīm (d. 2002)366 in the contemporary period. 
In this section, scholars raise the question of whether we have to follow all the deeds of 
the Infallible  or whether there are some rulings that are specific to him? How can we 
differentiate between the rulings that are specific to him and those that apply to others? 
In addition, they ask what the general indicator (dalāla) of the action is, and what the 
Prophet and Imām’s action’s is in particular? And is it an indicator of obligation, 
permissibility or something else? How can we differentiate between an action that 
indicates to obligation, and another indicating to permissibility? Given the fact that this 
section existed in the early period of uṣūlī works and was continued thereafter as an 
essential area, the first definition of the Sunnah by al-Bahāʾī was in effect a normal 
result of this tradition. Likewise, the absence of the definition of the Sunnah from al-
Qummī onwards does not affect the fact that the Sunnah still has its epistemological 
position as a reference for rulings and its definition as the sayings, actions and tacit 
approvals of the infallibles. On the other hand, however, the absence of this section 
affects the methods of interpreting the Sunnah, as we shall see below367. Nevertheless, 
this field witnessed extensive work regarding how to deal with the contradictory akhbār, 
known as ‘bāb al-taʿāruḍ’, which mainly addresses documentary and semantic issues.  
                                            
364 Ibid. p. 66 
365 al-Ṣadr, Durūs fī ʾIlm al-Uṣūl, v. 2, p. 365 
366 Muḥammad Taqī al-Ḥakīm, al-Uṣūl al-ʿĀmma fī al-Fiqh al-Muqāran, 2nd ed. (Qum: al-Majmaʿ al-ʿĀlamī li Ahl al-
Bayt, 1997), p. 115 
367 See on page 186. 
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3.4.2. The Concept of the Sunnah in Mudarrisī’s Thought 
Mudarrisī, like other scholars, believes in the probative force (ḥujjiyya) of the Sunnah 
generally. He believes that all attempts, both historical and contemporary, to deny the 
probative force of the Sunnah have failed. There are two schools when it comes to 
dealing with the Sunnah, according to Mudarrisī: first, those who exaggerate in following 
the Sunnah to the extent that some of them refuse to eat watermelon, for example, 
because they do not know how the Prophet ate it; and the second school, on the other 
side of the spectrum, reduce down the number of akhbār under the pretext that the 
transmission system is not reliable. Some proponents of this school would go as far as 
to claim that they do not trust any of the transmissions on the Prophet’s authority, 
except for seventeen transmissions368. Mudarrisī believes that these two extreme 
schools were obliged to choose these positions because they did not define the Sunnah 
properly in the first place, and therefore had not differentiated between the constants 
and the variables of the Sunnah. Thus, Mudarrisī chooses to define the Sunnah as the 
sayings, actions and tacit approvals of an infallible holistically, that is to say, not every 
single action of the Prophet’s is the Sunnah verbatim, such as the way in which he 
sleeps, eats, walks, etc. and nor is every word of his the Sunnah, such as words 
exchanged with his wives, friends, enemies etc., but rather his method and principles in 
friendship, for example, holistically embodies the Sunnah.  
For example, in the Qur’an Allah says: “[Prophet], remember when you left your home 
at dawn to assign battle positions to the believers: God hears and knows everything”369. 
In this verse, even though the Prophet went out to the battlefield early in the morning, it 
is not a Sunnah to go to the battlefield in the early morning; it depends on many 
circumstances, but what is the Sunnah is for the leader of the believers to supervise the 
war closely and to be with them370. Bearing that in mind, Mudarrisī distinguishes 
between the Sunnah itself and the applications of the Sunnah. So on the one hand, the 
Sunnah is the abstract principles that have been extracted from the words and actions 
                                            
368 al-Mudarrisī, al-Tashrīʿ al-Islāmī: Manāhijuhu wa Maqāṣiduhu, v. 2, p. 147 
369 The Qur'an: p. 43. 
370 al-Mudarrisī, al-Tashrīʿ al-Islāmī: Manāhijuhu wa Maqāṣiduhu, v. 2, p. 150 
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that the Prophet was saying and doing constantly and frequently, and on the other 
hand, the applications of the Sunnah are his actions and words concerned with 
particular things, which might be determined by their historical contexts371. 
He maintains that there are three reasons to support his argument of defining the 
Sunnah as such. First, the historical and practical juristic treatment of the Sunnah 
proved that jurists rejected the use of some reports (ḥādīth), because they believed 
them to have been restricted to specific circumstances. This is what is known in 
jurisprudential terminology as the real case (al-qaḍiyya al-ḥaqīqiyya) as opposed to the 
case in an event (qaḍiyyah fī wāqiʿiyya). Second, the divisions of the Sunnah (which will 
be discussed below) indicate that some sections of the Sunnah are variable. Finally, the 
characteristic of the evidences of the probative force (ḥujjiyyat) of the Sunnah restricts 
its generalization372. In this point he argues about the obligation of following the Prophet 
(al-taʾassī) and claims that the verse “Indeed, in the messenger of God a good example 
has been set for you for he who seeks God and the last day and thinks constantly about 
God”373 does not conclude that we have to follow the Prophet in every single action. 
Rather, it indicates to following the Prophet in some circumstances. In order to 
strengthen his argument, he discusses the general indication of any action being one of 
permissibility according to what is commonly held in Shīʿī jurisprudence, based on their 
belief that the action only indicates permissibility, not obligation or preference. Here he 
follows Muẓaffar’s argument. His embracing of this view raises the question of whether 
Muslims share common ground with the Prophet when it comes to legal rulings or not, 
i.e. whether the base principle (al-‘aṣl) is that the Sunnah has a generalization, or 
specificity. He concludes that the base principle is that legal rulings do not have a 
generalization. Rather, they are specific to the Prophet, unless there are evidences to 
generalize them to all Muslims374. 
From this demonstration, I would argue that Mudarrisī, in order to establish his theory 
concerning the Sunnah, tactically managed to revive a forgotten topic in the field, 
                                            
371 Ibid. 
372 Ibid. 
373 Qur’an: 21:33 
374 al-Mudarrisī, al-Tashrīʿ al-Islāmī: Manāhijuhu wa Maqāṣiduhu, v. 2, p. 166-71 
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namely the nature of the Prophet’s action. Through the re-examination of this field with 
his maqāṣidī approach, he attempted to establish an understanding of the Sunnah that 
considerably takes historical context into account in order to determine the ḥadīth to its 
circumstances. Simultaneously, this approach enables the jurist to extract the values 
and principles underlying these words and actions. This understanding was established 
through his embracing of the nature of the Prophet’s deeds and their specificity by 
claiming that some of them are confined to their historical circumstances,  and was 
further enriched by epistemological interpretation, the mechanism of the clear and 
ambiguous verses. This approach makes the understanding of the Sunnah consistent 
with making the mechanism of deriving legal rulings purposeful (maqāṣidī), as it enables 
a comprehensive way of studying the reports whereby their treatment does not rely 
heavily on the quantitativeness of the reports’ probative force (ḥujjiya) and nor on the 
linguistic equilibrium. Rather, it relies principally and primarily on the maqāṣid, where 
the factors of the probative force (ḥujjiyya) and the linguistic equilibrium are 
supplementary factors. However, this depends on Mudarrisī's theory of the divisions of 
the Sunnah, which will be discussed below. 
3.4.3. The Divisions of the Sunnah 
Here, I will demonstrate Mudarrisī's theory of divisions of the Sunnah, which is based on 
his definition of the Sunnah. I will also show how he employed and then improved 
Iṣfahānī's theory of the Sunnah to be consistent with his maqāṣidī approach. 
Based on the Prophet’s roles as explained in the Qur’an, Mudarrisī divides the Sunnah 
into five categories. 
1. The exegesis of the revelation (tafsīr al-waḥy): which represents the first role of 
the Prophet375. However, this category, in turn, is represented in three dimensions: 
1.1.  Reciting the revelation (tilāwat al-waḥy): where the Prophet recited the 
revelation to the people as he received it from God376. However, this is not 
                                            
375 Ibid, p 151. 
376 It could be said that reciting the Qur’an is not a part of Sunnah, but is indeed the Qur’an itself. 
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merely a reading. Rather, it is a specific reading within certain events and 
contexts that contribute to the meaning of the revelation. 
1.2.  Witnessing the revelation: by this, he refers to the term “shahāda”, which, in 
this context, means a commitment to and an application of the Sharīʿa in daily 
life, in which the Prophet should be looked upon as the model of religious 
morals, and, therefore, his behaviour is a model of religion. 
1.3.  Exegesis of the revelation (tafsīr al-waḥy): where the Prophet explains the 
content of the revelation to the people. This exegesis includes three main 
aspects: (i) the main values and teachings of the religion and its limitations (al-
ḥudūd), (ii) the rituals (al-shaʿāʾir) (iii) the religion’s teachings regarding the 
hereafter (al-ghaybiyyāt). 
2. The interpretation (taʾwīl) of the revelation: here, it means the application of the 
revelation in reality whether it concerns events or persons. For example, when a 
verse described the attributes of the believer, the Prophet, in order to interpret it, 
would say that ʿAlī, for instance, is the believer. Likewise, this can be applied to the 
concepts of revelation concerning events such as war, peace and so on377. 
3. Purifying people: one of the Prophet’s roles, according to verse 62:2, is to purify 
people, and this is reflected in his sayings and words, as purifying people is not a 
one-off sudden action. It varies from one person to the other, and the words and 
actions of the Prophet are varied even within the one subject matter. Some of his 
words are suitable for some people, whereas others are not. Moreover, purification 
needs to be applied gradually; sometimes the teacher chooses to start from the 
hardest practice, whilst at other times he may prefer to start from easiest one378. 
4. Leading people: the Prophet has a role to be the leader of the community. This 
leadership requires certain attitudes and decisions in specific circumstances, such 
                                            
377 Ibid, p 153. 
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as leading wars or negotiations or extricating a community from economic or social 
problems. These events are reflected in the Sunnah379. 
5. Judgement: one of the Prophet’s roles is to adjudicate between people according to 
the Sharīʿa.380 
This division of the Sunnah raises a critical question in terms of jurisprudence that 
believes in the Sunnah as a sum total: how can jurists, in this case, approach the 
Sunnah in deriving legal rulings? Mudarrisī at this point refers381 to and develops on 
Mīrzā Mahdī al-Iṣfahānī’s theory about the Sunnah. Here, I will provide a summary of 
this theory, and then I will demonstrate how Mudarrisī has improved it in favour of his 
maqāṣidī approach. 
Iṣfahānī provided a theory, which he called 'al-maʿārīḍ’ on how to understand the 
Sunnah. In his view, the nature of communication between people has different aspects; 
sometimes they deliver their ideas or needs explicitly and sometimes implicitly. The 
Prophet and Imāms have said that they sometimes make statements that can be 
interpreted with more than seventy meanings and all of them are correct. This 
phenomenon in the Imāms’ akhbār reflects the innate social phenomenon where people 
are divided into two categories: those who have the capacity to learn and those who are 
ignorant. Aside from the fact that the Prophet and Imāms were perfect in speaking the 
Arabic language and they knew very well the different kinds of communication, their 
mentioning that they use al-taʿārīḍ suggests that we must look at their akhbār in 
different ways. Given that fact, he came to the conclusion that the akhbār of the Imāms 
are divided into two general categories. The first category is instruction (taʿlīm) and the 
other is the issuing of a ruling (iftāʾ). By instruction, he means the main principles taught 
by them through which scholars can derive legal rulings from, so that the Imām, in the 
teaching of the akhbār, is targeting scholars on the one side, and intending to provide 
key elements of the subject on the other. In addition, in the instructive akhbār, it is 
possible and sometimes necessary to accommodate the whole subject and this can be 
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dependent on separated evidence (dalīl munfaṣil). By iftāʿ, he means the legal ruling (or 
an answer about theological issues) provided by the Imām to a certain person in a 
specific circumstance, where the statement of the Imām in this case cannot depend on 
separated evidence, because he does not provide it to the scholar. This classification 
led Iṣfahānī to draw some conclusions that affect the way that the akhbār can be 
understood. He concluded that interpreting any khabar that is in agreement with Sunnīs 
as being a taqiyya (dissimulation), which is the common method in Shīʿī jurisprudence, 
is not always right, because it might be a kind of ‘iftā’. Furthermore, and possibly more 
interesting, is that the iftaʾ reports are not valid for the derivation of legal rulings from, 
and therefore, cannot be used as valid akhbār to outweigh others. The only valid akhbār 
which can be considered as evidence for legal rulings are the instructive akhbār and the 
more the jurist is successful in referring the iftaʾ to the teachings, the more he can 
benefit from them in expanding his understanding of the subject of study. So here again, 
as was mentioned in the Qur’anic section, the mechanism of the principle and the 
detailed, or the clear and ambiguous, appears too but under a different title: the 
instructive and the individual ruling iftaʾ or sometimes, as he called them al-aṣl (the root) 
and al-farʿ (the branch).382 
Iṣfahānī’s thesis seems to have different dimensions. The first is the theological 
dimension in how it sees the role of the Prophet and the Imāms, and their reports, 
therefore, have to be categorized according to this. In addition,in Iṣfahānī's theory of 
sunnah, there is a mixture of hermeneutical concerns with a historical understanding of 
the Prophet and Imāms’ reports.  This distinguished it from contemporary Shīʿī thinking 
on this topic.. Although the motivations of believing in this approach fall out of the 
borders of this study, this approach opens a door for other scholars to question and 
develop a different way to understand the Sunnah. And this is exactly where Mudarrisī 
makes his distinct contribution. He believes that Iṣfahānī provided a unique 
methodology in understanding the Sunnah and broke a static line in Shīʿī thought of 
how to address the Sunnah. However, he also believes that Iṣfahānī’s approach 
reached a dead end as it was not able to answer the question of how to differentiate 
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between these two categories of reports: instructive (taʿlīm) and legislative (iftāʾ). 
Iṣfahānī raised this question in his treatise, but did not provide an answer. Mudarrisī 
believes that reaching this dead end was due to the fact that Iṣfahānī was focusing 
entirely on the field of akhbār and did not open his mind to the Qur’anic field, whereby if 
he had done so, he would have come up with conceptions, theories and mechanisms 
that provided an answer383. Subsequently, he himself attempts to provide a method of 
how to differentiate between these categories by studying the relationship between the 
Sunnah and the Qur’an. 
3.4.4. The Relationship between the Sunnah and the Qur’an 
Here, I describe Mudarrisī’s view concerning the relationship between the Qur’an and 
the Sunnah by providing a detailed example. The example will illustrate this relationship 
in addition to the process of drawing a connection between them. 
Mudarrisī strongly believes that the Sunnah is a commentary of the Qur’an in which the 
Qur’an has a centrality and dominance over the Sunnah. Accordingly, he conceives the 
relationship between the Qur’an and the Sunnah to be like the relationship between the 
parts of a tree, as he took this metaphorical image from the Qur’an itself. The main 
components of a tree are the roots, the trunk, the branches and the fruit. The 
relationship between them is in a vertical hierarchy where the root comes before others. 
It is, however, possible to have many trunks at the same time and likewise with the 
branches. Similarly, with the Qur’an and Sunnah, there are the clear verses (muḥkamāt) 
in the Qur’an, which are the reference points of the ambiguous verses (mutashābihāt); 
and likewise, in the Sunnah there are the clear points (muḥkamāt) and ambiguous 
points (mutashābihāt). The clear points of the Sunnah are a commentary on the clear 
parts of the Qur’an and, simultaneously they are, also reference points for the 
ambiguous points (mutashābihāt) in the Sunnah. The Qur’anic clear verses represent 
the branches, which might have other branches underneath, and the clear points of the 
Sunnah too represent branches that fork out from the Qur’anic one. Legal rulings 
represent the fruits, whilst the theological and moral foundations represent the roots and 
trunk. Discovering the Qur’anic clear verses and being successful in applying them to 
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the ambiguous verses (mutashābihāt) will lead to a successful discovery of the 
Sunnah’s clear points, which will then refer to its ambiguous points (mutashābihāt). 
Nevertheless, each clear point (muḥkam) has another clear point above it and another 
below it, and sometimes one clear point can generate several other clear points that 
have related ambiguous points (mutashābihāt). Thus, in order for the jurist to derive a 
legal ruling, he has to undertake certain steps. These are: studying the clear points 
(muḥkamāt), studying the Qur’anic legal examples of those clear points and studying 
the clear points (muḥkamāt) in the ḥadīth and its details. According to Mudarrisī, this 
process solves Iṣfahānī’s dead end, rebuilds the relationship between the Qur’an and 
the Sunnah and enables the legal system to deal with new cases based on the 
maqāṣidī approach.384 
A detailed example of this process can be provided, based mainly on Mudarrisī’s 
writing, which he provided as an illustration of the process of referring the furūʿ back to 
the principles in his uṣūlī work.385 Mudarrisī provides an example of the general principle 
in Islam called the rule of hardship (al-ḥaraj). In order to follow the steps that he 
mentioned previously, he starts off with what he believes to be the clear verse 
(muḥkam) regarding hardship, which says: 
“And strive for Allah with the striving due to Him. He has chosen you and has 
not placed upon you in the religion any difficulty. [It is] the religion of your 
father, Abraham. Allah named you " Strive hard for God as is His due: He has 
chosen you and placed no hardship in your religion, the faith of your 
forefather Abraham. God has called you Muslimsb ––both in the past and in 
this [message]––so that the Messenger can bear witness about you and so 
that you can bear witness about other people. So keep up the prayer, give 
the prescribed alms, and seek refuge in God: He is your protector––an 
excellent protector and an excellent helper”386. 
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Mudarrisī argues that this verse discusses the bestowals that Allah had granted Prophet 
Muḥammad’s nation (ummah), one of which being that Allah has not placed any 
hardship for them therein. Therefore, the absence of hardship is the clear fact extracted 
from the above clear verse about Allah’s bestowals. This clear verse has implications in 
the legal field, and subsequently some examples have to be mentioned in the Qur’an. 
Here, Mudarrisī goes through the second step, which is to search for the Qur’anic legal 
applications of that clear verse, which are in effect the ambiguous verses 
(mutashābihāt). Here, he mentions the verse of purification, which says: 
“You who believe, when you are about to pray, wash your faces and your 
hands up to the elbows, wipe your heads, wash your feet up to the ankles 
and, if required, a wash your whole body. If any of you is sick or on a journey, 
or has just relieved himself, or had intimate contact with a woman, and can 
find no water, then take some clean sand and wipe your face and hands with 
it. God does not wish to place any burden on you: He only wishes to cleanse 
you and perfect His blessing on you, so that you may be thankful”387. 
According to Mudarrisī, in this verse the Qur’an provides a legal application of the 
principle of non-hardship, which is dry ablution (tayammum). Additionally, the verse 
mentions the grounds for dry ablution, which are illness, travel and lack of water, as well 
as their pretexts, being any kind of impure bodily excretion and being filthy. 
The principle alone in its general form would not be enough for the jurist to derive a 
legal ruling, as it is not clear how it works, though some applications have been 
provided. Here is where the role of the Sunnah as a commentary to the Qur’an comes 
into play, and this is the third step in Mudarrisī’s suggested process. By referring to the 
Sunnah, there are many reports concerning the rulings of tayammum dealing with 
several detailed questions. For example, how much effort has to be spent in searching 
for water? For the ill person, to what extent is harm considered an excuse for doing 
tayammum instead of wuḍūʾ? Are there other justifications for doing tayammum in 
addition to those mentioned in the Qur’an? According to Mudarrisī, by referring these 
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reports back to the Qur’an and by considering the principle of non-hardship as a clear 
verse (muḥkam), the jurist is easily able to deal with the reports and find a solution for 
those reports that appear contradictory.  
For the first question, there are various reports with contrasting content regarding the 
effort that needs to be exerted. One report says that the person should take a risk and 
try to search for water even though it might take considerable time and effort. In keeping 
with this, other reports emphasize that the person should even spend money, 
regardless of cost, to buy water to do wuḍū’ with, and therefore, the scope of the excuse 
becomes very limited. On the other hand, there are some reports that cite the Imām as 
having told a person who was very close to a well that he does not need to exert effort 
in bringing water from the well. Alongside this, another report mentions the Imām as 
having told someone else not to even spend time in the quest for water whilst he was 
travelling. Mudarrisī’s point here is that by referring these reports back to the Qur’an, 
especially to the verse of hardship as a clear verse, we know that the principle in all 
these cases is being in state of hardship, and that the situation varies from one person 
to another. Subsequently, the reports vary in their response to each individual’s 
question in accordance with his/her situation. Moreover, studying these reports, which 
have many cases for legal rulings, both clarifies the Qur’anic principle and lifts away the 
contradiction between the reports. It is a back and forth dialectical process. 
The fourth step now is to deal with new cases that the jurist must confront in reality. 
According to Mudarrisī, going through the suggested process step-by-step allows the 
jurist to refer new cases back to the principle of non-hardship, even if there be no 
specific text referring exactly to that particular case. 
In addition to the above, Mudarrisī believes that discovering a Qur’anic principle, e.g. 
non-hardship, is an opportunity for further discovery of other principles which are 
relevant. For example, by considering non-hardship as a clear verse and therefore, 
generating a principle thereby, allows us to consider another principle, previously 
mentioned and which is relevant to the area of non-hardship, as a sub-principle of a 
clear verse. By doing this, the jurist manages to establish the limits of the other sub-
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principles, such as the principle of harm (al-ḍarar) as well as difficulty (al-ʿusr). Then, by 
going through the same process which had been executed with non-hardship, each of 
these principles are then clarified in detail and eventually the whole field of emergency 
rulings, as Mudarrisī called it388, can be defined. 
3.4.5. Conclusions 
Mudarrisī began establishing his theory about the Sunnah by redefining the conception 
of the Sunnah. His revision of the definition of the Sunnah is based on reviving a 
forgotten area in Shīʿī jurisprudential scholarship, namely the nature of the Prophet and 
Imāms’ actions. This led him, with some theological bases, to divide the Sunnah into 
several categories, some of which are constants and others variables. He further refined 
his categorization through a theoretical proposition furnished by a contemporary Shīʿī 
scholar Mīrzā Mahdī al-Iṣfahānī. However, he believed that Iṣfahānī’s theory had 
reached a dead end as it had not been able to provide a clear method to differentiate 
between these categories. This is attributed, according to Mudarrisī, to the fact that 
Iṣfahānī was focusing on the Sunnah (akhbār), whereas the key solutions are to be 
found by approaching the issue through the Qur’an. Therefore, he provided what he 
thought to be a method of differentiation between these categories where the Sunnah is 
a commentary of the Qur’an. 
Whilst Shīʿī jurisprudential discussions regarding the Sunnah, especially the 
Bahbahānian paradigm, were mainly concerned with discussion on the 
authoritativeness (ḥujjiyya), and, therefore, scholars were considerably preoccupied 
with issues such as khabar al-wāḥid, Mudarrisī, in contrast, did not pay any attention to 
this matter. Rather, being occupied with his maqāṣidī project, he devoted his efforts to 
developing an understanding of the Sunnah in relation to maqāṣid al-sharīʿa. Thus, he 
paid attention to semantic issues and to the relationships between the Sunnah and 
other pieces of legal evidence, especially the Qur’an, as discussed above. This 
supports the argument of this chapter, viewing the post-Bahbahānian paradigm as 
concerned with the function of jurisprudence more than with the legitimacy or 
authoritativeness of the jurisprudential process (al-ḥujjiyya).  It was the latter which was 
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the centre of the methodological framework of the Bahbahānian paradigm. Furthermore, 
by establishing this relationship between the Qur’an and the Sunnah, where the Qur’an 
is positioned at the very top of the jurisprudential sources and the Sunnah becomes 
mainly complementary, and functions as a commentary to it, Mudarrisī challenges the 
current jurisprudential hierarchy of legal sources. For the Bahbahānian paradigm, the 
epistemological value of the texts of the Qur’an and the Sunnah are quite similar, where 
they are regarded as one text where hermeneutical tools are applied equally to both of 
them. Thus, although the vertical hierarchical order of the sources, beginning with the 
Qur’an can sometimes be seen, in effect they are ordered horizontally side by side. For 
Mudarrisī, the vertical hierarchical order is firmly established by positioning the Qur’an 
at the top and subsequently supplemented by hermeneutical tools to maintain the 
hierarchy. The ramifications of such an establishment will be seen when Mudarrisī’s 
theory of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa is discussed later on.389 
3.5. Consensus (ijmāʿ) 
Here, I will address briefly Mudarrisī’s view regarding one of most debatable matters in 
Shīʿī jurisprudence, namely consensus (ijmāʿ). Similar to the previous sections, I will 
begin with the general context of the issue in the Sunni tradition, and then in the Shīʿī 
tradition in order to effectively allocate Mudarrisī’s own position within it. Along with the 
main argument of this chapter, that Mudarrisī’s is considered to be a departure from the 
methodological framework of the Bahbahānian paradigm, as well as an attempt to adapt 
the classic jurisprudential tools and theories in favour of his maqāṣidī project, I will 
demonstrate how he has done the same with ijmāʿ. 
3.5.1. Historical Overview of Consensus (ijmāʿ) in the Sunnī 
Jurisprudential Tradition 
The first emergence of consensus as an intellectual as well as a jurisprudential issue 
needing legitimate justification came with Ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī in his Risāla. In al-Shāfiʿī’s 
view, the concept of consensus was most concerned with the ways of knowing the 
Sunnah of the Prophet. Therefore, it overlapped with the discussion of tawātur. The 
question he posed was whether the consensus of the Prophet’s companions on an 
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action be a way of discovering the Sunnah of the Prophet? However, a few centuries 
later, the discussion shifted in other directions and extended to many different matters. 
These discussions revolved around a central theme: is consensus a separate legal 
source or it is merely a subsidiary deductive evidence for the Sunnah? Is valid 
consensus one that has been agreed upon in a specific place such as Madina or the 
two centres of Kufa and Basra, or should it be a consensus agreed upon by the entire 
Muslim community (ummah)? Does consensus include the whole community or is it only 
restricted to scholars or conveners (ahl al-ḥall wa-l-ʿaqd)? Is it possible in reality for 
consensus to actually occur? Has it really occurred as such? What if some scholars 
remained silent? Is their silence considered as supportive of consensus or they are 
considered to be breaking it? Can consensus be justified by reason (al-ʿaql) or are its 
evidences only textual? All these issues were [and still are] matters of debate amongst 
Sunni scholars. Moreover, the analytical reading of the historical context and the 
motivation behind the emergence of consensus has been the focus of attention for 
many scholars.390 
3.5.2. A Historical Overview of Consensus in the Shīʿī Jurisprudential 
Tradition 
From the textual sources at our disposal, the first emergence of consensus in Shīʿī 
jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh) seems to have been in the Baghdad school with al-Shaykh 
al-Mufīd (d. 1022). There is no reference to the matter in the second main Shīʿī centre 
of learning at that time, Qum. There were some references to the concept of consensus 
in the discussion on how to deal with conflicting transmissions (akhbār) as well as in 
some theological dialogues, but the concept was more about the majority of opinions 
(al-shuhra) than about consensus, which came to be point of discussion later on in the 
period of al-Mufīd. The Shīʿī attitude towards ijmāʿ, which was theoretically established 
by al-Mufīd and elaborated by al-Murtaḍā (d. 1045), can be summarized by the 
statement of al- Murtaḍā: 
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“The action of the Infallible has a probative force (ḥujjiyya), but not the 
actions of others alongside him. There is no probative force (ḥujjiyya) to an 
action carried out by a group, wherein the inclusion of the Infallible is 
unknown, and nor does it have probative force (ḥujjiyya) if the Infallible is 
excluded.”391 
This attitude has been the standard Shīʿī opinion since the fourth century up until now. 
The only change that happened lay in the extension of the debate and the ways of 
discovering the utterance of the Imām within ijmāʿ. That is to say, Shīʿī scholars have 
agreed that the essential idea behind accepting ijmāʿ as a valid source of legal evidence 
is that it must include the utterance of the Imām. This raises a question about how we 
can possibly know whether the Imām was there amongst the agreed opinion. Moreover, 
they asked on which grounds these ways of discovering the Imām’s opinion could be 
justified. These two questions have dominated most of Shīʿī jurisprudential discussions 
regarding consensus. With al-Shaykh al-Anṣārī the discussions became even more 
restricted to transferred ijmāʿ (al-ijmāʿ al-manqūl). Notwithstanding, Shīʿī scholars have 
discussed some matters that have, over time, come to be considereda part of ijmāʿ, that 
is, the majority in opinion or the majority in transmission (al-shuhra al-fatwāʾiyya and al-
shuhra al-riwāʾiyya). In these matters too, the common Shīʿī view is that these tools are 
valid as long as they reflect and include the opinion of the Imām. 
3.5.3. Mudarrisī’s View of Consensus 
Mudarrisī stands alongside the common Shīʿī attitude towards consensus, which rejects 
consensus as a valid source of legal evidence unless the Imām is included within it.392 
However, he notices that although in theory Shīʿī scholars reject consensus, in practice 
when they derive legal rulings they use it considerably. In attempting to analyze this 
phenomenon, he suggests that there are several factors that have led to the emergence 
of this phenomenon. On the one hand, it is common for the real practice of a field of 
knowledge to usually be more developed than its theoretical bases. The same thing can 
be said about the relationship between fiqh and uṣūl. Scholars in fiqh dealing with real 
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evidences and cases that necessarily make them more developed rather than solely 
abstracting concepts and theories as they might do in uṣūl. Therefore, they may find 
that they are in need of tools such as ijmāʿ. On the other hand, the inclination towards 
using ijmāʿ in fiqh might reflect a psychosocial dimension of human beings where the 
scholar does not want to be alone in adopting a different opinion to the rest. This might 
also be an explanation of why some scholars who reject consensus have attempted to 
strengthen the probative force (ḥujjiyya) of the majority opinion (al-shuhra al-fatwāʾiyya) 
instead. Whatever the reasons behind this ironic phenomenon, in the final analysis, the 
common Shīʿī attitude towards consensus has been to reject it on a theoretical level.393 
Having said that, Mudarrisī believes that the main misleading point in the whole 
discussion of ijmāʿ is attributable to the position that it has been allocated in 
jurisprudence. That is to say, from the beginning ijmāʿ was a practical tool for the Islamic 
community (ummah) to reach collective agreement regarding societal issues that they 
were faced with as a community. In other words, it was one element of the shūrā 
system. However, later on it was moved from being a tool used to deal with socio-
political variables to become a source of legal evidence for the field of constants in 
Islamic law. Subsequently, the legitimacy of ijmāʿ for this status could not stand up 
against the sharp criticisms from scholars. Therefore, according to him, the best and 
most valid place for ijmāʿ within the mechanism of deriving legal rulings should be 
restricted to variable rulings. In this sense, ijmāʿ is a tool for the jurists of the Islamic 
community through which they can reach a collective agreement on the issues of the 
variables relevant to societal matters. Examples of these societal matters are decisions 
of war and peace, approval of the general policy regarding economic resolutions and so 
on394. 
Later on, when I address395 Mudarrisī’s theory regarding the system of maqāṣid al-
sharīʿa, I will study in more detail the role of ijmāʿ and its relationship with the concept of 
the guardianship of the jurist (wilāyat al-faqīh). For the sake of this section, here are 
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some comments and conclusions. First, it seems that Mudarrisī has not rejected ijmāʿ in 
totality the same way that Shīʿī scholars have typically done so. Rather, he seems to be 
accepting something closer to a Sunnī concept of ijmāʿ as an administrative or 
governmental mechanism for collective decision-making. Examining Mudarrisī’s work, 
one can see that he has indeed consulted many Sunnī sources, especially those with 
maqāṣidī tendencies such as ʿAllāl al-Fāsī (d. 1974), who actually held the same idea. 
This might support the conclusion that Mudarrisī, as a part of Shīʿī reformist tendency, 
was forced to open his mind to the Sunnī experience in order to benefit from it and to 
adapt it with Shīʿī establishments. Secondly, Mudarrisī with his maqāṣidī project 
attempts to find a different category for legal evidence that does not rely exclusively on 
the epistemological level as it had done so with the Bahbahānian paradigm. Rather, his 
category mainly depends on the category of values, whereby some of them are 
constant and therefore evidences for the same, and others are variable and 
subsequently act as evidence for their like, in turn. Ijmāʿ, in this context, is classified in 
the second category. This point will be discussed in more detail later on. Thirdly, in 
establishing jurisprudential methodology, Mudarrisī seems to be more concerned with 
establishing the sort of evidence that has a collective and societal nature to it in terms of 
mechanism for derivation of rulings and making legal sense, as we shall see in more 
detail in the next chapter. 
3.6. Conclusion 
The above detailed analysis demonstrates that, comparing the Bahbahānian paradigm 
and Mudarrisī’s paradigm, what is the central core of one paradigm becomes peripheral 
for the other and vice versa. However, it is not simply a mere change in position, but 
also a shift from one world-view to another in a way that the change of position 
generates a new package of theoretical and hermeneutical tools. 
Whilst the Bahbahānian paradigm was epistemologically concerned with the duality of 
the certain (qaṭʿ) and the speculative (ẓann), and sought to establish legal evidences 
based on certainty, Mudarrisī is more concerned with a practical method of knowledge 
that can open more possibilities for the jurist to acquire religious knowledge as much as 
possible. Moreover, whilst the Bahbahānian paradigm, through its epistemological 
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restrictions, made a quietist out of the jurist as a result of the limits of the scope of his 
agency, Mudarrisī’s flexible epistemology allows the jurist to be ambitious and active by 
virtue of the wide scope that he can interact with. 
As for methodological stances, whilst the central concern of the Bahbahānian paradigm 
was authoritativeness (al-ḥujjiyya), which formalised most of the jurisprudential debates 
regarding legal evidences, Mudarrisī’s central methodological concern is the content of 
the sources. This has forced him, as was demonstrated in the chapter, to re-analyse 
what were deemed to be mere semantic tools within the Bahbahānian paradigm - such 
as interpretation (taʾwīl), the exoteric (al-ẓāhir), the esoteric (al-bāṭin), the clear (al-
muḥkam), and the ambiguous (al-mutashābih), as well obsolete enquiries, such as the 
division of the Sunnah and the actions of the Prophet to serve as epistemological 
purposive tools used to understand the main sources, namely the Qur’an and the 
Sunnah. In addition, this has led him to reconstruct the hierarchy of legal sources 
according to their theological status and content, where the Qur’an is assertively placed 
at the top, followed by the Sunnah, rather than constructing them side by side according 
to their semantic values. 
These differences in terms of epistemology and methodology between the Bahbahānian 
paradigm and Mudarrisī’s have been the subject matter of this whole chapter. In brief, 
Mudarrisī’s approach is a departure from the Bahbahānian paradigm both 
epistemologically and methodologically. In the next chapter, I will investigate Mudarrisī’s 
theories regarding the issues of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa, aiming to show how his insights are 
also a departure in terms of the functional framework of the Bahbahānian paradigm. 
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4. Chapter Four 
Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿa: The Nature of the Sharīʿa 
 
4.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the central argument postulated was that Mudarrisī, by calling 
for maqāṣid al-sharīʿa, had departed from the epistemological and methodological 
framework of the Bahbahānian paradigm. This chapter continues this emphasis, with 
particular focus on Mudarrisī’s departure from the functional framework. In addition, and 
in light of the above, the current chapter both analyzes and establishes the theoretical 
foundations of Mudarrisī’s theory of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa. The main argument at this 
stage is that the Bahbahānian paradigm ended up with a soft utilitarian functional 
framework, as was earlier discussed, in which common interest (al-maṣlaḥa) became 
the central discourse.396 Mudarrisī, on the other hand, departed from this framework, 
turning to a moral values discourse as the functional framework by calling for maqāṣid 
al-sharīʿa. To demonstrate this framework, I will discuss Mudarrisī’s view regarding the 
nature of the Sharīʿa, which defines its functions. This will lead to several theoretical 
discussions that will show how the moral values discourse became the core of his 
functional framework. 
4.2.  The Nature of the Sharīʿa 
Although terminological discussions are important and, in effect, crucial at times in 
Islamic studies, Mudarrisī seems to not pay this aspect much attention. Instead, he 
appears to be more concerned with conceptual aspects than with terminological 
discussions. Therefore, he does not spend time distinguishing between the terms 
sharīʿa, fiqh and qānūn (law). Rather, he sometimes uses them interchangeably. Having 
said that, he theoretically differentiates between three main fields: theology (kalām or 
philosophy), ethics (akhlāq) and Sharīʿa. However, he argues that the way in which 
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these fields are studied in Islamic religious institutions makes them separate and 
incoherent fields; whereas he believes that religion is a general frame that includes 
theology (which is an equivalent field to theoretical reasoning discussions in 
philosophy), ethics (ʾakhlāq) (which is an equivalent field to the social and practical 
reasoning discussions in philosophy) and Sharīʿa (fiqh) (which is an equivalent field to 
the philosophy of law and law in modern Western discourse).397 Mudarrisī argues that 
although these fields are separate when they are studied for practical and realistic 
reasons, they are interrelated in such a way that each one affects the other. In his view, 
even if they are separated in any other tradition, it is quite difficult, if not impossible, for 
them to be separated in the Islamic tradition398. 
Based on this account of religion and what it constituent parst (namely, theology, ethics 
and law), Mudarrisī argues that the Sharīʿa is a representation of the theological and 
moral contents of religion in the practical life of Muslims, both individually and socially. 
Taking into account the belief in the validity of Islam for all times and places as the final 
message from God, it is not surprising to observe that Mudarrisī believes in two broad 
categories in the Sharīʿa which make it a timeless system. These two categories are 
“constants” (al-thawābit) and “variables” (al-mutaghayyirāt). It is also not surprising that 
he holds this belief since the idea of constants and variables has been a notable 
discourse in Islamic thought generally and in Shīʿī discourse in particular over the past 
four decades as a way of dealing with the modern age.399 Though the idea has been 
discussed from different angles and aspects and for several motivations, it is a notable 
discourse amongst Shīʿī scholars. However, what is of interest here is to see how 
Mudarrisī addresses this idea, i.e. how it fits in with his maqāṣidī project and, above all, 
how he defines these concepts differently from other thinkers. 
4.2.1. The Constants (thawābit) of the Sharīʿa 
                                            
397 Muḥammad Taqī Mudarrisī, al-Tashrīʿ al-Islāmī: Manāhijuhu wa Maqāṣiduhu, 10 vols (Tehran: Dār intishārāt 
Mudarrisī, 1993), v. 3, p..13 
398 Ibid. p. 14 
399 The idea that in Islam there are constants and variables seems to be a notable discourse in Islamic thought both 
amongst Shīʿī and Sunnī scholars. For a detailed account of those scholars’ ideas, see: Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Qādir al-
Najjār, al-Masāḥa al-maftūḥa fī al-Tashrīʿ  al-Islāmī,  (Beirut Dār al-Maḥajjat al-Bayḍāʾ, 2013) 
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The concept of “constants” in Islamic thought has been discussed from different 
perspectives and for various motivations. In the Shīʿī context, some scholars have 
discussed it in the framework of the religion as a whole, motivated by showing the 
flexibility of Islamic thought and focused on the notion of natural religion as one way of 
dealing with the question of the validity of Islam.400 Other scholars have discussed the 
issue from an epistemological perspective, motivated by recent theological debate on 
the constancy and/or changing of religious knowledge.401 Yet other scholars have 
discussed the issue from a legal aspect motivated by the validity of Islam, not only as an 
ideological system, but also as an applied legal system that is compatible with the 
modern age.402 In each of these perspectives, the concept of the constant is different 
depending on the angle through which the issue is addressed. That is to say, from a 
general religious perspective, the concept is more about the theological and moral 
content with some legal content, though the legal aspect would be of less concern. 
However, from an epistemological perspective, the concept of the constant is mainly 
based on the form and degree of religious evidence epistemologically, and then the 
discussions proceed to issues of certainty and its relevant debates. In the Sunnī 
context, the ‘constants-variables’ discourse has also been discussed in contemporary 
discussions. It can be found in the works of al-Ṭāhir ibn ʿĀshūr403 with firmly similar 
motivations of that of the Shīʿīs. 
Mudarrisī addressed the concept from a purely legal perspective, motivated by the 
capacity of Islam as a legal system to be applicable in the modern age, as already 
mentioned. Consequently, he begins addressing the issue by asking a philosophical 
legal question, i.e. why do some parts of the law have to be constant? Having provided 
his answer to that question, he attempts to define the concept of the constant on three 
levels: (i) providing the method of discovering the constants; (ii) providing the 
philosophical theoretical worldview of the concept of the constant and, finally, (iii) 
                                            
400 Muḥammad Ḥussain al-Ṭabāṭabā’ī, I would argue, is considered within this category. See ibid. pp. 237-45 
401 Mālik Wahbī al-Āmīlī, I would argue, is considered within this category. See Mālik Wahbī al-Āmilī, Dawr al- ʿAql fī 
Tashkīl al-Maʿrifa al-Dīniyya,  (Beirut: Dār al-Hādī, 2008) 
402 Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr, I would argue, is considered within this category. See al-Najjār, al-Masāḥa al-Maftūḥa fī 
al-Tashrīʿ  al-Islāmī, pp. 215-36 
403 Ṭāhir ibn ʿĀshūr, Maqāṣid al-Sharīʾa, 2nd ed. (Jordan Dār al-Nafāʾis, 2001), pp. 251-67 
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opening actual philosophical debates with several schools of thought both in ethics and 
in legal philosophy on constant values. Whilst the philosophical legal question and the 
first two levels will be discussed here, the third level will briefly be mentioned here and 
will be addressed in detail as part of the next chapter. 
4.2.1.1. Why does the Law Have to Include Constants? 
The question of the inclusion of constants in the law is associated with the field of 
philosophy of law in contemporary literature, which is in fact a mixture of moral, social 
and political investigation. According to Mudarrisī’s understanding, there is a common 
convention among legal philosophers that law has to be characterized by constancy for 
two main reasons, notwithstanding their disagreement about the purposes of the law.404 
First, the law has to be constant for the security and stability of society405, for if the law 
was to change quickly and did not have constant parts, it would make people unable to 
anticipate their future and subsequently unable to plan for their interests. Moreover, 
without constancy of law, people would not even be able to protect themselves, since 
the law, which defines their rights and duties, would be changeable, and this in turn 
would lead to a society that is insecure. Second, the constancy of the law will make the 
law a custom of society in the long-term, which in turn makes the law easily applicable 
and implemented. Otherwise, if the law were easily changeable, it would disrupt the 
motivation of individuals and social parties of society to implement the law.406 
Mudarrisī agrees with the necessity of the constancy of the law and the reasons given 
for it. However, he attempts to provide Islamic grounds for this necessity by asking what 
Islam has established as the constant part of the law. He suggests three Islamic 
principles that secure the constant part of the law. First, Islam considers some moral 
values as fixed and constant and that cannot be changed whatsoever, such as justice, 
peace, honesty and so forth.407 The way in which these values have been established 
as fixed ones will be discussed elsewhere in this thesis408. Second, Islam considers 
                                            
404 Mudarrisī, al-Tashrīʿ al-Islāmī: Manāhijuhu wa Maqāṣiduhu, v. 2, p. 222 
405 Ibid. p. 223 
406 Ibid. p. 225 
407 Ibid. p. 226 
408 See on page 207. 
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right or the truth (al-ḥaqq) to be the centre and foundation of many regulations and 
ruling issues, and not people’s desires and interest.409 Third, by confining legislation to 
Allah, Mudarrisī argues that Islam secures the law - as a main body - as constant. The 
principle of ijtihād is that the jurist attempts to discover the divine rulings, through his 
best effort coupled with the highest level of piety; otherwise, it would be a dereliction of 
his duty and he would be considered as a liar by Allah. This builds a significant distance 
between the jurist and the divine law, which can secure the law from being manipulated 
by the jurist’s desires or interests.410 Through these three principles, Mudarrisī argues 
that Islam has established a ground for the constancy of the law. 
In light of the above, it can be argued that Mudarrisī discusses the issue of the 
necessity of the constancy of the law from a legal philosophical perspective by focusing 
on stability, security and implementation. On the contrary, other Shīʿī scholars (e.g. 
Muḥammad Ḥussain al-Ṭabāṭabā’ī and Mālik Wahbī al-Āmīlī) have discussed it from a 
purely philosophical perspective by focusing on natural religion. Moreover, Mudarrisī 
insists on providing an Islamic perspective regarding the issue. This might suggest that 
other scholars are in a defensive position to show the validity of Islam, whereas 
Mudarrisī, having already taken the validity of Islam for granted, takes a more 
constructive stance in building a theory regarding the nature of the Sharīʿa. 
4.2.1.2. What is the Method of Discovering the Constants of the Sharīʿa? 
As was discussed earlier, in Mudarrisī’s epistemology411, he always tends to think about 
and address the issue dynamically and in a complex way rather than confining himself 
to one factor in constructing an idea or theory. Likewise, he does not believe that there 
is only one method through which the constants of the Sharīʿa can be discovered. 
Rather, he thinks that there should be several methods, which collectively reflect 
different aspects and dimensions of reality in order to achieve coherence and 
equilibrium. These dimensions are reason (al-ʿaql), revelation (al-waḥy) and reality (al-
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410 Ibid.p. 228 
411 See on page 132. 
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wāqiʿ). In his view, by combining these three dimensions, we achieve a coherent view of 
the constants of the Sharīʿa.412 
Mudarrisī uses the term 'ʿaql – reason' to include moral intuition (al-fiṭra), independent 
rational indicators (al-mustaqillāt al-ʿaqliyya) as well as reason’s capacity for grasping, 
differentiating, understanding and so forth. Through this one word, he intends the moral 
and rational capacity of reason.413 Mudarrisī uses the term 'waḥy – revelation' to refer to 
the clear moral principles that have been mentioned in the sacred texts, i.e. the Qur’an 
and the Sunnah.414 By 'al-wāqiʿ – reality', he implies the induction and careful reading of 
human moral experiences in different religions and systems of thought.415 These human 
moral experiences, in his view, can be found in the fields of legal philosophy, history, 
moral philosophy and social philosophy. Thus, any mature method of seeking to 
discover the constants of the sharīʿa has be aware of how to combine these three 
methods. 
Mudarrisī here seems to be thinking out loud or wanting the reader to share his 
intellectual journey of discovering the constants; or at least he looks like he wants to be 
honest in expressing exactly how he is going to go about discovering the constants, 
since the method that he provided here is precisely what he seeks out to undertake. 
Compared to other Shīʿī scholars who dealt with the subject of the constants and 
variables, Mudarrisī seems to be the only one who, not only suggests several things as 
being constants of the Sharīʿa, but also provides a method for discovering these 
constants. Others tend to only address the issue from a philosophical perspective by 
providing the main principles of differentiating between each category, but without 
providing a method of how to discover the constants or variables in each category. This 
point will be clarified throughout this chapter.  
4.2.1.3. A Theoretical Worldview of the Constants of Sharīʿa  
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Mudarrisī, like many Muslim scholars of his generation, (and this might be a common 
understanding of Muslim scholars generally) believes that the field of sharīʿa/fiqh is a 
consequence of a theological and moral attitude. Having said that, Muslim scholars 
obviously differ in how they theorize this relationship and some of them might not even 
be concerned with theorizing it. Mudarrisī is concerned with providing a theoretical 
worldview of the relationship between theology and morality on the one hand and 
sharīʿa/fiqh on the other. Unlike other scholars, who have dealt with the issue of the 
constants and variables, Mudarrisī, through theorizing this relationship, has specified 
the location of the constants in the architecture of this worldview. 
Mudarrisī sees the world as created by Allah through His most beautiful Names 
(asmāʾuhu al-ḥusnā), and therefore every part of the world includes a complex element 
of these beautiful Names. Moreover, each beautiful Name reflects a cosmological rule 
(sunnah kawniyya) in both the physical and the social world. For example, his wisdom is 
reflected in the well-organized nature of the physical world and likewise his justice is 
reflected in the eventual victory of the vulnerable people over the oppressors. Now, 
each of these cosmological rules reflects “forms/types of wisdoms” (ḥikma) or values 
(qiyam). These constitute the moral principles of the legal issues in the sharīʿa. 
Previously I mentioned Mudarrisī's hermeneutical methods of how to discover these 
values and derive legal rulings from them.416 However, what is interesting here is that 
Mudarrisī believes that these wisdoms or values are the constants of the sharīʿa. 
Proceeding from Allah’s cosmological rules in the human, society and history, and 
from His complete knowledge of all their dimensions, Allah has legislated legal 
rules for us and called them wisdoms. These proceed from His cosmological rule 
in the natural and human world. Also, these wisdoms do not change”. 
These wisdoms are the background of the rulings of sharīʿa, the wisdom of 
respecting the human, e.g. his/her life, property, honour and dignity, the wisdom of 
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security, justice and charity, rejecting pre-Islamic fanaticism, the closest to Allah 
being the most pious, and the wisdom of praying and zakāt417. 
In addition, Mudarrisī believes that there are two other categories of constants within the 
sharīʿa. Though these are parts of wisdoms and values, Mudarrisī places extra 
emphasis on them. The first of these are the rituals of Islam418, but not necessarily what 
is known in the field as acts of “worship” in jurisprudential books.419 Instead, he means 
the purely ritualistic part of Islam, including prayers, fasting, pilgrimage and the places 
of worship (by which he means the mosques and shrines). He sees these as the social 
identity of the Muslim community that symbolizes the unity of the Muslim community.420 
The second category includes those legal rulings that are termed in the Qur’an as the 
‘ḥudūd’ – ‘limits’. Interestingly, however, Mudarrisī here does not mean the 
jurisprudential field of ḥudūd - limits, which basically deal with punitive measures. 
Instead, he argues that the ḥudūd that are mentioned in the Qur’an are concerned with 
legal rulings relevant to family law, namely, marriage, divorce, inheritance and such 
matters. So, in Mudarrisī’s view, punitive measures are not part of the constants of the 
sharīʿa. 
To sum up, Mudarrisī’s worldview is that the essence of the sharīʿa is moral principles 
(wisdoms or values) and these moral principles are reflections of Allah’s cosmological 
laws, which are in turn, reflections of Allah’s most beautiful Names. Moreover, these 
moral principles in addition to the rituals and ḥudūd, which includes family law, are the 
constants of the sharīʿa. 
In light of the above review, one can gather that amongst Shīʿī scholars who have dealt 
with the issue of constants and variables, Mudarrisī seems to be the only one who does 
not simply differentiate between them by considering the field of worship (al-ʿibādāt) as 
constants and the field of transactions (al-muʿāmalāt) as variables. Instead, he only 
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418 Ibid. p. 282 
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deems values, rituals and family law as constants. This has an effect on his concept of 
the variables, as we shall see421. 
4.2.1.4. A Practical Thesis Plan to Discover the Values of the Sharīʿa 
Having determined the methods of discovering the constants of the sharīʿa in addition to 
providing a worldview of religion which specifies the position of the constants, 
particularly moral values, Mudarrisī also provides a practical thesis plan to discover the 
values of the sharīʿa. As mentioned above, providing such a thesis plan, which was 
actually mentioned several times in his work, seems to indicate that Mudarrisī was 
thinking out loud: that he wanted the reader to share with him in his intellectual journey 
or at least he wanted to elucidate what his project was. 
Mudarrisī’s thesis plan claims that any project aiming to discover the constant values of 
the sharīʿa must be undertaken in two steps. First, there should be a dialogue with the 
different traditions of moral philosophy on the one hand, and legal philosophy on the 
other. By carrying out this dialogue, a mature theory of value can be achieved, which 
would then constitute the essence of the values of sharīʿa.422 This mature theory can 
then be understood as constituting the purposes of the sharīʿa (i.e. the maqāṣid).  
Secondly, the values of Islamic thought need to be determined, giving the Qur’an an 
intellectual centrality, and these need then to be linked to the values as determined by 
the dialogue between moral and legal philosophy. It is this, rather sketchy, procedure 
that Mudarrisī then aims to follow 423. 
Actually, this plan is precisely what Mudarrisī followed. He undertook a comparative 
study with moral and legal philosophy, with particular emphasis on the main values in 
each. Subsequently, he came up with the conviction that the main values of moral 
philosophy are three: love, justice and life.424 In legal philosophy, Mudarrisī argues that 
the main purposes of the law are three: security, justice and progress.425 He proceeded 
similarly in his plan for studying Islamic thought, particularly the Qur’an. He also claimed 
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that the tree of values in Islamic thought begins with faith (al-īmān), then comes 
guidance (al-hudā) and finally success (al-falāḥ) from which many values are derived. 
The above is just a brief survey of Mudarrisī’s thesis plan to discover constant values. 
The following chapter is devoted to the analysis of this thesis plan in detail. 
4.2.2. The Variables (mutaghayyirāt) of the Sharīʿa 
The second feature of the sharīʿa, in Mudarrisī’s view, is that it is changeable. As stated 
above, this is not an unusual idea in the discussion on the sharīʿa. Rather, it seems to 
be a standard discourse of many reformist Muslim scholars - both Sunnī and Shīʿī - in 
the twentieth century. However, their approaches and concepts of the variables are 
different. Mudarrisī has a different concept and it is a key idea of his thought regarding 
the sharīʿa and his maqāṣidī project. Here, I will demonstrate his conception of the 
variables and differentiate his view from those of others in this regard. Then, I will also 
demonstrate factors of the variables from his point of view. 
4.2.2.1. The Concept of Variables 
The mainstream understanding of the variables amongst Shīʿī scholars is that in the 
field of transactions (al-muʿāmalāt) the object of the legal ruling has changed in a way 
that requires new legal rulings. To demonstrate this view clearly, I will first clarify some 
assumptions here. There are many aspects as regards the nature of the legal ruling 
(ḥukm), which have been analyzed and discussed in jurisprudence. One of these 
aspects is the relationship between the legal ruling and its object. From an analytical 
perspective, the scholars conceive three elements in any legal ruling: the legal ruling 
(ḥukm) itself, the content of the legal ruling (mutaʿalliq), and its object (mawḍūʿ). For 
example, when analyzing the legal ruling of the prohibition of drinking wine, there are 
the three elements: the legal ruling, i.e. prohibition, the content of the legal ruling, i.e. 
drinking and the object, i.e. the wine.426.For the mainstream understanding of the 
variables, the scholars think that the variables of the sharīʿa take place in the third 
element of, i.e. the object (mawḍūʿ). The scenario is that for various reasons, the object 
has changed in a way that requires it to be categorized under a different legal ruling. For 
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instance, selling blood has been considered for a long time as a forbidden transaction, 
because blood did not have a value that justified it to be an object of a transaction. 
However, in the modern age, thanks to medical developments, blood has become a 
valuable object. Subsequently, the legal ruling has had to be changed from prohibition 
to permission427. This scenario repeats itself for myriad objects that are constantly 
changing and require new legal rulings. 
Mudarrisī argues that this sort of variable is merely one kind of variable, also being the 
less important one, and cannot even be taken into account seriously without going 
through a particular procedure and taking a greater context into account. For Mudarrisī, 
the variable is the significant societal change that happens at a particular time and in a 
specific place, either because of an emergent situation or because of socio-political 
challenges to the extent that not only does the reality of the object change, but also the 
whole societal context. Also, this change does not simply need to refer the new 
conception of the object under an established title of the legal ruling. Rather, it requires 
specifying legislations that are related to priority values compatible with the societal 
stage, context and circumstances. This societal change might even require canceling 
the legislative body of current legal rulings and/or creating a new one. It is a matter of 
prioritizing the most relevant moral values of the sharīʿa for particular societal 
circumstances over a period of time that might change after a while.428 It is this 
understanding of the variable that necessitates Mudarrisī revising the whole system of 
deriving the legal ruling, more than just attempting to provide a partial solution of 
referring the changed object under a different title of the legal ruling. Moreover, it is this 
understanding that requires him to call towards the maqāṣidī project, whereas others 
believed that the problem could be solved by improving the field of priority (al-ahamm 
wa al-muhimm)429, or dealing with every new variable by consulting the experts to 
identify  new objects, whereby it would be easy to refer them to their suitable title. 
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Proceeding from this conception of the variables, Mudarrisī believes that for the jurist to 
be able to deal with those variables he should first study the factors that cause these 
changes and then have a scientific way of understanding the current societal variable 
and what it requires. The former will be studied in the next section, whereas the latter 
will be discussed later on in the chapter, after discussing Mudarrisī’s ideas on how to 
reconcile between the constants and variables of the sharīʿa. 
4.2.2.2. The Factors of the Variables 
Needless to say, the study of social changes is closely related to the study of social 
sciences. However, legal philosophers, due to the interdisciplinary nature of human 
society, are interested in questioning what kind of social changes should be taken into 
account when considering the issue of legal practice.430 The same applies to Mudarrisī’s 
question here. He argues that not all social changes are considered significant to the 
extent that requires having a new legislation. Instead, there are some sorts of social 
changes that should be considered as variable. Notwithstanding, there is a degree of 
variance as to their real influence and the societies are varied too in responding to these 
changing factors.431 He mentions three main factors that cause a considerable social 
change to the extent of being deemed as variable.  
4.2.2.2.1. Custom (al-ʿurf) 
The role of custom (al-ʿurf) in the process of legislation has been considerably 
discussed in Islamic jurisprudential literatures and particularly in Sunnī jurisprudence432. 
Though Shīʿī jurisprudential literature, broadly speaking, does not deem custom as a 
source for legal rulings433, there is a general consensus that custom has a role in 
identifying the objects of legal rulings.434 Mudarrisī agrees with this general mainstream 
and defines custom as a common moral sense of a particular society both in deeming 
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some actions as acceptable and in identifying some social rights and duties. In light of 
this definition, he sees custom as a sort of variable that has to be taken into account 
when issuing legal rulings. Therefore, some legal rulings might be applicable for some 
societies, while others are not.435  
4.2.2.2.2. The Highest Benefits (al-maṣāliḥ al-ʿulyā) 
The phrase ‘highest benefits’ in Mudarrisī’s view is used to refer to the socio-historical 
context of a particular society that requires a certain policy that entails a body of 
legislation. It could also be of a highest benefit not for the whole society, but merely for 
a considerable part of the society, such as labourers, investors, students, the medical 
sector, etc.436 The importance of this highest benefit and how it can be studied will be 
discussed later on in this chapter.437 
4.2.2.2.3. Emergency Situations 
The phrase ‘emergency situations’ is used to refer to situations where individuals or a 
group of people are in an extraordinary situation that require different legal rulings. This 
sort of variable is generally well established in Islamic jurisprudence, and is known as 
the legal issues of harm (al-ḍarar) or difficulty (al-ḥaraj).438 Mudarrisī here is re-inventing 
the wheel, i.e. he generally goes in line with the stream of jurisprudential Islamic 
thought. However, what distinguishes his approach from the mainstream is the way that 
he combines these elements of the variable together and the way he allocates each of 
them within the procedures of deriving legal rulings. This point will become clearer by 
the end of this chapter when the whole of his approach is demonstrated and analyzed. 
4.3. The Reconciliation between the Constants and the Variables 
Conceiving the nature of the sharīʿa as composed of constants and variables and for 
the sharīʿa to be applicable in reality, raises an important question: how is it possible to 
reconcile between the constants and the variables of the sharīʿa. The discussion here 
for Mudarrisī is somehow practical and is based on both the actual construction of 
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Islam’s legal system as a part of the whole of Islamic thought and actual Islamic 
historical experience, especially the Shīʿas. In a sense, Mudarrisī seems not to be 
concerned with the matter of reconciliation or raising purely theoretical epistemic 
discussions – discussions which have preoccupied, a great deal, if not all Shīʿī 
jurisprudential discourses in the fields of contradictions (al-taʿāruḍ) and conflict (al-
tazāḥum). These are two fields in Shīʿī jurisprudence that discuss the issue of 
conflicting evidences. The first field deals with the clashing of evidences in theory as 
well as on the stage of deriving legal rulings, and is known as the field of contradictions 
(al-taʿāruḍ).439 The second field deals with the clashing of legal rulings in reality when 
they are applied and this field is known as conflict (al-tazāḥum)440. In both fields, Shīʿī 
jurisprudential discussions are mainly concerned with the epistemic value and the form 
of each evidence or legal ruling. Therefore, the scholars attempt to theorize general 
rules of how to strike a balance between them. This can be seen in its mature version in 
the field of contradictions in the work of Murtaḍā al-ʾAnṣārī441 and in the field of conflict 
in a contemporary work of the Shīʿī Iraqī scholar al-Ṣaffār’s442 (b. 1962), which is 
deemed to be the most extensive and comprehensive work on this issue. Mudarrisī, on 
the contrary, does not consider the issue of reconciliation between the constants and 
the variables as applicable for any of these fields, though there are some sophisticated 
tools that could be used in some cases of the variables, as we shall see443. Rather, 
Mudarrisī is concerned with providing a practical approach that is based on the contents 
of the contradictory components. From this perspective, Mudarrisī sees that there are 
three theoretical elements that are embodied in reality in three particular formats, if they 
can be correctly described as such, and they have to be reconciled to reach a 
coherence or equilibrium. These formats are reason (al-ʿaql), which is embodied in 
moral values (al-qiyam), reality (al-wāqiʿ), which is embodied in the shūrā and revelation 
                                            
439 al-Baḥrānī, al-Muʿjam al-Uṣūlī, v. 1:, p. 535 
440 Ibid. p. 503 
441 Murtaḍā al-Anṣārī, Farāʾid al-Uṣūl, 4 vols., (Qum: Majmaʿ al-Fikr al-Islāmī, 1998), v. 4 
442 al-Ṣaffār, Fiqh al-Maṣāliḥ wa al-Mafāsid 
443 See on page 233. 
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(al-wāḥiy), which is embodied in leadership (Imāmah).444 In the following sections, I will 
demonstrate these formats and analyze the relationships between them. 
 
4.3.1. The Values and the Flexibility of the Sharīʿa 
In the context of identifying the values of the sharīʿa, which constitute the first element 
of the reconciliation between the constants and variables, I will only address the general 
framework of the values, because they will be the central point of the following 
chapter.445 
For Mudarrisī, value (al-qīmah, pl. qiyam) is the contemporary Arabic synonym of the 
Qur’anic term al-ḥikma (pl. ḥikam). This philosophical perspective begins with faith and 
considers it to be the relationship between the Creator and the creature. The essence of 
faith is recognition, whereby the human being recognizes the plurality and diversity of 
creation, which includes nature, the world of irrational creatures and the world of human 
beings. Through successive recognitions that begin with the physical world, the human 
being will attain the recognition of God and His beautiful names, which results in 
understanding divine cosmological laws in both the physical and the human world. This 
is where the agency of human beings becomes active in seeking proximity to God 
through following the sharīʿa, particularly its moral values that are embodied within its 
legal rulings.446 
This philosophical overview of religion and morality ultimately aims to apply moral 
values in reality, and therefore to consider the other elements (shūrā and wilāya) as 
complementary and procedural tools to apply the sharīʿa in reality. To practice this in 
real life situations, Mudarrisī suggests a theory whereby both could practically be 
applied. 
4.3.2.  The Balance between Shūrā and Wilāya 
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As discussed above, shūrā and wilāya constitute the procedural device of reaching a 
sort of coherence or equilibrium in applying the sharīʿa. Shūrā, on the one hand, 
represents the people and reality (as experts of the society), and wilāya, on the other 
hand, represents the authority of the religious institution as the expert of the sharīʿa. 
Based on this, both sectors (people and jurists) are assumed to be sharing a common 
sense of the sharīʿa's moral values. Mudarrisī’s aim here is to provide an insight on how 
to strike a balance between these two powers in a way that makes the sharīʿa 
applicable without the religious overriding of society and vice versa. Thus, I will 
demonstrate and analyze his theoretical foundations of the consideration of each, and 
within that I will illustrate his balancing approach. 
4.3.2.1. The Theoretical Foundations of the Consideration of Shūrā 
Considering Shūrā to be the significant Islamic socio-political value or at least a part of 
the Islamic political system seems to be notable in the discourse of contemporary 
Muslim scholars, especially amongst the reformists.447 In this discourse, the Shūrā is 
presented as an alternative or as comparable to democratic discourse that has been 
seen as a challenge to Islamic thought. However, it has been considered as a political 
or intellectual matter, not as a jurisprudential one. Notwithstanding this, Shīʿī 
jurisprudence has, in great detail, discussed the matter of the authority of the experts in 
deriving legal rulings. This is especially true within the Bahbahānian paradigm as it was 
a part of the epistemic concerns of the duality of certain and speculative knowledge. 
This discussion considers the role of non-religious experts, e.g. the linguist as the 
famous example with regard to literature, in influencing religious experts, i.e. the jurists, 
in deriving the legal ruling.448 From this perspective, the democratic and the expert’s 
discussions overlap in the debate over the role of the people who are out of the circle of 
the jurists in influencing the procedure of the legal system. 
                                            
447 There are several contexts in which the shūrā is discussed in the contemporary Islamic discourse, mainly in the 
political discourse. However, some scholars are interested in providing it as a jurisprudential discourse, such as ʿAllāl 
al-Fāsī. See ʾAllāl al-Fāsī, Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿa wa Makārimihā  (Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1993), p. 118 
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From this context, it can be argued that Mudarrisī in his discussion of the Shūrā was 
concerned with two lines of debate (the democracy/legitimacy-expertise): (i) 
participation seen as the ground of political and social legitimacy, on the one hand, and 
(ii) expertise, as the foundation of the knowledgeable and scientific plausible religious 
opinion, on the other. For Mudarrisī, the Shūrā is a part of the religious procedure in 
deriving legal issues and he provides two arguments to support this: 
a. The first argument is that of expertise: Mudarrisī argues that the Shūrā, by 
having people from different fields of expertise, represents the most 
knowledgeable understanding of reality possible, especially for the variables 
of society. This argument is, in effect, the continuity of the jurisprudential 
argument in connection with the consideration of the experts. However, by 
expanding the scope of the variables to include social changes in its complex 
terms, the scope of the experts’ participation is necessarily expanded as well. 
In accurate terms, Mudarrisī has changed the conception of the real object 
(al-mawḍūʿ) of the legal issue by expanding the concept of the variable, and 
then established the jurisprudential argument for the authority of the expert, 
which is based on the authority of knowledge, aiming to support the position 
of the Shūrā. Mudarrisī says: 
“There are thousands of cases in which society needs wisdom and rational opinion. 
Through the Shūrā and making people take responsibility for thinking for themselves, 
we can ripen such an opinion, especially in the more complicated cases such as the 
political, economic and generally humanitarian cases”449.  
b. The second argument is the participation one: Mudarrisī argues that the 
Shūrā, through people’s participations in a ‘civil society’, i.e. unions, regional 
councils, organizations and so forth, and in identifying the current condition of 
society in broad terms, represents the most legitimate decision. As will be 
discussed later on, in Mudarrisī's view, there are some variables are 
established by a process in which people (through Shūra) play an important 
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role. Thus, the Shūrā here represents the participation of the people. 
Moreover, this not only makes the legal ruling legitimate in this sense, but 
also makes it more implementable as it has been formulated in a collective 
and participatory manner. Mudarrisī says: 
“Participation in the decision-making process would aid in its implementation, especially 
when society witnesses positive competition, which the world nowadays is based on. 
Positive competition will reduce the energy of positive conflicts and employ it in positive 
action, which would in turn push society’s wheel forward a great deal”.  
“Consequently, Shūrā councils can become the channels that accommodate and 
systematise conflicts and contradictory opinions, and bring them under control. 
Subsequently, these councils can prevent them from corrupting societal morals or 
moving towards bloody conflicts or a civil war”450. 
Therefore, Mudarrisī's argument to establish the Shūrā is based on principles of both 
individual juristic expertise, and popular participation.  Each of these is designed in his 
system to give the values determined through Shūra a high level of legitimacy. Having 
established that, Mudarrisī then provides what he considers to be an initial insight into 
the channel of the Shūrā in society. 
 The Channels of Shūrā 
From the very beginning, Mudarrisī states that what he attempts to provide is not a 
structure applicable and suitable to all societies per se. Rather, reality is more 
complicated and each society requires a different structure and procedure.451 However, 
the principle is the same: participation and expertise. Thus, he argues that the more 
Shūrā channels a society has, the more that society is able to identify reality and have a 
proper legislation. For example, in questioning whether it is most beneficial for a society 
to have a free market or to nationalize the private sectors, Mudarrisī says:  
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“These sorts of questions cannot be answered in an absolute manner, because 
each society has its own perculiarities and each condition has its own judgment. 
Therefore, let’s search for the answer within the community and the people for 
whom we are seeking to benefit first and foremost in this case”452. 
Based on this perception, any case has to go through four steps, as outlined below: 
1. The concerned party, which might be the state or a regional council, 
poses the case forward to the people, whether directly through 
referendum or indirectly through representative advisory councils. 
2. The civil society should then initiate an open discussion and debate 
through research centres, universities, leaders of tribes and so forth. 
3. The debate should then be transferred to the form of a proposal that 
can be a subject for voting through representative councils. The 
proposal would be considered as an identification of reality for the 
jurist. 
4. Finally, the voted proposal should go to the jurist as a representative of 
religious expertise. He has to study it carefully to make sure that the 
proposal does not contradict any of the principles of sharīʿa and that its 
legal writing is consentient with the sharīʿa. 
Through these steps, Mudarrisī argues that “the principal dilemma of how to conciliate 
between the constant divine values and the variable interests or conditions can be 
resolved.”453 However, this approach raises the question of the authority of the jurist and 
its foundation, which will be addressed in the next section. 
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Figure 8 – The channels and stages of Shūrā and its intellectual principles  
4.3.2.2. The Theoretical Foundations of Wilāya 
The term wilāya here is used to refer to the authority of the jurist (wilāyat al-faqīh). The 
notion of wilāyat al-faqīh became famous and well-known after the Islamic Revolution of 
Iran in 1979, which adopted the notion as a doctrine for the political system after the 
revolution. The basic idea of wilāyat al-faqīh is that the Shīʿī jurist, who has gained 
certain religious and moral characteristics, is considered to be a representative of the 
twelfth Imām of the Shīʿa during his occultation, not only for religious matters, but also 
for political authority. Therefore, the jurist is the point of reference for both religious and 
political issues for the Shīʿī community. Elsewhere in this work454, I have argued that 
Mudarrisī was the first Shīʿī scholar in the modern age who has theorized for the notion 
of wilāyat al-faqīh, though it is has been attributed in the Āyatallāh Khomeini in 
contemporary writings. 
For Mudarrisī, the notion of al-wilāyah is not only a political system, but it is also a part 
of the theoretical foundation of the reconciliation between the constants and variables. It 
stands alongside the values of sharīʿa representing reason, and the Shūrā representing 
reality, whilst wilāya itself represents revelation (al-waḥiy). Considering it in this context, 
Mudarrisī did not pay significant attention to discussing the notion from its foundations. 
Rather, he only mentions the basic foundations. That is to say, the notion of wilāya is a 
continuity of the authority of the Prophet and Imām in the responsibilities that are 
attributed to them as leaders of the Islamic community, and it has been transferred to 
the jurist in the age of Occultation.455 Accordingly, he concerns himself primarily with 
two issues: (i) why wilāya is an important part of the reconciliatory system and (ii) how 
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we can be sure that wilāya will not become an authoritative power that might control 
society. To address these questions, Mudarrisī provides three arguments: 
(i) First, Mudarrisī argues that the position of the jurist in the Muslim 
community is not isolated from the moral values of the sharīʿa. Instead, it 
is based on them. Thus, it is restricted by these moral values and, 
because of its critical position, it is conditioned that the jurist who wants to 
hold this position has to be knowledgeable, just and qualified. Here, 
Mudarrisī wants to insist that the position of the jurist is not a theocratic 
system or any kind of monarchal ruling, where the position of ruling is 
confined to a specific dynasty or close circle. Instead, it is open equally 
and fairly to anyone who has acquired the necessary requirements. In 
addition and above all, the qualified jurist does not gain authority until he is 
chosen by the community; otherwise he would be considered to be an 
illegitimate ruler.456 To this point Mudarrisī pays considerable attention in 
providing several pieces of evidence from both the holy texts as well as 
the Islamic historical experience to prove that Islamic discourse insists on 
resisting the oppressive ruler more than on choosing the just ruler. For 
Mudarrisī, this is a proof that this critical position is not an authoritative 
position and should not be under any circumstances. 
“Therefore, requiring certain qualities does not imply the 
obsoleteness of the role of the people in political life, as Islam is 
based on responsibility and does not recognize any sort of 
determinism at all, especially the coercion of authority, which is 
totally rejected in Islam […] I myself was wondering  why the Holy 
Book has paid such considerable attention to the issue of resisting 
corrupt regimes more than simply establishing just regimes. After 
having undertaken social and historical research, I arrived at the 
conclusion that the need of human beings to fight oppressors, 
especially those who use the name of God in their ruling over people, 
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surpasses their need to establish a wise leadership, which can be 
done once people are rid of their fear of oppressors"457. 
(ii) Second, Mudarrisī argues that the qualities required of the jurist are not 
merely sought at the beginning of his rule or his being a source of 
reference (marjaʿ), but they are also required throughout the period that 
he holds the position. Otherwise, in case he lacks any of these required 
characteristics, people would be obligated to stand against him and to 
remove him. However, Mudarrisī mentions that it is not easy for people to 
identify that the jurist is no longer qualified, especially with the knowledge 
that he has, which enables him to deceive and manipulate people. Here, 
he relies on the role of moral values and common moral sense that have 
been implanted in the collective consciousness of the Muslim community, 
especially through the Qur’an. Mudarrisī says: 
This question, in my opinion, addresses the most important point in the 
field of political authority in Islam. To provide an answer to this 
question, we have to go back to the role of values, which we had 
previously spoken about […] One of these values, or perhaps the 
greatest one, is the people's freedom of choice, and therefore if 
someone takes the reins under any pretext, people have the right to 
stand against him458. 
(iii) Third, Mudarrisī argues that the rationale behind the need of wilāyat al-
faqīh is similar to needing the experts in any field of knowledge. The field 
of religion, especially in terms of understanding moral values and dealing 
with their priority and structure, is no less complex than any other field.459 
Moreover, in order to achieve harmony between values and reality, the 
subject is a crucial one because it is related to the sacred area of religion. 
Therefore, the authority of the jurist as an expert is paramount. 
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The matter is related to the sacrosanct which no human being can 
address, because it is very sensitive to people and prone to 
disrespected altercations, which would have a completely 
counterproductive effect. Therefore, we must leave it to the experts in 
the field, who can only be the jurists460. 
In light of these three arguments, Mudarrisī provides the theoretical foundations for the 
role of the jurist in reconciling between the constants and the variables. 
4.4. The Mechanism of Studying the Variables 
In light of the above definition of the variable, i.e. a socio-historical moment or change in 
a particular society that requires a certain course of action or a change to the real object 
of the law, Mudarrisī attempts to provide his vision of how to scientifically study the 
variable. As was discussed above, for him, the whole process of applying the sharīʿa in 
the modern age relies on having a mature, rational and scientific approach to 
understanding reality, e.g. the variable, on the one hand, and on having a clear outline 
of sharīʿa’s moral values, on the other. The latter will be discussed in the next chapter, 
while the former will be demonstrated and analyzed here.  
Having re-defined the concept of the variable, Mudarrisī concerns himself with providing 
a rational and scientific way of studying the variable. For the sake of clarification, the 
usage of the terms ‘rational’ and ‘scientific’ here is not laden with Western intellectual 
meanings. That is to say, it has nothing to do with the Western discussion on rationality 
or epistemology. Rather, it simply signifies a reasonable status of knowledge that 
legitimizes a certain understanding of a particular situation to be followed or to base a 
public policy upon. If we use Islamic jurisprudential terminology, it is the ḥujjiyya. 
However, the closest Western academic field to Mudarrisī’s discussion here, perhaps, is 
the field of social epistemology and public policy.461 In other words, he wants the jurist 
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to identify the variable not arbitrarily, but rationally through investigative means and 
through his own deduction upon which a great decision can be made. Two questions 
concern him here: (i) how the variable can be studied rationally and (ii) how the 
precedence of a certain variable over another can be identified.  
4.4.1. The Method of Studying the Variables 
In the context of studying the variables, Mudarrisī has benefited considerably from his 
open dialogue with Western debates on legal philosophy. This can be seen here in the 
discussion on what the ideal method to study the variables would be. He frames such 
variables as the socio-historical changes within the greater social construction, which is 
known in the literature of legal philosophy as the idea of “spirit of the people" or 
"national character". This idea was proposed by the German philosopher and theologian 
Johann Gottfried Herder462 (d.1803), known in Germany as Volksgeist, and has then 
been developed by the historical school of law, the sociology of law and sociological 
jurisprudence. Mudarrisī argues that seeking the idea of the ‘spirit of the people’ was 
one of the most important motivations for the French philosopher of the Enlightenment, 
Montesquieu463 (d. 1755) to write his famous and influential work The Spirit of the Laws. 
Regardless of the motivations and developments of the idea, the general conception of 
the notion is that a certain society at a particular time and in a specific place passes 
through a socio-historical moment that requires specific needs, plans and policies, and 
therefore the law has to be an expression of this collective ‘spirit’. Mudarrisī deems this 
sort of ‘spirit’ as a framework for society's variables that need a rational method through 
which it should to be studied.464 However, even though he relies on the idea of the ‘spirit 
of people’ as a framework for the variables, he does not follow all of its social, political 
and philosophical ramifications. Instead, he merely agrees with its establishment for the 
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ontology of social reality as a separate existence having its own constructions and 
manners. Then, he continues his open dialogue with different schools of thought on the 
nature of this spirit and the role of law in a society seeking to establish this method of 
studying the variables. Accordingly, Mudarrisī argues that the spirit of the people as the 
framework for the variables should be studied through three determining factors that 
collectively constitute the general spirit, in addition to a fourth determining factor, 
represented by the pure technical experts.465 These determinants are (a) the general 
trend, (b) the components of the society, (c) the most important need, and (d) the 
opinion of the experts. Although these determinants have been discussed in different 
fields and contexts, he argues that they can be integrated into a general framework to 
produce a mature understanding of society.  
4.4.1.1. The General Trend 
Mudarrisī here benefits from the work of the famous British philosopher of history Arnold 
J. Toynbee (d. 1975), entitled A Study of History, which focuses on the factors of the 
rise and fall of societies through studying 26 civilizations. Toynbee focuses on the 
factors of the challenge and response in the rise and fall of societies, and he concludes 
that under the leadership of the creative elite who successfully respond to internal or 
external challenges, society will rise.466 According to Mudarrisī’s reading of Toynbee, 
these challenges provoke the spirit of the society by making the people seek to 
transcend by means of moral values, and therefore, responses become spiritual rather 
than material.467 This response in the context of that particular circumstance of the 
society would raise certain moral values and priorities. Although Mudarrisī does not 
agree with Toynbee in some aspects, he agrees with him that what emerges from the 
challenge-response process will constitute the spirit of people or what Mudarrisī prefers 
to describe as ‘the general trend of the society’.468 However, he argues that it is only a 
part of the spirit of the people, because of the importance of the other determinants in 
constituting the whole spirit of people. 
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4.4.1.2. The Components of the Society 
Each society has been created in a particular way in accordance with its historical 
context. The characteristics of each society are the subject of the social sciences in 
their widest terms. However, the relationship between the components of society and 
the law, which might well be a subject for legal philosophy or sociology of law or other 
fields, is what is intended here. Mudarrisī believes that the first philosopher who 
attempted to address this issue was Montesquieu in his famous work entitled The Spirit 
of the Laws469. Montesquieu, according to Mudarrisī’s reading, attempted to study the 
relationship between the components of society in their wide terms, e.g. the natural 
environment, political regime, economic system, culture, tradition, religion, social 
institution, the legal system and so forth. Although Mudarrisī does not completely agree 
with all of Montesquieu’s thought, claiming that some aspects of it are outdated, he 
argues that Montesquieu’s contribution is invaluable and it has inspired many legal 
philosophers and sociologists to address his work.470 Moreover, he sees this sort of 
socio-legal study of society as being very crucial for understanding the variables, which 
vary from one society to the next in a way that affects the respective legal system of 
each society. Thus, studying this aspect helps in identifying the spirit of the people as 
the framework for the variables. 
4.4.1.3. The Most Important Need 
The “most important need” of a society here refers to the specific essential requirements 
that a society has at a given socio-historical moment.471 In light of this definition, 
Mudarrisī differentiates between this sort of need and the general trend in terms that the 
latter is more about a great challenge that requires a collective response and that 
dominates the whole society. Though the most important need is more about societal 
need in a particular socio-historical context, it is somehow a part of the general trend. 
Mudarrisī here benefits considerably from the American legal philosopher Roscoe 
Pound (d. 1964), who is well-known for his contribution to legal philosophy through the 
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establishment of sociological jurisprudence, i.e. the law as a means to social 
engineering and theory of interests.472 For Pound, the law is an instrument of social 
control through which authority can achieve the purposes of the law in accordance with 
social need. However, social need varies according to the socio-historical conditions of 
a certain society. However, according to Mudarrisī, Pound has mentioned four main 
social needs, namely (a) social stability, (b) secure social institutions, (c) self-assertion 
and freedom, and (d) fulfillment of essential human needs.473 In spite of Mudarrisī’s 
disagreement with Pound’s legal thought, he emphasizes, alongside Pound, the 
influence of social need in shaping the legal system. Thus, studying social need is 
deemed to be part of understanding the spirit of the people as the framework for the 
variables.  
4.4.1.4. Scientific Opinion 
 Mudarrisī assumes that there is a scope in the variables that is left to scientific experts 
to decide, and it is not a part of the spirit of the people. Rather, it is a very technical 
scientific scope that is mostly related to the natural sciences, not to the social ones 
assumed to play a significant role in the study of the spirit of the people.474 Having said 
that, he argues that science itself has become a sort of ideological discourse in which it 
seems to be an authoritative power, rather than as an instrument to help to implement 
the law. Therefore, although he recognizes the referencing of ‘science’ in certain areas, 
he argues that it has to be taken into account alongside the components of the spirit of 
the people. Mudarrisī says: 
Of course, the specialized effects related to different sciences have to be studied 
in the centres of specialized research dedicacted to those sciences in terms of 
their relationship with the law. However, these research centres have to work 
alongside the representative councils that have been elected by people. These 
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centres derive the supreme moral principle from the scholars and wise people, 
who protect the supreme values of the society475. 
4.4.1.5. Overview of the Study of the Variables  
Seeking to understand the spirit of the people and its components represents the 
essence of Mudarrisī’s thought on the variables. To this end, he proposes three 
essential factors in order to determine this spirit, namely, (i) the general trend, (ii) the 
components of the society and (iii) the most important need. However, repeating his 
epistemological approach of equilibrium or coherence, he argues that each of these 
determinants has to integrate with the others through a societal debate in the public 
sphere to reach a common overlapping and equilibratory consensus. Moreover, he 
assumes that for the general strategic issues of society, the leaders and the scholars 
remain in control. However, studying the components of society and their most 
important need is dependent on the people themselves through the representative 
councils and civil society, as they are the closest section of the society to these 
issues.476 The general purpose of the whole idea here, as he claims, is to have a legal 
system that is characterized by three features: (a) a clear outline of moral values, (b) 
flexibility in applying the law, and (c) a sound device for development.477 
4.5. The System of Prioritization 
This is the second part of Mudarrisī’s discussion on the variables. The assumption here 
is that the variables, whatever they may be, in reality represent the moral values that 
have been imposed by certain socio-historical contexts. This is because in reality any 
action happens through a particular context that gives it moral meaning. Thus, reaching 
an equilibratory status in studying the variables will eventually end up with an advisory 
to implement a public policy at a certain time and in a specific place in a particular 
society, which in turn represents a moral value. This poses a question, which is in effect 
the main concern of this discussion: how to identify the precedence of a certain variable 
over another? However, this question re-assumes the notion that there is a hierarchy 
                                            
475 Ibid. p. 364 
476 Ibid. p. 363 
477 Ibid. p. 364 
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within the moral values whereby a certain value can have precedence over another. 
Subsequently, the role of the jurist is to consider the hierarchy on the one hand, and the 
variables on the other, and then to decide which one should be given priority over the 
other in this context. 
The debate over this issue has been a concern for many scholars who have been 
interested in the maqāṣid al-sharīʿa project. It has been explored under various titles 
such as the fiqh of reality (fiqh al-wāqiʿ), fiqh of priorities (fiqh al-awlawiyyāt), 
implementing the sharīʿa (tanfīdh al-sharīʿa), fulfilling the principle (taḥqīq al-manāṭ)478 
and other titles. Nonetheless, it was also a concern of the earlier scholars interested in 
al-maqāṣid, such as al-Ghazālī and al-Shāṭibī (d. 1388). 
Mudarrisī might be the earliest contemporary Shīʿī scholar who addresses this issue. 
Surprisingly, however, he does not seem to have read the contemporary Sunnī 
contributions479 of his age during the writing of his works. This might be attributed to the 
fact that the topic was quite new at that time, even in Sunnī circles. Nevertheless, he 
has discussed two classical Sunnī scholars with regard to the prioritization of values, 
namely al-Ghazālī and al-Shāṭibī in addition to only one western philosopher, Ralph 
Barton Perry480 (d. 1957). As seems to be a feature of Mudarrisī's address of some of 
the maqāṣid issues, he does not go deeply and thoroughly into the topic at hand. 
Instead, he seems to prefer to provide an overview of it or a general insight. Thus, I will 
provide three characteristics of his dealing with the system of prioritization of values, 
followed by his critique of Ghazālī and Shāṭibī’s contributions. 
Mudarrisī’s approach is characterized by three features:  
                                            
478 These terms and conceptions have been introduced mostly within the Sunnī jurisprudential tradition and witnessed 
a notable growth in the contemporary maqāṣid discourse. Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī is well-known for his interest in this sort 
of research. See Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, Fī Fiqh al-Awlawiyyāt: Dirāsa Jadīda fī Ḍawʾ al-Qur’an wa al-Sunnah, 2nd ed. 
(Egypt: Maktabat Wahbah, 1996) 
479 For example, he seems to be not aware of the whole works have been produced by International Institute of 
Islamic Thought (IIIT) nor of the work of al-Ṭahir Ibn ʿĀshūr. These works were available when he was working on his 
own theory. See Bibliography for full bibliographical details of these works. 
480 Ralph Barton Perry is an American new realist philosopher of the nineteenth and twentieth century (1876 – 1957). 
His work in morality and the issue of weighting between values can be found in his book: Perry, Ralph Barton, 
General Theory of Value: Its Meaning and Basic Principles Construed in Terms of Interest. (USA: Harvard University 
Press, 2013) 
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I. Mudarrisī concentrates first and foremost on the content of the value more than 
its form when he prioritizes some values over others. Some scholars who 
addressed this issue focused on the form of the ruling, obligatory or permissible, 
limited or generalised, worship-related or transactional, related to the right of the 
God or to the right of fellow humans, and many other such forms of rulings.481 
The famous example for this ruling is one where the believer is in a situation 
where he must either perform his daily obligatory prayer or save a person in 
deadly danger, drowning in the sea for example. In contrast, Mudarrisī focuses 
on the content of the ruling, whether it is justice or freedom, security or instability 
and so on. Subsequently, he strongly insists that there is a hierarchy within moral 
values where security is more important than justice, and justice is more 
important than freedom.482 However, one of the points that will be discussed in 
the following chapter is whether Mudarrisī was successful in providing an outline 
of this hierarchy or not, even though he certainly seems to have, or at least he 
strongly believes in, a sort of hierarchy within the moral values. 
II. In light of the essence of the previous feature, Mudarrisī’s approach seems to be 
different from one of the most dominant discourses within both the Sunnī 
maqāṣidi and Shīʿī Bahbahānian paradigm. In these discussions, common 
interest (maṣlaḥah) is considered a final end of the sharīʿa. Interest has, though, 
been intertwined with moral values making it very difficult to differentiate between 
them. In contrast, Mudarrisī deems common interest as one of the values that 
has to be taken into account, both in balance with other values as well as in the 
context of reality. In effect, I would argue that it is from that understanding or 
application of the legal system that gives this importance to common interest, 
that Mudarrisī has been motivated to find another way to make values both 
central and realistic when considering the reality of the variables.483 
                                            
481 This is how al-Ṣaffār has addressed the issue. See al-Ṣaffār, Fiqh al-Maṣāliḥ wa al-Mafāsid 
482 Mudarrisī, Al-Tashrīʿ al-islāmī: manāhijuhu wa-maqāṣiduhu, 3: 367. 
483 Ibid., 296. 
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III. As for the centrality of the values discussed above, Mudarrisī again believes in 
the necessity of reaching an equilibrious status in studying the variables and 
prioritizing one value over another. Even though, then, the values have their 
hierarchy, certain factors in specific instances will, for Mudarrisī, deactivate the 
hierarchy, switching the priority in which the values are located. Therefore, here 
additional elements such as the norm of quantity of effect, or the closest of all 
possibilities, or any other utilitarian norm, would play a role in giving precedence 
to one value over another484. 
Based on these three features of his vision of the system of prioritization, Mudarrisī 
critiques the contributions of Ghazālī, Shāṭibī and Perry. He criticises Ghazālī for his 
quantitative norms, Shāṭibī for his hierarchical norms and Perry for his philosophical 
ground of moral values. Here I will study the first two, namely Ghazālī and Shāṭibī, 
whilst Perry's insights will be discussed in the following chapter, as Mudarrisī’s criticism 
of him is more philosophical, in connection with his system of prioritization. 
4.5.1. Mudarrisī’s Criticism of al-Ghazālī 
It seems that Mudarrisī has come to know Ghazālī’s opinion through some 
contemporary Sunnī scholars who were interested in reviving or studying his thought. 
He relies particularly on ʿAlāl al-Fāsī485 (d. 1974) and Ḥusayn Ḥassān486 (b. 1932). 
According to these scholars, Ghazālī was the only scholar who embraced the notion 
that there are two kinds of interests (maṣlaḥa): a general interest and a particular one. 
He believed that the greatest common interest that benefits the majority of people takes 
priority over one that benefits the minority. Ghazālī says: 
“There is another division of interest, in addition to its clarification in terms of apparent 
and hidden meaning, that some interests are relevant to people in general, benefitting 
everyone, whereas others apply the majority, and yet others are relevant only to a 
particular person in a rare event”487. 
                                            
484 Ibid.p. 365 
485 al-Fāsī, Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿa wa Makārimihā 
486 Ḥusayn Ḥassān, Naẓariyyat al-Maṣlaḥah fī al-Fiqh al-Islāmī  (Egypt: Maktabat al-Mutanabbī, 1981) 
487  Mudarrisī, al-Tashrīʿ al-Islāmī: Manāhijuhu wa Maqāṣiduhu, v. 3, pp. 377 
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Al-Fāsī takes the idea further and claims that by giving priority to the greatest common 
interest, the state can make a public policy both economically and socially, based on 
this notion in a way that enables it to interfere in the market, e.g. in determining prices 
or nationalizing some public sectors.488 This understanding seems to be very similar to 
utilitarianism in the West. Mudarrisī claims that Ghazālī and his contemporary followers 
have taken the idea for granted, and therefore have not paid sufficient attention to prove 
it, and he believes that it should be proved in order to understand its dimensions. Thus, 
he himself attempts to provide three proofs in support of it, but simultaneously disproves 
them:  
(a) The rational argument, which holds that reason would prefer the 
benefit of the majority over the benefit of individuals, because society 
as a whole consists of a large number of individuals. 
Mudarrisī argues that if this were the case, then it would have been mentioned in 
religious scripture, the Qur’an and Sunnah.489 
(b) The way of the sharīʿa, that there are many cases where the sharīʿa 
advances the benefit of the majority. 
Mudarrisī argues that these cases, at best, can only be considered as indicators and not 
proofs, because they are an insufficient induction, which produces only speculative 
knowledge.490 
(c) The argument of customary practice, which claims interest is identified 
by custom (al-ʿurf).  For Mudarrisi, the jurists' understanding of custom 
predominates, as they are always thought of as having the interests of 
the majority at heart. 
Here Mudarrisī argues that whilst it is true that the interest of the majority is important, it 
is not a criterion and cannot be generalized. Furthermore, he argues that a distinction 
should be made between the greatest interest and the most important interest, where 
                                            
488 Ibid. p. 378 
489 Ibid. 
490 Ibid. 
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the former is about sheer quantity and the latter about the value itself.491 For example, 
according to Mudarrisī, the independence of the Islamic state is more important than its 
economic welfare, which might quantitatively have greater public interest. 
In sum, Mudarrisī rejects Ghazālī’s theory of how to prioritize one value over another.  
This theory, he believes, has been used in the interests of power, even by socialist 
parties, in which the true mechanism whereby values might be prioritised in particular 
circumstances has been ignored.492 
 
4.5.2. Mudarrisī’s Criticism of Shaṭibī 
Shāṭibī is well-known for his influential jurisprudential work al-Muwāfaqāt, which is 
deemed to be the first systematic theory of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa in Islamic thought 
generally. In his theory, he divides the maqāṣid al-sharīʿa into three main categories: 
necessities (al-ḍarūrāt), needs (al-ḥajiyāt) and luxuries (al-taḥsīniyyāt). Necessities are 
those essentials without which one cannot live. Needs are those things without which 
life becomes difficult. Luxuries are those things that add a sense of comfort to life. 
Bearing this in mind, necessities are further divided into those that preserve one’s faith, 
soul, mind, wealth and offspring. Inspite of the detailed discussions that Shāṭibī provides 
on the whole theory, and narrowing our discussion down to the system of prioritization, 
Shāṭibī relies on these three categories, respectively, i.e. necessities being the most 
important, followed by needs, and finally luxuries. Moreover, the same mechanism 
works within the necessities themselves whereby the preservation of faith is more 
important than the preservation of the soul, and similarly for the soul over the mind and 
so forth.493 
                                            
491 Ibid. 
492 Ibid. p. 380 
493 For more details about Shāṭibī’s life and thought see M.K. Masud, Shāṭibī's Philosophy of Islamic Law  (Adam 
Publishers & Distributors, 2006). Also see W.B. Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni 
Usul Al-Fiqh  (Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 162-206. 
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Mudarrisī admires Shāṭibī’s theory of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa in general and particularly his 
system of prioritization, because of his focus on the content of the values rather than 
merely the form. However, he criticises his prioritization on two main points:  
(a) Mudarrisī disagrees with Shāṭibī’s theoretical establishment of the level 
of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa, which moves gradually from necessities to 
luxuries and similarly with the scheme of the levels within the category 
of necessities. He has come up with a different theoretical model for 
sharīʿa’s moral values, which includes Shāṭibī’s theory, but does not 
necessarily correspond with his outline.494 
(b) Mudarrisī argues that Shāṭibī has neglected the quantitative 
dimensions of moral values or interests in reality, and according to 
Mudarrisī, if these were to be taken into account, the formula might not 
work.495 For example, jihād is assumed in Islamic thought as a defense 
of the Muslim’s faith, which is the first necessity in Shāṭibī’s categories. 
However, if the case is that an unjust ruler has declared jihād for a 
small battle which will preserve the faith of a small number of Muslims. 
However, on the other hand participation in this battle might further 
empower the unjust regime, resulting in its longevity; and then the 
continuity of that unjust regime will affect the lives of a greater number 
of people than those whose faith was preserved by the battle, bearing 
in mind that preservation of people’s wealth holds less priority than the 
preservation of their faith, according to Shāṭibī’s categorisation. Here, 
Mudarrisī thinks that the quantity of the effect would change the 
formula, only because of the factor of the quantity. 
Therefore, Mudarrisī argues that even though the contents of moral values are crucial, 
the quantitative dimensions have to be seriously considered when studying reality. This 
seems to be a sort of amalgamation of Shāṭibī and Ghazālī’s theories, in addition to his 
own epistemological manner in which he attempts to reach a balanced opinion. 
                                            
494  Mudarrisī, al-Tashrīʿ al-Islāmī: Manāhijuhu wa Maqāṣiduhu, v. 3, p. 376 
495 Ibid. 
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4.6. Conclusion 
The above analysis demonstrates that calling for maqāṣid al-sharīʿa has required not 
only a new epistemic and methodological framework, but also a new functional 
framework, which provides a different understanding to the nature of sharīʿa. Although 
the functional framework of the Bahbahānian paradigm was mainly characterized by 
being soft utilitarian, Mudarrisī calls for a moral or virtue-based functional framework. 
This understanding argues that theology, morality and law are one generating body 
where each one entitles the other in turn. Thus, the sharīʿa is the practice of morality, 
which is, in turn, a reflection of the overall theological perceptions of religion. In order to 
make this understanding applicable, Mudarrisī, like many Muslim scholars of his 
generation, conceives that the contents of sharīʿa are divided into two categories, i.e. 
constants and variables. However, contrary to other scholars, he sees the constants as 
abstract moral values of the sharīʿa, whereas the variables are the socio-historical 
conditions to which moral values are applied. This definition of constants and variables 
has two impacts. On the one hand, it requires a mechanism that regulates the 
relationships between constants and variables, which is where Mudarrisī revives the 
Islamic idea of the shūrā, not as a political tool of governing the state, but as a 
jurisprudential tool that plays a crucial role in legislation and making public policy. On 
the other hand, it has changed the functional role of the sharīʿa in reality and the role of 
the jurist, accordingly. The sharīʿa, in this perspective, is not merely a passive 
reactionary force but rather an active institution that seeks to achieve particular 
purposes, i.e. moral purposes, to be implemented in reality. Similarly, the jurist in this 
functional framework is not a quietist anymore. Rather, he/she is an ambitious agent 
seeking to implement the sharīʿa in reality. This perception of the sharīʿa as a whole 
represents, I would argue, a departure from the functional framework of the 
Bahbahānian paradigm. Whilst this chapter has demonstrated in detail the mechanism 
of the variables, the following chapter will examine the constants, particularly their 
theoretical foundations and the tree of moral values of the sharīʿa as depicted in 
Mudarrisī’s version of the actual maqāṣid al-sharīʿa. 
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5. Chapter Five 
Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿa: The Moral Values of the Sharīʿa 
 
5.1. Introduction 
In the preceding chapter, I addressed Mudarrisī’s view regarding the nature of the 
sharīʿa. A number of themes were focussed upon, namely, the theoretical foundations 
of the nature of the sharīʿa, its internal mechanism, its components, and the way in 
which it integrates with reality. One of the principal ideas Mudarrisī embraces regarding 
the sharīʿa is that it consists of constants and variables. The constants represent 
general moral values, whereas the variables represent the applications of these moral 
values in reality at a specific time and in a specific place. The variables of the sharīʿa 
were addressed in detail in the preceding chapter; this chapter aims to examine 
Mudarrisī’s theory in connection with the constants of the sharīʿa.  
In general, studying the constants of the sharīʿa in Mudarrisī’s thought contributes to the 
current research in two ways. On the one hand, it is a natural continuation of one of the 
main arguments of the research, namely, Mudarrisī presents a paradigm shift for the 
Shīʿī uṣūl al-fiqh from the Bahbahānian paradigm. In particular, and in relation to the 
preceding chapter and this chapter, it presents his departure from the functional 
framework of the Bahbahānian paradigm. On the other hand, studying the constants of 
the sharīʿa in Mudarrisī’s thought, in a sense, can be deemed as the highlight of this 
research. That is to say, after examining Mudarrisī’s critique of the current Shīʿī uṣūl al-
fiqh methodology of deriving legal issues and discussing his alternative theoretical and 
conceptual tools (which are considered as different not only from the tradition of Shīʿī 
uṣūl al-fiqh, but also from the Sunnī maqāṣidī trend) we can now see his actual practical 
alternative to maqāṣid al-ssharīʿa.  
Accordingly, this chapter falls into two main sections. The first section examines 
Mudarrisī’s theoretical discussion on values, which, in turn, includes two layers of 
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discussion: (a) the moral philosophical discussion and (b) the legal philosophical 
discussion. The second section provides an analytical examination of his actual 
practical outcomes of the constant values of Islam, which are considered as his 
alternative to both the Sunnī and Shīʿī jurisprudential understanding of the sharīʿa’s 
moral values. 
5.2.  Theoretical Discussion of the Values 
This section introduces some theoretical discussions on the values that Mudarrisī 
engages with. The importance of studying these discussions lies in the idea that they 
demonstrate his understanding of the values, his justifications, and the main values in 
Mudarrisī’s thought. In order to locate his position within this discussion, it is argued that 
Mudarrisī is engaged in two broad philosophical debates: (i) the moral philosophical 
debate and (ii) the legal philosophical debate. Throughout these extensive discussions, 
four significant points in Mudarrisī’s moral theory are realised. These four points are 
central to Mudarrisī’s project of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa, they are (a) his understanding of the 
moral faculty of the human being as a unique transcendental characteristic; (b) the 
dynamic feature of the sources of values which consists of intellect (al-ʿaql), reality (al-
wāqiʿ), and revelation (al-waḥy); (c) his theory of faith as the foundation of establishing 
an integrative moral theory; and (d) his understanding of the manner in which moral 
values integrate with legal purposes.  
In order to illustrate these debates and ideas, this section will be divided into two further 
sections. The first subsection presents the moral discussion in which I address three 
issues from Mudarrisī’s viewpoint, namely, (i) the nature of moral value, in which three 
points will be discussed: the conception of the value, the nature of the moral faculty, and 
the evaluation of contemporary moral discussions; (ii) the sources of justification of the 
moral value, in which he discusses the principal trend, i.e. subjectivism, and also 
provides an alternative foundation, i.e. theory of faith; and (iii) the essence of the moral 
theory in which he provides what he thinks to be the main moral values which generate 
other values. The second subsection introduces the legal philosophy discussion in 
which I study three themes: (i) the necessity of the purposes of legal theory and the 
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legal system, (ii) the necessity of having absolute moral purposes, (iii) Mudarrisī’s virtue 
ethics theory as an alternative to contemporary legal philosophy discourse. 
5.2.1. The Moral Discussion 
According to Mudarrisī, engaging in broad moral discussion is necessary, not only for 
establishing a legal moral theory but also for answering essential human existential 
questions.496 Mudarrisī’s view is that moral questions (i.e. regarding what we as human 
beings should do) represent second level existential questions after questions about our 
origins. In a classical Islamic framework, the moral question is connected with practical 
wisdom, that is, the field that deals with the foundation of human socio-political 
institutions. Though Mudarrisī’s works repeatedly rejects many of the elements of the 
Aristotelian intellectual framework for other fields (e.g. metaphysics and epistemology) 
he did not reject the whole theoretical structure of dividing wisdom into theoretical and 
practical wisdom. Rather, by enriching the theoretical structure, Mudarrisī attempts to 
develop modern science and replace its terminology and concepts with the religious 
view. However, from another angle, he believes that engaging in such a broad moral 
discussion is essential, because this sort of discussion, with its invaluable content that 
has been built by different schools of thought, represents reality (al-wāqiʿ). By reality, 
Mudarrisī refers to a sort of socio-anthropological study of different societies and 
thoughts which constitute a source of moral reasoning. This in effect was one element 
of his method of discovering the constants of the sharīʿa along with intellect and 
revelation, as stated before. Accordingly, Mudarrisī devoted a considerable part of his 
third volume of al-Tashrīʿ al-Islāmī to the debate in moral philosophy (and legal 
philosophy). He starts his discussion with defining the concept of ‘value’ and then 
examines the source of justifying values and finally ends with a comparative study of 
many different moral schools which are classified under three main categories: the 
transcendental, the natural, and the activist moral school. Having said that, it is 
worthwhile mentioning three points regarding Mudarrisī’s moral discussion before 
outlining the issue that will be addressed here in this section. 
                                            
496 Ibid., p.91. 
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First, Mudarrisī wrote the third volume of al-Tashrīʿ al-Islāmī, which is devoted to 
discussing moral philosophy, between 1991 and 1992. Since then, the study of morality 
has developed considerably not only in Western literature but also in Arabic discourse. 
Much research has been carried out in the past twenty years on the Islamic moral 
tradition and on the relationship between religion, in its broad sense, and morality.497 
Mudarrisī’s discussion of morality may, therefore, not match the expectations of every 
reader. 
Second, most of Mudarrisī’s moral discussions relate to Western philosophy. An 
explanation for this particular concern is provided elsewhere in this thesis.498 What 
matters here is that, at the beginning of his book, Mudarrisī complained that there were 
not enough resources available for him on moral philosophy.499 Similarly, he complained 
of the poverty of Islamic scholarship for not having serious intellectual work on moral 
philosophy.500 Mudarrisī decided to rely on Western works of moral philosophy that had 
been translated into Arabic and Persian. Unsurprisingly, misunderstandings can be 
seen in Mudarrisī’s discussion of Western philosophy which result from his reliance on 
translation. 
Third, what is of relevance to this thesis is Mudarrisī’s thought regardless of whether he 
accurately understood the moral schools he was studying or not. That is to say, 
Mudarrisī was engaged in explaining and evaluating many moral issues, such as the 
moral faculty, the sources of moral value, and the moral schools. What matters is not to 
what extent he understood these issues accurately, but rather what his moral thought is 
regarding these moral issues which can be extracted from his exposition and his 
reviews. 
Based on these observations, this section will address, as mentioned above, three 
dimensions of Mudarrisī’s moral thought: (a) the nature of the moral; (b) the sources of 
                                            
497 Ḥasan Bilūshī, ‘A Methodological Approach to the Moral Tradition: A Critical Reading for Establishing Promises 
and Methodology’, al-Baṣaʾir, no. 45 (2009). 
498 See on page 87-90. 
499 Al-Mudarrisī, al-Tashrīʿ al-Islāmī: Manāhijuhu wa Maqāṣiduhu, vol. 3, p.5. 
500 Ibid., p.6. 
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justification(s) for the moral; and (c) the essence of the moral theory. Mudarrisī’s 
exposition of moral theories will not be studied here, not only due to space constraints, 
but also because it is not required to deepen our understanding of his moral thought. 
 
5.2.1.1. The Nature of Moral Value 
Mudarrisī begins his moral discussion in a very typical Islamic, juristic, and traditional 
way. The discussion starts with providing a definition of the subject of research. At the 
end of his discussion of moral value a significant position is reached on his 
understanding of the moral faculty of the human being. This understanding can be 
deemed as a cornerstone of his moral thought. According to Mudarrisī, of the moral 
faculty is the means by which the human practices transcendence, moral 
representation, and sanctification. The moral faculty has a significant effect on his 
discussion of the sources of justifying moral values. Then, in light of clarifying the nature 
of the moral faculty, Mudarrisī provides an evaluation of the contemporary moral 
discourse which explains his concern with the maqāṣid al-ssharīʿa and reflects his 
vision of the legal and social prospects of the maqāṣidī discourse. In the following, I will 
address these subjects respectively, as stated above. 
5.2.1.1.1. The Concept of Moral Value 
Although the debate Mudarrisī aimed to engage in was primarily a philosophical one, he 
began his discussion of the concept of moral value with the field of social psychology. In 
attempting to differentiate between moral value and other close concepts, he relied on 
some social psychology research that had been done to study the development of moral 
values in the childhood period.501 Within this research, the researcher was obligated to 
clearly differentiate between different concepts. Mudarrisī thought that it would be a 
useful starting point to begin this way so that he could identify the concept of the moral 
value. However, within his discussion on clarifying the concept, he moved from a social 
psychology discussion to a philosophical debate. Extracting the philosophical details 
                                            
501 Mudarrisī relies on the research of ʿAbd al-Laṭīf Khalīfah. See ʿAbd al-Laṭīf Khalīfah, Irtiqāʾ al-Qiyām: Dirāsah 
Nafsiyya, vol. 160, ʿĀlam al-Maʿrifah (Kuwayt: al-Majlis al-Waṭanī lil-Thaqāfah wa al-Funūn wa al-Ādāb, 1992). 
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from his discussion is the concern of the research here, especially in the discussion of 
the nature of the moral faculty. 
The accepted definition of moral value for Mudarrisī is ‘a human belief or doctrine about 
holy or legitimate goals that provides criteria to judge things or actions as good or bad 
or as they should or should not be done.’502 
In light of the above definition, Mudarrisī differentiates between moral value and some 
other concepts, as follows. 
(a) Between Value and Need (al-ḥāja) 
Moral value differs from need in that need has a biological nature, whereas value is a 
representation of biological and/or social need in a spiritual form. Therefore, it is 
different in its formation and in its ability to resist and transcend biological and social 
needs.503 
(b) Between Value and Motive (al-dāfiʿ) 
Motive might consist of different components of which value can be one. However, 
value precedes motive in terms of level as it is a conception or a representation toward 
something. However, value preceding motive does not mean that it always constitutes 
it, as in many cases the value of an agent could be weak to an extent that it will not 
motivate him/her toward something or toward an action.504 
(c) Between Value and Interest (al-ihtimām) 
Value is more general than interest as the former is characterised by both being a social 
criterion of a transcendental nature and having a sort of hierarchal order within it. 
However, interest is merely an individual status and it does not have a hierarchal order 
within it.505 
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(d) Between Value and Trait (al-sima) 
Value is one of the components of trait. However, it is the conscious part of the trait 
which can be changed through the tools of changing the consciousness, say, through 
reflection, reasoning, thinking, and arguing.506  
(e) Between Value and Belief (al-muʿtaqad) 
Value and belief share three features as both give criteria of the true and the false, give 
criteria of the good and the bad, and motivate the agent toward acting in a certain way. 
However, according to Mudarrisī, value is one part of the many manifestations of belief 
and it is exactly the manifestation of belief in the agent’s behaviour. In the other words, 
it is the behavioural part of belief.507 
(f) Between Value and Attitude (al-ittijāh) 
Attitude is the collection of action toward several things. By this definition, Mudarrisī 
argues that value is conceptually narrower than attitude in which the value is a mental, 
psychological, and spiritual status that directs and constitutes the soul of attitude. In a 
way, attitude, as a collection of the agent’s actions, represents the tools and/or 
applications of the value in reality. Here, Mudarrisī insists on the precedence of value 
over attitude, because of the philosophical difference between them in terms of their 
origin. Of these, the former is a downward operation that starts from the mental and 
rational concepts toward the psychological status and ends with action, whereas the 
latter is the opposite. Mudarrisī’s insistence here reflects his philosophical stance 
against behaviourism.508 
(g) Between Value and Behaviour (al-sulūk) 
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Mudarrisī also argues that behaviour does not always reflect the values of an agent. 
This is due to the fact that representing value in reality is constrained by the social 
context in a way that an action cannot tell which value it includes. Moreover, an agent 
might have a dichotomy in his/her character that makes him/her act differently from 
his/her values. Therefore, the agent believes that value is more general than behaviour. 
Here again, he attempts to maintain his philosophical position against behaviourism.509 
5.2.1.1.2. The Nature of Moral Faculty 
Mudarrisī’s discussion on the concept of moral value shows just how significant the 
moral faculty is in his thought. On different occasions throughout his survey of moral 
theory and schools of thought, Mudarrisī repeatedly refers to the moral faculty and so it 
seems to be one of the cornerstones of his moral thought. Moreover, as stated above, 
based on his particular understanding of the moral faculty, he presents his vision of 
contemporary moral discussions and the prospects of the maqāṣidī project in Islamic 
thought. 
Mudarrisī describes the special human moral sense as the property of representation 
(al-tamthīl wa al-iḍfāʾ), transcendence, sanctification, inclining toward sublimation (al-
tasāmī) and loving the transcendent. He uses these expressions interchangeably to 
refer to a special human property that differentiates him/her from other creatures by 
having an inner subjective faculty that enables him/her to transcend himself, add a 
sense of beauty to material things, sanctify the meanings represent his social 
relationships beyond its physical limits, and seek to transcend the physical components 
of things. In recognition of this sort of faculty, Mudarrisī is not the only one who sees the 
special ‘inclination’ in the human being. However, what differentiates him from others is 
his particular understanding of it. On the one hand, he argues that it is an inner 
component of the human being. However, it is not a biological component as some 
philosophical and scientific schools claim, in which they see that the only way of 
studying it, then, would be through its material manifestations (at the time when 
Mudarrisī was writing his work, this type of thought had not witnessed a significant 
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expansion as it has done today in different scientific fields, not least of which is 
neuroscience).510 Rather, in Mudarrisī's view, it is a ‘spiritual’ component of the human 
being or a ‘divine breath’ (nafḥa rabbāniyya) or a ‘spiritual immanence’ (muḥāyatha 
rūḥiyya) or it might be called in Qurʾānic terminology ‘the reproaching soul’ (al-nafs al-
lawwāma) or ‘breaking into obstacle’ (iqtiḥām al-ʿaqaba).511 Mudarrisī here finds affinity 
with one of the main schools of thought concerning human nature, namely, dualism.512 
Nevertheless, he also refers to his understanding of the intellect, which he sees as a 
divine light of God in the human being, as was previously discussed.513 
On the other hand, Mudarrisī argues that this faculty is not merely an inner faculty, as 
some philosophical schools, especially subjectivism, have claimed. Instead, he argues 
that this faculty is an inner component. However, and simultaneously, it is a part of the 
natural order of the existence as some naturalist schools have claimed.514 That is to 
say, the moral faculty is not merely an inner, emotional, non-normative, and irrational 
faculty as some subjectivist moral schools have argued. Rather, he argues that, as with 
causality the moral faculty is a part of the natural order, the general will, or the universal 
soul in which there are some normative criteria of the true and the false and the good 
and the bad. If causal orders and systems are discovered through experimentation in 
the physical domain, they are discovered in the social domain through intuition, 
conscience, or reason. We may consider Mudarrisī to be referring to the intellect when 
he talks about discovering social causation and not negative faculties of the human 
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being, such as al-dahmāʾ.515 Here, Mudarrisī inclines toward the naturalist moral 
schools. However, he generally seems to take a middle position between subjectivism 
and objectivism. 
In summary, the moral faculty as Mudarrisī conceives it, is an inner normative rational 
faculty in the human being amongst other faculties, and corresponds to the reproaching 
soul. Moreover, it is consistent with the natural order or the universal will in terms of 
having criteria and consisting of a causal order. The intellect as a partially separated 
element from the human being plays the role of connecting the inner moral faculty with 
the universal will to reach a reasonable moral judgment. This view can be considered as 
a middle position between two broad trends in moral philosophy, namely, subjectivism 
and objectivism. 
5.2.1.1.3. Evaluation of Contemporary Moral Discourse 
Based on his understanding of the moral faculty, Mudarrisī engages in an intellectual 
conversation with the French philosopher François Grégoire, whose book on moral 
philosophy, The Grand Moral Doctrines516, represents one of Mudarrisī’s main sources. 
At the end of his book, and after having introduced several moral schools, Grégoire 
provides an evaluation of contemporary moral discourse in order, he claims, to learn 
moral lessons from the extensive moral debates. Mudarrisī takes the opportunity to 
comment on Grégoire’s evaluation thereby showing not only his opinion of 
contemporary moral discourse, but also his vision of the prospects for his maqāṣid al-
sharīʿa project. 
Grégoire presents three conclusions regarding contemporary moral discourse, as 
follows. 
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a. Grégoire believes that the ambition of establishing a moral philosophy with a 
firm rational and scientific basis, had been abandoned in the modern era, 
especially after Kant.517 
Mudarrisī clearly disagrees with this conclusion. Conversely, he argues that this 
ambition is not only possible, but it is also still underway in the contemporary era.518 
This might be attributed to his approach of the source of moral reasoning, which will be 
discussed later,519 which combines subjectivist schools and the natural school, 
especially with the assistance of religion in which the opportunity of reaching a level of 
stability in moral philosophy is very likely. 
b. Grégoire argues that of the transcendental, naturalist, and subjectivist moral 
doctrines the modern period is dominated by the latter and is seen in several 
moral theories. Thus, morality is looked upon as an inner individual matter 
more than as a rational and systematic social one.520 
Mudarrisī again disagrees with this conclusion and thinks that all three grand moral 
doctrines are still alive and active, especially the transcendental schools which are 
based on religious teaching and thought. He argues that Grégoire has only reflected 
upon the course of moral philosophy in the West and this is obviously indifferent to other 
cultures and traditions.521 
c. Grégoire argues that individuals nowadays struggle with being moral, which 
requires inner motivation, or what Kant describes as the moral dimension of 
duty (deontological), especially with the social constraints and impositions 
which, if followed without conviction, make the individual immoral.522 
Here, Mudarrisī partially agrees with Grégoire. However, he argues that Grégoire’s fault 
lies in his belief that to be moral, the individual has to be motivated solely from within. 
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Alternatively, Mudarrisī thinks that morality is a combination of inner and social 
motivations. As we shall see later on523, he thinks that there are three sources of moral 
reasoning. Therefore, for somebody to be moral, he/she has to combine intellect, 
nature, and revelation. Social constraints, especially if they are rooted in tradition, are 
right and proper tools to implement morality in society.524 
Based on the intellectual conversation above, it might be argued that for Mudarrisī there 
is the potential to establish a rational, stable, and moral philosophy. Such a moral 
philosophy will be on a subjectivist basis but will also have a societal perspective. This, 
however, seems to be another expression of his maqāṣid al-ssharīʿa project. 
5.2.1.2. Sources of Moral Value 
This section addresses sources of moral value in Mudarrisī’s thought. Mudarrisī has 
shown his opinion through an intellectual conversation with several moral philosophies, 
especially from the Western tradition. The importance of this section lies in showing the 
sources which Mudarrisī deems as valid foundations of moral reasoning. Moreover, 
through this comparative debate, he provides his understanding of faith; an 
understanding which he believes to be comprehensive and benefitting from various 
moral schools. It is this understanding of faith upon which Mudarrisī bases his inquiry 
into the moral values of the sharīʿa. 
Broadly speaking, moral philosophy can be divided into two broad positions regarding 
the source of moral value, an issue which is studied in the field of meta-ethics, as it is 
known nowadays. These two positions are subjectivism and objectivism525. Subjectivism 
argues that the source of moral value is a subjective matter for the human being. 
Differences in subjectivism regard intuition, emotion, good will, or even social 
construction as the evidence for moral judgment. Conversely, objectivist schools argue 
that the source of moral value is something beyond the human self. Objectivists can be 
divided into two broad types: (i) those who believe that the source of moral value is a 
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transcendent thing beyond the physical world (mostly people with religious 
commitments) and (ii) those who believe that the transcendent thing is not beyond the 
physical world, but it is rather something within the material world (mostly people with 
naturalist tendencies). 
Mudarrisī, in his attempt to theorise the source of moral value, has discussed several 
positions in meta-ethics, giving considerable attention to the subjectivist schools. 
Mudarrisī discusses realism, Kantianism, and social constructionism in both its 
Durkheimian and positivist forms. Mudarrisī pays little attention to objectivist schools, 
providing only an evaluative overview of objectivism, mainly of a naturalist variety. 
Finally, he presents his theory of faith as an alternative to other moral philosophical 
doctrines.  His theory, unlike the others, begins with begins with belief in God, which in 
turn entails various interacting sources of moral reasoning. 
In the following, I will demonstrate his views, as stated above, beginning with 
subjectivism and its types, namely, realism, Kantianism, and social constructionism. I 
will then move toward objectivism by introducing Mudarrisī’s general observations, and 
finally I will end with his theory of faith. 
5.2.1.2.1. The Subjectivist Schools 
The subjectivist schools, broadly speaking, argue that the source of moral value is the 
human self, although their expressions regarding the components of the self vary. This 
is how Mudarrisī understands this position, and therefore he regards many philosophers 
under this category, such as Spinoza, Hegel, Kant, Dewey, and Perry. Before going 
through the intellectual conversation with these subjectivist schools, Mudarrisī provides 
five general evaluative observations on subjectivism, as listed below. 
(1) Mudarrisī believes that subjectivism, in its different versions, represents the 
essence of the materialist crisis of thought and that materialism is the source 
of the disadvantages of subjectivism.526 
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(2) As an explanation of the preceding point, subjectivism, in its best version, is 
no more than an attempt to centralise the human being in the world. However, 
it entails neglecting the environment as well as other creatures (such as 
animals).527 
(3) Taken as the essence of the crisis of tendency, subjectivism, in its various 
versions, has not been successful in establishing a strong ground for morality 
beyond the individual utility through which it attempts to establish the social 
institution. However, according to Mudarrisī, this subjectivist individuality does 
not have sufficient philosophical foundations for preserving the continuity of 
the social institution beyond the axial of the self.528 
(4) Mudarrisī argues that the human self, whether represented by intuition, will, or 
conscience, has no priority over the general order.  The self does not have a 
higher level of existence, nor is it more valuable in moral terms than other 
morally valuable items such as the general order of nature.  The order of 
nature could be of greater moral priority since it is the starting point for all 
morality. According to Mudarrisī, the sort of philosophical moral reasoning 
where the self is viewed as the absolute value fails to recognise the position 
of the self within the grander order of existence.529 
(5) The natural result of subjectivism – in spite of its original idealistic aims of 
establishing a shared good and the morality of duty – is the nihilistic atheist 
existentialism of the twentieth.530 
5.2.1.2.1.1. Realism 
Realism has various forms, however, all of them share, according to Mudarrisī’s 
understanding, an epistemological stand toward human knowledge. The 
epistemological stand makes a clear distinction between the subject and the object. 
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Thus, it maintains that for knowledge to be correct, it has to correspond with reality. 
However, it conceives that gaining knowledge and examining its correspondence is 
done through a sort of relationship between the subject and the object. According to 
Mudarrisī, moral realist philosophers have transferred this paradigm to moral reasoning, 
in which moral values are a sort of relationship that is constituted through selective 
operations and attitudes determining the morality of an action,531 which is known in 
Western literature as cognitivism.532 
Mudarrisī’s evaluation of realism, and particularly moral realism, can be summarised in 
the following three points. 
(1) Mudarrisī agrees with realist epistemology, which argues that the reality of the 
object, and therefore the truth, is independent of the subject. Thus, the 
corresponding relationship is the criterion of the truth.533 
(2) Mudarrisī disagrees with the realist explanation of the relationships between 
the subject and the object. Realism, as he understands it, conceives the role 
of the human being in gaining knowledge as a passive role, in which the 
agent is only a receiver of reality’s stimulus. Instead, Mudarrisī argues that 
although the truth is independent from the human being, knowledge is gained 
through an active role from the subject which happens through the intellect, 
which according to Mudarrisī’s theory is a divine light that gives the human 
the ability of knowing. Subsequently, he denies what he describes as the 
camera–picture relationship between the subject and the object. Instead, he 
sees that the active role of the human gives him/her the feature and meaning 
of knowledge over the object. Having said that, he admits that there is a part 
of the human self which is responsible for reflecting reality or bad experience 
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without a critical sense, which, in turn, would incline the human to make 
mistakes. This part is what he calls desire (al-hawā) or al-dahmāʾ, which is 
different from intellect.534 
(3) In a moral discussion with realism, Mudarrisī applies his criticisms to its moral 
applications. Thus, at the same time, he appreciates its insistence on the 
independence of moral truth. He also criticises what he thinks of as the 
passive realist view of human agency in gaining moral truth. The view that is 
entailed to relativism at the end in terms of moral reasoning, as Mudarrisī 
sees it, is the new realism of Perry in which the source of moral values is 
merely interest.535 
5.2.1.2.1.2. Kant’s Morality 
Mudarrisī considers Kant’s moral philosophy to be subjectivist. He addresses Kant’s 
moral thought in two sections in his book: first when he deals with sources of moral 
value,536 and second when he studies moral schools.537 Although there is a distinction in 
terms of the quantity in each section, the points addressed are the same. He addresses 
three points in Kant’s moral thought: the source of moral value, the good free will, and 
the categorical imperative. Below are further details on these themes. 
(I) The Source of Moral Value 
Mudarrisī, like many others, argues that Kant’s contribution to moral philosophy was 
revolutionary. According to Mudarrisī, Kant was relatively successful in bringing about 
belief in the human as a rational creature and as a source of moral value.538 Kant’s 
attempt to criticise pure/theoretical and practical reason was in a way seeking a source 
of moral value that does not depend on any material elements, such as human desire or 
experiment. Instead, it sought a prior rational foundation. Although it has been 
expressed variously, Kant, according to Mudarrisī’s understanding, equates the source 
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of moral value with a faculty of rational and free human beings which can establish a 
categorical imperative.539 
 
(II) The Good Free Will 
Mudarrisī argues that Kant’s discovery of the fact that human beings are able to be a 
source of moral value resulted in him terming this feature ‘good will’. This phrase is 
used to mean the will which demands an action, just because it is moral and not 
because of anything else. It has this feature because of following the rational faculty of 
the human being, namely, reason.540 
(III) The Categorical Imperative 
As good will is rooted in the human being as a rational creature, all human beings must 
share good will. Thus, it establishes a categorical imperative with which all human 
beings can discover and follow and subsequently it gives grounds for the co-existence 
between human beings in which they share the common or general good.541 
Mudarrisī seems to be content with providing a brief overall exposition of Kant’s moral 
philosophy together with an overall evaluation. On the one hand, he appreciates Kant’s 
attempt to identify the source of moral value for humans and especially his 
establishment of a transcendent faculty that is prior to, and independent from, any 
material components.542 However, on the other hand, although Kant was relatively 
successful in discovering the value of reason, Mudarrisī argues that Kant does not 
provide a clear-cut definition of reason or intellect. Kant’s reason is still, according to 
Mudarrisī, a part of the human self and not transcendent of it, that is, differentiating 
between reason and desire is not enough if reason is not a transcendent element. Even 
though Kant was aiming at a sort of categorical imperative, the philosophical 
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foundations of free will would turn again to be subjectivist. Similar could be said about 
his attempt to establish a priori knowledge.543 
 
5.2.1.2.1.3. The Social Constructivist Morality 
Mudarrisī addresses what is described in contemporary Western literature as the ‘social 
constructivist school’544 mainly through presenting the ideas of the French sociologist 
and philosopher Emile Durkheim (d. 1917). He first examines Durkheim’s philosophy of 
society, the social institution, and the social self. Following this, he studies Durkheim’s 
moral philosophy which ends up with a relativist and descriptivist view of morality, 
according to Mudarrisī. Finally, he provides his evaluation of the whole enterprise of 
social constructivist morality. Below are further details on these themes. 
(I) The Philosophical Foundation of Social Constructivism 
Social ‘construction’ or ‘constructionism’ or ‘constructivism’ are terms that have widely 
been used in the humanities and social sciences and applied to several objects to 
represent a philosophical understanding of human phenomena and, recently, even of 
natural phenomena.545 The core idea of social constructionism is that ‘some object or 
objects are caused or controlled by social or cultural factors rather than by natural 
ones.’546 Therefore, it aims to show ‘that such objects are or were under our control: 
they could be, or might have been, otherwise.’547 This understanding of social reality is 
attributed to the French sociologist and philosopher Emile Durkheim, who attempted to 
establish a theory of social ontology that argues for the real existence of society. 
Durkheim, in Mudarrisī's view, presents society has being parallel to nature, featuring its 
own rules, constraints, motivations, and even logic that overrules and precedes 
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individuals. Moreover, society is prior to individual ontology by which the individual 
constitutes his/her awareness about the self as a conscious entity, representations, and 
relationships. In a word, the individual’s conception of the social (and maybe the 
natural) world are socially constructed. Mudarrisī argues that Durkheim goes even 
further by saying that even logical norms and concepts are determined by society.548 
This is how Mudarrisī sees social constructivism (or what he describes as the social 
school of knowledge and morality), confining himself mainly to Durkheim’s thought 
despite various developments in contemporary social philosophy.549 Accordingly, 
Mudarrisī builds his evaluation on the core claim of Durkheimian subjectivism that 
emphasises the powerful influence of society over the individual. Mudarrisī, on the one 
hand, argues that the social school was a revolution in social studies which focused on 
the significance of social factors in understanding many human phenomena. 
Subsequently, it has led to discovering many social rules that enable human beings to 
improve their life. On the other hand, Mudarrisī disagrees with the duality of the social 
school in which it is constituted from natural and social ontology, and sometimes it is 
only a social ontology that overrules even the individual’s representations of the natural 
world. Instead, he argues for the triple ontology of existence which consists of individual 
ontology as an autonomous, free, and conscious agent and social ontology as a 
construction that has its own rule and system and natural ontology.550 Within this triple 
ontology, the agency of the human being is constituted. This agency might be overruled 
by social construction and in other cases individual agency constructs social ontology, 
and similarly with natural ontology. Furthermore, Mudarrisī argues that contemporary 
social sciences tend to support the agency of the individual in society, especially in 
fields such as education that are concerned with habits, traits, growth, and change.551 
Therefore, he rejects social constructivism as a hard determinism and accepts it as a 
soft determinism in which the social factor is a part of the elements that affect and 
constitute the agency of the individual. 
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(II) The Moral Applications of Social Constructivism 
Mudarrisī argues that social constructivism has two main applications in morality. These 
are as follows.  
(a) As society is the principal ontology that constitutes the consciousness of the 
agent of which moral value is a part, and because each society is determined by 
its circumstances, moral values are relative and determined by each society’s 
conditions.552 
(b) Accordingly, the function of any social inquiry and moral theorisation has nothing 
to do with what the morals of society should or ought to be, i.e. normative inquiry. 
Rather, its function is to discover the reality of the actual morality of society, i.e. 
descriptive inquiry.553 
Mudarrisī provides three objections to the above moral applications, as listed below. 
(a) As for the result of relativity, Mudarrisī uses a classical objection to all relativist 
doctrines. He objects to the circular logic which states that if human representation is 
socially constructed it is therefore relative. Mudarrisī says that this idea itself is a human 
representation and is, therefore, according to the logic of social constructivism, itself 
relative. So, according to Mudarrisī it is rather the case that not all human 
representations are socially constructed.554 
(b) With respect to the function of moral and social inquiry, Mudarrisī argues that though 
this idea started with Durkheim, it has been shaped to its extreme form with the extreme 
logical positivism which can be found in the social sciences. Although positivism in 
general, according to Mudarrisī, has provided significant contributions to human 
knowledge, especially in the social sciences, as a methodological enterprise it is 
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confined to some parts of human knowledge and is valid only by integration with other 
philosophical perspectives.555 
(c) Mudarrisī also argues that human experience, the historical understanding of human 
beings, and objective experiments confirm that there are some constant principles that 
generate moral and social values in society. Any rejection of these constant principles 
would put believing in the sociality of the human being in doubt. He wonders how we 
believed in the principle of sociality and then we disrupt the principle. Here, Mudarrisī 
again employs his principle of the intellect or the conscience in which he argues that it 
has discovered the sociality of human being, and it is also able to discover other 
aspects of the human being, including its individuality and the rule of the natural world 
and so forth.556  
In the words of Mudarrisī,  
the problem of philosophical schools is that when they advance proofs, they 
consequently reach a point where they rely on intuition or conscience, in 
which they all claim that their evidences are based on an intuitional 
dimension which is instinctively known. However, they do not rely on this 
intuition to begin with and accuse the one who relies on it as being naïve or 
non-scientific. Yet, intuition (or conscience, or knowledge in which there is no 
evidence except for the intellect) is the foundation of any knowledge.557 
In addition, Mudarrisī says,  
In spite of the differences in interpreting these principles as a direct result of 
the different social conditions involved, the unity of the general concept is 
evidence for the existence of constant human principles. One of these 
principles, perhaps, which the social school recognises and is very focussed 
upon, is the principle of sociality, in which you find people glorifying societal 
living. Is not this a firm value in the human self? Thus, how would it be 
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explained if we did not say that it was a result of an intuitional sense of 
human beings?558  
5.2.1.2.2. The Objectivist Morality 
The essence of objectivism in moral philosophy is represented by the naturalist 
tendencies of morality which see the moral realm, and generally all areas of human 
identity, as being similar to natural reality. This follows from the view that natural 
scientific methods have to be used in any moral inquiry.559 In ancient philosophy, 
objectivism was represented by Epicureanism and in modern philosophy, especially 
since the eighteenth century, it was revived by individuals with quite different 
backgrounds, for example, Pierre Bayle,560 David Hume, and Claude Adrien 
Helvétius.561 Later on John Stuart Mill and Joseph Fourier562 gained their objectivism 
from psychology, whereas with Sigmund Freud it was from medicine. However, the 
most prominent objectivist tendency which remains today is utilitarianism. Though the 
term naturalism is problematic for describing these tendencies, generally they share an 
ontological view toward the reality of the human being, yet, they are different in their 
methodology. Based on this overall understanding of that tendency, Mudarrisī provides 
general observations on the relationship between moral philosophy, philosophy in 
general, and science. He then briefly studies several naturalist schools. What is of 
interest and relevance to the research here is the examination of his general 
observations on the relationship between morality and science, because it reflects his 
evaluation of naturalism as a source of moral value. Therefore, I will examine his 
general insights in this section. 
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Mudarrisī argues that naturalism has provided some benefits to the field of moral 
philosophy especially given its emphasis on scientific rigour.563 However, he maintains 
that its benefits are confined to the investigation of society. Thus, it would help as a 
means to apply morality and to study objects of moral inquiry in reality. Having said that, 
from the ontological perspective, Mudarrisī sees ‘science’ as a non-normative power of 
the human being which enables human beings to discover and exploit reality. Thus, it 
needs to be guided by another wise power of the human being.564 Furthermore, science 
and scientific methods, as we understand nowadays, are quite changeable in their 
nature in a way that on some levels it becomes very difficult to depend on them 
completely. This is not only with regard to establishing a philosophical worldview, but 
also for establishing public policy in any given society. This point has been deeply 
discussed in contemporary discourse, especially in the field of social epistemology and 
public policy, as mentioned before. Finally, Mudarrisī argues that science lacks an 
essential feature of any moral philosophy, that is, commitment. Science and scientific 
methods, as we understand them nowadays, with their changeable features, lack the 
ability to provide a foundation for people to be committed to a certain morality. Instead, 
they incline toward being relative more than being constant and/or stable in practice.565 
Drawing on this idea, Mudarrisī draws two conclusions. 
(a) On the one hand, moral philosophy and philosophy in general have to concern 
themselves with the grand questions of human experience, that is, those questions 
which deal with the constant part of human life and are related to public policies. On the 
other hand, science has to concern itself with the variables and applications of morality 
and rendering services to philosophy. 
(b) On the other hand, science has to have in an integrating, dialectical, and 
harmonious relationship with philosophy, in which science provides the discovered 
particulars that lead philosophy to build general convictions. On the other hand, 
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philosophy provides general convictions that guide scientific inquiry and application.566 
For example, if moral political philosophy comes up with the conviction that the state 
should interfere in society, then science, with the help of the utilitarian norms of 
pleasure and pain, can provide measurable methods to make public policy. The same 
can be applied to any philosophical conviction that would have an effect in society in the 
form of a policy. 
5.2.1.2.3. Theory of Faith 
Having discussed the source of moral value and the subjectivist, social constructionist, 
and objectivist schools, Mudarrisī turns to presenting his own theory of the source of 
moral value. I term this theory Mudarrisī’s ‘theory of faith’. This theory is drawn on the 
attempt to accommodate in an integrating way the contributions of the moral doctrines 
to the field in a way that establishes an open mind from the beginning, and is interactive 
and able to adopt a self-corrective methodology. Moreover, this theory depends on a 
triplet which Mudarrisī always and repeatedly mentions, that is, the triplet of revelation, 
reason, and reality. In the following, I will present the theory in detail. 
One of the common distinctive features of religious discourse, especially Islamic 
discourse, is to consider religion, in its broad sense, as a vital source of moral 
reasoning. However, the way in which each tendency within the religious discourse 
theorises the details of its approach makes each contribution different from others.567 
Mudarrisī believes that religion is represented by faith, as its essence is a vital source of 
both moral value and reasoning. However, in the details of his theorising, he provides a 
distinctive theory that has its features and ramifications in the whole moral thought and 
particularly in the maqāṣid al-sharīʿa. This theory is drawn on two concepts (namely, the 
intellect568 and the moral faculty),569 one of which was discussed in Chapter 3, and the 
other of which was discussed at the beginning of this chapter. Although these concepts 
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are ontologically united, they can be differentiated conceptually and intellectually. These 
concepts connect with three spheres from which they are generated. These spheres are 
faith as the longing for the transcendent; the most beautiful names of God as the order 
of the universe; and the human agency toward the infinite perfection. 
Mudarrisī argues that from the beginning we should recognise that the intellect, 
conscience, intuition, or moral faculty (however we may term it) is the source of true 
human knowledge as well as of moral value. Contrary to other moral philosophies, 
Mudarrisī believes that this source is the ultimate source on which all moral 
philosophies eventually draw their morality. However, they only recognise it partially. 
For example, subjectivism recognises the good will and the cognitive relationship 
between the subject and the object; yet it rejects the sense of sociality and the 
compatibility with the natural world. Here exactly is where Mudarrisī insists on the 
centrality of the truth (al-ḥaqq), which is enlightened and discovered by the intellect 
(including all its capacity of moral and social senses). By such insistence, he thinks that 
the Islamic term for this notion is faith (al-īmān), which means believing in the total truth 
and therefore recognising its merits.570 The essence of faith, in his view, is the absolute 
submission to the truth, and then through this submission the human being will 
recognise the different sorts of existence in which they become the source of moral 
value. 
Based on his understanding of faith, Mudarrisī argues that three spheres will be 
generated which collectively represent the concept of Islamic worship (al-ʿibāda). The 
first sphere is drawn from the most obvious fact and truth in the universe, that is, God. 
Under the intellect or intuition, the first and obvious truth is the existence of the perfect 
and absolute power in the universe, which is morally reflected in the sense of longing for 
the transcendent. This meaning includes a sense of the absolute need in the human for 
the provision of God. Here is where revelation (al-waḥy) becomes a source of moral 
value. The second sphere is drawn from the natural world in which the human being, by 
dealing with and reflecting on the natural world, recognises not only its existence and its 
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components, but also its good design and beauty. This beauty of the natural world, 
Mudarrisī argues, reflects the most beautiful names of Allāh by which He created the 
world in a way that they constitute every part of it. Thus, it morally reflects the intellect, 
which recognises causality and the order of the world, in which the intellect becomes a 
source of moral value. The third sphere is drawn from reality by which he means 
recognising the incompletion of the world and its ability to be invested for the good of 
the human being. This morally reflects reality as a source of moral value, which 
recognises the agency of the human being in investing the earth and in pursuing 
perfection.571 
Mudarrisī considers these three spheres as the essence of faith, in which faith means 
the absolute submission to the truth and the practical faith, which is the meaning of life 
and the philosophy of the creation, i.e. worship (al-ʿibāda). Thus, worship means the 
agency of the human being in processing through these spheres back and forth. This, in 
a whole, represents Mudarrisī’s theory of faith as the source of moral value, in which 
there are three sources of morality, namely, the revelation, the intellect, and the reality. 
Mudarrisī, by this theory, wants to accommodate different moral thoughts in which each 
one of these sources reflects a main moral school respectively: the transcendental, the 
naturalist, and the subjectivist/voluntarist. Moreover, each of these sources and moral 
thoughts reflects, according to Mudarrisī’s conclusion, a main moral value that 
represents the essence of morality (which will be demonstrated below) and these are 
love, justice, and life, respectively.572 Nevertheless, in the view of Mudarrisī, these moral 
values as the essence of morality will be reflected in legal philosophy as the three main 
goals of any legal system. However, when they are reflected legally, they will be 
security, fairness, and advancement, respectively, as we shall see in the legal 
discussion573. 
5.2.1.2.4. The Essence of Morality 
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Mudarrisī, after discussing the source of moral value and studying comparative moral 
philosophy, comes to a conclusion on the essence of morality. He argues that faith 
constitutes the essence of morality. Faith, according to his understanding, is the 
absolute submission to the truth, which follows recognition of its existence and the 
entitled requirements. This produces three main values, each of which generates 
several sub-values to which they are attached. In the following, I will demonstrate each 
value with its sub-values as seen by Mudarrisī. 
5.2.1.2.4.1. Love 
Love is the first component of the essence of morality, according to Mudarrisī, by which 
he means that love is a transcendence of the human self. Its root is attributed to the 
recognition that there are many other existences and the moment of transcending the 
self for the sake of the other is the manifestation of the value of love. Mudarrisī claims 
that love entails charity (al-iḥsān) for others and parents, asceticism, worship, love of 
Allāh and people, living for others, friendship, seeking the common good and utility and 
giving. Here, Mudarrisī attempts to reduce several values from different ethical systems 
to the value of love. He specifically mentions Christianity, Buddhism, Confucianism, and 
utilitarianism.574 
5.2.1.2.4.2. Justice 
The second component of the essence of morality is justice, by which Mudarrisī means 
giving everything that is deserved. Mudarrisī thinks that justice is rooted in believing in 
God and his most beautiful names through which he created the world and which are 
reflected in every part of the world and which are also constituted in every part of the 
world. This is what is called the natural order, which, in a sense, requires a recognition 
of its variety and is morally reflected in giving each constituent part what it deserves. 
Many values are generated from justice, such as making a balance, moderation, 
fulfilment, trust, and animal and environmental rights. Here, Mudarrisī again attempts to 
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accommodate values from different moral backgrounds under the value of justice. This 
time he mentions Plato, Epicurus, and realism.575 
5.2.1.2.4.3.  Life 
The third component of the essence of morality is life, by which he means the strong 
ambition in the human being to seek perfection and to invest in the earth. The root of 
the value of life is attributed to the fact that the reality of the human being and of the 
physical world has not yet been completed. There is still considerable room for the 
human being to seek a better and perfect life both individually and socially. This is 
morally reflected in the agency of the human which generates several other values, 
such as freedom, jihād, health, spiritual experience, advancement , productivity, and 
family. Here, Mudarrisī again attempts to reduce values from different ethical systems 
under the value of life, especially those which are associated with voluntary morality. In 
this regard Mudarrisī mentions Manicheanism, Nietzsche, existentialism, and 
socialism.576 
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Figure 9. The sources of moral reasoning and its reflections on moral values and legal purposes 
according to the view of Mudarrisī. 
251 
 
 
5.2.2. The Legal Discussion 
In his legal discussion, Mudarrisī seeks to make a comparative study of legal philosophy 
in order to identify the essence of the purposes of the law. Thus, he studies three main 
doctrines that have dominated legal philosophical debates, that is, natural legal theory, 
positivism, and social legal theory. Conducting a legal inquiry in this way allows 
Mudarrisī to integrate his moral discussion with his legal discussions which represent 
his theory of the nature and the purpose of the law (sharīʿa). This integration reflects the 
idea that Mudarrisī seeks to break the impasse of duality in the individualist and social 
theories that have dominated legal philosophical debates (and somehow political 
philosophy as well). The solution which Mudarrisī provides is to call for virtue ethics or 
jurisprudence theory as a moral legal philosophy or the project of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa if 
we use Islamic terminology. As for the purposes of the law, Mudarrisī resolves that 
there are three main integrative purposes of the law, namely, security (al-amn), fairness 
(al-inṣāf), and advancement  (al-taqaddum) or the common good (al-khayr al-
mushtarak). 
As for the interest of this thesis, this section will not examine Mudarrisī’s understanding 
and evaluation of legal philosophy. Rather, it will study his legal philosophical vision 
toward three important points. These are: (a) the necessity of the purposes of the legal 
theory and system, (b) the necessity of the purposes of being absolute moral purposes 
rather than being temporary positive purposes, and (c) Mudarrisī’s virtue ethics theory 
as an alternative to the duality of individualist and social theories. These points will 
demonstrate Mudarrisī’s critique of current legal philosophy to which he provided the 
project of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa as the alternative. Moreover, it will show how he integrated 
moral and legal discussion in which he then provided the three main purposes of the 
law as the societal reflections of his moral theory. This, in turn, will show the difference 
between his theoretical discussions, which he introduced in moral and legal 
discussions, and his practical discussions, which will be studied in the next section and 
which represent his practical study of the maqāṣid al-sharīʿa that was based on textual 
study. 
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5.2.2.1. The Necessity of the Purpose of the Legal Theory and System 
Mudarrisī recognises that the relationship of morality and law is much debated, and in 
particular, there is the debate around whether law can be viewed as having a set of 
moral purposes or not. Some believe that morality is not the business of the law or, to 
be more accurate, the legality of any system of law does not depend on its merits. 
Rather, it has to do with its structure of governance. This view is widely held by legal 
positivism.577 For others, even though morality is not the business of the legal system, 
studying the purposes of the law is worthwhile. However, such study has to be done in 
the other fields of inquiry which are peripheral to law, such as political and moral 
philosophy. This view is widely held, according to Mudarrisī.578 For natural legal theory, 
moral discussions represent the essence of legal philosophy in which any legal system 
deserves its legality depending on its merits.579 
In this context, Mudarrisī after studying three main positions (natural legal theory, 
positivism, and social legal theory) argues that studying the purposes of the law is a 
philosophical and pragmatic necessity even for the doctrines that reject the role of 
morality in the law. At this stage of his argument, Mudarrisī differentiates between the 
purposes and the values of the law in which the purpose might be temporary, partial, 
and related to a specific place. However, in the next section, he develops his argument 
further to claim the necessity of the purposes of the law to be absolute. Mudarrisī bases 
his argument on the common notion that morality forms a part of legal philosophy , 
whether completely or partially. It seems clear that Mudarrisī has neither read very 
recent legal philosophy – such as the critiques of hard legal positivism by Dworkin580 
and Raz581 – nor has he read the broad contemporary debates of political and moral 
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philosophy which have a significant impact on legal debates and on such worldviews as 
Rawlsian moral liberalism582 and Macintyrean communitarianism.583 This might suggest 
that his conclusion is based only on his critique of Western modernity, on the one hand, 
and his embracing of the maqāṣidī project, on the other. In any case, based on this 
conviction, he argues that even for doctrines such as positivism and social legal theory, 
studying the purposes of the law is necessary. According to Mudarrisī’s understanding, 
for the contractarian tradition the will of individuals and social parties – through social 
contract – constitutes the law. In the final analysis, Mudarrisī argues, questions of the 
objectives of these wills or the collective will are unavoidable. Otherwise, these wills or 
the collective will would be an arbitrary and meaningless will, which is against the belief 
of human rationality. Mudarrisī thinks that this conviction even becomes widespread 
amongst the contractarian figures in which he mentioned the ideas of Melvin 
Eisenberg,584 a German–American legal philosopher, as an example. As for the social 
theory of law, this is divided into two trends. In one, the law is conceived of as the 
product of social factors, and therefore describes the society rather than directing it. In 
the other, the law is thought to have a purpose, or purposes, making the study of the 
law more like moral or political philosophy. Thus, Mudarrisī argues that even the social 
theory of law has eventually been convinced of the necessity of the purposes of the 
legal system.585 As for utilitarianism, with its slogan of ‘the greatest happiness for the 
greatest number’, the discussion of the meaning of happiness has eventually to be done 
in order to apply the utilitarian doctrine in the legal system. This means, Mudarrisī 
argues, that the purposes of the law has become a necessary debate.586  
Mudarrisī argues that there were several factors that have led to legal philosophy 
having a moral element. in the field of legal studies. He addresses some of them in his 
study of the manifestation of positivism which he mainly refers to in his discussion of the 
intellectual and social environment of the nineteenth century and the increase in the 
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material movement across Western thought.588 Having said this, he also believes that 
there are some objective obstacles which are related to the nature of the research itself, 
which makes it difficult and unpalatable for some, such as its interconnected nature.589 
The philosophy of law, according to Mudarrisī, is in effect an overlapping field of study in 
which political, moral, and social philosophy are intersecting. This sort of research, in 
turn, requires a set of philosophical presumptions around epistemology, linguistics, and 
hermeneutics. The environment of the intellectual and philosophical inquiry of the 
nineteenth until the late twentieth century rejected this sort of interconnected research. 
However, the very late part of the twentieth century witnessed a return to 
interdisciplinary research in legal philosophy and its counterparts. 
5.2.2.2. The Necessity for Legal Purposes to be Absolute 
After arguing for the necessity of the purposes of the legal theory and system and after 
attempting to re-interpret legal doctrines in a way that confirm their compatibility with the 
purposive inquiry, Mudarrisī takes his argument further. His claim states that any legal 
theory and system has to have not only temporary purposes for a particular time and 
place, but also absolute purposes with which the temporary purposes and entire 
legislative system have to be compatible.590 To establish his idea that purposes are 
absolute, Mudarrisī chooses to engage with a figure from the social theory of law who 
has a broad tendency to reject the idea that legal theory needs to be concerned with 
absolute purposes. The figure is questions is Roscoe Pound.591 
Pound, in his influential book, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law,592 argues that 
the purposes that jurists should be concerned with are temporary purposes. Mudarrisī 
quotes the following from Pound: 
Philosophers have devoted much ingenuity to the discovery of some method 
of getting at the intrinsic importance of various interests, so that an absolute 
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formula may be reached in accordance wherewith it may be assured that the 
weightier interests intrinsically shall prevail. But I am skeptical as to the 
possibility of an absolute judgment. We are confronted at this point by the 
fundamental question of social and political philosophy. I do not believe the 
jurist has to do more than recognising the problem and perceiving that it is 
presented to him as one of securing all social interests so far as he may, of 
maintaining a balance or harmony among them that is compatible with the 
securing of all of them.593 
Mudarrisī attributes Pound’s idea to two arguments. Firstly, Pound claims that there are 
profound disagreements amongst people and philosophers with regards to absolute 
purposes, to the extent that it is impossible or at least quite difficult to reach an 
agreement. Thus, these sorts of purposes should be left and jurists have to concern 
themselves with the temporary purposes over which a common consensus is very likely 
to be reached. Secondly, as absolute purposes can not really be a subject of 
agreement, in reality if a legal system has sought to identify such purposes and 
implement them, this would be a kind of dictatorial system.594 
Mudarrisī raises four objections to Pound’s arguments. Firstly, Mudarrisī maintains that 
the absolute purposes reflect the transcendent seeking of the human being for the 
meaning of life and existence which are unavoidable. Thus, any temporary solution, 
such as only focusing on temporary purposes, will not work over a long period.595 
Secondly, there are countless other issues that jurists and philosophers have strongly 
disagreed about, such as the nature of the law. Yet, they have not been left for the 
reason of disagreement. Actually, if they were left for such a reason, there would be no 
legal studies.596 Thirdly, ignoring people’s concerns, that is, the absolute purposes, is no 
less dictatorial than implementing certain purposes upon them.597 Finally, there is ample 
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opportunity to reach an agreement regarding the absolute purposes and it could be 
quite possible if the political and legal system has been established legitimately through 
people’s choice. Here, in fact, the discussion of absolute purposes becomes dynamic 
and necessary for establishing a common consensus and there will not be dictatorship, 
because the institution and the room of discussion have already been created based on 
people’s choice.598 
5.2.2.3. Mudarrisī’s Virtual Doctrine of Legal Philosophy 
Mudarrisī calls for what is termed in the Western tradition as the ‘virtual doctrine’ of legal 
philosophy (al-madhhab al-qiyamī), which he suggests to be the solution to the impasse 
of the two prominent legal philosophies. It is worth mentioning that categorising 
Mudarrisī’s theory in English is problematic as it is sometimes misleading to simply give 
a theory that was established in a particular context and culture a name from another 
particular context and culture. Thus, categorising Mudarrisī’s theory as a virtual doctrine 
or as virtue jurisprudence might mislead the reader about the real content of the theory. 
However, the use of such labels, which have basically been formed in a Western 
context, is merely to approximate the meaning and to show some similarities between 
the theories. Mudarrisī based his choice of virtue jurisprudence on his critique of the two 
broad prominent legal philosophies on the purposes of the law, that is, subjectivist–
individualist theory and social theory. In the following, I will briefly demonstrate his 
criticisms of these two trends and the outlines of his own theory. 
5.2.2.3.1. The Subjectivist–Individualist Theory 
The individualist theory is fundamentally a philosophical worldview of the human being 
that sees the human as a rational agent who is capable of thinking independently using 
reason and therefore making rational choices about his/her life. This philosophy is 
represented in moral philosophy by considering the human self, especially its reason, 
and free will as sources of moral values, as was previously mentioned. In political 
philosophy, it embraces the notion that individual rights are the foundation of the 
political social contract that legitimates the political institution and its legislative system 
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through representing a collection of individual wills. Although this philosophical 
worldview has several intellectual presentations, the Kantian tradition, and therefore the 
contractarian tradition, are deemed as their most faithful branches, according to 
Mudarrisī.599 As for legal philosophy, especially in relation to the purposes of the law, 
this trend, in its broad sense, believes that the individual is the end of any legal system. 
Thus, the whole legal system should seek to fulfil the individual’s interests. This view 
has several ramifications in terms of social, political, and economic institutions. 
Mudarrisī does not provide a detailed presentation of subjectivist–individualist theory. 
Instead, he only provides the outlines of its general ideas. Needless to say, the 
accuracy of Mudarrisī’s understanding is not the concern of this thesis. Rather, his 
actual thinking on contemporary issues, as seen through his criticisms and evaluations, 
is of concern in this thesis. Mudarrisī provides two main criticisms for the subjectivist–
individualist theory; one is related to the limits of justice and the other is concerned with 
the social nature of the human being which affects the foundation of social contract 
theory. For the first criticism, Mudarrisī claims that the centrality of the individual as the 
foundation of the political legal system will lead to a lack of justice in society. This is 
because the freedom of the individual is not necessarily consistent with societal interest, 
and therefore it has to be restricted. This contradicts the foundation of the subjectivist–
individualist theory.600 As for the second criticism, Mudarrisī attempts to attack the 
subjectivist–individualist theory at its roots by claiming that the autonomous individualist 
view of the nature of human beings is fundamentally mistaken. Rather, Mudarrisī 
claims, the strength of human ties to his tradition, family, culture, and his/her entire 
social world is to an extent the factor that makes his/her individuality shrink, that is, fade 
away where his/her single action is not considered as an individual action. Rather, the 
individual’s action is intersected with his social associations in which even the single 
contract made by the individual is done through society’s supervision and affects not 
only the contractor, but also the whole society in general and his/her close ties in 
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particular.601 Here, Mudarrisī seems to be very close to the contemporary Western 
critique of liberalism, in particular the communitarian criticisms of the liberalist concept 
of the liberalist self. In any case, Mudarrisī sees that these criticisms are sufficient for 
not considering the subjectivist–individualist theory as a valid philosophical foundation 
for the legal philosophy of the purposes of the law.  
5.2.2.3.2. Social Theory 
In contrast to the subjectivist–individualist theory as a moral, political, and (therefore) 
legal philosophy, social theories such as socialism and communism have emerged. 
Mudarrisī does not pay attention to their philosophical foundations, except for two 
principles on which these sort of approaches are based, namely, the originality of 
society and social justice.602 Mudarrisī instead focuses on the socio-political factors that 
contribute to the emergence of these approaches. In other words, he discusses the 
historical experience and application rather than the philosophical foundation as he did 
with the subjectivist–individualist theory. Mudarrisī argues that four main factors have 
contributed to the emergence of social theory in moral political philosophy generally and 
in legal philosophy particularly. These four factors, as outlined below, are recognised by 
Mudarrisī to concern different matters. 
Firstly: the worst ramifications of the subjectivist–individualist theory the West has 
witnessed since the late nineteenth century, especially with the emergence of the 
industrial revolution. These ramifications were the exploitation of the vulnerable, the 
poor distribution of wealth, and extreme inequality.603 
Secondly: spread of the national spirit among many nations, which was represented in 
the increase of nationalist ideologies. This manifestation of the national spirit was 
attributed either to the general feeling of indignity, as was the case in Germany, or to 
the spirit of ambition, as was the case in England.604 
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Thirdly: exaggeration in seeking the moral purity of the self, which motivates the 
individual to transcend him/herself and melt into the community. Here is where religious 
teachings played a role, especially the Christian morality which calls its followers to melt 
into the community as a part of moral purification.605 
Fourthly: the authoritative power that was given to the state in the Renaissance period 
which gave the ruler the absolute authority over the people. It was to the extent that the 
will of the ruler was considered as legislation and this was reflected intellectually in 
several works of philosophers especially Hobbes and Machiavelli.606 
Despite the noble intentions of social theories, Mudarrisī argues that in reality the 
experience and application was worse than the experiences of the subjectivist–
individualist theory. The implementation of social theories saw the state, under the 
slogan of social justice, gradually dominate all areas of the society. Thus, the state 
became the absolute power in society in a way that any vulnerable worker could not 
even complain about his situation. The clearest example for Mudarrisī is the experience 
of the Soviet Union.607  
5.2.2.3.3. Virtue Jurisprudence as the Alternative 
Mudarrisī introduces three projects which have been posed to solve the polarisation of 
the individualist–socialist discourse that has dominated legal political philosophy in the 
contemporary age. Needless to say, Mudarrisī refers to the legal political discourse prior 
to the 1990s given that this was the literature available to him at the time of his writing. 
The first project is to not only embrace individualist discourse as a legal political 
philosophy, but to refine it by inflating the legislative body which protects individuals and 
social groups from the greed of capitalism. This project has been adopted, generally 
speaking, by Western countries in which the human rights discourse has been 
increased together with associated discourses.608 The second project is to embrace 
                                            
605 Ibid. 
606 Ibid. 
607 Ibid., p.311. 
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socialist discourse as a legal political philosophy, but refine it in a way that allows room 
for individual initiatives. This project has been adopted, generally speaking, by countries 
like China, as a developed version of socialism, and some left or socialist movements in 
the West, such as the Italian Communist Party.609 Mudarrisī believes that both solutions 
are untenable and that they are only adequate until a crisis reoccurs. 
The third project Mudarrisī embraces is what is called virtue jurisprudence. The core of 
this tendency is to claim that there are a set of virtues which have to be sought only for 
the sake of their virtues. That is to say, neither rights come first (as with the 
deontological and, later, liberalist claim) nor consequences (as with the consequentialist 
claims). Rather, virtue has to be first in establishing the normative legal political system. 
As mentioned above, it might be misleading to label Mudarrisī’s maqāṣid al-sharīʿa 
project as virtue jurisprudence. However, both maqāṣid al-sharīʿa and virtue 
jurisprudence maintain that legal and political philosophy has to be based on moral 
value. Here, again we face both linguistic and cultural difficulties in presenting not only 
Mudarrisī’s project, but also the whole maqāṣid al-sharīʿa project. The difficulty in 
examining the linguistic and cultural context for Mudarrisī lies in the fact that in the 
Arabic and Islamic traditions the words ‘morality’, ‘ethics’ (akhlāq), ‘value’, and ‘virtue’ 
(faḍīla) are quite interchangeable linguistically and conceptually. Thus, in the Arabic and 
Islamic traditions, it does not make sense to make a conceptual distinction between 
morality and virtue.610 This is not to say that, in Arabic and Islamic traditions there are 
not several systems or orders of morality in which the hierarchy of values differs from a 
certain moral order to another.611 But it is important to remember that labelling 
Mudarrisī’s project, and possibly the maqāṣidī project in its entirety, as virtue 
jurisprudence will not be accurate. Nevertheless, virtue jurisprudence, as the legal 
application of the moral philosophical trend of virtue ethics, and Mudarrisī’s maqāṣid al-
sharīʿah, share the core claim that ‘the fundamental concepts of legal philosophy should 
not be welfare, efficiency, autonomy, or equality. The fundamental notions of legal 
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theory should be flourishing, virtue, and excellence.’612 Mudarrisī then claims that both 
the first and the second project are not sufficient, in his words: 
At this point legal research connects with morality, which is considered as the 
principal subject of this volume. In order to identify the common criterion 
between the individual (citizen) and the state (as representative of the 
society), we have to investigate the meaning of the criterion (value) and its 
source of legitimacy, consequently identifying it accurately.613 
Thus, he identifies the solution so as to have a clear order of moral values which is 
looked upon as the criterion of the legal system and public policy, bearing in mind the 
difference in reality.614 At the time of Mudarrisī’s writing, taking into account the Western 
literature available to him, the trends which interested him in this approach included 
some legal philosophers who embraced social legal theory, most of which came from a 
sociology background. Thus, Mudarrisī mentioned several attempts in this context, such 
as those by Eisenberg, Gurvitch, and Pound. However, currently the virtue ethics 
approach is witnessing a revival in moral and political philosophy through the critical 
trend of the deontological and liberalist tradition and the work of Macintyre, Taylor, and 
Sandal.615 In legal philosophy as well, virtue jurisprudence is considered as a new 
approach and has not been established as a standing theory yet. Salmon explains this 
as follows: 
Virtue ethics has hardly vanquished deontology or consequentialism, but 
there has been a flowering of aretaic approaches in moral philosophy and 
productive dialogue between virtue ethicists, utilitarians, and deontologists. 
The best way to test the ability of virtue jurisprudence to contribute to legal 
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theory is to build an aretaic legal theory and evaluate the insights that it 
generates.616 
Based on this, moral values and their hierarchy are still two arguable issues raised in 
the context of the virtue jurisprudence project. Mudarrisī at this stage, that is, the stage 
of theoretical discussion, has proposed the main purposes of the law to be three, 
namely, security, fairness, and advancement  (or common good). However, as he 
surveys the practical discussion, the map of his moral order changed profoundly, though 
these three values were still included in his moral map. 
5.3. The Practical Discussion: The Tree of Values 
The aim of this section is to demonstrate analytically the tree of values Mudarrisī has 
devised in order to explicate the purposes, or moral values, of the law – in other words, 
his version of the maqāṣid al-sharīʿa. This section presents Mudarrisī’s theoretical 
jurisprudential discussion which grounds his maqāṣid al-sharīʿa project and its 
ramifications in the law (fiqh) and which can thus be considered as the climax of his 
theoretical discussion. This section will first provide some methodological 
considerations to connect theoretical jurisprudential discussion with practical discussion. 
Secondly, it will outline the map of values Mudarrisī has produced and their 
interrelations. This point will be done through (a) defining each value under discussion, 
its meaning and its position in the moral map, (b) providing the relevant legal/fiqhī 
discussions, and finally (c) drawing some observations on how Mudarrisī has addressed 
the subject. 
5.3.1. Methodological Considerations 
As was discussed in detail in Chapter 3,617 Mudarrisī has provided a package of 
epistemic, methodological, and hermeneutical conceptual tools as alternatives or 
developments of their current counterparts in Shīʿī jurisprudence. There were, for 
instance, the mechanism of the clear (muḥkam) and ambiguous (mutashābih), al-bāṭin, 
al-ẓāhir, al-tadabbur, the framework of the five circles, al-maʿārīḍ, and so forth. In the 
                                            
616 Ibid. p.6. 
617 See, 151-163. 
263 
 
practical discussion, Mudarrisī has employed these conceptual tools in his research on 
maqāṣid al-sharīʿa. In the following, I will mention some of them, to clarify how they 
work practically and I will begin with the most common and abstract and finish with the 
most procedural tools. 
(a) Mudarrisī considers that the intellect, revelation, and reality are sources of 
value in moral and legal discussion. This framework has been employed in 
his practical discussion in terms of building the concept of each value and 
its legal discussion and in terms of the presentation of moral values. Thus, 
as we shall see later on618, in each discussion of the value, he attempts to 
combine three elements. Specifically, Mudarrisī bases his intellectual 
construction on Qurʾānic statements and ḥadīth texts while consulting 
modern legal discussions on the issue as it represents reality. 
(b) Mudarrisī has provided his insights on the relationship between the Qurʾān 
and ḥadīth, as was discussed in Chapter 3.619 In his practical discussion, 
he attempted to keep this relationship as he had conceived it. Thus, in 
addition to consulting the books of traditions, he also attempted to base 
his hierarchy of moral values on the order in which they are discussed in 
the books of traditions. The traditions in these books are given a particular 
order, especially the sections on the characteristics of the believer (ṣifāt 
al-muʾmin). Mudarrisī particularly relied on the orderings of al-Kāfī620 and 
al-Biḥār.621 Furthermore, he did thematic research in books of tradition on 
each value which he derived from the Qur’an and then he attached it at 
the end of the presentation. 
(c) At the base of Mudarrisī’s moral tree is faith. Mudarrisī has conceived of 
faith as the absolute submission to the truth, beginning with belief in God 
and his most beautiful names and encompassing recognition of others. 
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The tree that begins with monotheism, as the theoretical faith, and ends 
with success (al-falāḥ), as the practical faith, in which both together bring 
about God’s promise of the life of well-being (al-ḥayāt al-ṭayyiba)622. 
(d) Mudarrisī has employed his epistemic hermeneutical mechanism 
(muḥkam) and ambiguos (mutashābih) in his practical discussion. This 
mechanism begins hermeneutically with a deep linguistic reflection on the 
meaning of the Qurʾānic word, then it is followed by tracing the word 
throughout the Qurʾān by considering its position within its topical context 
together with the words which occur with it, followed by a thematic tracing. 
Throughout this process, he transfers from this hermeneutical linguistic 
technique to the epistemic mechanism, in which, after tracing the word 
throughout the Qurʾān, an intellectual concept is realised on the value, in 
which it has to be referred to its origin or principle and simultaneously has 
to be a principle from which the sub-value can be derived623. 
Now, by dynamically combining this package of epistemic, methodological, and 
hermeneutical conceptual tools, Mudarrisī attempted over a number of years to draw 
the tree of moral values. This research took around ten years, whereby he applied his 
approach to drawing a tree of moral values. Eventually, Mudarrisī completed his 
intellectual journey and has illustrated the tree, as will be discussed in detail in the 
following section. 
5.3.2. The Actual Tree of Moral Values 
The tree of moral values devised by Mudarrisī consists of three main values, each 
producing sub-values, and some of the sub-values also produce further sub-values. 
These three main values are faith (al-īmān)624, guidance (al-hudā)625, and success (al-
falāḥ)626.  
5.3.2.1. Faith (al-īmān) 
                                            
622 Cross-RF 
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624 Which he devoted volume four of al-Tashrīʿ al-Islāmī to discuss it. 
625 Which he devoted volume five and six of al-Tashrīʿ al-Islāmī to discuss it 
626 Which he devoted volume seven, eight and nine of al-Tashrīʿ al-Islāmī to discuss it 
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‘Faith’ here is used to refer to theoretical faith, that is, the concepts which believers hold 
regarding the creator and creation. It also refers to the practical faith which is 
represented by acts of worship, such as prayer, fasting, and ḥajj. 
The meaning of faith is that it is the absolute submission to the truth which is manifested 
in its clearest image in God, the most truthful truth627. Based on the absolute submission 
to the truth, faith begins a continuing operation of recognition of created items whether 
they are humans, animals, the environment, material things, or spiritual entities. 
Considering God as the clearest truth and attempting to know Him through his beautiful 
names generates the concept of longing for Him and therefore finding the way to 
approach Him. Though Mudarrisī expresses this idea in modern language, it has been 
expressed in different ways in theological and jurisprudential literature, such as the 
obligation of thanking the giver (wujūb shukr al-munʿim) or the right of obeying (ḥaqq al-
ṭāʿa)628. In effect, this idea is considered as the cornerstone of many jurisprudential 
discussions on the concept of legal issues and the way of knowing God’s will. 
The reflection of these theoretical concepts of faith is represented in practical faith, that 
is, in worshipping God in practice. Here, Mudarrisī mentions629 four axes as the sub-
values which are generated from faith. These are: remembering and thanking God, 
praying and supplication, forgiveness and repentance, and determination and 
infallibility. All these values and sub-values presumably require legal issues that 
organise and regulate them, as Mudarrisī readily admits. However, he maintains that 
this topic should be dealt with in a separate legal work because of the difficulty in 
accommodating all the legal issues of what is called in Islamic legal works al-ʿibādāt, 
which is usually discussed at the beginning of a fiqhī work630. Thus, he settles for 
providing only the concepts of those values considering them as the foundation of the 
coming moral values. 
5.3.2.2. Guidance (al-Hudā) 
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Guidance here represents the learning aspect of the values or the theory of knowledge 
which creates the link between theoretical and practical faith (al-falāḥ), as Mudarrisī 
sees it. Accordingly, he addresses the meaning and the ways of guidance, in which he 
deals with two broad issues: guidance (al-hudā)631 and knowledge (al-ʿilm)632 and these 
occupy the fifth and sixth volume of his work, al-Tashrīʿ al-Islāmī. 
On the topic of guidance, Mudarrisī addresses four issues. These are: the meaning of 
guidance633, the purity of the heart as the impact of guidance634, the covering (al-rayin) 
of the heart as opposed to causes of guidance635, and the cruelty (qaswa) of the heart 
as the impact of misguidance636. On the topic of knowledge, he addresses as well four 
issues: the meaning and the sources of knowledge, the light of knowledge as the impact 
of knowledge, the pact (mīthāq) of knowledge and disinformation (al-ḍalāl) as the 
opposite of knowledge. 
Based on these two volumes, Mudarrisī begins to apply his theory in which he considers 
moral values as the source of legal issues and in which he attempts to derive legal 
issues from each value or sub-value. Also, he begins to apply his theory of the 
combination of revelation, reason, and reality in studying moral values and their entitled 
legal issues. Thus, his way of doing this is to begin with collecting as many Qurʾānic 
verses as possible which are relevant to the topic under study. Then, after reflecting on 
them to derive the meanings and the concepts of the moral value, he follows that by a 
section called the insights of the verses (baṣāʾir al-āyāt) in which he summarises his 
findings of the verses. In Mudarrisī’s terminology, this section can be considered as the 
section of unambiguous verses (al-muḥkamāt). This section is followed by a section 
entitled the legality of the verses (fiqh al-āyāt) in which he discusses the legal issues 
that can be derived from moral value. In this section, he begins with mentioning a verse 
or group of verses and then states the legal issues which these verses include. 
Moreover, in this section, he attempts to link legal issues with their discussion in 
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religious legal literatures (the fiqh discussion) and sometimes with its positive or modern 
legal discussions. In doing that, he sometimes develops the religious legal discussion, 
on the one hand, and comparatively studies the legal issues with modern legal 
discussions, on the other. He follows this method constantly throughout all volumes, 
though the extent to which he expands the discussion varies from one topic to 
another637. 
Having said this, although he followed the above mentioned method in these volumes, 
the legal issues that he ‘derived’ from the moral values under study were modest. They 
were mostly general statements and guidelines, though they were written in a legal 
language. Furthermore, he could neither link them with their religious legal discussions 
nor could he do so with the modern legal discussions. This might be attributed to the 
abstract nature of the topic (the theory of knowledge) or because it is a new topic for 
legal discussion. The following quotation offers some clarification. In his sixth volume, 
which regards knowledge, when Mudarrisī discusses the meaning of knowledge and its 
sources in the section of the fiqh al-‘āyāt, he says: 
We conclude from the verse the value of education and that it is a human 
need and that its tools are hearing and vision. Furthermore, we infer that the 
creation of a human gradually benefits all human beings to know the Lord 
and His well-organised creation so that we might thank Him and know our 
own intrinsic inability. Moreover, to know that human knowledge (as well as 
ability) is a divine gift which God takes back when we become older. 
Moreover, we conclude from that the forbidding of handing things to those 
who become older, at the age in which they cannot not grasp things and; 
therefore, establishing the rule of retirement in accord to the various 
conditions of the lives of human beings.638 
5.3.2.3. Success (al-Falāḥ) 
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Success, al-falāḥ, is the label Mudarrisī gives to describe practical faith. That is to say, 
faith other than worship, which is one component of faith. The previous values were 
mostly abstract or theoretical. However, success represents practical faith, that is, faith 
in practice in everyday life whether individually or socially. Furthermore, in terms of 
quantity, it constitutes three volumes of the work in total: the seventh, eighth, and ninth 
volumes. In terms of quality, however, it almost accommodates all the classic sections 
of fiqh and adds some more sections as well. 
Mudarrisī does not address the value of success itself. Instead, he addresses it through 
two subtitles as sub-values, which, in turn, include some other sub-values. These titles 
are (a) the pillars of faith (arkān al-īmān) and (b) the canons faith (sharāʾiʿ al-īmān) 639.  
5.3.2.3.1. The Pillars of Faith (arkān al-īmān) 
Under the title of the pillars of faith (‘arkān al-‘īmān), Mudarrisī devotes four sections 
which he considers to represent the pillars of faith. Each pillar is, in turn, sub-divided 
into some sub-values. Furthermore, these four pillars are the principles or interior (al-
bāṭin) of the coming values, that is, the canons of faith. These four pillars are piety (al-
taqwā), charity (al-iḥsān), al-jihād and following the best (ittibāʿ al-aḥsan). In the 
following sections, I will discuss these in detail.  
5.3.2.3.1.1. Piety (al-taqwā) 
The first pillar of the faith is piety. Although Mudarrisī addressed the title of piety in the 
fourth volume when he presented a theoretical discussion on faith, here piety is 
discussed as the manifestation of its origins or principles in social life in which it appears 
in four values. These are: (i) fulfilment of God’s covenant, (ii) fulfilment of measurement 
and weight, (iii) return of something entrusted, and (iv) sincerity. Below is a detailed 
discussion of these640. 
i. Fulfilment of God’s Covenant (al-wafāʾ bi-ʿahd allāh) 
There are some covenants which God has required the human being to fulfil, the first 
and foremost being the covenant of monotheism (al-tawḥīd). There are also some 
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covenants which humans have made to others and which must be fulfilled. These sort 
of covenants constitute the largest part of the social life of the human being and give 
rise to many social, political, and economic entities.641 
ii.  Fulfilment of Measurement and Weight (al-wafāʾ bil-kayl wa al-
mīzān) 
Fulfilment of measurement and weight in effect means being fair in the spiritual and 
material rights of people, though it mostly happens in financial matters. Examples of its 
applications in financial matters are giving money to those who deserve it, to do less 
than what is due (al-taṭfīf), or to weigh the goods unjustly. Mudarrisī deems this as the 
general rule which can be applied and guide the jurist to consider the variables in which 
fairness should be considered.642 
iii. Return of Something Entrusted (radd al-amāna) 
Returning something which has been entrusted is deemed as a branch of fulfilling the 
covenant, which means not only returning the entrusted item, but also taking care of it. 
In this sense, it is a support to fulfilling the covenant and measurement, and is therefore 
a sign of the piety, according to Mudarrisī.643 
iv. Sincerity (al-ikhlāṣ) 
Sincerity means purifying religion from polytheism and being sincere to the religion of 
God, not only in rejecting any wrongful social authority (al-ṭāghūt), but also in the pure 
application of the sharīʿa.644 
In the course of his discussion of these titles, Mudarrisī addresses the fiqhī section of 
the covenant (al-ʿahd) which is usually studied in the section of transactions (īqāʿāt). 
However, he expands the discussion to include political agreement (al-bayʿa al-
siyāsiyya), the social contract which establishes social foundations and international 
                                            
641 Ibid., pp11-33. 
642 Ibid., pp.34-9. 
643 Ibid., pp.41-6. 
644 Ibid., pp.47-60. 
270 
 
agreements645. These issues are considered as new issues for Islamic law which arose 
in the modern age. In the coming sections, Mudarrisī will apply his findings here in the 
issue of the legitimacy of the international court in solving conflicts, especially in 
warfare.  
5.3.2.3.1.2. Charity (al-iḥsān) 
The second pillar of faith is charity (al-iḥsān), which means giving more than what 
someone deserves. The concept of charity is a counterpart of justice, which means 
giving what someone deserves. In this sense, both are obligations in Islamic thought, 
except some sorts of the charity which are preferable (mustaḥabb). Though charity as a 
term sounds a merely preferable thing to do, throughout Mudarrisī’s discussion, he 
attempts to show that the considerable part of it in principle is an obligation in Islamic 
morality which is reflected in legal rulings646. 
Legally speaking, Mudarrisī mentions many legal issues that are applications of the 
principle of charity and others which are ruled by the principle. For example, he 
mentions that taking care of parents is an application of charity. Furthermore, the 
alimony which is given to the divorced wife in the particular period between the 
announcing of the divorce to the status of being totally divorced, which is known as al-
ʿiddah in Islamic law, is also an application of charity. There are some examples of 
cases where the principle of charity is ruling the case, rather than being an application 
of it, such as the contract of the curious (ʿaqd al-fuḍūlī) and the limits of the trust of the 
trustee (ḍamān al-amīn). Moreover, Mudarrisī claims that the charitable activities of 
Muslims in society stem from the principle of charity, such as establishing charitable 
foundations, volunteering for social services, and so on. In his al-Tashrīʿ al-Islāmī, 
Mudarrisī is content with just mentioning these. However, in his detailed fiqhī work, al-
Wajīz fī al-Fiqh al-Islāmī647 and in addressing the sections of the contracts, Mudarrisī 
categorises several contracts under the title of charitable contracts in an attempt to link 
legal rulings to their moral values. These contracts are debts or loans (al-qarḍ or al-
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dayn), lending (al-ʿāriya), deposits (al-wadīʿa), mortgages (al-rahn), and gifts or 
presents (al-hiba). In addition, he considers the sections of donations (al-ṣadaqāt) and 
endowments (al-waqf) as applications of the principle of charity.648 
 
5.3.2.3.1.3. Jihād 
The third pillar of the faith is al-jihād which concerns protecting Islamic society from 
immoral influence.  This can be by a social movement, and sometimes even military 
force against an external or internal threat. According to Mudarrisī, jihād has manifested 
firstly in responsibility, then respectively in calling for good (al-amr bil-maʿrūf), migrating 
in the path of God, preparation, integrity, responding to al-jihād, and finally fighting. 
Mudarrisī does not confine his discussion to the narrow meaning of jihād – fighting – as 
most contemporary literature tends to do. Rather, he addresses the conception 
comprehensively from different angles, of which fighting is no more than one aspect. 
Therefore, jihād means making the utmost effort in defending the right values and 
calling for them, beginning with taking responsibility and ending with fighting. 
It can be said that Mudarrisī’s work on the topic of al-jihād is the most comprehensive in 
modern Shīʿī fiqhī literature. On the one hand, it is unlike the classic jurisprudential work 
on the topic which is rather limited. Instead, Mudarrisī expands the scope of the topic 
beyond solely the issue of fighting. On the other hand, Mudarrisī addresses many 
contemporary conceptions of warfare from the legal perspective, such as reasons for 
declaring war, the legitimacy of military interference (al-jihād al-ibtidāʾī), the mechanism 
of solving conflicts, the legitimacy of referring to the international and criminal justice 
courts regarding military conflicts, the extent to which international covenants are 
binding, and prisoner of war regulations.649 
5.3.2.3.1.4. The Following of the Best (ittibāʿ al-aḥsan or al-ḥusnā) 
The fourth pillar of faith is the following of the best (‘ittibāʿ al-aḥsan or al-ḥusnā), which 
means that the believer seeks the best things in his/her speaking, acting, and 
                                            
648 Mudarrisī, al-Tashrīʿ al-Islāmī: Manāhijuhu wa Maqāṣiduhu, vol. 7, pp.63-92. 
649 Ibid., pp.97-390. 
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appearance. In terms of speaking, it represents the value of good speech (al-kalima al-
ṭayyiba), the beautiful speech (al-qawl al-ḥasan), not expressing bad speech, being 
wise in asking, and returning a greeting in the best manner. In terms of acting, it 
represents seeking good deeds, to hasten in good works, reformation and 
reconciliation, and warding away bad with good. In terms of appearance, it is 
represented in purity and adornment. These are the sub-values that branch from the 
fourth pillar. 
In this pillar and its sub-values, Mudarrisī does not provide a legal discussion. Instead, 
his discussion is similar to his discussion of piety in which he provides general 
statements derived from his reflection of relevant Qurʾānic legal verses. This is except 
for the value of reconciliation, in which he addresses the classical fiqhī section of 
reconciliation (bāb al-ṣulḥ), which regulates legal issues about contentions and 
disagreements between people especially in financial affairs.650 
5.3.2.3.2. The Canons of Faith (Sharāʾiʿ al-Īmān) 
The canons of faith (sharāʾiʿ al-īmān) is the second section of the main value here: 
success (al-falāḥ). It means the details of the pillars of faith in human life. It is distributed 
into two axes of values: the first is peace from which several sub-values are branched in 
order to devote peace651; the second is dignity from which several sub-values are also 
branched in order to enforce the dignity652. Thus, peace is a dimension of the piety and 
charity from the pillars of faith, whereas dignity is a dimension of jihād and following of 
the best. The details of these are as follows. 
5.3.2.3.2.1. Peace (al-salām) 
The value of peace is conceived as the ideal value around which many other values are 
centred in the social life of the human being. These values pave the way for the second 
axis of the canons of faith, i.e. dignity. Each value of these then has a set of guidelines 
and legislations which contribute to its application. Mudarrisī mentions here sixteen 
values that centre on peace. These are: security (al-amn), truth (al-ḥaqq), legislation (al-
                                            
650 Ibid., pp.391-502. 
651 Which was dealth in volume eight. 
652 Which was dealth in volume nine. 
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ḥukm), justice (al-ʿadl), retribution (al-qiṣāṣ), the inviolability of life (ḥurmat al-nafs), 
innocence (al-barāʾa), fortification (al-iḥṣān), preservation (al-ḥifẓ), feeding (al-iṭʿām), 
living (al-sakan), health (al-ṣiḥḥa), education (al-taʿlīm), affection and religious 
brotherhood (al-mawadda wa al-ukhuwwa al-īmāniyya), ties of kinship and leadership 
(ṣilat al-raḥim wa al-qawāma), and children and offspring (al-banīn wa al-dhurriyya). 
Below are more details on these. 
a. Security (al-amn) 
Security here means more than the legal and political meaning of security in the modern 
usage of the term. Mudarrisī argues that the value of security in Islamic thought is more 
comprehensive than merely the protection of a person’s properties and self. Rather, it is 
‘the other face of justice and fairness, as without fulfilling the total rights of people – 
beginning with the right of life and ending with the right of electing (the political and 
religious rights) and passing through all rights and sanctities – the individual cannot live 
securely.’653 Thus, he addresses the issue of security beginning with the holding of a 
right belief, as a source of mental and psychological security, and ending with 
preserving rights and sanctities.  
b. Truth (al-ḥaqq) 
Truth means the absolute submission to the truth and considering it as the centre from 
which the relationships of the people in society are constructed.654  
c. Legislation (al-ḥukm) 
Legislation means the centrality of the truth as the reference of the judgment and 
regulations which would happen through considering that God is the source of 
legislation. This can be done through referring to the sound sources of legislation, that 
is, the religious sources, the Qurʾān and Sunnah.655 
                                            
653 Mudarrisī, al-Tashrīʿ al-Islāmī: Manāhijuhu wa Maqāṣiduhu, 1 ed., 10 vols., vol. 8 (Tehran: Dār intishārāt 
Mudarrisī, 2000)p.35. 
654 Ibid., p.9. 
655 Ibid., p.115. 
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d. Justice 
Justice here constitutes the content and the purpose of the legislation and judgment 
which should be based on the fulfilment of rights and acting with fairness. Mudarrisī 
considers justice as the essence of faith which enforces security and paves the way to 
peace. Here, he addresses several dimensions of justice in Islamic law through 
discussing its principles in the legislation of politics, the economy, social institutions, the 
judiciary, and the family.656 
e. Retribution (al-qiṣāṣ) 
Retribution represents the tool by which justice is applied whereby rights are reserved 
and injustice is deterred. This includes both sanctions and punishments.657 
f. The Inviolability of Life (ḥurmat al-nafs) 
The inviolability of life means preserving human life which is considered as one of the 
most sacred sanctities in Islam, according to Mudarrisī. Here, he addresses the legal 
issues that are relevant to the inviolability of human life.658  
g. Innocence (al-barāʾa) 
As a branch of the inviolability of human life, innocence means that the person in 
principle is innocent from any sin. Thus, he/she would not be assumed to be guilty 
except when convincing evidence proves the latter. Here, Mudarrisī mentions many 
legal rulings that confirm this idea of the innocence of the human-being.659  
h. Fortification (al-iḥṣān) 
As a branch of the inviolability of human life, fortification means the responsibility of the 
individual and the society to protect the person from potential dangers before they 
happen. Here is where Mudarrisī expands the conception of security, as the core value 
                                            
656 Ibid., p.55. 
657 Ibid., p.137. 
658 Ibid., p.147. 
659 Ibid., p.165. 
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of peace, to accommodate not only the protection of a person’s properties, but also 
providing a secure environment that includes the protection of his/her intangible rights. It 
is represented in the sexual and intellectual fortification (iḥṣān al-farj wa al-fikr) and in 
defence.660  
i. Preservation (al-ḥifẓ) 
As a branch of the inviolability of human life, preservation means the responsibility of 
the individual and the society to preserve the person from potential dangers. The 
difference between fortification and preservation is that the former is a protection from a 
potential danger before it happens, whereas the latter is from the coming potential 
danger.661  
j. Feeding (al-iṭʿām) 
Starting from this value, Mudarrisī begins to discuss four values which he considers to 
be the basic needs of human beings. The first of these is the human need for food and 
drink. Under this title, he discusses several principles that regulate this value, such as 
the foundations of considering the feeding as the obligation of the society as a whole 
towards each other, especially towards those who are in real need. In addition, other 
considerations are the extent to which feeding should be provided, who is responsible 
for feeding, and to whom should food be provided. Furthermore, he discusses the 
principle of the permissibility of food and drink as the original principle in the field.662  
k. Dwelling (al-sakan) 
The second value of these basic needs is living, which means providing accommodation 
for the people. However, the conception is not confined to merely providing 
accommodation, but rather it means paying attention to providing the city with all the 
necessary resources, such as public utilities, good design, and so forth. Mudarrisī 
                                            
660 Ibid., p.171. 
661 Ibid., p.198. 
662 Ibid., p.205. 
276 
 
mentions as well some legal rulings regarding the sanctity of the home and some of its 
decencies.663 
 
l. Health (al-ṣiḥḥa) 
The third value of these basic needs is health, which does not only refer to the need for 
physical health (manifested through hospitals and medical provision) but also general 
well-being (al-ḥayyāh al-ṭayyiba), which includes psychological health, providing 
treatments, and having a preventative health program. Thus, he mentions the legal 
rulings that are relevant to this value.664 
m. Education (al-taʿlīm) 
The fourth value of these basic needs is education, which means providing primary 
learning and education for the person whereby he/she will be skilled enough for life. 
Mudarrisī here mentions the legal rulings that are relevant to the value, such as rulings 
relating to the role of scholars, parents, and the state in providing education.665 
n. Affection and Religious Brotherhood (al-mawadda wa al-ukhuwwa al-
īmāniyya) 
Starting from this value, Mudarrisī begins to discuss three values which he considers to 
form a social framework for the values of peace which accommodate and enforce them. 
These values are related to the social domain and he begins with the wider concept and 
ends with the narrower. The first of these values is affection and religious brotherhood, 
which means that affection constitutes the foundation of the relationship between the 
believers. Then, it is manifested in the religious brotherhood, which means a sort of 
social authority (wilāya) amongst believers. Mudarrisī then mentions several legal 
rulings that are relevant to these values.666 
                                            
663 Ibid., p.264. 
664 Ibid., p.314. 
665 Ibid., p.343. 
666 Ibid., p.355. 
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o. The Ties of Kinship and Leadership (ṣilat al-raḥim wa al-qaymūma) 
The second of these values is the ties of kinship as the framework of intuitive social 
relationships, which begins with the nuclear family and expands to include the larger 
family, such as the tribe and the clan. Here, Mudarrisī allocates the value of leadership 
(al-qaymūma) as the regulative value of the intuitive social relationship in the nuclear 
family. Accordingly, he discusses the legal rulings that are relevant to those values. In 
particular, he pays special attention to al-qaymūmah.667  
p. Children and Offspring (al-banīn wa al-dhurīya) 
The third of these values is children and offspring, by which he means the overview of 
Islamic thought regarding the seeking of having children, which is considered as the 
value of life. Mudarrisī provides the general principles of Islam and then some legal 
rulings that are relevant to it. He particularly discusses the issue of child support and 
custody.668 
5.3.2.3.2.2. Dignity (al-karāma) 
The value of dignity represents the second axis of the canons of faith under the main 
value of success (al-falāḥ). Dignity, according to Mudarrisī’s thought, depends on three 
theoretical pillars and they are in turn manifested in three values that constitute the 
concept of dignity. These three pillars are: responsibility (al-masʾūliyya); sending the 
prophets (baʿth al-anbiyāʾ) and the straightforward path (al-sabīl al-qawīm); and their 
three manifestations of honesty (al-ṣidq), aspiration (al-taṭalluʿ), and being virtuous (al-
tazayyun bil-faḍāʾil). Below are some details on these factors. 
 The Pillars of Dignity 
Mudarrisī argues that there are three pillars for human dignity, which are not values as 
much as they are theoretical backgrounds that establish the concept of human dignity. 
These are as follows: responsibility, meaning the freewill of the human, his/her ability of 
                                            
667 Ibid., p.392. 
668 Ibid., p.440. 
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possession, and his/her authority (wilāya) in which he/she is able to establish a social 
institution.669 
(a) The sending of the prophets (baʿth al-anbiyāʾ): this means that as the 
human owns dignity, God sent him/her the prophets to be examples 
and models. Thus, it means that the human has an ability to be better 
by his/her choice through following the teachings of the prophets.670 
(b) The straightforward path (al-sabīl al-qawīm): this means that the 
human is able to know the truth and falsehood by what he/she has 
been equipped with, that is, the intellect.671 
These are what Mudarrisī thinks of as the pillars of dignity. Its manifestations are as 
follows. 
1) Honesty (al-ṣidq) 
The first value which arises from human dignity is his/her honesty in seeking the truth 
and standing for it. This would appear in speaking and acting which should be in accord 
with the truth. Mudarrisī argues that this expresses the honour of the human and his/her 
uniqueness over other creatures. Subsequently, starting from this value, he opens a 
wide legal discussion on the legal rulings that are relevant to honesty, that is to say, the 
section of contract and covenant. As for contract, he extensively discusses the section 
of contact which itself has witnessed an extraordinary development in Shīʿī fiqh since 
the work of Shaykh al-Anṣārī. Mudarrisī discusses the objects of the contract, which are 
known as al-makāsib al-muḥarrama, the form of the contract, the eligibility of the 
contractors, and the defect of the will which is known in Shīʿī literature as al-khiyārāt. As 
for the section of the covenant, Mudarrisī discusses the legal rulings regarding promise, 
oath, and bail.672  
2) Aspiration (al-taṭalluʿ) 
                                            
669 Mudarrisī, al-Tashrīʿ al-Islāmī: Manāhijuhu wa Maqāṣiduhu, vol. 9, pp.15-69. 
670 Ibid., pp.70-109. 
671 Ibid., pp.110-32. 
672 Ibid., pp.135-310. 
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The second value which arises from human dignity is that the human is an ambitious 
creature that seeks to achieve goals in the world and hereafter. From this three main 
sub-values arise. First, human beings are equal and they should be above class and 
racism and therefore they should seek to cooperate for mutual good. Second, human 
beings compete in investing the earth for their good and therefore they are concerned 
about time and good governance. Third, human beings seek to gain power for the 
service of the good and truth in which they recognise the real power, which is in the 
hands of God, and seek stable and independent political institutions. 
As most of these values are not discussed in classical Islamic law, Mudarrisī attempts to 
provide legal rulings that are relevant to them, though they are provided as a general 
legal statement rather than as a detailed legal discussion.673  
3) Being Virtuous (al-tazayyun bil-faḍīla) 
The third value which arises from human dignity is that human beings seek not only to 
do the minimum of moral duties, but rather to be virtuous by commitment to a set of 
moral values which are more than required. Mudarrisī here mentions some of these 
values: peacefulness (al-sakīna), restraint (kaẓm al-ghayẓ), humility (al-tawāḍuʿ), and 
forgiveness (al-ʿafw).674 
                                            
673 Ibid., pp.311-476. 
674 Ibid., pp.477-520. 
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Figure 10. The overview of the tree of moral values in Mudarrisī’s maqāṣid al-sharīʿa. 
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5.4. Conclusion 
The above presentation has explained and analysed Mudarrisī’s theoretical and 
practical discussions of the constants of the sharīʿa, in other words, the moral values. 
The theoretical discussion has engaged with moral and legal philosophy in which 
Mudarrisī sought, by doing a comparative study, to provide a theory about the sources 
and the essence of moral values and the main purposes of the law. He has devised a 
dynamic version of the sources of moral values which consists of revelation, reason, 
and reality. As for the essence of moral values, he has concluded that they are three, 
namely: love, justice, and life. However, in his philosophical and legal discussion, he 
has concluded that the three absolute purposes of the law are security, fairness, and 
advancement or common good. It seems that all these theoretical discussions are 
correlated; revelation generates love as a moral value and security as the purpose of 
the law. Similarly, reason generates justice and fairness and, finally, reality generates 
life and advancement or common good. Interestingly, the practical discussion has 
shown a significant difference with the theoretical discussion. The practical discussion 
has been achieved over years of research and was mainly based on close contact with 
tradition, aiming to create a link between jurisprudential discussion and moral values. 
Thus, the findings of such an approach have given rise to a different map of moral 
values, which are considered as Mudarrisī’s version of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa.  
The moral map or what Mudarrisī prefers to call ‘the tree of moral values’ consists of 
three main moral values in which each generates some sub-values and so forth. These 
three values are faith (which is the origin of all values), guidance (which is the path to all 
values), and success (which is the actualisation of all values). Success, in turn, consists 
of four ‘pillars of faith’ (piety, charity, jiḥād, and the following of the best) and ‘the 
canons of faith’, which are centred in two main values from which many other sub-
values are derived, that is, ‘peace’ and ‘dignity’.  
This tree of moral values can be considered as the first Shīʿī version of maqāṣid al-
ssharīʿa. Interestingly, while the general tendency within the maqāṣidī discourse tends 
to narrow moral values or the purposes of the sharīʿa to as few as possible (for example 
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the classical theory sees five purposes675 and some contemporary theories consider 
four spheres),676 Mudarrisī seems to expand them and makes them more complex. This 
might be attributed to the fact that his practical discussion was quite close to the text 
and tradition on one hand, and to jurisprudential discussions on the other hand, in which 
he attempted to accommodate classical jurisprudential tradition and reconstruct it based 
on moral values. The others were either concerned with the theoretical discussion of the 
values or purposes of the sharīʿa, which is usually to a certain extent from practical 
discussion, or concerned with particular sections of the practical fiqhī discussion, and 
therefore were not able to provide a comprehensive framework. 
 
                                            
675 As is the case with al-Shaṭibī and his followers. 
676 As is the case with ʿAṭiyah’s proposal, see Jamāl al-Dīn ʿAṭiyah, Naḥwa Tafṣīl Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿa (Damascus: Dār 
al-Fikr, 2001). 
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6. Conclusion 
Whilst it is commonly held by scholars of Shīʿī  jurisprudential studies that modern and 
contemporary Shīʿī  jurisprudence is the outcome of the victory of the Uṣūlī school over 
the Akhbārī attack, and therefore a resulting revival of the old Uṣūlī school, research, 
however, has concluded a different perspective of the history of Shīʿī  jurisprudence. 
This is a reading that does not see the field of jurisprudence as a closed academic field 
but, rather, as an element within a broader construction, which includes socio-political 
and intellectual components that contribute to the composition of the characteristics of 
this field within a particular historical context. Thus, it advocates that an understanding 
of the historical developments of Shīʿī jurisprudence is necessary in order to understand 
modern and contemporary discussions and theories within it. Committed to this 
methodological perspective, the research has concluded that the current Uṣūlī trend in 
Shīʿī jurisprudence is not merely a continuation of pre-Akhbārīsm, despite their sharing 
of a name and common slogans; it is, rather, a new paradigm with its own 
epistemological, methodological and functional frameworks.  
There were several socio-political and intellectual factors particularly during the Safavid 
period that contributed to constructing this paradigm, better known as the Bahbahānian 
paradigm. This nomenclature goes back to a famous Shīʿī scholar in the eighteenth 
century Muḥammad Bāqir al-Bahbahānī (d. 1791), also known as al-Waḥīd al-
Bahbahānī and who is credited with the defeat of the Akhbārī school, and therefore, 
with having establishing modern Shīʿī jurisprudence. The Bahbahānian paradigm is 
characterised, the research argues, by being Aristotelian in its epistemology, formalist in 
its methodology and soft-utilitarian in its functionality. If there were particular objective 
conditions for the Bahbahānian paradigm that necessitated its existence, the twentieth 
century came along with its own particular requirements and challenges that 
necessitated a modification or breakdown of this paradigm. The essence of those 
challenges is the increasing participation of the jurist in public affairs, especially the 
‘political jurist’ who engages in politics through the position of the religious institution in 
the Shīʿī community. In other words, it is identifying the distance between the religious 
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institution and the temporal power, and thereby the scope within which the jurist 
competes against the attempt of the modern nation-state to secularize the public 
sphere. Within that particular sphere, the Bahbahānian paradigm made the Shīʿī 
religious institution quietist.  
In opposition, the essence of the response to these new challenges was a conviction 
that the Bahbahānian jurisprudential mechanism was insufficient to meet the 
requirements of the new reality. Thus, arose the call for a mechanism that was able to 
deal with the public sphere without accepting the secularization of religion whilst at the 
same time being characterised by initiative and effectiveness. These requirements were 
represented in the call for the maqāṣid al-sharīʾa. However, by surveying the attempts in 
this regard within the Shīʿī jurisprudential discourse, there was variation in the way that 
some of them were advocating for a modification of the Bahbahānian paradigm, 
whereas others were calling for the creation of a new field to deal with the maqāṣid al-
sharīʾa, namely the field of philosophy of fiqh, and yet others called for a new paradigm 
altogether. In this context, Muḥammad Taqī al-Mudarrisī (b. 1945) is a scholar who not 
only called for a new paradigm, but who has also provided a systematic contribution 
towards it, - in theory and practice -, that advocates the abandonment of the 
Bahbahānian paradigm in favour of a virtue-ethics paradigm. 
Committed to the same methodology, this research attempts to contextualise Mudarrisī 
as a thinker within a specific historical development of the Shīʿī institution. Here, the 
research concludes that the most effective context for interpreting Mudarrisī is the study 
of the political position of the Shīʿī jurist in the twentieth century and his ambitions. This 
position has been materializing since the initial participation of the Shīʿī jurist in the 
political regime of the Safavid Empire, which then developed through the Qajar period 
towards his becoming more independent, and finally ended with his ambition to create 
his own state, which happened with the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979. Mudarrisī 
belonged to this latter generation.  
However, his experience was characterised partially by his family’s associations, where 
he is descended on both paternal and maternal sides from political and revolutionary 
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families, namely the Shirāzīs and the Mudarrisīs. Furthermore, his intellectual 
association to a specific theological-philosophical school within the Shīʿī scholastic 
circle, the Tafkīkī school, added a unique feature to his experience. Although the Tafkīkī 
school is not a political movement but rather an anti-political engagement, its theological 
rebellion against the dominant trend within the Shīʿī religious institution liberated him 
from traditional obstacles and allowed him to set out with wider scopes. Moreover, he 
was active within a particular context in the Middle East, namely the context of a 
confrontation with the West, represented by the liberation from the consequences of 
colonialism, especially the Israel-Palestinian conflict. This overall context had its 
conditions and requirements on both theoretical-intellectual and practical levels. As 
Mudarrisī is an intellectual and an activist, on the intellectual level he was preoccupied 
with the triad of originality, contemporaneity and the Other, specifically the ‘Western’ 
other. On the practical level, he established a socio-political movement, which had 
significant impacts on the history of the Shi’a in the Middle East, especially in Iraq, the 
Gulf and Iran.  
This combination of intellectual and practical engagement was having to engage with 
real developments in the historical context in which the project of maqāṣid al-sharīʾa 
was crystallised. More precisely, the project was crystallised when Mudarrisī witnessed 
the failures and challenges of the political and administrative experience of the Iranian 
revolution. As a response to those failures and challenges, Mudarrisī called for a 
particular version of maqāṣid al-sharīʾa, a version that enabled the sharīʾa to not only to 
be applied in the modern state, but to also be an engine for the renaissance of the 
Islamic nation. 
The research concludes that the departure from the Bahbahānian paradigm requires a 
departure from the three frameworks that constitute the identity of the paradigm, that is, 
the epistemological, methodological and functional frameworks. Accordingly, this is 
what the research attempted to observe in Mudarrisī’s contribution. In the 
epistemological framework, Mudarrisī attempted to depart from Aristotelian 
epistemology to a theory of knowledge characterised by a trusting of the intellect and a 
certain pragmatism in the quest for the truth, by which it would be possible to arrive at 
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the truth by constructing several factors and intersecting the methods. This 
epistemological commitment has an effect on reconstructing the relationship between 
intellect and religion, an issue that has a huge impact on jurisprudence. Furthermore, it 
has an effect on the constitution of the evidential basis of religious knowledge, which 
has enabled the jurist to reach a broader range of religious truths and knowledge than 
within the Bahbahānian paradigm. 
At the methodological level, by comparing the Bahbahānian paradigm and Mudarrisī’s, it 
is evident that there is a movement in the hierarchical position of the legal evidences, 
however, it is not merely a movement in position, but rather an essential change in the 
whole methodological framework. Mudarrisī determined the holy Qurʾan to be at the top 
of the legal evidences, and introduced some Qurʾanic hermeneutical tools that delve 
deeper into it and provoke religious meaning. Similarly, he handled the Sunna by 
differentiating between its constants and variables through dividing it into several 
sections, whereby the jurist is able to employ the hermeneutical tools to extract religious 
meaning thereof. As for consensus (ijmāʿ), Mudarrisī considered it an administrative tool 
of temporal conciliation for scholars regarding a specific legal issue. Through this 
theorisation, Mudarrisī departed from the formalist framework of the Bahbahānian 
paradigm to a methodological framework that is more complex in dealing with religious 
meaning, especially in discovering the purposes of the sharīʾa. Furthermore, it has 
paved the way to depart from the functional framework, which redefines the nature of 
the sharīʾa.  
Here, the research attempts to examine Mudarrisī’s theory regarding the nature of the 
sharīʾa, a theory that departs, the research concludes, from the soft-utilitarian 
framework of the Bahbahānian paradigm to the moral functional framework of the 
sharīʾa. This has required of Mudarrisī to not only provide the methodological 
perceptions regarding the means of deriving legal rulings, but also a theological 
theorisation for the nature of the sharīʾa. Mudarrisī has presented a theory that sees the 
sharīʾa as the practice of morality, which is in turn a reflection of the overall theological 
precepts of religion. Thus, these three elements, i.e. theology, morality and law, are one 
generative body whereby each one leads to the other. Accordingly, he divided the 
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sharīʾa into constants and variables, and provided some theoretical and practical 
precepts of how to establish the relationships between them. The constants in essence 
are the abstract moral values of religion, whilst the variables are the socio-historical 
conditions in which the moral values are applied. By doing this, he abandoned the dual 
definition of the constants and variables that can be found in both the contemporary 
jurisprudential as well as the maqāṣidī discourse, which sees the former as the acts of 
worship (al-ʿibādāt) and the latter as the transactions (al-muʿāmalāt). This definition, 
according to Mudarrisī, is the narrowest definition of the variables, whereas the deepest 
one is to consider the variables as the scope whereby the sharīʾa is applied in a specific 
socio-historical context. This requires from the jurist a real interaction with practicality by 
activating the shūrā mechanism through interactive dynamic relationships between the 
revealed texts and reality, in which each of them has an effective role in embodying the 
moral value in actual practice, and is not simply a reaction towards necessities under 
the name of maṣlaḥa. From this perspective, the jurist has an initiative for reality and is 
not merely a reactionary and quietist force as he was within the Bahbahānian paradigm. 
This perception of the nature of the sharīʾa requires, as it would require from any 
proponent of the maqāṣidī project, the provision of a clear vision of the actual purposes 
(maqāṣid) of the sharīʾa. Here, Mudarrisī has provided his theoretical precepts through 
philosophical moral and legal discussions of values and then appended it with a 
practical discussion based on his methodological perceptions regarding the reading of 
religious texts and his former moral and legal philosophical discussions. Despite the 
overwhelming ambition of his theoretical discussion of the maqāṣid al-sharīʾa, the 
practical discussion has proven the contrast between the theoretical discussion and 
practical inquiry. Through practical inquiry and through actual contact with the text and 
tradition, Mudarrisī has come up with a tree of values that presents the values of the 
sharīʾa as three main moral values, each of which generates sub-values and so forth. 
These values are crystallised through rational reflection, actual contact with the human 
tradition - or what Mudarrisī prefers to call ‘the reality’ by which he means here the legal 
tradition - and revelation. These three values are faith, which is their basis, guidance, 
which is the path for them, and success, which is their practice in reality. From success, 
288 
 
four pillars of faith are derived, namely piety, charity, jiḥād and the pursuit of the best. 
Furthermore, the canons of faith are derived thereof as well, and which are centered on 
two main values from which many other sub-values are derived, and they are peace 
and dignity. These results, which Mudarrisī derived through around ten years of 
research, varied considerably from the theoretical results of moral and legal 
discussions. 
That was at the level of the internal analysis of the findings of experience and its deep 
construction. As for the level of the relationship of the experience with the non-Shīʿī 
environment and its ramifications on the Shīʿī discourse and institution, it is possible to 
conclude the following: 
Although the experience of maqāṣid al-sharīʾa in Mudarrisī’s version was in touch to a 
certain extent with the Sunnī jurisprudential tradition, especially the maqāṣidī tradition, it 
was in stark contrast to the other Shīʿī maqāṣidī experiences that were inclined towards 
the Sunnī maqāṣidī conceptions, especially those related to the derivation mechanism, 
in the Shīʿī version. Mudarrisī was attempting to prove the ability of the Shīʿī tradition to 
provide a different experience from the Sunnī one, and he relied especially on an 
intellectual Shīʿī school, the Tafkīkī school, which sought for Shīʿī originality. Thus, he 
attempted to establish the hermeneutical tools, the derivation mechanism and the moral 
construction based mainly on the Shīʿī tradition. Therefore, if we were to ask about the 
Shīʿī version of maqāṣid al-sharī’a - and this was of genuine interest to the research -, 
then Mudarrisī would be one of the models of that. 
At the internal Shīʿī level, despite the internal complaints of the strain on the 
jurisprudential legacy to fulfil the requirements of the modern age and to attempt to 
provide alternatives, Mudarrisī’s contribution, given an opportunity to prove itself clearly, 
represents a paradigm shift that would be shake Shīʿī jurisprudential foundations. That 
is to say, it is supposed that this approach would increase the role of the intellect (ʿql), 
based on Mudarrisī’s understanding, in legal system in which not only the jurist has a 
significant role practically, as it was previously, but also he would have such a 
significant role in creating the religious meaning. In a sense, the religious meaning 
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within this system is more reachable. Consequently, the whole field of practical 
principles (uṣūl ʿamaliya) will be reduced, as the field has been created and extended to 
limit the jurist in accessing the religious meaning. In contrast, it will allow to providing 
various hermeneutical approaches in order to derive the purposes of sharīʿa. These 
impacts, in effect, present new jurisprudential foundations or what was called thought 
the research a paradigm shift. However, at the fiqhī level, so far, it cannot yet be a 
serious contender against classical fiqh. Although there has been a shift in the 
foundations of jurisprudence, the actual fiqhī impacts that have presented so far are 
confined to reordering some of the classic fiqhī sections and introducing a few other 
sections, but have not been able to seriously put forth the other sections. Thus, it has 
not significantly changed the mujtahid-muqallid relationship.  
Having said that, although the reception of Mudarrisī’s conception of maqāṣid al-sharīʾa 
has not been seen in either the Arab or Iranian Hawza, what is expected from such an 
experience is for it to primarily affect the mujtahids (jurists), then subsequently the 
religious learning institution - especially the new generation of students and senior 
scholars - and finally the activist religious social foundation more than actual classical 
fiqh itself. Furthermore, it would have a greater impact on the authoritative scholars who 
have a significant role in making public policy for their community such as in Lebanon, 
Iraq and Afghanistan. The ideal impact would be on the jurist who runs a state or on an 
Islamic social political movement striving for a political ruling. 
From the same context, the maqāṣid al-sharīʾa can be seen as part of Mudarrisī’s 
reactive spirit, which has featured in his intellectual and practical projects. In a sense, 
calling for maqāṣid al-sharīʾa in this version can be seen as an advanced stage of the 
confrontation between the religious project and the processes of secularization that 
have appeared since the fall of the Caliphate and the consequence of the modern state. 
Maqāṣid al-sharīʾa is generally seen as an intellectual reaction to limit and surround the 
scopes of secularization and as and active contributor to the rehabilitation of religion in 
the public sphere. This is especially true of Mudarrisī’s version of maqāṣid al-sharīʾa, 
which differs from other maqāṣid al-sharīʾa projects. Where the latter attempt to 
liberalise Islamic discourse so as to be compatible with human rights discourses, 
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especially in their western versions, by deconstructing religious knowledge and bringing 
current discourse into it, his was quite strict in remaining close to religious tradition at 
the source level, especially the Qurʾān and Sunna, and at the same time maintaining 
flexibility in opening room for dialogue with others.Though it is difficult to speak about 
post-Mudarrisī for his contribution has not been seriously introduced to the debates 
within Muslim and particularly Shīʿī discussions, one can assume several ramifications 
on the current broader Islamic reform context. In line with the Qur’anic reform, the trend 
which seeks to establish primarily a Qur’anic reading of Islam as a way of originality and 
transience of the tradition, Mudarrisī has provided a serious discussion in this regard. 
His contribution brought out a jurisprudential argument for the position of Qur’an in 
contrast to the position of Sunnah and detailed hermeneutical tools (i.e. tadabbur and 
the epistemological interpretation) for how to read Qur’an. In line with various attempts 
of moral-cum-reading of Islam, he has provided, too, a detailed contribution (i.e. the 
theory of faith and his version of Islamic values) which would influence the current 
debate in several ways. To be precise, after Shāṭibī in Sunnī thought, he seems to be 
the first Muslim scholar from a Shīʿī background who elaborated a specific picture of the 
Islamic values which can be bases for jurisprudential derivation. Furthermore, his works 
in this regard contribute to theo-philosophical debate in the Islam-morality discussion 
both theoretically and practically; theoretically for his theory of the faith which engages 
in great deal with many discussions of Islam and ethics. However, for the practical 
discussions, i.e. the debate over what are the Islamic ethics and moral values, his 
practical thesis of the Islamic values (i.e. tree of values), if it is read properly, would 
contribute profoundly to this regard. Finally, Mudarrisī’s approach to how the variables 
of sharīʿa can be studied and reconciled with the constants and therefore the system he 
provided (i.e. the channel of shūrā) contributes to two main debates in contemporary 
Islam reform, namely; Islam and modern reality  and the position of the jurist in the 
Muslim community. For the former, it contributes to the whole field of fiqh al-wāqiʿ which 
includes many modern issues regarding Islam and politics, medicine-bioethics and 
social changes. For the latter, it contributes to the profound discussion concerning the 
political role of the jurist in the Muslim, and particularly in the Shīʿī community, which in 
a sense touches the issues such as wilāyat al-faqīh and Islam and democracy. 
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Despite the limitations of the research, there is further scope for development and 
further research in order to address several questions that are relevant to the field of 
this study. The attempt of this research to provide a different reading of the history of 
Shīʿī jurisprudence demonstrates the possibility of an alternative reading of this 
intellectual history, especially by improving methodological approaches. This is 
especially true of the pre-Anṣārī period, which seems to have been neglected in the 
field, except in the interest of the Akhbārī-Uṣūlī disputes. As for maqāṣid al-shariʿa in 
Shīʿī jurisprudence, although the research has focused on what is considered to be the 
most systematic contribution to the field, i.e. Mudarrisī’s, there are still several trends 
that merit study. Mudarrisī’s is only one version of the Shīʿī maqāṣidī discourse and he 
has spent considerable effort to establish his project. Other versions are possible and 
will very likely come up with different methodological approaches as well as different 
moral values of the sharīʾa. Furthermore, the maqāṣid al-sharīʿa discourse shows a 
promising capacity of an overlapping dialogue not only within Islamic doctrine, but also 
interfaith and even within non-religious thinking. Thus, there is scope for further 
research into the epistemic, methodological and actual moral similarities and differences 
between several religious and non-religious ideologies. 
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Glossary 
In this section, I provide a definition for important key concepts, figures and schools of 
thought that will help to clarify technical terms that feature in the thesis. Translating 
specialized terms is not an easy job to do and has been problematic for decades in 
Islamic studies. For Shīʿī jurisprudence, the standard translation of terminology used 
here is that provided by Roy Parviz Mottahedeh in his translation of al-Ṣadr’s book of 
jurisprudence, Lessons in Islamic Jurisprudence677. Throughout the thesis, I will follow 
his translation. However, there are some cases where I might suggest an alternative 
translation or where the usage of the term by Mudarrisī requires another translation in 
order to clarify his opinion. And there are, of course, terms that have not been translated 
by Mottahedeh.  
al-adilla al-ijtihādiyya and al-adilla al-faqāhatiyya  
al-adilla al-ijtihādiyya in Shīʿī jurisprudence means a category of legal evidence whose 
function is to discover the reality of sharīʿa. al-adilla al-faqāhatiyya, on the other hand, 
are a category of legal evidence that function in providing procedural actions that one 
should follow in the absence of al-adilla al-ijtihādiyya. 
bināʾ al­ʿuqalāʾ(rational norms)  
bināʾ al­ʿuqalāʾ means rational norms that are held by the majority of people in 
qualifying the morality of an action. It is part of al­dalīl al­ʿaqlī in its second meaning, as 
mentioned above. 
al­dalīl al­ʿaqlī  
al­dalīl al­ʿaqlī has two meanings: the first refers to one of the four sources of deriving 
sharīʿa law, namely the Qur’an, sunnah, ijmāʿ (consensus) and ʿaql (intellect); and the 
second refers to the epistemological foundation of justifying the validity of several 
sources of the sharīʿa. Throughout the thesis, I discuss the second meaning with regard 
                                            
677 R. Mottahedeh, Lessons in Islamic Jurisprudence  (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2003). 
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to the details in Chapter One and Chapter Three in comparing between Mudarrisī and 
Bahbahānian epistemology.  
dhātī (self-evident)  
dhātī means self-evident, which refers to a proposition that cannot be proved otherwise 
in any other higher field. 
ḥujjiyya (authoritativeness/authority)  
There are various different translations for this term in particular. Some might prefer to 
translate is as probative force or probativity. Throughout the thesis, I have used 
authority to indicate to the crucial notion in Shīʿī jurisprudence. The notion is that for any 
candidate evidence to be admissible as legal evidence for legal derivation it has to 
reach a level of ḥujjiya. In other words, it must be proven that following this sort of 
evidence will lead to certain knowledge (in pre-Anṣārī terms) or for the believer to be 
excused where he to follow this evidence (from Anṣārī onwards).  
al-ʿilm al-burhānī (demonstrative knowledge)  
This refers to demonstrative knowledge in the Islamic philosophical tradition, which its 
logical syllogism consisting of two self-evident premises and resulting in a certainty. 
maqāṣid al­sharīʿa  
maqāṣid al­sharīʿa refers to the idea that the sharīʿa as the legal element of God’s 
message encompasses certain aims and purposes, which should be fulfilled, even 
indirectly, and through which God’s will for humanity in this world and the hereafter will 
be achieved. 
marjiʿiyya  
marjiʿiyya primarily means a religious institution consisting of a class of scholarly jurists 
led by the most knowledgeable jurist (marjiʿ). The ordinary Shīʿī believer (non-mujtahid) 
refers to marjiʿiyya primarily for his religious concerns. In modern time, some marjiʿiyya 
might have had more than merely religious characteristics, such as social and political 
characteristics. 
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maṣlaḥa  
maṣlaha linguistically means interest or benefit. Depending on the context, it sometimes 
refers to common and worldly interests of people or a particular community or individual. 
Sometimes it refers to the sharʿī maṣlaḥa, indicating to man’s other-worldly interests 
that will benefit the believer in terms of his salvation in the Hereafter. 
Mirzā Mahdī al-Iṣfahānī (d. 1946)  
A Shīʿī scholar considered to be the founder of the Tafkīk School. He studied in Najaf, 
then went to Mashhad where he started to spread his ideas and attract students. One 
such student was Muḥammad Kāẓim al-Mudarrisī, the father of Muḥammad Taqī al-
Mudarrisī. Mudarrisī was heavily influenced by the Tafkīk School through his father and 
by the work of Mirzā Mahdī al-Iṣfahānī. 
Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī (d. 2002)  
Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī was Mudarrisī’s maternal uncle. He was born in Najaf 1928, then 
moved to Karbala where he studied. He became a marjiʿ after his father’s death in his 
youth. He established one of the most influential religious and socio-political movement 
in Gulf, Iraq and Iran during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. He was the most influential 
person in Mudarrisī’s life, and his influence is discussed in Chapter Two. 
muḥkam (clear/decisive) and mutashābih (ambiguous)  
As mentioned in taʾwīl, although muḥkam and mutashābih, generally speaking, refer to 
semantic and linguistic clarity or ambiguity, Mudarrisī’s definition of these terms are 
epistemological.  Thus, muḥkam is not simply a clear verse in terms of its meaning; 
rather it is the principle (aṣl) corresponding with the mutashābih, which means its 
application (farʿ). Through taʾwīl, a jurist refers the muḥkam back to the mutashābih. 
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mustaqillāt ʿaqliyya (independent rational indicators)  
mustaqillāt ʿaqliyya refers to the independent rational indicators that can be understood 
without revelation (wahy) based on a person’s reason (ʿaql).  Thus, the legal proposition 
would consist of two rational premises. 
mustaqillāt ghayr ʿaqliyya (non-rational indicators)  
mustaqillāt ghayr ʿaqliyya refers to the non-rational indicators that can only be 
understood through revelation (waḥy). However, they are assisted by rational indicators 
to constitute a legal proposition. Thus, the legal proposition would consist of two 
premises, one rational and the other legal (sharʿī). 
al­mulāzamāt al­ʿaqliyya (rational correlations)  
al­mulāzamāt al­ʿaqliyya refers the rational correlations where, by analysis, one rational 
proposition would adhere to another as a logical consequence.   
al­qaṭʿ (certainty/ assurance)  
Mottahedeh defines qaṭʿ as the legal agent’s firm subjective certainty about either the 
facts or the law, and is always a material circumstance that the jurist must consider678. 
This definition might have been suitable for the late understanding of qaṭʿ in Shīʿī 
jurisprudence, Anṣārī onward. However, the pre-Anṣārī understanding of qaṭʿ was as a 
certainty and equivalent to certain knowledge (ʿilm). Mudarrisī’s definition is quite similar 
to Mottahedeh’s, in which he consider qaṭʿ as merely a psychological assurance. 
Sunnah  
The sunnah comprises everything known about the Infallibles that gives guidance for 
human conduct, including their sayings, actions and tacit approvals. Mudarrisī has 
differentiated between the actual sunnah and the application of the sunnah. Thus, he 
provides a slightly different definition of sunnah. 
                                            
678 Ibid., p 174. 
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tadabbur (contemplation)  
tadabbur in its linguistic Arabic usage means to think deeply about something in terms 
of its ends. Mudarrisī has used the term in a different way. For him, it means a particular 
hermeneutics through which the Qur’an is read and understood. This hermeneutics 
depends on some assumptions regarding the Qur’an, such as the unity of the sūra and 
the unity of the Qur’an as whole. The concept has been discussed in Chapter Three. 
Tafkīkī School (School of Separation)  
The Tafkīkī School was founded by Mīrzā Mahdī al-Īṣfahānī around the 1940s as a 
trend critical of the dominant philosophical school within the Shīʿī learning institutions, 
namely Mullā Ṣadrā’s Philosophical School. The school advocated the separation of 
human knowledge (al-ʿulūm al-bashariyya) from divine knowledge (al-maʿārif al-
ilāhiyya). According to the Tafkīkī school, this implied that Mullā Ṣadrā’s Philosophical 
School had been heavily influenced by Greek Philosophy that had come to the Islamic 
Civilizations during the era of translation. The main claim of the Tafkīkī school was that 
divine knowledge (al-maʿārif al-ilāhiyya) has its own methods to interpret and 
understand its contents, and therefore does not need any support from any other 
human knowledge (al-ʿulūm al-bashariyya). Although human knowledge is useful for 
other fields of knowledge, it is not valid for religious knowledge, according to Tafkīkī. 
Hence it came to be known as theTafkīkī School, the School of Separation, which 
separated or differentiated between the nature of divine and human knowledge. 
taʾwīl (interpretation) taʾwīl  
refers to a particular way of reading and understanding the Qur’an. It is not exegesis 
(tafsīr), rather it is the interpretation of the Qur’anic text. Throughout the thesis the term 
has been used differently depending on the context. I have dealt with three meanings of 
taʾwīl: mystical, linguistic and epistemological. Mudarrisī’s definition of taʾwīl is the 
epistemological interpretation, which denotes the mechanism of referring each idea in 
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the Qur’an back to its principle (aṣl) or application (farʿ). Thus, taʾwīl according to him is 
not a linguistic tool to deal with unclear verses. 
ẓāhir (exoteric) and bāṭin (esoteric)  
Similar to the previous terms, here too Mudarrisī’s usage of these terms differs from 
their classic usage. ẓāhir according to him is not merely the apparent meaning of the 
text. It is rather the legal ruling of the verse (ḥukm), whereas the bāṭin is the 
cosmological divine principle. Thus, it is neither the hidden nor unclear meaning of the 
verses, but again it refers to its principle and application. Where muḥkam and 
mutashābih referred to the principle as an aṣl/moral value and the farʿ as the legal 
ruling, here the reference is to the principle as the cosmological divine law and the farʿ 
as the legal ruling. All these technical terms related to his theory of five levels are 
discussed in Chapter Three. 
al­ẓann (presumptive knowledge)  
The intermediate alternative between qaṭʿī, assured, in one direction, and mashkūk, 
doubtful, in the other. 
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